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Chapter 1
Introduction
In this chapter we introduce the topic of our thesis: the design of controls in network organi-
zations. We discuss the concept of a network organization, as dealt with in this work. Further-
more, we introduce the notions of opportunistic behaviour, control mechanism, and the network
perspective on controls. We also give an overview of the e3controlmethodology, which is devel-
oped in this thesis. In addition, a short review is made of the principles of conceptual modelling
and the economic value perspective which underpin this methodology. Finally, we discuss the
research questions, research methodology, research outcomes and contributions made by this
thesis.
1.1 Controls in network organizations
1.1.1 Network organizations
Organizations have increasingly formed themselves into networks. In mobile communications
sector companies worked together to develop standards such as GSM and WAP
[Bekkers et al., 2002]. Toyota has led the field in mastering tight inter-firm collaboration with
its suppliers, and has hereby managed to deliver high quality products at reasonable prices for
many years [Schonberger, 1986]. These examples are no exceptions, and they have become
common in organizing business.
Companies pursue network strategies for various reasons. These reasons include access to new
markets, increased efficiency, lower risk of R&D, access to specialized and complementary
competencies, the ability to serve individual consumer needs, hedge against lagging behind
technology, setting standards, and obtaining subsidies or grants [Man, 2004].
There are many definitions of network organizations in business literature1. What we define a
network organization as a set of independent, privately or publicly owned companies with their
own objectives (e.g. profit making or strategic objectives). These companies are bound to some
1The phenomena of network organization is referred to with many different terms, including ‘network orga-
nization’, ‘inter-organizational relation’, ‘joint venture’, ‘small firm network’, ‘value-adding partnership’,‘virtual
corporation’, ‘value network’, ‘value web’ and ‘value constellation’ (see [Alstyne, 1997])
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short- or limited-term contractual agreements aimed at a targeted joint business activity, such as
the joint delivery of some service to a final customer.
Decision making in networks is not so much based on one authority, as in hierarchies, but is
more distributed, as in markets [Bakos, 1998]. Decisions in networks are not imposed by one
central organization, but are negotiated between network participants. Such negotiations are
necessary since the organizations participate in networks voluntarily. By participating in net-
works, companies want to achieve their business objectives. So, if a company is not satisfied
with their gain from the network, it can leave the network. As a result, the network can dis-
appear. One of the reasons why companies exit the network is the opportunistic behaviour of
other network participants.
1.1.2 Opportunistic behaviour
Parties in networks are vulnerable to the opportunistic behaviour of others, mainly due to the
close link both on business and communication levels. Networks are often characterized by
high-level integration and inter-connection between individual firms. Such integration and inter-
connection takes place both on the communication level, by creating tight technology-enabled
information links between firms, as well as on the business level, by entering into partnerships
in order to profit from the sharing of resources and knowledge.
On the communication level, the seamless information links with network partners may make
the company more vulnerable to their opportunistic behaviour. For example, network partners
may get easier access to confidential company information. This threat is relevant for both
business-to-business and business-to-consumer transactions. Especially the electronic business-
to-consumer transactions are vulnerable to the communication-level risks, e.g. credit card fraud.
On the business level, an company’s ability to meet customer’s expectations increasingly de-
pends on the performance of the network partners. For example, in order to deliver an informa-
tion service via a mobile network, the service provider has to cooperate with a mobile operator.
However, if the mobile operator experiences technical problems and is not able to deliver the
service properly, it will have a negative effect on the service provider’s revenue. So a company’s
revenue is vulnerable to the opportunistic behaviour of the network partners.
Yet another factor to be taken into account is the digitalization of the network economy. Many
of today’s products are knowledge-based such as digital music or Internet newspapers. These
products obey a law of increasing returns: once the costs of making the first digital copy have
been invested, the reproduction costs are almost zero [Tapscott et al., 2000, p. 6]. Although
this results in huge potential profits for the producer of the product, their collection from the
distribution network is an enormous problem. The reason is that the producers cannot control
how many products are sold by their network partners, because these partners can also easily
copy the product and sell it without the producer knowing about it. So music or software
industries suffer enormous losses due to illegal downloads and pirate copying.
In general, the losses that stem from opportunistic actions are enormous. Losses from fraud
alone account for around 5% of the US GDP, a staggering $652 billion [ACFE, 2006]! In
Europe, losses from a VAT-tax fraud account for 100 billion euros loss of revenue per year
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[Houlder, 2007]. Legal music downloads are gaining in popularity, yet they were outnumbered
by their illegal counterparts ten-to-one in 2006, as according to a report by an NPD Group
survey of consumers [NPD, 2007].
1.1.3 Network perspective on controls
To be sustainable, a network organization needs mechanisms to govern and control the inter-
action among network participants and to mitigate opportunistic behaviour. In most cases, this
interaction is governed by contractual arrangements and implemented through procedures and
regulations. Control mechanisms or just controls constitute a part of the contractual agreements.
By the term ‘inter-organizational controls’ we understandmeasures one or more parties can use
to prevent, detect or correct opportunistic behaviour of its counter parties. The design of such
controls is the subject of this thesis.
It is essential to understand that we are explicitly examining the opportunistic behaviour of
the external parties of an organization, and not of its employees. In addition, the controls we
are considering take into account the activities of the external parties. We call this a network
perspective on controls.
The network perspective is important, because if networks are to be sustainable controls must
ensure that no network participant behaves opportunistically. As a result, we assume that one or
several network participants will introduce controls to protect themselves from the (potential)
opportunistic behaviour of other participants. In addition, controls in the networks are designed
during a collaborative decision making process, as describe above.
1.2 Research objective
The objective of this research is to develop a methodology of designing controls for network
organizations. We define the objective as follows:
• To develop a methodology that would support human analysts in designing controls
against opportunistic behaviour in networks of organizations.
Design methodologies for network organizations have received considerable attention in recent
years, e.g. [Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2002], [Tapscott et al., 2000], [McCarthy, 1982],
[Gordijn and Akkermans, 2003], [Pateli and Giaglis, 2004]. However, most of the methodolo-
gies focus on the design of networks from the efficiency and profitability perspective rather than
addressing the issue of control.
Controls in inter-organizational relations attract a lot of interest, especially in management ac-
counting research into strategic alliances and joint ventures (e.g. [Das and Teng, 1998],
[Dekker, 2004]). However, this research is mostly theory-oriented and not much has been done
on designing inter-organizational controls.
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In general, many alternative views on the nature of controls exist. Inter-organizational controls
have been studied in many fields, including public administration, law, business sciences and in-
formation systems. Each field addresses specific aspects of controls, but none of the field alone
is sufficient to address the issue completely. For example, proper legislation which prohibits
illegal downloads is required to tackle the problem of illegal music distribution via Internet.
However, proper legislation is not enough, if there is no technology to support it.
In this research, we address controls from the perspective of two disciplines: internal control
and requirements engineering. The internal control field provides a starting point to define
the concept of control and to get insights into how the controls are designed in hierarchical
organizations. Taken in the perspective of other theories, such as the agency theory, the internal
control field also provides some ideas about how controls in networks can be designed. The
requirements engineering field provides a more solid theoretical framework on how to develop
the design methodology.
1.3 Design Requirements
In this section we briefly discuss the two pillars of this research: internal control and require-
ments engineering. We explain how these two disciplines can be used to understand the design
of controls in network organizations and, from that, we derive the requirements for our design
methodology. This allows us to formulate our research questions.
1.3.1 Control theory
Internal control is a well-established field of practice, which mainly concerns with procedural
measures to safeguard assets of an organization. There are many different definitions of inter-
nal control. [Simons, 2000] defines it as the set of procedures that dictate how and by whom
information should be recorded and verified in order to provide the checks and balances to en-
sure that assets are safeguarded and the information collected and processed by the accounting
system is accurate. Some use a somewhat broader definition, for example [Knechel, 2001] and
[Hayes et al., 2005] see internal control as a process that is designed by management to reach
reasonable assurance that the following objectives will be met: 1. improvement of decision
making’s effectiveness and operational efficiency; 2. increase reliability of information; 3. fos-
ter compliance with laws, regulations and contractual obligations; 4. safeguarding of assets.
In general, internal control is described in Dutch literature within Internal Control/ Adminis-
trative Organization (IC/AO) discipline [Starreveld et al., 1994] and in Anglo-Saxon literature
within the Accounting Information Systems (AIS) discipline [Romney and Steinbart, 2006],
[Hollander et al., 1999].
By our definition of internal control theory, maintained henceforth, we refer to internal control
as it is described in [Romney and Steinbart, 2006], [Hollander et al., 1999] and
[Starreveld et al., 1994], which also corresponds to the definitions given above. Internal controls
described in this literature mainly refer to control measures of procedural nature implemented
inside an organization. Some everyday examples of typical internal control problems are the
Design Requirements 23
theft of cash or inventory, forging accounting records or making errors in administration. Such
occurrences results in inaccurately reported profits and can be aimed at hiding of embezzle-
ment of the organization’s assets. The usual internal controls to mitigate such control problems
include segregation of duties, establishing audit trail, proper authorization, independent verifi-
cation and access restriction (see Chapter 2).
The recent trend in practice is to focus on a general concept of management control, of which
internal control is only a part. Management control is broadly defined as all activities and de-
cisions taken by management to ensure that employees behave in such a way that they increase
the probability that the organization will achieve its goals [Merchant and van der Stede, 2007].
This may include procedural measures, such as internal controls, but also value-based proposi-
tions, that can be taken from agency-theory and transaction cost economics. In this work we in
particular employ agency theory to get understanding of inter-organizational and value-based
aspects of controls.
Relation to the network perspective
The internal control theory focuses on internal controls rather than on those in a network con-
text. The inter-organizational control problems - the ones caused by the opportunistic behaviour
of parties other than the company’s employees - are not explicitly addressed in the internal con-
trol theory. They are assumed to be mitigated by the internal controls, which are not specifically
designed for that purpose.
The network perspective on controls contrasts with the traditional practice of the internal control
theory, which implies that an organization manages only the activities within the boundaries of
the organization. In addition, the internal control theory makes no explicit distinction with
regard to who causes the risk: an internal employee or an external party. In principle, from the
network perspective we only consider controls against the opportunistic behaviour of counter
parties. As a result, such controls must take into account the activities of other parties in the
network. For example, regulation between a company’s internal activities and the external
activities of its counter parties becomes important. So, the inter-organizational controls have an
effect outside the boundaries of any one company.
Many of the inter-organizational controls that we describe in this thesis are known to the in-
ternal control field though not explicitly outlined as inter-organizational controls. One of our
contributions in this thesis is to remedy that situation.
It is not easy to apply the internal control theory to designing controls from the network per-
spective, so, some other theories are also considered. In particular, we use agency theory and
management control theory as sources to provide a general conceptual framework and classi-
fications of inter-organizational controls. For example, as with the agency theory, we distin-
guish between two parties: an agent, a party that behaves opportunistically, and a principal, a
party that suffers from this opportunistic behaviour and wishes to control it. Similar to man-
agement control theory, we distinguish between procedural against contractual controls and
ex-ante against ex-post controls. This will be explained further in the next section.
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1.3.2 Requirements engineering
Networks of organizations are characterized by a high level of Information Systems (IS) us-
age. IS have many advantages, such as increasing the speed of communication or reducing
transaction costs [Tapscott et al., 2000]. Nowadays, as more and more networked information
systems come in place, controls become an intrinsic part of information systems development
[ISACF, 2005]. We therefore expect that the final target in the design of controls in a network
organization will often be the adaptation of an information system. Such an information system
would enable these controls. This is similar to the internal controls, which are incorporated into
the organization’s accounting information system [Hollander et al., 1999].
In this thesis, the design of controls is approached as part of a requirements engineering task.
Requirements engineering is the process of developing requirements for IS through an iterative
co-operative process of analyzing the problem, documenting the resulting observations, and
checking the accuracy of the knowledge gained [Loucopoulos and Karakostas, 1995]. Require-
ments engineering consists of eliciting, representing and evaluating the software technical re-
quirements for IS artifacts at hand. Requirements for information systems can be very complex
[Sommerville and Sawyer, 1997], because, for instance, of the multiple contradictory require-
ments involved. Therefore, requirements engineering research develops techniques that help to
tackle these issues of complexity.
Two important components are common to requirements engineering techniques. Firstly, the
concept of multiple viewpoints and, secondly, (graphical) conceptual modelling. We will now
go on to discuss how these two components are used in this work.
Value viewpoint
The design of inter-organizational controls can be very complex, because, amongst other things,
different perspectives of the multiple stakeholders are involved. Controls in networks are not
usually imposed on the network by one central organization as is the case in a single enterprise,
but are negotiated by all network participants, e.g. business analysts, system developers, CIOs,
CEOs. As in a free market system, the decision making process within networks is spread out
and does not depend on one authority, as in a hierarchy. Stakeholders often have different views
on control problems and the control mechanisms that solve them. For example, a financial
manager will focus more on the economic implications of a solution, rather than an IS engineer
who is more interested in its technical details. Such multiple perspectives add extra complexity
to the decision-making process.
Multiple viewpoints have been put forward in requirements engineering as mechanisms in deal-
ing with this multi-perspective problem. By describing one system from several viewpoints,
complicated requirement issues can be broken down into self-contained perspectives, which
can be addressed and decided independently of each other [Finkelstein et al., 1992].
Amongst other things, requirements analysis distinguishes between a process viewpoint, which
describes business processes, and an information system viewpoint, which describes information
systems that enable and support the business processes. Recently, many researchers emphasize
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the necessity of taking business requirements into account for information systems. To ad-
dress this issue, [Gordijn and Akkermans, 2003] have introduced the economic value viewpoint,
which focuses on the way economic value is created, exchanged and consumed in a multi-actor
network. In this work, we emphasize the development of the economic value viewpoint for
controls.
The internal control theory, the development of which dates back to the early days of informa-
tion systems engineering, only considers the design of controls from a process and information
system viewpoint. We consider it important to add the value viewpoint to the design of inter-
organizational controls for several reasons. They are discussed in detail in Chapter 2. In short,
the following arguments are put forward.
Firstly, in a network, the provision of controls can be seen as a commercial service with
added value and have their price tag. This has been observed in a number of case stud-
ies [Kartseva et al., 2004a, Kartseva et al., 2005a, Kartseva et al., 2005b, Kartseva et al., 2006b,
Kartseva et al., 2006c]. The second argument is that many control instruments (e.g. evidence
documents, incentives) have inherent value aspects. Documents, used for control reasons, often
have an economic value and can be traded. An example of such a document is the Bill of Lad-
ing, which is a document in international trade procedures that must be presented by the buyer
to the carrier to claim goods [Kartseva et al., 2004a]. From the control perspective, the Bill of
Lading is proof that the buyer has paid for the goods. On the other hand, typically, Bills of
Lading for overseas trade are usually traded many times before the shipped goods are actually
claimed. The ownership of goods is also transferred every time a Bill of Lading is traded, which
makes it an object of value. The last argument is that the value viewpoint provides a good ratio-
nale for procedural controls. By introducing a value viewpoint, we provide a high-level model
of controls from the economic perspective, without focusing on procedural details. Controls
are primarily about safeguarding objects of value and the value perspective points out which
objects of value should be guarded.
The development of the value viewpoint on controls is a major contribution given by this thesis
and, in addition, we also consider some aspects of integration with the process perspective on
controls. This is mainly done within the control patterns described in Chapters 8 and 9. The
information systems perspective on controls is out of the scope of this work.
Conceptual modelling
Another component taken from requirements engineering is conceptual modelling. Conceptual
models consist of a number of symbol structures and symbol structure manipulators which are
supposed to correspond to the conceptualization of the world by human observer
[Borgida et al., 1982]. This view appears to underly the work on requirements engineering
methodologies. Examples of well-known conceptual modelling techniques are Data Flow charts
and Unified Modelling Language (UML) diagrams [Fowler and Scott, 2000],
[Hollander et al., 1999]. Over the years, the requirements engineering field has developed rigor-
ous and novel model-based methods for conceptualization. Conceptual modelling and graphical
diagramming methods have been elaborated into a fine art at a level of sophistication not found
in other disciplines [Akkermans and Gordijn, 2006] in business science.
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In particular, conceptual modelling is useful for designing controls in a network environment.
The design of such controls is more complex than in a hierarchical organization with a central
authority, since the design process requires negotiations between multiple stakeholders. The
stakeholders often have different views on control problems and solutions and different inter-
ests, which, when communicated in normal language, may lead to incomplete and ambiguous
statements [Malone, 1987]. The advantage of conceptualization is that the conflicts, which can
occur during the negotiation process are made explicit, and this helps stakeholders to resolve
them at an early stage of development. For further discussion on the conceptual modelling see
Chapter 2.
Internal control practitioners utilize thorough conceptualization of business processes and in-
formation systems to get an understanding of the control problems and the necessary controls
(see e.g. [Romney and Steinbart, 2006]). What is innovative in our work is that we introduce
conceptualization of controls from the value perspective. In addition, as will be explained later,
we utilize the concept of patterns for conceptual modelling.
1.4 The e3controlapproach
In the previous section we have identified several requirements which we believe a design
methodology for inter-organizational controls should comply with. In short, they include in-
corporating the economic value perspective, the network perspective and conceptual modelling
in our design methodology. In order to address the research objective and to take into account
these requirements, we have defined the following research questions:
• Research Question 1: What steps are needed to design controls in network organizations
from the economic value perspective?
• Research Question 2: What constructs are needed to describe the control problems and
control mechanisms from the economic value perspective?
To address the research questions, we introduce the e3control ontology and the e3control design
framework. The e3control design framework is a step-wise method which guides the design
of control mechanisms and therefore addresses the first research question. It starts by analysing
of the business network, then proceeds to analyse control problems in the network, and finishes
with the design of control mechanisms. The framework is shown in Figure 1.1. See Chapter 3
for more details.
The e3control ontology provides constructs to describe control problems and control mecha-
nisms from an economic value perspective and therefore addresses the second research ques-
tion. In general, an ontology is a common method of representing semantic conceptual models
- explicit formal specifications of the terms in the domain and the relationships between them
[Gruber, 1994]. Ontologies have become common on the World-Wide Web and range from
large taxonomies categorizing Web sites (such as on Yahoo!) to categorizations of products for
sale and their features (such as on Amazon.com). Wide-spread general-purpose ontologies are
emerging as well, for example, the United Nations Development Program and Dun & Bradstreet
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Control Model
Figure 1.1: The e3control design framework
have combined their efforts to develop the UNSPSC ontology which provides terminology to
describe products and services (www.unspsc.org)
[Noy and McGuinness, 2001]. Modern definitions of ontology (see e.g. [Borst et al., 1997])
emphasize that there must be agreement on the conceptualization that is specified: ‘An ontol-
ogy is a formal specification of a shared conceptualization’.
An ontology defines a common vocabulary for researchers who need to share information in a
domain. It includes machine-interpretable definitions of basic concepts in the domain and the re-
lationships between them. Some prime reasons for developing an ontology are: to share a com-
mon understanding of the structure of information among people or software agents; to enable
reuse of domain knowledge; to make domain assumptions explicit; to separate domain knowl-
edge from operational knowledge; and to analyze domain knowledge
[Noy and McGuinness, 2001]. Some of these goals are also relevant for the design of inter-
organizational controls.
The e3control ontology is based on the existing e3value ontology, introduced by
[Gordijn and Akkermans, 2003]. It represents concepts, which describe a network organiza-
tion as a set of actors that exchange objects of economic value with each other. By instantiat-
ing the e3value ontology, one can create e3valuemodels (or just value models), which describe
value transfers between network participants. The value models describe the network organiza-
tion from an economic value perspective. Although there are several other suitable ontologies,
which describe the economic value perspective, in this thesis we use the e3value ontology, as
motivated in section 3.1.5.
However, since the e3value ontology does not explicitly consider control aspects, such as op-
portunistic behaviour we have to extend it to specifically include the concepts needed to model
the effects of opportunistic behaviour on value transfers. The resulting ontology is known as
the e3control ontology and because it is an extension of the e3value ontology, to create graphical
e3controlmodels we can still use the software tool support developed for e3value .
The e3control ontology and the e3control design framework can be used to design controls in
networked organizations. However, the design process still requires a vast amount of knowledge
on inter-organizational controls themselves. This leads us to the third research question, which
28 Introduction
is:
• Research Question 3: How to represent the recurrent control problems in networks of
organizations and what are the accepted and proven control mechanisms that mitigate
these problems?
To make this knowledge on available, we propose a library of control patterns. The patterns
approach is well-known for structuring complex design knowledge. The patterns are defined as
descriptions of common solutions for recurrent problems [Gamma et al., 1995]. The e3control
patterns represent problem-solution pairs of inter-organizational control problems and mech-
anisms, and describe control problems and mechanisms from both the value and the process
viewpoints. The value viewpoint focuses on the economic value aspects of controls, while the
process viewpoint focuses on their procedural aspects. The patterns can be used in the de-
sign process by the business analyst to model new controls. Typically these new controls are
composed from instantiation of a pattern.
In general, the patterns capture accepted design knowledge [Gamma et al., 1995]. The knowl-
edge captured by e3control patterns is readily available rather than invented in this work. We
focus on structuring the existing knowledge about control problems and control mechanisms in
patterns.
The e3control patterns also contribute to the second research question. In addition to the e3control
ontology, they contain a vocabulary which describes the additional concepts needed to design
the controls.
e3-control
Ontology
e3-control
Patterns
e3-control
Design Framework
Figure 1.2: The components of the e3control approach
To summarize, the e3control ontology, the e3control patterns and the e3control design frame-
work constitute the e3control approach, see Figure 1.2. This approach is unique because it is
based on an economic value perspective. It is the transfer of objects of economic value in a net-
work that has to be controlled in the first place. In addition, it assumes a network perspective,
which implies that parties in a network of enterprises introduce controls to reduce any losses
caused by the opportunistic behaviour of other network members. This is in contrast to the tra-
ditional internal control theory, which focuses on internal controls from a process-oriented view.
Finally, the e3control approach provides a structured way of designing controls by employing
such techniques as ontologies and patterns.
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1.5 Research perspective
The type of our research is design-oriented and inter-disciplinary; as already explained, we fo-
cus on two fields: internal control and requirements engineering. The internal control discipline
and the focus on the economic value relate this research to the field of business science. The
requirements engineering perspective links this research to computer science.
In business science, our research can be positioned in the paradigm of design science. As
stated by [Hevner et al., 2004], design science seeks to extend the boundaries of human and
organizational capabilities by creating new and innovative artifacts. Design is a key activity in
fields like architecture, engineering, medicine, and law [van Aken, 2004].
Design science is often contrasted with the explanatory sciences, like physics, sociology and
economics. The mission of an explanatory science is to describe, explain and possibly predict
observable phenomena within its field [Simon, 1976]. Explanatory sciences are engaged in a
quest for solving pure knowledge problems, such as why one country is wealthier than another
or why one information system is more user-friendly than another. On the other hand, design
sciences develop prescription-driven models, that can be used in an instrumental way to design
solutions for management problems [March and Smith, 1995]. Design sciences focus on the
knowledge to be used in designing solutions for existing problems, such as the design of user-
friendlier information systems or the design of a governance system to reduce tax fraud. ‘The
mission of a design science is to develop knowledge for the design and realization of an artifact,
i.e. to solve construction problems, or to be used in the improvement of the performance of
existing entities, i.e. to solve improvement problems’ [van Aken, 2004].
In business science, the dominating research paradigm tends to be the explanatory science. Nev-
ertheless, more and more researchers in business science address the value of the design science
in the business domain [Hevner et al., 2004], [March and Smith, 1995], [van Aken, 2004]. One
of the driving forces behind the development of design-oriented research in business sciences
is the utilization problem [Susman and Evered, 1978]. There are serious doubts about the ac-
tual relevance of present-day management theory as developed within the exploratory research
paradigm. In their study of American management education,
[Porter and McKibbon, 1988] point out that the business world is ignoring the research com-
ing from Business Schools. ‘Management theory is either scientifically proven, but then too
reductionistic and hence too broad or too trivial to be of much practical relevance, or relevant
to practice, but then lacking sufficient rigorous justification [van Aken, 2004] p. 221. As a
result, [van Aken, 2004] suggests that the results of design science, with its ultimate focus on
prescription-driven solutions will contribute to the relevance of the knowledge developed by
the academics in the business sciences. The importance of design science can be confirmed
by the recent developments in the field of business modelling [Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2002],
[Tapscott et al., 2000], [Weill and Vitale, 2001], [Gordijn and Akkermans, 2003], where the de-
sign research paradigm is dominating.
Design-oriented research is not new in the field of computer science, although this commu-
nity does not specifically identify it as ‘design science’. Requirements engineering journals
and conferences contain many contributions that can be described as design science research
[Wieringa et al., 2005], [Akkermans and Gordijn, 2006]. Moreover, proposals for different in-
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novative conceptual modelling techniques and methods for requirements engineering are core
contributions given by the requirements engineering research community. As
[Wieringa et al., 2005] states, design in itself is “useful for other engineering researchers even if
the design is not validated, because they could replicate the technique and validate its properties,
or use it to solve their own problems, which might be problems the designer of the technique
had not considered”.
To summarize, there is no common view on what design-oriented research is. Design-oriented
research in business science, known as design science, is quite a new phenomenon compared to
the explanatory type of research. Design research in computer science is quite a developed field.
Further to define our research process we incorporate the best findings of both communities.
1.6 Research outputs
The usual research product of design-oriented research is the heuristic prescription, technologi-
cal rule or solution concept [van Aken, 2004]. These outputs are often called ‘artifact’ in design
science literature and can be of four types: constructs, models, methods and implementations
[March and Smith, 1995]. Constructs constitute a vocabulary of a domain. A model is a set of
propositions or statements expressing the relationship between constructs. A method is a set of
steps used to perform a task. An instantiation is the realization of an artifact in its environment.
In this research, we make use of four design outputs:
1. Constructs: The e3control ontology in Chapter 3 represents a collection of constructs
required to describe a domain. In addition, the vocabulary in Chapter 7, which is a part
of the e3control patterns library, describes additional constructs of a domain.
2. Models: The e3control patterns in Chapters 8 and 9 represent models which describe the
relationships between the constructs. These relationships are of a prescriptive nature,
meaning that they express how the constructs should be used to design correct controls.
3. Method: The e3control design framework in Chapter 11 is a method that sets up steps to
perform the process of controls design.
4. Implementation: Implementation artifacts are models that are developed as a result of the
instantiation of other e3control artifacts in case studies. These models are described in the
case studies in Chapters 4, 5, 12 and 13.
1.7 Research cycle
The process of design research can be conducted in many different ways. A generally accepted
view in design science is that the process comprises of two main research activities: build and
evaluate [March and Smith, 1995], [Hevner et al., 2004]. Building is a process of constructing
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an artifact for a specific purpose and evaluation is the process of determining how well the
artifact performs.
Requirements engineering literature provides a different approach on how design-oriented re-
search should be conducted [Wieringa et al., 2005], [Akkermans and Gordijn, 2006]. In partic-
ular, it identifies the engineering cycle as the logical structure or engineering activity
[Wieringa et al., 2005]. In our view, this approach is more solid, since it is based on decades of
practising design-oriented research in engineering and its major assumptions have been tested
empirically, e.g. by [Cross, 2001] and [Witte, 1972].
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Figure 1.3: Activities in the engineering cycle including an implementation use activity. Boxes
represent activities, arrows represent impacts. There is no perfect sequential relationship be-
tween activities. Adapted from [Wieringa et al., 2005].
Engineering Cycle. The engineering cycle in Figure 1.3 is basically a rational decision mak-
ing structure [Wieringa et al., 2005]. It represents a list of activities that include problem anal-
ysis, solution design, solution validation, solution implementation, and implementation evalua-
tion2:
• Problem Analysis. Examining a problem and defining the goals.
• Solution Design. Specifying one or more possible solution.
2Note that the activity Implementation Use is not a part of the engineering cycle, according to
[Wieringa et al., 2005]
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• Solution Validation. Analyzing the properties of specific solutions, and evaluating their
potential to solve problems and achieve the desired goals.
• Solution Implementation. Implementation of a selected solution.
• Implementation Evaluation. Analysing the properties of the implemented solution. This
might be a problem analysis task in another engineering cycle.
The important characteristic of the engineering cycle is that it describes a list of activities,
but does not prescribe their sequential execution. One can start with problem analysis, with
solution design, or even with validation. This approach is based on empirical findings that
show that a human tends to perform these research activities in parallel. For example, as shown
by [Cross, 2001] experienced designers develop their understanding of a problem parallel to
designing a solution and validating its properties.
The engineering cycle approach contrasts with the view taken in the business science literature
on the design science research methodology [March and Smith, 1995], [Hevner et al., 2004].
Firstly, the engineering cycle describes a more detailed set of activities needed to effect a design,
compared to the two activities build and evaluate described in design science literature. Sec-
ondly, it does not require the execution of all activities, but emphasizes the non-sequential nature
of design, which has been proven by many (see [Wieringa et al., 2005],
[Akkermans and Gordijn, 2006] for a more detailed discussion on this issue). Thirdly, it dis-
tinguishes between validation and evaluation, which the design science literature does not
[March and Smith, 1995], [Hevner et al., 2004]. Validation research is covered by solution val-
idation, while evaluation research includes either problem investigation or implementation eval-
uation.
The difference between validation and evaluation is that in the former, a technique not yet
implemented in practice is investigated, whereas in the latter, a technique already implemented
in practice is investigated. Various research methods can be used for evaluation, such as field
research, case studies etc. However, doing field research for validation is not a good idea,
since the properties of a technique that has not yet been implemented are under investigation.
Useful research methods for validation are mathematical analysis, formal proofs or laboratory
experimentation.
Validation is an essential part of the design process. For example, when civil engineers come up
with a new design for a bridge, they do not immediately go and test it in practice, as that may
have severe consequences. The usual way of working is to scrutinize the design by testing it in
a computer-simulated environment and to rely on thorough mathematical proofs.
1.8 Research activities
The research activities carried out for this study are shown in Figure 1.4. This figure is based on
the engineering cycle and also indicates which chapters in this thesis address certain activities.
Following the guidelines laid down in the engineering cycle, the research activities were not
performed in a sequential order. We started with problem analysis and moved on to solution
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Figure 1.4: The research process
design, implementation nd evaluation. However, there were multiple iterations of all activities.
Deeper insight into each activity was gained by undertaking other activities, often in parallel.
In this thesis we report on the results of this complex design process.
In this section, we describe each research activity of the engineering cycle, how they were
carried out, and finally, we highlight the important results.
1.8.1 Problem Analysis
We examine the problems pertaining to the design of controls in networks. This step is described
in detail in Chapter 2. Firstly, we define the requirements for our design methodology, then,
we make an extensive literature review of the existing methodologies and theories of controls.
The goal of this literature study is to find out if off-the-shelf solutions exist for designing the
inter-organizational controls that meet our requirements. Unfortunately, as we will show, no
such methodology is available. Although methodologies on design of control mechanisms are
available in the internal control literature, they do not satisfy our requirements, because they are
not described from the economic value perspective or from the network perspective. Therefore,
the literature review in Chapter 2 is used as input for the development of the e3control approach.
1.8.2 Solution Design
The solution design activity includes the development of the e3controlmethodology which, as
already explained, the e3controlmethodology consists of three parts: the e3control ontology, the
e3control patterns and the e3control design framework.
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We start with the e3control ontology, described in Chapter 3. The e3control ontology is an ex-
tension of the e3value ontology, adapted to model control problems and control mechanisms.
The development of the e3control ontology is performed in iteration with its implementation
in two case studies in the music industry (see Chapter 4) and in the health care industry (see
Chapter 5).
We also develop e3control patterns, which are described in Chapters 6 to 10. For their devel-
opment, we rely on the methodological guidelines taken from patterns literature, as described
in Chapter 6. According to the relevant literature, patterns have to represent proven solutions
for recurrent problems and they have to describe existing knowledge. The patterns are elicited
based on knowledge taken from both theories as well as case studies.
1.8.3 Solution Implementation
Empirical methods should be used to evaluate the results of the solution design
[Wieringa et al., 2005]. Several research strategies are available, e.g. experiments, surveys,
and case studies. We choose a case study as a method of evaluating the e3control approach.
A case study is an ‘empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its
real-life context’ [Yin, 1994]. [Yin, 1994] has identified some specific types of case studies:
exploratory, explanatory, and descriptive. A more suitable categorization for our research is
to distinguish between the extracting and the developing case-studies [van Aken, 2004]. The
extracting case-study is a kind of best-practice research and is aimed at uncovering artifacts
(e.g. technological rules) already used in practice. In the developing case-study the artifacts are
developed and tested by the researcher(s) in close collaboration with people in the field. The
nature of the case studies reported in this thesis is developing. The goal of our case studies is to
test how the e3control is able to handle real-life problems.
Due to the nature of the engineering cycle, the development of the e3control approach is carried
out parallel to the case studies. During the development stage, the e3control approach is applied
to design the case studies and is changed many times as a result of feedback, which is also
provided the other way around. As a result, the e3controlmodels describing the case have to be
changed or additional data collected. In this thesis we report only on the final outcome of this
design process.
Case studies We perform four case studies for this research, each of which will now be de-
scribed in short. The first two case studies involve the evaluation of the e3control ontology and
the initial e3control design framework. The last two case studies involve the evaluation of the
e3control patterns and the e3control design framework, adapted for the use of the patterns.
• Internet Radio. This case study focuses on the clearance of rights for broadcasting mu-
sic content via the Internet. In order to broadcast music commercially, a radio station has
to obtain several licenses and pay for several copyrights, including a right to broadcast
music to the public. Currently, there are no reliable procedures to identify how many
tracks are broadcasted, what tracks are broadcasted and how many listeners listened to
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which track. When reported by the radio stations, this information is not reliable because
they want to reduce the royalty payments and may therefore report the information incor-
rectly. In this case study, we use e3control to design a reliable procedure for controlling
the broadcasting information.
• Dutch health care services. A study is made into the complicated payment process
within the Dutch health care system for the treatment of long-term and chronic diseases.
In The Netherlands, such diseases covered by public insurance which is paid for by the
government but involves many controls. The goal of this case study is to design existing
controls and to analyze the underlying control problems. In fact, we perform a sort of
reverse engineering of the past and present procedures in the health care system to see
if e3control could describe it. In addition, we design a future situation, which has not
yet been implemented in practice. A remarkable feature of this study is that the health
care system is a highly regulated sector, in which production, distribution, and pricing
decisions are made by a regulatory authority rather than determined by market forces. The
specific question examined in this case study is whether the e3control approach, which
relies on e3value and its notion of the reciprocal economic exchange, makes sense in such
a non-profit setting.
• Renewable Electricity Certificates. This study looks into the system for stimulating the
generation of electricity from renewable sources, such as wind turbines and solar pan-
els. The case specifically focuses on such a system which has been implemented in the
UK, where the Renewable Obligation (RO) law places an obligation on electricity sup-
pliers, who are licensed to supply electricity in the UK, to source a certain proportion
of electricity from renewable sources [OFGEM, 2004b]. Suppliers meet their obligations
by presenting Renewable Obligation Certificates (ROCs) which correspond to a certain
amount of the electricity bought by the supplier. In addition, ROCs can also be traded
separately from the electricity supply, e.g. a supplier who had bought insufficient renew-
able electricity can buy more ROCs to comply with the regulation. The focus of this
case study is whether the e3control patterns could describe the mechanisms behind the
ROC scheme. Unlike in the Internet radio case, the mechanisms here had already been
implemented.
• Beer Export. The case concerns an excise collection procedure within the EU. When
excise goods like beer and cigarettes are sold, the seller must pay a special tax called
excise. If the goods are sold within the EU, the seller does not need to pay the excises
in the country of export; the excises are paid in the country of import. However, the
collection of excises poses many control problems. For example, exporters may overstate
the amount of exported excised goods to avoid excise payments. This happens because of
control weaknesses in the existing excise reporting procedure. The goal of this case study
is two-fold, firstly, we undertake a kind of re-engineering of the existing procedure and,
by using the e3control patterns, suggest how it could be improved. The second goal of the
case study is to suggest a scenario to replace the existing paper-based control procedure
using new smart seal-based technology. The issues examined in this case study are (1)
whether the e3control patterns are able to describe weaknesses in the existing procedure
and (2) whether they are able to design a new smart seal-based solution of the procedure.
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The case studies were selected primarily by (1) variety of business sectors and (2) availability.
The availability of the cases depended on the projects that provided access to domain experts
and case material, and on the willingness of the domain experts and companies to cooperate.
Hence, (a) generalizability of case observations is limited, and (b) completeness of control
mechanisms is not guaranteed by these cases. These and other issues of research design validity
are discussed later in this section.
1.8.4 Implementation Evaluation
During implementation evaluation, we investigate the use of the e3controlmethodology in prac-
tice. Techniques may not work as expected, so in practice there are usually multiple iterations
between the solution design, the solution implementation and the implementation evaluation
tasks.
The final evaluation of the research results is done by reflecting on the results and stating the
Lessons Learned at the end of each case study. The lessons learned reflect mainly on the argu-
ments given in support of the value modelling at the beginning of the thesis. These arguments
are:
1. Controls are commercial services with added value, which can be modelled from the
value viewpoint;
2. Control instruments have inherent value aspects, which can be modelled from the value
viewpoint;
3. Value viewpoint is an abstract rationale for procedural aspects of controls.
Furthermore, in the case of Music and Health care we discuss the ability of the e3control on-
tology to describe the control problems and mechanisms in the case study. In the ROC and
Beer case studies we also discuss the ability of control patterns to describe control problems
and mechanisms. In particular, we are interested if the e3control ontology and e3control pat-
terns provide sufficient analytical instruments to describe the existing controls or design new
controls.
1.8.5 Solution validation
Two points can be addresses with respect to solution validation: (1) validation of the e3control
ontology and e3control patterns and (2) validation of the case study models, which are built
based on the e3control or e3value ontologies. The e3control ontology was built using the princi-
ples of building ontologies from software engineering
[Noy and McGuinness, 2001]. We have not looked into the validation of the e3control ontol-
ogy itself. However, the e3value ontology, on which the e3control is based, has been validated
and was build using the ontology engineering principles [Gordijn, 2002]. The compliance of
the the e3control ontology with the ontology building principles can be proven by the fact that
the e3value software tool is able to represent the e3controlmodels.
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The e3control patterns are designed according to the rules of elicitation taken from the patterns
literature. That is to say, each pattern is encoded into the context-problem-solution structure, an
example of each pattern is provided, and the patterns vocabulary is defined. For more on this
see Chapter 6.
With respect to validation of the case study models, we have observed that they comply with the
restrictions of the e3control or e3value ontologies. For example, as in e3value , the e3control on-
tology prevents loop forming in the dependency paths. Furthermore, the one-way value transfers
are only allowed in subideal e3controlmodels, but not in ideal e3valuemodels. So, we observe
that there is no one-way value transfers in the ideal models and that the dependency paths do
not contain loops. See chapter 3 on more details about the e3control ontology, e3value ontology
and ideal and subideal value models.
1.9 Research design criteria
Four well-known tests can be carried out to judge the quality of empirical research. Construct
validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability.
Construct validity. Construct validity means establishing the correct operational measures
for the concepts being studied. This is especially problematic in case study research and has
been a source of criticism because of potential investigator subjectivity. [Yin, 1994] proposed
three remedies to counteract this:
• Use multiple sources of evidence;
• Establish a chain of evidence (A chain of evidence should be maintained to increase the
reliability of the study. The procedure involves an external observer who follows the
derivation of evidence from initial research questions to ultimate case study conclusions);
• Have a draft case study report reviewed by key informants.
In our case studies, we comply with all three requirements a discussion of which now follows.
For more details on the data collection for each particular case, see the section Research Context
of each case.
• Internet Radio. In this case, we reused the case description from previous research, e.g.
[Pedrinaci et al., 2005]. The case description was composed by other researchers, namely
by J. Gordijn, in cooperation with SENA3 and within the realm of the OBELIX research
project4. The author of the thesis has elicited knowledge by closely cooperating with J.
Gordijn as well as by reading the research reports of the OBELIX project. See more on
the research context in Chapter 4.
3In Dutch: De Stichting ter Exploitatie van Naburige Rechten. See www.sena.nl
4http://obelix.e3value.com
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As a chain of evidence, the case study report, as presented in Chapter 4, refers to the
original source of data where appropriate. Verification of the case study description as
well as its final results was given by J. Gordijn who has a thorough knowledge of the
domain. The description and results were also verified with SENA by J.Gordijn. The
final information system model was verified with a security expert.
• Dutch health care services. This case study was conducted within the Freeband User
eXperience (FRUX) Freeband project [Droes et al., 2005]. The data for the case study
was collected by the author of this thesis and another researcher J. Hulstijn from (1) a
series of semi-structured interviews with five experts from different health care organi-
zations, (2) publicly available documents and research articles on the Dutch health care
system and (3) government web sites. In addition, the author of the thesis also partic-
ipated in regular project meetings, where relevant issues were discussed by the domain
experts. See more on the research context in Chapter 5.
As a chain of evidence, the case study report, as presented in Chapter 5, refers to the
original source of data where appropriate. More references can be found in the two reports
of the FRUX project [Kartseva et al., 2005c] and [Kartseva et al., 2006d]. The interviews
with domain experts have been written and are available upon request.
Verification of the case study description and its final results was given by presenting the
e3controlmodels to two domain experts. The models were adapted to incorporate the
feedback.
• Renewable Electricity Certificates. The data collection was carried out within the EU-
funded research project BUSMOD5 before this research started. During this project, data
was collected by several researchers, including the author of this thesis. This mostly
took the form of organized brainstorming sessions with domain experts from different
organizations in the network. Some data, mostly concerning processes behind the ROC
scheme, were collected from on-line public sources. See more on the research context in
Chapter 12.
As a chain of evidence, the case study report, as presented in Chapter 12, refers to the
original source of data where appropriate. More references can be found in the deliver-
ables of the BUSMOD project, which are available from the project web-site.
Verification of the case study value models was given by the domain experts – partici-
pants of the BUSMOD project, in particular in workshop sessions organized during the
project. The process models were not verified with domain experts, but only verified
against literature sources and with other researchers.
• Beer Export. This case study was carried out within the EU-funded research project
ITAIDE6. During this project, the data on how the excise system operates were collected
mainly by several other researchers (Z. Baida, Y.-H. Tan, B. Rukanova and J. Liu) during
both interviews and organized brainstorming sessions with stakeholders from different
organizations in the network. The author of the thesis elicited knowledge by closely
5http://www.e3value.com/projects/ourprojects/busmod/
6www.itaide.org
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cooperating with these researchers, by reading their project reports and by participating in
several sessions with the domain experts. In addition, one extensive interview, conducted
by the author of the thesis with two domain experts, was specifically targeted to elicit
knowledge about the control problems within the case. See more on the research context
in Chapter 13.
As a chain of evidence, the case study report, as presented in Chapter 13, refers to the
original source of data where appropriate. More references can be found in the deliver-
ables of the ITAIDE project, which are available from the project web-site. All interviews
with the domain experts were tape-recorded.
Verification of the case study value and process models was given by the domain experts
– participants of the ITAIDE project, in particular in brainstorming sessions organized
during the project as well as during an interview in a personal meeting.
Reliability. The objective of reliability testing is to demonstrate that the results of a case study
can be the same if a second investigator follows exactly the same procedures described by an
earlier investigator and conducted in the same case study. We believe that the procedures we
carry out for data collection and chain of evidence ensure reliability. It is further ensured be-
cause the analysis is done using rigorous and well-formalized conceptual modelling techniques,
such as e3value , e3control and UML activity diagrams.
Internal validity. Internal validity means proving that reasoning and conclusions are correct
in the context of a case study. To ensure this, we can compare the results that we get from the
e3controlmodelling with the knowledge and conclusions drawn by domain experts or provided
by literature. As already mentioned in the Construct Validity section, a validation of the results
with the domain experts is performed to some extent in each case study.
External validity. External validity is the degree to which we can generalize the findings of
case studies and is usually a major barrier for the case study research. Obviously we cannot
make any sound claims for the generalizability of e3control approach and e3control patterns
based on four case studies. The generalizability claim cannot be made, since (1) we cannot
prove that the set of patterns is complete (most likely there are still control mechanisms missing)
and (2) we cannot prove that the patterns give the right solution for all possible cases.
However, we undertake several measures to ensure at least some generalizability. Firstly, the
e3controlmethodology in general, and e3control patterns in particular, is mostly based on the
internal control theory, the background of which reflects decades of practice and academic
research. This helps to ensure that we will capture the most important aspects of the design of
controls.
Secondly, the findings are tested in four large case studies, which cover various sectors. If the
e3control patterns are found in these various sectors, this to some extent will give the impression
that the patterns are not domain-dependent.
40 Introduction
1.10 Research contribution
The design of control mechanisms for network organizations is uncharted territory. The e3control
approach contributes an integrated perspective to controls design and structures existing knowl-
edge on controls by employing (1) the economic value viewpoint, (2) the network perspective,
(3) the patterns.
The design of controls in networks is a multi-disciplinary task. It obviously involves economic
and legal aspects, but computer science issues are also relevant (many controls are implemented
in information systems), as well as inter-organizational business process design (many con-
tracts stipulate how, and in which sequence, business transactions should be carried out, and by
whom). Therefore, the e3control approach offers an integrated perspective, which enables the
design of both economic and procedural aspects of controls.
Although the process and information systems viewpoints on controls have been developed
for internal controls (see e.g. [Romney and Steinbart, 2006, ISACF, 2005, COSO, 2004]), the
integration with economic aspects of controls has been left out. As has been claimed earlier,
the development of the economic value perspective on controls is very important. The e3control
approach facilitates the evaluation of the impact of control mechanisms on the business models
that underlie the network organization. This is innovative compared to the field of internal
control, where, conventionally, only process models are considered for designing controls, and
no conceptual modelling tools are used to perform a cost-benefit analysis.
The second contribution is the network perspective on controls. In network organizations, the
opportunistic behaviour of some participants may prevent other participants from achieving
their strategic objectives, which can cause the network to fall apart. Therefore, in order to
satisfy the objectives of each network participant, a more general approach to control is needed.
The network perspective of e3control , agreed upon and subsequently implemented as a standard
by network participants, considers controls to migrate the opportunistic behaviour of the peer
participants. This view contrasts to the traditional practice of the internal control theory (e.g.
[Romney and Steinbart, 2006, Starreveld et al., 1994]), in which each organization within the
network only manages the activities within its own boundaries and where no explicit difference
is made between threats coming from inside or outside of the organization. The contribution of
e3control is not to invent new controls, but to restructure existing ones (i.e. internal controls)
and describe them from the network perspective.
The use of requirements engineering techniques, such as conceptual modelling and multiple
viewpoints, is innovative in the field of control design. Even though these techniques are famil-
iar to the internal control field, their full potential is not being utilized. The purpose of e3control
is to assist in the design of inter-organizational controls in a systematic way. To facilitate the
design process we propose setting up a library of e3control control patterns to structure existing
knowledge and make it transferable to the inter-organizational domain, which is a contribution
in itself. Furthermore, such a structured way of design is different from standard practice in in-
ternal control, which involves work with databases of hundreds of very specific controls which
are only applicable to one domain. Describing the controls by using only six general patterns is
a contribution of our work.
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1.12 Outline of the research
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 elaborates on the theoretical foundation of this
research and consists of business control theories and value modelling. This chapter argues why
an economic value perspective is important when considering controls. In addition, it provides
the reader with a broad literature review of the field of internal and inter-organizational controls.
In Chapter 3 we develop the e3control ontology and the e3control design framework. In addition,
we discuss the design of rights and evidence documents in e3value , which are typically present
in controls. In Chapters 4 and 5 we discuss the e3control approach by presenting two case
studies: the music industry and health care sector. We also present the lessons learned.
Chapters 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 deal with the development of the e3control patterns which represent
accepted design knowledge of inter-organizational controls. We start with the elicitation of
these patterns in Chapter 6. Furthermore, we develop a vocabulary to describe the patterns
in Chapter 7. We describe the actual control patterns in Chapters 8 and 9, and deal with the
delegation of control activities in Chapter 10.
Chapter 11 shows how to use the patterns for a specific case at hand. Chapter 12 and 13 discuss
two case studies in the electricity and international trade sectors to demonstrate and evaluate the
application of the patterns. Finally, the thesis ends with the conclusions chapter, in which we
come back to the research objective of this thesis and present our conclusions.
Chapter 2
Designing controls in network
organizations
The goal of this chapter is two-fold. Firstly, we define the requirements for our design methodol-
ogy, then we undertake an extensive literature review of the existing methodologies and theories
of controls. As a result, we argue in favour (1) of developing a value-based design methodology
for inter-organizational controls and (2) of using a conceptual modelling approach to design
controls. Finally, we suggest developing patterns of inter-organizational controls to represent
design knowledge explicitly. We start with reviewing existing theories on controls.
2.1 Inter-organizational controls
In this section we review theories taken from literature which consider controls in business or-
ganizations or networks. We see a network organization as a set of actors (e.g. companies or
individuals) who have direct or indirect business relationships with each other. The network ac-
tors have to comply with certain obligations, imposed either by contracts between the actors or
by law or regulation, e.g. European Union environmental laws that apply to all companies oper-
ating within the EU. Some actors may behave opportunisticallywith respect to these obligations
and not comply with them.
Inter-organizational controls are the measures implemented by the network participants, jointly
or individually, to mitigate such opportunistic behaviour. More precisely, we may define inter-
organizational controls as measures one or more party can use to prevent, detect or correct
opportunistic behaviour of its counter parties. This definition implies the network perspective
on controls, described in Chapter 1.
Before proceeding with inter-organizational controls, we present a review of the internal control
theory [Hollander et al., 1999], [Romney and Steinbart, 2006]. Although the internal control
theory focuses mainly on controls inside organizations, we consider it to be a good starting
point for understanding the concept of control in general. Furthermore, we consider agency
theory which renders a useful introduction to inter-organizational controls. Finally, we consider
44 Designing controls in network organizations
the work on inter-organizational controls taken from a series of publications of [Bons, 1997],
[Bons et al., 1998], which provides a starting point in the design of inter-organizational controls.
2.1.1 Internal control theory
The internal control theory views an organization as a set of business processes which are a se-
ries of operational activities intended to accomplish the strategic objectives of an organization
[Hollander et al., 1999]. The operational activities are also called events [Hollander et al., 1999].
Traditionally, several standard business processes known as transaction cycles are identified
within a hierarchical organization.
Transaction Cycles and Activities
Regardless of the type of goods and services it provids, each organization has at least three busi-
ness processes, also called transaction cycles [Romney and Steinbart, 2006]. The main cycles
are the Expenditure Cycle, the Conversion Cycle, and the Revenue Cycle.
The Expenditure Cycle incorporates only those activities and objects needed for acquiring,
maintaining and paying for resources required by an organization. These activities are ‘request
goods or services’, ‘order goods or services’, ‘receive goods or services’, ‘store and maintain
goods or services’, and ‘pay for goods or services’. The Revenue Cycle consists of activities
and objects needed for selling and delivering goods or services to customers and the collecting
of payments. They are known as ‘receive an order for goods or services’, ‘select and inspect
goods or services to be delivered’, ‘prepare goods or services to be delivered’, ‘deliver goods or
services’, and ‘receive payment for goods or services’. The Conversion Cycle consists of activ-
ities that convert the acquired resources into goods and services for customers, e.g. assembling,
growing, manufacturing, transporting, distributing, educating.
Internal versus external activities. Every activity in a transaction cycle can be classified as
internal or external [Bons, 1997]. Internal activities are entirely within a party and are not visi-
ble to other parties. External activities are those activities that directly involve - and are visible
to - outside parties. Expenditure and revenue cycles incorporate both internal and external activ-
ities. The activities ‘request goods or services’, ‘store and maintain goods or services’, ‘select
and inspect goods or services to be delivered’, ‘prepare goods or services to be delivered’ are
all internal. External activities are ‘order goods or services’, ‘receive goods or services’, ‘pay
for goods or services’ in the expenditure cycle and ‘receive an order for goods or services’, ‘de-
liver goods or services’, and ‘receive payment for goods or services’ in the revenue cycle. The
conversion cycle comprises internal activities only. In the realm of the network perspective, we
only focus solely on the external activities of network participants.
Control problems
Every organization faces a multitude of risks which can be defined as exposure to the chance
of injury or loss [Hollander et al., 1999], p.189. A potential risk threatens some aspects of
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the organization’s operation or even its very existence. An organization faces many types of
risks, namely strategic risk, decision risk, operating risks, information risks and financial risks
[Hollander et al., 1999], p.191.
We focus primarily on operating risks, which are those related to the incorrect execution of
activities of transaction cycles. According to the internal control theory, these risks lead to a
loss of financial resources in the organization. Some examples of common risks include theft
of cash by an employee, paying for the same goods twice, and accepting unordered goods.
Each activity in the transaction cycles has associated risks. [Hollander et al., 1999] suggest
using a REALmodel as a guide to recognizing these risks for each activity. REAL is an acronym
for Resource, Event, Agent and Location and is an extension of the REA model suggested by
[McCarthy, 1982] for the design of accounting information systems. This model shows that
every operating activity can result in unintentional errors and intentional irregularities with one
or more of the following characteristics:
• An activity takes place at the wrong time or in the wrong sequence (or does not take place
at all)
• An activity is carried out without the proper authorization
• An activity which involves the wrong internal agent
• An activity which involves the wrong external agent
• An activity which involves the wrong resource
• An activity which involves the wrong amount or number of of resources
• An activity carried out at the wrong location
According to this classification, a shipment activity may involve such risks as late shipment
of goods, shipment without proper authorization, shipment to the wrong buyer, shipment of
unordered goods, shipment of the wrong quantity of goods, and shipment of goods to a wrong
location.
Control mechanisms
Internal control literature describes many different controls1, specific to the risks of every trans-
action cycle. We are not going to list them here as they can be found in other sources such as
[Romney and Steinbart, 2006] and [Hollander et al., 1999]. An example of such a control for a
Shipping activity in the Revenue Cycle is “Reconciliation of sales order with picking ticket and
1In the internal control literature the term ‘controls’ is being used to refer to both control activities and con-
trol mechanisms. A control activity is an operational activity performed to minimize or eliminate the risk (see
[Hollander et al., 1999], p. 189). This can be confusing, since a control activity is a not the same as a control
mechanism. A control activity is only a part of a control mechanism. A control mechanism (e.g. authorization)
consists of control activities, but also of other measures, such as the order of the activities in a specific situation.
In this thesis, the term ‘control’ refers only to control mechanisms and we refer to control activity explicitly.
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packing slip”. The related control problem is errors in shipping, e.g. shipping wrong merchan-
dize.
Conventional descriptions of internal controls are very domain-specific. Firstly, separate risks
and controls are described for every specific activity of each transaction cycle. Secondly, they
assume the presence of some specific documents (e.g. the picking ticket in the example above)
or parts of IS (e.g. a credit card processing system). As a result, an enormous number of risks
and controls known to a control expert. [Romney and Steinbart, 2006] lists 12 common risks in
the Revenue Cycle2 and 17 in the Expenditure Cycle3. Each risk corresponds to around three-
four control mechanisms. So, a control expert, who wants to design controls for the Expenditure
Cycle and Revenue Cycle, should be familiar with about a hundred controls.
Internal control literature also offers classifications of controls, for instance, to their use: whether
they are used to prevent, detect, or recover from errors and irregularities. The purpose of each
control is evident from their name [Hollander et al., 1999]:
• Preventative controls focus on preventing an error or irregularity
• Detective controls focus on detecting when an error or irregularity has occurred
• Corrective controls focus on recovering, repairing the damage from, or minimizing the
cost of an error or irregularity.
Using credit card processing systems to avoid cash theft by cash processing employees is an
example of a preventative control. Demanding a comparison of the cash in the cash drawer with
the total sales accumulated by the cash register during an employee’s shift is an example of a
detective control. An example of a corrective control is a policy of deducting the amount of a
cash drawer shortage from an employee’s pay. This policy also serves as a preventative control,
since it discourages the theft.
Control principles
Another classification of controls distinguishes between segregation of duties, authorizations,
access controls, proper documents and independent verifications [Romney and Steinbart, 2006]4.
Notice that there is an overlap with the categories of preventative, detective and corrective con-
trols. For example, segregation of duties is both a detective and a preventive control.
Authorization. Every employee should have proper authorization to perform any action, so
that if something goes wrong accountability could be established.
Segregation of duties. No employee should be assigned too much responsibility according to
the following principles:
2See p. 381 of [Romney and Steinbart, 2006]
3See p. 435 of [Romney and Steinbart, 2006]
4[Hollander et al., 1999] use a different terminology, but the meaning remains the same
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1. An employee who is responsible for custodial activities (e.g. handling cash, inven-
tories, writing checks, receiving checks) should not be the same employee who is
responsible for recording functions (e.g. maintaining journals, preparing reconcil-
iations, performance reports). This prevents employees from falsifying records in
order to conceal theft of assets entrusted to them.
2. An employee who is responsible for custodial activities should not be the same
employee who is responsible for the authorization of these activities. This prevents
authorization of a fictitious or inaccurate transaction as a means of concealing asset
theft.
3. An employee who is responsible for recording activities should not be the same
employee who is responsible for the authorization of these activities. This prevents
an employee from falsifying records to cover up an inaccurate or false transaction
that was inappropriately authorized.
4. An employee who is responsible for a verification (checking) activity should not be
the same employee who is responsible for the activity being verified (checked). This
prevents an employee from falsifying results of verification to cover up an inaccurate
or false transaction.
Audit trail. Every activity should be recorded to create a proper audit trail. More specifically,
according to the REA model [McCarthy, 1982], a change in a resource as well as the
executing agent should be recorded for every event. For instance, in a purchasing activity,
the goods purchased and the employee who purchased them should be recorded.
Adequate documents and records. All documents should comply with certain requirements.
For example, every document has to have space for a signature and they also have to be
sequentially pre-numbered so each can be accounted for and any missing document can
be detected.
Access restrictions. Information and assets have to be protected and access to them should
only be granted to authorized persons. This control is closely related to segregation of
duties because the authorization is assigned based on the segregation of duties principles.
Independent verifications. Every activity in an organization has to be periodically checked,
verified or reviewed. In accounting such verifications may concern accuracy and com-
pleteness of records and are carried out by reconciling the records with another set of
records, or by reconciling them with a material reality. Other points of attention are how
often verification should take place, should it be direct or indirect, what documents and
which material reality provides ‘true’ information about the state of affairs, and how this
‘true’ information should be collected. This principle is closely related to the fourth seg-
regation of duties principle, since a verification activity has to be performed by a person,
who is independent of a person, performing the activity being verified.
Henceforth, we call these categories control principles, to distinguish them from the control
mechanisms themselves. One difference between a control mechanism and a control princi-
ple is that the principles are the building blocks of the control mechanisms. For example, a
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“Reconciliation of sales order with picking ticket and packing slip” mechanism requires the
implementation of several control principles: the correct segregation of duties between a party
that reconciles the order and the one who records the sales order, correct information placed
on the picking ticket and packing slip, proper authorization of the party who carries out the
reconciliation, etc. The control principles can be seen as the design rules of internal controls.
Internal control theory in practice
The internal control theory is rather practice-oriented and provides the tools for practition-
ers, i.e. controllers and auditors, to apply and audit controls in internal business processes
[Romney and Steinbart, 2006]. Practitioners use such conceptual modelling techniques as flow
charts and data flow diagrams to describe administrative processes. The focus of internal control
literature is on how an organization should arrange an internal accounting information system
and internal business processes in such a way that loss from the potential opportunistic be-
haviour of employees is minimized. Practitioners focus mostly on audit of existing systems
rather than on their design. Internal control literature pays most attention to procedural aspects
of controls, such as safeguards of assets, access restrictions, segregation of duties and documen-
tary evidence.
2.1.2 Agency theory
The controls in the internal control theory cannot be applied in a straightforward way to the
control problems considered in the network perspective. Internal controls aim to mitigate
control problems by adjusting the activities within a company’s boundaries and do not take
into consideration activities and relationships with counter parties. In order to apply the the-
ory to the network setting, we first need to understand familiar inter-organizational control
problems and mechanisms to mitigate them. To do this, we consider the agency theory (e.g.
[Ross, 1973, Arrow, 1985], for a survey see [Eisenhardt, 1989]).
The agency theory focuses on a relationship between two parties - a principal and an agent - in
which a principal delegates an activity to an agent. Agency theorists do not distinguish between
firms and markets in terms of how cooperation is achieved and in how firms and markets operate
and produce coordination [Jensen and Meckling, 1976]. So, the principal-agent framework is
also applicable in describing inter-organizational control problems and mechanisms. The theory
argues that an agent behaves opportunistically under the conditions of (1) the principal and the
agent being utility maximizers with bounded rationality, (2) uncertainty and (3) information
asymmetry in favour of the agent.
The central dilemma examined by agency theory researchers is how to get the agent to act
in the best interests of the principal when the agent has an information advantage over the
principal and divergent goals or interests. Empirical evidence provided by the agency theory
shows that outcome-based contracts align goals between principals and agents, that monitoring
reduces self-serving behaviour of agents, that outcome-based contracts make agents more risk
averse, and that behaviour-based contracts do the opposite [Eisenhardt, 1989]. Note that in
this research, it is not our intention to test the assumptions of the agency theory empirically. We
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only use the principal-agent framework as a way of grasping and organizing inter-organizational
controls.
Control problems in the agency theory
There are two types of control problems in the agency theory: hidden information and hidden
action. Hidden information, also referred to as adverse selection, occurs when information
possessed by the agent is concealed from everyone else, but the welfare of the principal depends
on that information [Campbell, 2006]. For example, a producer may hide essential information
about the quality of his product, as a result of which the buyer may make wrong decisions, e.g.
by buying a product of a lower quality than desired.
Hidden information involves hidden characteristics and hidden intentions [Keil, 2005]. Hidden
characteristics refer to the abilities and skills of the agent that are not ‘common knowledge’.
Hidden intentions refer to the goals and intentions of the agent not known by the principal.
The hidden action problem is also referred to as moral hazard. It arises when a principal hires
an agent to carry out a task, but cannot be sure whether the agent does his work according to
the contract [Campbell, 2006]. For example, opportunistic behaviour may lead an employee to
overstate working hours if an employer does not know how long the employee spends on some
particular piece of work.
The hidden information problem refers to opportunistic behaviour of an agent that arises ex-
ante, so before a contract between a principal and an agent is signed, which means that this
problem can be mitigated ex-ante as well. The hidden action problem refers to the opportunistic
behaviour of the agent that arises ex-post, so after the contract between the principal and agent
is signed. In fact, hidden information is an additional condition to the problem of hidden action.
If not stopped in an ex-ante period, an agent who behaves opportunistically will cause problems
in an ex-post period.
Control mechanisms in the agency theory
Agency literature describes several particular controls to mitigate the problems described above.
The controls against the hidden information problem are screening and signalling controls; the
controls against the hidden action problem are monitoring and incentives [Keil, 2005]. Here is
a short description of each control.
Screening. Screening is the evaluation of the past activities of a potential agent by the principal.
Such an evaluation satisfies certain criteria and enables the principal to employ an agent.
For example, some companies screen employees by contacting their former employers
before hiring them.
Signalling. The signalling mechanism was introduced by [Spence, 1973] and is based on the
idea that an agent performs some action which credibly signals the information about the
agent. Unlike in screening, a principal does not evaluate the past activities of a potential
agent, but rather other information that provides a picture about an agent’s abilities. There
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are two types of signalling information: indexes and signals [Keil, 2005]. Indexes involve
information and data about the track record, economics performance, number of employ-
ees, etc. For example, in some cases a principal may decide that a large, well-known
company is more suitable for certain work than a less known middle-size company. The
second type of signalling information is signals, which are guarantees or certificates given
by trusted parties. For instance, a company may prefer job candidates with a university
degree, since that signals a certain level of knowledge of the candidate.
Monitoring. After a contract is settled, the principal can monitor the behavioural activities of
the agent. A disadvantage of behaviour monitoring is that it can be costly. For instance,
the principal might not have the expertise to judge the agent’s behaviour correctly or he
might not have access to the agent’s activities, e.g. in overseas trade. In such cases the
principal would need to hire a third party that has the necessary skills or access.
The principal can also abandon monitoring behaviour, and monitor the output instead.
The crucial point of output monitoring is to formulate rules and restrictions in the agent’s
behaviour so that the output can be controlled unambiguously. For example, in outsourc-
ing software development the principal might require the agent to follow coding and
testing guidelines, functional specification, etc. [Keil, 2005]. The output can then be
assessed against these guidelines.
Incentives. The implementation of monitoring mechanisms is often difficult and costly and
can sometimes even be impossible. Another way to prevent an agent’s opportunistic be-
haviour is to align his or her interests with those of the principal by means of an incentive
system. Incentives motivate the agent to act in one way rather than another, given a choice
of actions. A classic example is to make sure that a CEO’s salary depends on a company’s
performance [Jensen and Meckling, 1976].
There are two types of incentives: positive and negative incentives. Positive incentives are
rewards, negative incentives are punishments. Henceforth, we will call positive incentives
just incentives and negative incentives penalties.
Incentives and penalties always require monitoring mechanisms to measure when the
reward or penalty has to be given or not. In the example of the CEO, such a measure can
mean an increase in profit at the end of the year.
2.1.3 Inter-organizational control theory
We have reviewed two control theories in business science: the internal control theory and
the agency theory. On the one hand, the internal control theory provides a detailed practice-
oriented approach to design controls. The control principles presented in this section can be
seen as prescriptive design rules. However, these principles have been developed to be applied to
internal controls. In fact, it is not that clear whether they make sense in the inter-organizational
setting.
On the other hand, the agency theory provides a clear structure and description of common
inter-organizational control problems and mechanisms. However, it does not provide detailed
control principles behind controls in a way that the internal control theory does. The agency
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theory researchers do not focus on design details, but on the selection of appropriate controls
and on empirical examination of performance of controls [Eisenhardt, 1989].
We need to merge both theories in order to design inter-organizational controls. On the one
hand, we need to design control mechanisms to solve problems relevant to the network setting,
as described in the agency theory. On the other hand, we would like to design them at the same
level of detail as those described by the internal control principles.
In this section we make a review of existing work on inter-organizational controls, gained from
a series of publications of [Bons, 1997], [Bons et al., 1998] and [Bons et al., 2000]. This work
uses the principle-agent framework on the one hand and the internal controls on the other and
describes control principles for several inter-organizational controls. It identifies two types of
inter-organizational controls: those with a preventative function and those with an evidence
function. While the preventative function covers the monitoring control of the agency theory,
the evidence controls are, in fact, an inter-organizational interpretation of the audit trail concept
of the internal control theory (see section 2.1.1).
An inter-organizational model, taken as a unit of analysis in Bons, has been borrowed from the
agency theory. It assumes two actors who have a legal agreement to execute two operational
activities. The principal agrees to execute a so-called primary activity, and an agent agrees
to execute a counter activity. The primary activity is an “external, activity of a party that
corresponds to a primary obligation in some underlying legal agreement”. The primary activity
is executed in return for a counter activity. Consequently, the principal is called the primary
actor, and the agent is called the counter actor. As in the agency theory, the primary actor is
uncertain about the counter actor and expects him to behave opportunistically.
Preventative function of controls
What Bons calls the controls with a ‘preventative function’ are in fact the monitoring controls
of the agency theory. Unlike the agency theory, the Bons controls are described in a very
detailed way so that clear guidelines for the procedural implementation of the controls can be
derived. For example, they describes what operational activities have to be executed, in which
order and by whom. Such level of detail is similar to the internal control theory.
[Bons, 1997] formulates three variations of controls with a preventative function5. The first
mechanism takes into account that a principal monitors the counter activity of an agent by
direct observation of this activity. The second and the third mechanisms cover the situation
when observation is not possible; in this case, the principal has to rely on some other evidence
provided by a trusted party; a trusted party is a party trusted by the primary actor to provide the
correct evidence of the counter actor’s actions.
Evidence function of controls
The evidence function of inter-organizational controls is to ensure that the party responsible for
the performance of some activity receives evidence of execution of this activity6. [Bons, 1997]
5Here we refer to the general control principles II - IV, see [Bons, 1997], p.61-62
6Here we refer to the general control principles I and V, see [Bons, 1997], p.60-62
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argues that since multiple autonomous parties are involved in networks, a situation in which
someone behaves opportunistically usually leads to a (legal) dispute. In such cases, the function
of inter-organizational controls is to establish evidence that may be used by both the principal
and the agent in case of the dispute.
Evidence function controls are of two types: execution evidence and commitment evidence and
they address different control problems. The execution evidence and commitment evidence
controls are not described in the agency theory, as reviewed in section 2.1.2. However, they can
be related to the audit trail principle of the internal control theory (see section 2.1.1). The audit
trail requires every activity to be recorded so that accountability for actions can be established.
Execution Evidence. The execution evidence control problem is related to the counter actor’s
actions when accusing the primary actor of the wrong execution of the primary activity. The
counter actor claims that the primary actor has not executed the primary activity properly, to
which the primary actor does not agree.
To mitigate this problem, the counter actor must be able to testify about the completion of the
primary activity by making use of some evidence document, which should be offered to the
primary actor. In case of a dispute, the evidence document can be used by the primary actor
as a proof of performance of the primary activity. An intuitive example of such an evidence
document is a receipt in a shop. When a customer buys something in a shop, he must have a
receipt. If, after a while, the shop accuses the customer of stealing goods, the customer can
always show the receipt to prove that he paid for the goods.
Commitment Evidence. The commitment evidence control problem is related to the counter
actor’s denial of his commitment to the primary actor. For example, a seller may refuse to
execute an order for a certain price by saying that that the agreement was for a higher price.
A buyer may refuse to pay for goods by saying that that he did not order them. In the internal
control theory, these problems result in uncollected cash and illegitimate orders in the revenue
cycle ([Romney and Steinbart, 2006], p. 380).
To mitigate this problem, the commitment evidence control requires the counter actor to send
the principal a confirmation of his commitment, e.g. in a form of an evidence document
[Bons, 1997], [Weigand and de Moor, 2003]. This evidence can be used in a case of dispute.
An intuitive example of the commitment evidence document is a contract. By signing a con-
tract both parties create evidence of their commitment to each other.
The pre-execution requirement
An important aspect of the mechanisms described by [Bons, 1997] is a requirement to execute
a primary actor’s activity after a counter actor’s activity. We call this a pre-execution require-
ment.
As controls of the preventive function, the principal has to obtain evidence of the counter activity
before executing the primary activity7. Thus, monitoring of the counter activity has to be done
7see the general control principles II-IV [Bons, 1997], p.61-62
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before the primary activity. A well-known example of such a requirement is a pre-payment
agreement in trade. A seller can require payment upfront if the creditworthiness of a buyer is
unsure.
The pre-execution requirement is also present in controls with the evidence function. As com-
mitment evidence, the principal should receive confirmation of the agent’s commitments before
executing the primary activity8. As execution evidence, the principal should receive the confir-
mation of the primary activity at the same time as the primary activity is executed9.
The pre-execution requirement is an important component of inter-organizational controls. In
the internal control theory, the pre-execution principle is similar to the authorization principle,
which requires an authorization to be issued before the execution of the activity being authorized
(see section 2.1.1). In the pre-execution principle for monitoring, a positive outcome of the
monitoring activity can be seen as an authorization to execute the primary activity.
Trust
A network organization can be interpreted as a number of binary transactions between actors.
A lack of trust is likely between parties in a network who do not already have a business
relationship. Trust has been defined as “The willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the
actions of another party based on the expectation that the other party will perform a particu-
lar action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other
party”[Mayer et al., 1995]. Without prior trust, the party who invests in a transaction, called the
trustor, is uncertain whether the other party, the trustee, will perform its part of the deal, or will
defect and behave opportunistically. The uncertainty of the trustor about possible opportunis-
tic behaviour also comes out in Gambetta’s definition: “Trust is the subjective probability by
which an individual A expects that another individual B performs a given action on which its
welfare depends” [Gambetta, 1988]. However, trust does not have to depend on the trustor and
trustee alone. Institutional control measures can be used to guarantee performance according
to a contract. In general, the purpose of an inter-organizational control mechanism is to reduce
the uncertainty of the trustor and provide enough guarantees for both parties to engage in a
transaction [Tan and Thoen, 2000].
In Bons’s work, trust has a direct relation to the concept of uncertainty. Therefore, little trust
by the primary actor in the counter actor can be interpreted in the work of Bons as ‘the primary
actor is uncertain in the counter actor’.
[Bons, 1997] incorporates the concept of trust in his controls. A general guideline is that a
control is needed in case the primary actor has little trust in the counter actor. The pre-execution
requirement can be relaxed if the primary actor does trust the counter actor. For example, a pre-
payment arrangement might not be required if a seller is certain that a buyer will pay. Such trust
usually exists in long-lasting relationships and is absent in relationships limited to a one-time
transaction.
8see the general control principles V [Bons, 1997], p.62
9see the general control principles I [Bons, 1997], p.60
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2.1.4 Management control theory
Another trend in the literature on business controls is the management control theory
[Anthony and Govindarajan, 2003], [Merchant and van der Stede, 2007] the scope of which is
broader than that of the internal control theory. The objective of controls is seen not only as
to mitigate opportunistic behaviour with procedural measures, as taken in this work, but also
on designing controls in such a way as to motivate partners or employees to reach the objec-
tives efficiently and effectively [Geringer and Hebert, 1989], [Groot and Merchant, 2000]. As a
result, the management control theory considers controls more as coordination mechanisms to
improve the overall performance of an organization or a network. Usual management controls
include budgeting, reporting and performance incentives. The procedural controls constitute
only a small part of the coordination mechanisms. The management control literature on inter-
organizational relations focuses more on the second objective and less on procedural aspects of
inter-organizational controls.
Although our focus is on procedural controls and not on coordination mechanisms, the man-
agement control theory provides several classifications of inter-organizational controls that are
worth considering for a general understanding of a domain. We will now describe the classi-
fications in more detail. Their application to the previously discussed controls can be seen in
Figure 2.1.
Ex-ante and ex-post controls
Controls can be classified as ex-ante and ex-post. We call controls ex-ante if they are executed
before a contract is settled, i.e. signed. Controls executed after the contract is settled are called
ex-post.
The screening, signalling and commitment evidence controls detect and prevent an agent’s op-
portunistic behaviour that occurs ex-ante, and they are therefore executed ex-ante (see section
2.1.2). The monitoring of contract performance and execution evidence controls detect and
prevent the opportunistic behaviour that occurs ex-post and they are therefore executed ex-post
(see section 2.1.2, 2.1.3). Incentives are executed both ex-ante and ex-post (see section 2.1.2).
Settlement of contracts where incentives are defined (e.g. agreements on ownership structure)
take place ex-ante. However, rewarding or punishing of the agents takes place ex-post.
In addition, controls can be assigned to phases of the transaction cycle
[Weigand and de Moor, 2003], see also [Bons, 1997], p. 30. The process of concluding a trans-
action consists of four phases: the preparation phase and the negotiation phase, which occur
ex-ante, and the execution phase and the acceptance phase, which occur ex-post. Therefore,
screening and signalling controls are executed during the preparation phase. Commitment evi-
dence controls are executed in the negotiation phase. Monitoring is executed during the execu-
tion phase. Execution evidence controls are executed in the acceptance phase. The contracts on
incentives are settled in the negotiation phase, while rewards/penalties are paid in the execution
phase.
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Contractual and procedural controls
The management control literature distinguishes between contractual obligations, henceforth
called contractual controls, and formal organizational mechanisms for cooperation, henceforth
called procedural controls [Ouchi, 1979], [Sobrero and Schrader, 1998]. Incentives are con-
tractual controls, since they involve contractual arrangements that settle financial incentives to
align the interests of the principal and the agent. All other controls - screening/signaling and
monitoring, and the evidence-related controls - are procedural, since they rely on procedures
and do not involve financial incentives. In addition, incentives require presence of procedural
monitoring controls (see section 2.1.2).
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Figure 2.1: Types of formal controls
Formal and informal controls
Controls can be formal and informal [Ouchi, 1979]. All the controls discussed so far - screen-
ing, signalling, monitoring, evidence creation and incentives - are formal controls. Informal
controls, also referred to as social controls, concern the informal cultures and systems which in-
fluence members and are essentially based on mechanisms inducing self-regulation e.g. through
the creation of shared values and creation of trust [Ouchi, 1979], [Dyer and Singh, 1998],
[Dekker, 2004].
Some formal controls also contribute to informal controls. For example, screening and sig-
nalling can also be seen as informal controls. The informal part of screening and signalling is
that the selection of a good partner contributes to a creation of trust [Ouchi, 1979],
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[Dekker, 2004]. In this work, we focus on procedural aspects of the screening and signalling
controls.
Informal controls are more a condition rather than a mechanism that can be designed. Trust and
reputation either exist or not: The presence and absence of trust and reputation define to what
extent other formal controls have to be implemented [Dekker, 2004]. A common assumption is
that the more social control is present there in a relationship, the less formal control is required.
2.2 Design of controls
The objective of this study is to develop a methodology that would support human analysts in
designing controls against opportunistic behaviour in networks of organizations. In the previ-
ous sections of this chapter we have reviewed the existing methodologies and theories on the
design of controls. Before we draw any conclusions about whether any of these theories and
methodologies suit our needs, we discuss what characteristics we would like our methodology
to have.
Networks are characterized by collaborative decision making. Because companies participate in
networks voluntarily, but seek self-interest, any agreements in networks, including controls, are
not usually decided upon by an individual manager [Man, 2004]. In the network environment,
such decision making is carried out by different stakeholders - representatives of autonomous
network partners - who often have different interests as well as different professional back-
grounds and cultures. These and other factors make the collaborative decision making more
complicated.
The collaborative decision making of the diverse network stakeholders takes the form of a nego-
tiation process. One of the problems during this negotiation process is that stakeholders usually
use natural language to present and communicate their statements. However, the stakehold-
ers often have different views on control problems and solutions, as well as different interests,
which, when communicated in natural language, may lead to incomplete and ambiguous state-
ments [Malone, 1987].
We turn to the field of requirements engineering [Sommerville and Sawyer, 1997], which offers
conceptual modelling as a common approach to address this gap. The notion of a conceptual
model comes originally from the cognitive science, which describes it as a model consisting
of a number of symbol structures and symbol structure manipulators which are supposed to
correspond to the conceptualization of the world by human observer [Borgida et al., 1982]. Re-
quirements engineering and computer science see a computer system as a model of a ‘world’ or
a ‘slice of reality’ and conceptual models reflect the users’ conceptualization of this world.
Conceptual models are based on the principle of abstraction, which is a fundamental tool in or-
ganizing information [Borgida et al., 1982]. Classification, aggregation and generalization are
just a few aspects of abstraction useful to describe conceptual models. Classification refers to
grouping entities that share common characteristics. Aggregation refers to treating a collection
of concepts as a single concept. Generalization refers to extracting from one or more given
classes the description of a more general class that captures the commonalities but suppresses
some of the detailed differences in the description of the given classes.
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Conceptual models are often supported by graphical interfaces, which can be displayed and dis-
cussed during negotiation meetings and brainstorming sessions with the stakeholders. The use
of graphical conceptual models has proven to be useful in software engineering, which employs
the models for representing software requirements. In particular, the utilization of graphical
modelling techniques in software engineering improves the readability of complex formal spec-
ifications [Brathwaite, 1980]. In addition, graphical modelling techniques can be used to allow
for greater user participation, which can lead to better acceptance of a new system and can
therefore reduce the initial learning curve [Brathwaite, 1980]. Graphical conceptual modelling
techniques are also used for business analysis [Tapscott et al., 2000, Weill and Vitale, 2001].
These features of conceptual modelling are very essential for our methodology, since we intend
to develop a methodology used by human analysts.
Recently, some conceptual modelling techniques have been developed in the business science
domain (see [Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2002], [Gordijn and Akkermans, 2003], for an
overview [Pateli and Giaglis, 2004]). They have different purposes, for instance to assist in the
discovery of new business models or to analyze their feasibility. An important requirement for
conceptual models is that they represent a terminology common to the intended users in order
to achieve a shared understanding among them [Borst et al., 1997]. This feature makes concep-
tual models attractive for the design of inter-organizational controls, since shared understanding
is essential for decision making in a multi-enterprise environment.
The use of conceptual modelling is not new to the control field. As already mentioned, internal
control practitioners utilize thorough conceptualization of business processes and information
systems to get an understanding of the risks and necessary controls in internal business pro-
cesses (see e.g. [Romney and Steinbart, 2006]). The components of procedural controls, such
as evidence documents, data repositories, and the relationships between them can be modelled
using process modelling techniques, such as flow charts and Data Flow Diagrams (DFDs). So,
the conceptual modelling approach can also be useful for the design of inter-organizational
controls.
2.2.1 Value models
The design of inter-organizational controls can be very complex, among others because dif-
ferent perspectives of the multiple stakeholders are involved. In requirements engineering, a
multi-viewpoint approach is suggested as a mechanism to deal with this multi-perspective prob-
lem. By introducing several viewpoints on one system, complicated requirement issues can be
broken down into self-contained perspectives, which can then be addressed and decided upon
independent of each other [Finkelstein et al., 1992], [Finkelstein et al., 1994].
Requirements engineering distinguishes a process viewpoint and an information system view-
point. The process viewpoint describes business processes and the information system view-
point describes information systems that enable and support the business processes. For exam-
ple, [Wieringa et al., 2003] suggest a framework for integrated business process and application
architecture design. The tools for conceptualizing the process and information systems view-
points include UML activity and sequence diagrams [Fowler and Scott, 2000], flow charts, and
data flow diagrams [Hollander et al., 1999, Romney and Steinbart, 2006].
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More recently, many researchers have emphasized the necessity of taking into account busi-
ness requirements for system developing. As a result, several viewpoints for so-called early
stages of requirements engineering were developed, one such viewpoint being a value viewpoint
[Gordijn and Akkermans, 2003]. The value viewpoint focuses on the way economic value is
created, exchanged and consumed in a multi-actor network. The models considered in the value
viewpoint are often referred to as business models [Morris et al., 2005],
[Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2002].
Another approach for early requirements engineering is goal-oriented requirement engineering,
which expresses the relationship between systems and their environments in terms of goal-based
relationships [Yu and Mylopoulos, 1998]. In this work we focus on the value viewpoint, since
it is specifically focused on economic requirements.
Conceptualization of the value viewpoint is a rather new field of research. The conceptual
modelling technique for value viewpoint, considered in this thesis, is e3value suggested by
[Gordijn and Akkermans, 2003]. An e3valuemodel represents a network organization as a set
of actors who exchange objects of economic value with each other. An example of e3value
model is shown in Figure 2.2. The network presented consists of a buyer, a seller and a tax
office, each exchanging the objects of economic value: Payment, Goods, V AT and Legal
Compliance. A buyer buys goods from a seller and pays in return; the seller pays a value-
added tax (VAT) to the tax office, as a result of which he obtains a legal compliance, meaning
that he is not charged with a fine.
ch3_ideal, 2008-04-12 17:10:23, http://www.e3value.com/
BUYER SELLER TAX OFFICE
Goods
Payment
Legal
Compliance
VAT
Figure 2.2: Example of an e3valuemodel of a purchase including a tax payment
The e3valuemodel abstracts from the time-dependence between operational activities, as of-
ten considered by the business process models, and focuses purely on transfers of objects of
economic value. In this respect, the process viewpoint focuses on a way of putting the value
viewpoint in operation in terms of business processes. For example, the value transfer of the
object Goods and Payment between a buyer and a seller may be put into operation in different
ways, e.g. a simple simultaneous exchange in a supermarket, a buyer pays first, a seller delivers
first, or a complex Letter of Credit procedure, involving intermediaries [Kartseva et al., 2004a].
In fact, these decisions may reflect control considerations.
There are other conceptual modelling techniques for value modelling besides e3value . We will
briefly review them in Chapter 3.
2.2.2 Value viewpoint on controls
The internal control theory, the development of which dates back to the early days of informa-
tion systems engineering, only considers process and information systems viewpoint which is
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a subject in the field of IT Audit, also called EDP Audit [ISACF, 2005]. A value viewpoint on
controls does not exist in the internal control theory. We argue that the consideration of a value
viewpoint when designing control mechanisms for networks is an important and useful. There
are several reasons why this is so.
Controls as commercial services with added value. Understanding the impact of controls
on business models requires the development of a value viewpoint. As we have observed in
a number of case studies [Kartseva et al., 2004a, Kartseva et al., 2005a, Kartseva et al., 2005b,
Kartseva et al., 2006b, Kartseva et al., 2006c], controls impact on business models in many dif-
ferent ways. Firstly, controls are essentially services with their own price tag (e.g. TRUSTe’s
web site seal10). They require financial resources, which affects the sustainability of a network.
A value viewpoint can help in making different design choices when introducing controls, e.g.
who is going to pay for a control service? who is going to execute it? and how will it affect
the financial performance of network participants? In addition, a cost-benefit analysis of con-
trols, which is an important part of a decision on a control structure, can be supported by value
models. Furthermore, a need for control often leads to new business opportunities for control-
related services. For example, in our analysis of health care quality controls in the Netherlands
we developed a new business model of community-based quality control by means of an inter-
active web-site [Droes et al., 2005], [Kartseva et al., 2006c]. These business aspects of controls
are not the subject of a process or information system viewpoint, and can be better highlighted
in a value viewpoint.
Value aspects of control instruments. Many components of controls have an inherent value
aspect. Examples we refer to as control instruments include evidence documents, rights and
incentives.
The value properties of incentives (see section 2.1.2) can be well represented by value models.
A reward or penalty can be modelled as a value object with an associated economic value. For
example, an actor paying a monetary penalty can be modelled with an outgoing value object.
The goal of an incentive scheme is to change the behaviour of an actor, e.g. by introducing
a monetary incentive which decreases in the case of opportunistic behaviour. So, the value
perspective enables us to see how an incentive impacts on the profitability of actors. This is not
possible to model explicitly in process models or information systems models, since they do not
have a notion of value in the first place.
Another example of a control instrument with a value aspect is a so-called negotiable document.
Documents, used for control reasons, often have an economic value and can be traded. An
example of such a negotiable document is the Bill of Lading, which is a document that is issued
by a carrier to prove that he received goods from a seller, and that must be presented by the buyer
to the carrier to claim the goods from the carrier [Kartseva et al., 2004a]. Bills of Lading in the
oil industry are often sold many times when the oil is transported over sea. In these transactions
the transfer of the Bill of Lading means a transfer of value (payment in return for bill of lading)
as well as a transfer of an evidence control document (proof of ownership). Understanding
10TRUSTe is an independent, nonprofit organisation that certifies and monitors web site privacy and email
policies, monitor practices, and resolve thousands of consumer privacy problems every year.
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this complex relationship requires the use of a value perspective on controls. The negotiable
documents are explained in more detail in Chapter 12.
The value viewpoint is an abstract rationale for procedural aspects of controls. The value
viewpoint has two purposes for procedural controls: (1) to represent a high-level economic
motivation of controls and (2) to provide abstraction of procedural details of controls.
The value perspective represents a high-level economic motivation of controls. Fraud and em-
bezzlement often have an economic motivation: people steal to increase their wealth. Before
designing procedural controls, the control problem should be understood from the economic
perspective. Value models can provide a high-level specification of opportunistic behaviour and
explain the economic motivation behind it.
Representing a motivation for controls from the value perspective makes the primary reason for
controls more clear. The primary reason for introducing controls is always related to value, and
not to processes. For example, consider the number of export documents within the EU. During
our interviews with domain experts within the Beer Export case study, it became apparent that
no one knows why the documents are needed. We therefore argue that before introducing the
procedural controls, such as the documents, one should identify why the control is needed in
the first place. Only if the absence of the control leads to a loss of some value, should such
control be introduced.
The second purpose of the value viewpoint for procedural controls is motivated by the complex-
ity of the networks. The design of inter-organizational controls can be very complex, because,
among other things, multiple stakeholders have different perspectives. As already discussed
above, a way to deal with this multi-perspective problem is to use a multi-viewpoint approach.
By introducing a value viewpoint, we provide a high-level model of controls, without focusing
on procedural details yet. Then, the procedural details can be designed to operationalize the
value perspective.
2.3 Control patterns
What has not been discussed yet is how the available knowledge about each inter-organizational
control should be organized. By this we mean the selection of a framework for describing
the design knowledge about controls. The design knowledge of inter-organizational controls
includes guidelines on how a business model or process in a current network organization should
be changed in order to ensure sufficient control. There are several requirements for describing
this design knowledge.
Firstly, we need to describe not only a control mechanism, but also a related control problem.
A control mechanism is useless without the knowledge of the related control problem, since
not all control mechanisms can mitigate every control problem. For example, monitoring helps
against the hidden action problem, but not against the hidden information problem.
Secondly, the description of control problems and mechanisms should be supported by a graph-
ical conceptual model to allow for easy communication with stakeholders and improve shared
Control patterns 61
understanding. Such graphical representation is essential since we aim to develop a design
methodology. The advantages of graphical conceptual modelling were discussed in 2.2.
Furthermore, we wish to address both value- and process-level aspects of control problems and
mechanisms. The value aspects are needed to understand the economic motivation behind the
control mechanism and its impact on the business model of the network. The process perspec-
tive is needed to design procedural aspects of controls, as in the internal control theory.
Patterns
To structure knowledge about inter-organizational controls we suggest using patterns which
form are a well-known approach to structure complex design knowledge. A pattern is a de-
scription of a general and accepted solution for some recurring problem. Patterns prove to be
useful for many reasons. They describe solutions for ‘real world’ problems, capture domain ex-
pertise, document design decisions, reuse wisdom and experience of master practitioners, and
form a shared vocabulary for problem-solving discussions.
The pattern approach was originally proposed in architecture by [Alexander, 1979]. Alexander
describes a pattern as ”a problem which occurs over and over again in our environment and
then describes the core of the solution to that problem, in such a way that you can use this
solution a million times over, without ever doing it the same way twice”. Patterns have proven
to be successful in software engineering [Gamma et al., 1995], [Coplien and Schmidt, 1995],
[Manns, 2001], where people recognized that much of the code they wrote is reusable in other
contexts. Recent research on patterns in the business domain explores the idea of reusing pat-
terns to solve recurring business problems (see [Tapscott et al., 2000], [Weill and Vitale, 2001],
[Fowler, 1997], [Martin et al., 1998], [Rolland et al., 2000]).
There are many definitions of patterns in literature. Although most definitions of them are for
the software engineering domain [Gamma et al., 1995], [Fowler, 1997],
[Coplien and Schmidt, 1995], there are some definitions for the business domain as well. For
example, [Rolland et al., 2000] in their work on patterns of organizational change argue that
patterns should focus on specific problems within the context of organizations. They define
patterns in business domain as “generic and abstract organizational design proposals”.
It is important to realize that knowledge captured by patterns is already available knowledge
rather than knowledge to be invented by the patterns designer. Patterns make it possible to cap-
ture recurring business problems and solutions, so that these solutions can be subsequently
reused, allowing other practitioners to benefit from the experience of the pattern designers
[Seruca and Loucopoulos, 2003].
Control patterns
We propose a library of control patterns which structures existing knowledge about
inter-organizational controls. The advantage of a pattern approach for structuring knowledge
about inter-organizational controls is that the traditional structure of a pattern coincides with
the structure of the internal control taxonomy (see section 2.1.1). Traditionally, a pattern has
the following structure: name, context, problem, solutions [Gamma et al., 1995]. In the control
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domain, control mechanisms can be seen as solutions for control problems. We can therefore
define a control pattern as a description of generic and re-usable control mechanism for a re-
curring control problem.
The primary intent of a control pattern library is to provide useful abstractions of existing solu-
tions to recurring control problems, for reuse. From a theoretical perspective, control patterns
are innovative in several ways. Firstly, control patterns provide a structured way of designing
controls, using conceptual modelling techniques well-known from software engineering. Un-
like in the internal control theory, we take a value perspective in addition to the usual process
perspective to model business networks by the transfer of economic value between participants.
This also allows the designer to evaluate the impact of a control pattern on the business model
of the network organization. Secondly, the library of control patterns that we present here is
specifically tailored for inter-organizational control problems which deal with the risks of con-
ducting a transaction in a network setting between parties that may not trust each other. Thirdly,
our contribution extends previous research on inter-organizational controls [Bons, 1997], on
which some of the patterns are based, by providing specific guidelines for the design of controls
to deal with a larger set of control problems.
2.4 Further steps
In this section, we summarize the literature review and identify further steps of our research.
We aim to develop a conceptual modelling approach to designing inter-organizational controls.
As already argued, this approach must have the following characteristics:
• Address the design of control from the economic value perspective;
• Address the design of controls from the network perspective;
• Provide conceptual modelling techniques to support a human business analyst in the de-
sign process. The identified conceptual modelling techniques include ontologies and pat-
terns.
None of the theories and methodologies reviewed contain all these three features. The internal
control theory has some elements of the design methodology on controls. For example, the seg-
regation of duties and other control principles described in section 2.1.1, are prescription-type
rules on the structure of controls. In addition, the internal control theory employs conceptual
modelling techniques, such as flow charts, to describe and audit administrative processes in
organizations.
Furthermore, the focus of the internal control theory is primarily on internal control measures
rather than on structuring of inter-organizational processes. Internal control theory does take
some inter-organizational aspects into account in a way that an organization is always a part
of some external environment [Romney and Steinbart, 2006]. Nevertheless, its main focus is
on relationships within an organization and it is not that straightforward whether the internal
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control principles can and should be applied for inter-organizational relationships and to what
extend.
The agency theory provides a clear structure and description of typical inter-organizational con-
trol problems and mechanisms. It describes inter-organizational controls. We have discussed
some of them, namely screening, signalling, monitoring and incentives (see Figure 2.1). Unlike
the internal control theory, the agency theory does not provide any conceptual design method-
ology at all. It does not provide prescriptive rules for the design of inter-organizational control
systems. The agency theory research is mostly concerned with the selection of appropriate
controls and on the empirical examination of performance of controls, e.g. by addressing such
issues as what defines a better fit of a control and in which circumstances a control should be
applied [Eisenhardt, 1989]. In our methodology, the reasoning about finding the best controls is
assumed to be done by the human user, while the methodology provides the concepts to describe
and structure the controls in a precise and accurate way for the human designer.
By combining findings from the internal control theory and the principal-agent framework,
[Bons, 1997] provides some prescriptive design rules for inter-organizational controls, as shown
in section 2.1.3. Only monitoring controls from the agency theory, have been considered by
Bons. In addition, Bons identifies evidence-based controls, which stem from the internal con-
trol theory. One of the main results of [Bons, 1997] is a Petri Net-based expert system, which
allows the encoding of inter-organizational transactions in a formal way and auditing their trust-
worthiness by checking their compliance with certain heuristics. Unlike Bons, we do not intend
to develop an expert system which uses automated reasoning to select the optimal controls for
a particular network. Instead we wish to develop a methodology to assist humans in the design
process of controls.
As a result, we have undertaken the following steps. We start with developing a conceptual
modelling technique to design controls from the value perspective. This is done in Chapter 3.
This technique is based on the e3value ontology discussed in this chapter previously. In Chapter
4 and 5 we test the conceptual modelling technique in two case studies. Furthermore, we de-
velop control patterns. For this, in Chapter 6 we make an overview of the controls mechanisms
extracted in this chapter and, after synthesizing them, we suggest a set of non-overlapping and
unique problem-solution pairs of controls, which form the control patterns. The control patterns
are further tested in two case studies in Chapter 12 and 13.
2.5 Summary
In this chapter we have introduced the concept of inter-organizational controls and defined
our requirements for the design approach for inter-organizational controls. We argue that the
approach should have the following features:
• Address the design of control from the economic value perspective;
• Address the design of controls from the network perspective;
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• Provide conceptual modelling techniques to support a human business analyst in the de-
sign process. The identified conceptual modelling techniques include ontologies and pat-
terns.
Designing controls from the value perspective is a core contribution of this thesis. In short,
there are three motives behind introducing a value perspective on controls:
1. Controls are commercial services with added value;
2. Many control instruments have inherent value aspects;
3. Value viewpoint is an abstract rationale for procedural aspects of controls.
Furthermore, we have suggested a need for a pattern approach to organize knowledge about
inter-organizational control mechanisms. The patterns capture the knowledge about the most
common inter-organizational controls.
In the literature review in this chapter, we have considered the internal control theory
[Hollander et al., 1999], [Romney and Steinbart, 2006], the agency theory [Eisenhardt, 1989]
and the work on Bons inter-organizational controls [Bons, 1997], [Bons et al., 1998]. Although
these theories provide a starting point towards the design of inter-organizational controls, no sin-
gle source satisfies our requirements for the value-based design methodology of
inter-organizational controls.
In the following chapters we develop a methodology for the design of inter-organizational con-
trols in network organizations. In Part I we extend the e3valuemodel with additional concepts
to represent opportunistic behaviour and control mechanisms on a value level. In Part II we
develop a library of control patterns.
Chapter 3
The e3controlmethodology
In this chapter we extend the e3valuemethodology [Gordijn and Akkermans, 2003] so as to be
able to analyze control problems and design controls in network organizations. The goal of such
a methodology is to provide the tools that will improve understanding between stakeholders in-
volved in the design of a control mechanism. The e3valuemethodology is a suitable starting
point for designing inter-organizational controls, since it allows us to model controls from the
economic value perspective. As was argued in Chapter 2, the value perspective on controls is
useful for several reasons. For example, because controls are basically services with their own
price tag, they require financial resources, and therefore have effects on the financial sustainabil-
ity of a network organization. In addition, the initial goal of a control is to safeguard a value.
Finally, estimating the impact of controls on business models and vise versa requires a more
rigid focus on economic value, which cannot be achieved with conventional process modelling
techniques.
3.1 The e3valuemethodology
Before extending the e3valuemethodology, we describe some e3value concepts in more detail
using the example of a computer manufacturer (e.g. Dell) and its business network. Figure 3.1
shows a customer who buys a personal computer (PC) from Dell and pays money in return. Dell
then does two things. Firstly, in order to assemble the PC, it buys various PC components from
manufacturers. Secondly, Dell has to deliver the PC to the customer and to do this may choose
between the services of two logistic service providers: UPS and DHL.
3.1.1 Basic elements
This scenario described above can be conceptualized in e3value using the following e3value
constructs:
Actor. An actor is perceived by its environment as an independent economic (and often legal)
entity. An actor makes a profit or increases its utility. In a sustainable business model
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Figure 3.1: The e3valuemodel of a computer distributor Dell and its network
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each actor should be capable of making profit. The example shows a number of actors:
Dell, UPS, and DHL.
Market Segment. A market segment is a concept that breaks a market (consisting of actors)
into segments that share common properties. Accordingly, the concept market segment
shows a set of actors that assess value objects equally from an economic perspective for
one or more of their value interfaces. In the example in Figure 3.1, the market segments
are Customer and Manufacturers.
Value Object. Actors exchange value objects, which are services, products, money, or even
consumer experiences. The important point here is that a value object is of value to one
or more actors. In Figure 3.1 examples of value objects are PC, Money, Components and
Delivery.
Value Port. An actor uses a value port to show to its environment that it wants to provide or
request value objects. The concept of port provides an abstraction away from internal
business processes, and thereby focusses only on how external actors and other compo-
nents of the business model can be ‘plugged in’.
Value Transfer. A value transfer is used to connect two value ports with each other. It repre-
sents one or more potential exchanges of value objects between value ports.
Value Transaction. A value transaction is the set of all value transfers in one value interface.
Value Interface. Actors have one or more value interfaces for grouping reciprocal, opposite-
directed value ports. A value interface shows which value object an actor is willing to
exchange in return for another value object via its ports. The exchange of value objects
is atomic at the level of value interface.
The value interface concept allows us to represent an important assumption of e3value , known
as the Principle of Reciprocity which states that an actor is either willing to exchange a value
object in return for some other value objects, or to make no exchange at all. The importance
of the principle of reciprocity is that it represents the ideal behaviour of actors: an actor always
offers something in return for obtaining a value object. Controls can be seen as measures that
enforce such economic reciprocity.
3.1.2 Dependency path
With the use of the concepts introduced so far, we can explain who wants to exchange values
with whom, but we cannot yet explain what happens in response to a particular end-consumer
need. More specifically, we have to show how value transfers depend on each other. For this
purpose e3value uses dependency paths (based on [Buhr, 1998]) between value interfaces and
inside an actor.
Consumer need. The start of a dependency path is a consumer need which is modelled graph-
ically with a single-layered circle, also referred as a ‘bull’s eye’. In Figure 3.1, the con-
sumer need indicates a need of the market segment Customer for persona computers PC.
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Boundary element. A boundary element indicates where the dependency path ends which is
modelled graphically with a double-layered circle, also referred as a ‘bullet’. In Figure
3.1, there are three boundary elements: one atUPS, one atDHL and one atManufacturers.
Dependency node. A dependency node is a consumer need, a value interface, an AND-fork,
an OR-fork, an implosion, and explosion, or a boundary element.
Dependency segment. A dependency segment connects dependency nodes and it is repre-
sented by a link. The segment that connects two value interfaces indicates that if one
interface exchanges its value objects, another interface also has to exchange its value
objects. For example, the value interface of the transaction of PC and Money between
Dell and Customer is connected via the interface to the value transfer of Components and
Money with Manufacturers. This means that Dell cannot make money by selling a PC
unless it first purchases the components.
AND-fork and AND-join. An AND-fork splits a dependency segment into two or more seg-
ments. An AND-fork is represented by a line, which has one incoming segment and two
or more outgoing segments. In Figure 3.1, an AND-fork splits a segment coming from
the interface of Dell with Customer into two segments: one leading to Manufacturers
and one leading to UPS and DHL. This means that in order to deliver PC to Customer,
Dell needs both exchanges withManufacturers and with UPS or DHL. An AND-join is a
‘reversed’ AND-fork. It collects several segments into a single segment. It is represented
by a line, similar to an AND-fork, but in this case has with several incoming segments
and one outgoing segment.
OR-fork and OR-join. An OR-fork models a continuation of the dependency segment in a
direction that may be chosen from a number of alternatives. An OR-fork is represented
by a triangle, which connects one incoming segment and two or more outgoing segments.
In Figure 3.1, an OR-fork splits a segment in two: one leading to UPS and the other
one leading to DHL. This means that in order to receive an object Delivery, Dell can
choose either UPS or DHL. The OR-join is a ‘reversed’ OR-fork. It merges two or more
segments into one segment. As with an OR-fork, it is also represented by a triangle, but
with several incoming segments and one outgoing segment.
Dependency path. A dependency path is a set of dependency nodes connected by segments
that lead from a consumer need to a boundary element. In Figure 3.1, the path starts with
a consumer need at Customer and ends after the value transfers with DHL or UPS, and
with Manufacturers are completed.
Implosion and Explosion. If we return to the out-going port on the far-right of the AND-
fork in Figure 3.1, we see that it is connected to an explosion/implosion element. Such
an element contains exactly one in-coming port and one out-going port with different
occurrences. It is called an explosion element if the occurrences on the out-going port are
higher than on the in-coming one, otherwise it is an implosion element. In this example,
the element shows that in order to deliver one PC to a customer, Dell must purchase m
components at Manufacturers. So, the occurrences at the in-coming port, connected to
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the value object PC, are 1 and the occurrences at the outgoing port, connected to the value
object Components, arem (m > 1). This means that this is an explosion element.
3.1.3 Valuation
The e3valuemodels allow us to estimate the profitability of each actor in a value model. To do
this, we have to estimate the number of actual value transfers in a time period (e.g. a year) and
the monetary value of the transferred value objects. For each actor, the results are summarized
on a net value sheet, which shows an estimate of whether the business model is or could be
profitable. We assume that a value web can only be sustainable in the long term, if each actor
can create a positive net value flow.
Valuing value objects. To calculate the net value flow sheet we need to assign economic value
to the objects obtained and delivered. If we know how many objects are transferred, and their
economic value, we can construct a net value flow sheet. An example is given in Table 3.1.
How to value a value object? The e3valuemethodology distinguishes two types of value objects:
monetary objects (these are monetary objects such as banknotes, checks and alike) and non-
monetary objects (e.g. goods or services).
The reason for distinguishing monetary and non-monetary objects is that the valuation of these
objects differs, as e3value argues. If money objects are transferred, it is possible to state ob-
jectively how much money is transferred. Perhaps the amount of money to be paid is on a
suppliers price-list or the outcome of a negotiation process, but ultimately the amount of money
transferred can be objectively observed by each participant in a value web; they do not disagree
about this amount of money.
Each actor assigns their own subjective economic value to non-monetary value objects. For
example, if we ask a number of people to value the same sports car in terms of monetary units
(how much money each person is willing to pay for the sports car), each person will probably
come up with a different value. The valuation of non-monetary objects also depends on context
like place and time. For instance, many people assign a higher economic value to water if
they are alone in the dessert, than if they are in an area where they can easily buy water. To
sum up, people assign value to non-money value objects differently. The valuation of non-
monetary objects allows us to take the concept of utility [Varian, 2006] into account. In modern
economics, utility is a way of describing consumer’s preferences which are subjective and can
therefore be modelled in e3value by using the non-monetary values. These aspects are useful in
the valuation of penalties and incentives in Chapter 9.
Example. The software tool support for e3value allows us to assign numbers to value objects
and calculate the net value sheets for each actor in a value model. Table 3.1 shows such a net
value sheet for Dell in the example given earlier. The first column lists all the actors that have
value transactions with Dell. The second and the fourth columns list the formulas for calculating
the value of incoming and outgoing value objects of Dell with each actor correspondingly. The
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Table 3.1: The net value sheet for Dell in Figure 3.1
Actor Dell
Value Object In Valuation Value Object Out Valuation
with Cus-
tomer
Price PC X Volume $20,000 M (PC)
with Manu-
facturer
(Components) Price Component X
Volume
$10,000 M
with DHL
and UPS
(Delivery) Price Delivery X Vol-
ume
$1000 M
Total net
value flow
$9000 M
third and the fifth columns list estimations of these formulas for the incoming and outgoing
value objects correspondingly.
We estimate the monetary value of each value object (non-monetary objects are left out). To
calculate a net value for a specific actor we subtract all his out-going value objects from all
his in-coming value objects and multiply the result by the number of times the value object is
transferred. For example, the valuation of the object Money coming from Customer to Dell
is estimated as the price of each computer sold Price PC times the amount of computers sold
Volume. If Dell sells a computer to one customer for $1000 and if around 20 million PCs are
sold annually 1, then the value object Money is estimated as $1000 X 20 M = $20,000 M. The
valuation of object Money for the transfers between Dell and manufacturers/distributors (UPS
and DHL) is carried out in the same way. If Dell buys components for $ 500 and pays $50 for the
delivery for one computer, then for 20 million computers the components will cost $10,000 M
and delivery $1000 M.
Finally, profit or loss is calculated as the difference between the total value of the incoming and
the total value of the outgoing value objects. In our example, Dell’s net value is ($20,000 M -
$10,000 M - $1000 M) = $9000 M per year.
Note that in our estimations we make many simplifications. More fine tuning can be done to
achieve more precision. For example, a distinction could be made between different market seg-
ments, different pricing models of components manufacturers (we only estimate total spending
for the components), and different pricing models of logistic providers (we assume they are the
same).
Sensitivity analysis
The e3valuemethodology can be used to perform sensitivity analysis of different business mod-
els. For example, an analysis can be made of how certain changes in prices or market share
influence the profitability of each actor.
Such a sensitivity analysis could be performed for controls to make cost-benefit analysis. The
situation could be modelled with and without controls and the financial impact of both could be
1The data taken here are fictional
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compared. To do this, it would also be necessary to estimate the probabilities of the occurrence
of certain control problems. In e3value these probabilities could be included as choices at the
OR-fork. Although this is an interesting and important line of research, we will not focus on
the cost-benefit analysis any further in this thesis and leave it for future research.
3.1.4 The e3valueontology
The basis of the e3valuemethodology is the e3value ontology shown in Figure 3.2. It is repre-
sented as a UML class diagram, which models relationships between the e3value concepts.
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Figure 3.2: The e3value ontology, source [Gordijn, 2002]
Figure 3.2 contains the e3value concepts, already named: market segment, actor, value interface,
value offering, value port, value transfer, value transaction, and value object. The links between
the objects show how the elements are related with each other. The value interface is assigned
to zero or one actor and it consist of one or two value offerings, which contain at least one value
port. A value port contains zero or more in- and out-going value transfers, which constitute a
value transaction. Finally, a value port can offer or request one value object.
3.1.5 Comparison with other approaches
Apart from e3value , various conceptual modelling techniques have been developed to ana-
lyze and reason about the economic aspects of network organizations. Other alternative value-
oriented ontologies are Business Modelling Ontology (BMO), developed by Pigneur and Os-
terwalder, expressing the business logic of firms [Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2002]; value webs
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of [Tapscott et al., 2000], and finally, Resource-Event-Agent ontology (REA), developed by
Geerts and McArthy, which takes an accounting view on the economic relationship between
various economic entities [McCarthy, 1982]. These value ontologies focus on the creation and
transfer of economic value and are often called business modelling ontologies, as opposed to so-
called enterprise modelling ontologies such as the Enterprise Ontology [Uschold et al., 1998]
and the Business Process Handbook [Malone et al., 1999] that are more focused on organiza-
tional structure, activities and management.
We argue in favour of the e3value ontology to represent a value viewpoint on controls. To
this end, a number of design choices which appeal to us have been made in developing the
e3value ontology. This is a lightweight, rigorous ontology with a graphical representation, for-
mally specified in such a way that software support tools can be developed for it. It focuses
on a network organization, which is also a focus of our study. Usability of e3value has been
successfully validated in a variety of industries including entertainment, news, internet ser-
vice provisioning, banking, trade documents and energy supply [Gordijn and Akkermans, 2001,
Gordijn and Akkermans, 2003, Gordijn, 2002]. In these and other case studies, e3value has
proved to be a useful support for decision making in groups [Kartseva et al., 2004b]. We now go
on to discuss the arguments in favour of e3value in more detail by comparing it to other existing
ontologies.
1. Firstly, e3value is a lightweight ontology, meaning that the ontology contains only a small
number of concepts and relationships. As a result, it can easily be understood and ex-
plained. Creating a business model using the ontology can also be done within a rea-
sonably short timeframe, which is a requirement given time-to-market considerations.
Many other ontologies are too extensive, and therefore less useful. For example, the
Business Process Handbook project [Malone et al., 1999], an ontological business pro-
cess modelling approach, developed for designing organizations, has a conceptual model
with about 3400 different activities with 20 levels of specialization and 10 levels of de-
composition. Such a complex conceptual model is too complicated for exploring network
organizations, where the modelling object is not just a single organization, but rather a
large group of organizations. BMO has more concepts than e3value . REA also has a
small number of concepts. Value webs of Tapscott are lightweight, but less formal (see
below).
2. Secondly, to represent instantiations of the ontology (i.e., particular business models),
a graphical syntax has been developed using a software tool support (available from
http://www.e3value.com). As was argued in Chapter 2, a graphical representation is an
important feature to enhance communication with business stakeholders. BMO and REA
do not have a fully developed graphical representation. Value webs of Tapscott are graph-
ically represented, but no systematic method is given how to make these representations.
They do not specifically focus on the economic value perspective and contain some ele-
ments of process modelling.
3. Thirdly, the focus of e3value is on the creation, distribution, and consumption of economic
value in a network of enterprizes and consumers. The terminology of e3value comes
from research on strategic perspective of network organizations [Tapscott et al., 2000],
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[Porter, 1980], marketing [Kotler, 1988] and axiology
[Holbrook, 1999]. The focus on economic aspects of a network and the relevant termi-
nology is essential for our research. Although BMO also views the networks of suppliers
and customers, it limits the notion of business model to a single firm. Tapscott’s value
webs do not specifically focus on the economic value perspective, but contain some ele-
ments of e.g. process models. REA considers the external activities of a firm, although
its original purpose was to develop internal Accounting Information Systems. The dis-
advantage of REA for our task is its limitation within the accounting definition of value,
e.g. unlike e3value it does not consider ‘experience’ to be a value object. As the name
suggests, the focus of REA is on resources and events, which are more oriented towards
a process viewpoint. In addition, REA is a structural, and not a behavioral model (see
below).
4. Fourthly, the e3value ontology has been formally described to enable the development
of software tools that support automated analysis and the evaluation of designed busi-
ness models. The e3valuemodel enables computer-supported reasoning about finan-
cial sustainability by generating net value flows in the form of a spreadsheet analysis
for each actor involved. The e3value ontology is available as a UML class diagram,
RDF/Schema implementation, Prolog rule base, and Java-programmed design workbench
(see http://www.e3value.com/). Tapscott’s value webs are very informal.
3.2 The e3controldesign framework
In this section, we introduce some steps which are usually needed to design controls. From the
network perspective, we refer to these steps as the e3control design framework. In addition, we
introduce some terminology used throughout the thesis.
Based on the internal control theory, as described in section 2.1.1, the process of design of
controls consists of three steps. In the first step an analyst identifies a transaction cycle, which
in fact represents a normative model on how a process should occur so that the risks of fraud and
errors are minimized. In the second step, an analyst compares real processes with the normative
one and identifies potential or present control problems. In the third step, the analyst designs
control mechanisms.
In our opinion, a more precise terminology to describe these three steps is provided by deontic
logic [Wieringa and Meyer, 1993], [Jones and Porn, 1985] in which two states of a network can
be distinguished: ideal and sub-ideal. Applied to the domain of inter-organizational controls, a
network in an ideal state is one in which all actors behave as they are expected to (e.g. according
to contractual agreements). Such behaviour of the actors is known as ideal behaviour and the
ideal state of a network is referred to as ideal situation. In a sub-ideal state, actors in the network
do not behave ideally and this is called sub-ideal behaviour. According to the internal control
theory, sub-ideal behaviour can be intentional (e.g. fraud) or unintentional (e.g. errors). The
sub-ideal state of a network is referred to as sub-ideal situation. As a result, we suggest the
following steps to design inter-organizational controls:
1. Ideal situation: Designing the ideal situation.
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2. Sub-ideal situation: Analysis of existing or possible sub-ideal situations.
3. Control mechanisms: Designing control mechanisms to reduce damage caused by control
problems.
These steps constitute the e3control design framework. In the first step, we model an ideal
situation in which we describe how we want the actors in a network to behave and we assume
that no fraud or errors occur. This is similar to normative models of transaction cycles in the
internal control theory. In addition, both a value view and process view on the ideal situation
can be designed.
In the second step we describe situations, in which actors in a network behave sub-ideally, e.g.
commit fraud or make unintentional errors which lead to loss of value of their counter parties.
This is similar to control problem analysis in the internal control theory, however, in our case
both the value view and process view of the ideal situation can be designed.
Finally, in the last step we address sub-ideal behaviour by adding control mechanisms. This
model with controls is an ‘improved’ ideal model. It contains controls against a problem de-
scribed in the second step. Again, we can model these situations from both the value and the
process view.
e3-control
Step 1:Ideal Model
Step 2:
Sub-ideal Model
Step 3:
Control Model
Figure 3.3: The e3control cycle
A network usually contains several control problems. Therefore, the steps can be repeated in
cycles to address each control problem. After a previous problem is addressed, the ‘improved’
ideal model can be taken as ‘ideal’ model in the next cycle, where the next problem is addressed.
This creates a cyclic approach, shown graphically in Figure 3.3 and demonstrated in case studies
in Chapters 4, 5, 12 and 13.
3.2.1 Subjective view on sub-ideal behaviour
An important issue here is who determines what behaviour is sub-ideal and what is not. We
incorporate a subjective view on sub-ideal behaviour which assumes that such behaviour is
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defined subjectively by one actor or a group of actors. For example, from a customer’s point of
view an untimely delivery by a seller is sub-ideal. However, the seller might not share this view
if we assume that he is a rational actor, interested only in the maximization of his own wealth.
However, actors rarely make decisions based only on rational concerns. Very often they define
something to be sub-ideal based on existing legal or social norms. In the previous example, such
a legal norm can be a contract between a customer and Dell that proclaims that late deliveries are
sub-ideal. In this case, if the seller agrees with the contract (e.g. by signing it) he also considers
the late delivery to be sub-ideal. The conventional use of e3control is where various parties
in a contracting situation jointly agree on what they consider the relevant control problems to
be, hence the sub-ideal model normally represents the agreed control concerns of all parties
involved. If no such control concerns can be agreed on, it means that a situation exists in which
parties cannot agree on a contract.
Another example is a regulation to stimulate the production of renewable energy, as discussed
in Chapter 12. In the past, the emission of carbon-dioxides was considered sub-ideal only by
a limited group of environmentalists. The reduction of non-renewable energy production was
not generally accepted by all groups of society, since there were (and still are) parties, who
resisted renewable energy production, e.g. oil companies because it would reduce oil-based
energy production. However, after the Kyoto protocol, the opinion of the environmentalist
groups became the general policy of several governments. The Kyoto protocol defines a legal
norm, accepted by the governments of countries who signed it, and as a result, the emission of
carbon dioxide is seen as sub-ideal by the governments as well.
3.2.2 A need to extend e3value
To address the three steps of the framework from the value viewpoint, we need to be able
to model both ideal and sub-ideal situations in value models. The e3valuemethodology pre-
supposes an ideal world, in which parties in the value web do not commit a fraud or behave
opportunistically with respect to each other. A value model expressed in e3value can be seen
as a model of a contract in which parties have obligations to exchange value objects and act in
accordance with a contract. Therefore, e3value can only model ideal situations.
The e3valuemethodology is not enough to model sub-ideal situations. Take for example the
e3valuemodel in Figure 3.4, where we show value transfers between a seller, a buyer and a tax
office. The model shows that the buyer pays the seller for the goods and that the seller pays the
VAT tax to the tax office in return for getting a compliance with the tax law. This is modelled
with the value objects Goods, Payment, V AT and Legal Compliance.
One sub-ideal situation of this model is when the seller does not pay taxes when he should. In
a value model, this corresponds to a transfer of a single value object Legal Compliance from
the Seller to Tax Office (because the value object VAT is not transferred). But such a single
value transfer is not allowed in e3value because of the Principle of Reciprocity, which says that
actors only exchange value objects in return for one or more other value object, or they do
not exchange at all (see section 3.1). In e3value terms, a transfer of a single value object is an
invalid construct and the attempt to model it should result in an error message by an e3value
model checker.
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Figure 3.4: Ideal value transfers and value objects in e3control
Since e3value only models ideal behaviour, we need to extend it with concepts to represent sub-
ideal behaviour. We call this extension e3control . An e3controlmodel enables representation
of control problems as sub-ideal value models.
3.3 Constructs of the e3controlontology
We extend the e3value otology to the e3control ontology in order to be able to model sub-ideal
situations when the Principle of Reciprocity does not hold. The constructs of the e3control on-
tology enable the modelling of sub-ideal situations. In particular, e3control allows us to specify
value transfers affected by a violation as well as the actors responsible for the violation.
Firstly, we represent a violation of the principle of reciprocity by introducing sub-ideal value
objects and sub-ideal value transfers. In Figure 3.5 we model several sub-ideal situations that
can happen when one of the actors violates the exchange obligations stated in the ideal model
of transactions between a seller, a buyer and a tax office in Figure 3.4.
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Figure 3.5: Sub-ideal value transfers and value objects in e3control
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The value transactions 1 and 6 in Figure 3.5 correspond to the ideal situation modelled in Figure
3.4. As in Figure 3.4, the actors exchange so-called ideal value objects Goods, Payment,
V AT and Legal Compliance.
Other value transactions correspond to sub-ideal situations in which at least one actor does not
behave as prescribed by the ideal situation. For example, value transaction 3 models that the
goods have been paid for but not delivered. Failure to deliver the goods is modelled with the
objectNo Goods, which is a sub-ideal value object. Its value transfer is marked with a dashed
line. Other sub-ideal situations are modelled in a similar way: the sub-ideal value object No
Payment represents non-payment of goods, the object Damaged Goods represents a delivery
of damaged goods, the object No V AT represents non-payment of VAT, and the object No
Legal Compliance represents a denial of legal compliance. In the value transaction 8, legal
compliance is exchanged for tax payment while taxes are not paid. So, the Legal Compliance
object is sub-ideal, because the legal compliance should only be given if the taxes are paid.
We now go on to define the concepts used in 3.5 more precisely. These are sub-ideal value
objects, sub-ideal value transfers, sub-ideal value ports, liability tokens, sub-ideal dependence
segments and paths, and sub-ideal actors. The concepts and relationships between them are
summarized in the UML class diagram in Figure 3.6.
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3.3.1 Sub-ideal value objects
A sub-ideal value object models a value object affected by sub-ideal behaviour. It usually
has a name that is related to the name of its corresponding ideal value object. For example,
if we name the ideal value object ‘Goods’, a sub-ideal value object can be named ‘Damaged
Goods’. Because multiple control problems are possible, each ideal value object corresponds to
multiple sub-ideal value objects. In Figure 3.5 the objectsNo Goods,No Payment,No V AT ,
Damaged Goods and No Legal Compliance, and Legal Compliance in value transfer 8 are
sub-ideal.
3.3.2 Sub-ideal value transfers
A sub-ideal value transfer transfers a sub-ideal value object. It is visualized with a dashed line.
In Figure 3.5 all the value transfers with sub-ideal value objects No Goods, No Payment, No
V AT , Damaged Goods and No Legal Compliance, and Legal Compliance in transfer 8 are
represented with a dashed line.
3.3.3 Empty and incorrect sub-ideal value objects
We can distinguish two types of sub-ideal value transfers: transfers of empty value objects and
transfers of incorrect value objects. Empty value objects correspond to a situation in which no
value is delivered to a receiving actor. The examples in Figure 3.5 areNo Goods, when ordered
goods are not delivered, No Payment, when no payment is made, and No V AT , when no
taxes are paid. An incorrect value object is a value object different from the one transferred
in a corresponding ideal situation. The examples in Figure 3.5 are Damaged Goods, when
goods are delivered in a damaged state. A good with other characteristics than ordered is also
an example of an incorrect value object.
3.3.4 Liability tokens
In Figure 3.5 we modelled six pairs of value transfers in which the Principle of Reciprocity does
not hold. However, from this model it is not clear which actor is responsible for the violation,
i.e. which actor behaves sub-ideally. For example, it is not clear if the seller is responsible for
damaging the goods or the buyer.
To address this issue, we introduce a liability token, which is assigned to one of the two value
ports of a sub-ideal value transfer and is assigned to an actor responsible for this sub-ideality. A
liability token is visualized with a letter L, assigned to a value port that contains the sub-ideal
value transfer. One actor may have multiple liability tokens, corresponding to different kinds of
sub-ideal behaviour.
In Figure 3.7 we see liability tokens placed at various sub-ideal value transfers. In value trans-
actions 2 and 5 the buyer is responsible for the sub-ideal value transfer No Payment. In value
transactions 3 and 5 the seller is responsible for the sub-ideal value transferNo Goods. In value
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transaction 4 the seller is responsible for the sub-ideal value transfer Damaged Goods and so
on.
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Figure 3.7: Liability tokens and sub-ideal dependency paths in e3control
Note that e3control does not give advice on how to identify a sub-ideally behaving actor. This is
very domain- and case-specific and has to be determined by a modelled. e3control only provides
concepts to describe the sub-ideal behaviour.
3.3.5 Sub-ideal value port
Every value transfer, ideal or sub-ideal, has at least two ports: ingoing and outgoing. A value
port is sub-ideal if it is connected to a sub-ideal transfer and has a liability token. Liability
tokens are assigned to ports that contain sub-ideal value transfers, as explained above. So, all
value ports which are connected to dashed lines, and that have liability tokens are sub-ideal.
For example, in Figure 3.7 value transaction 4 models that a damaged good is the responsibility
of the seller. The liability token can also occur on an incoming value port. For example, when
damaged goods are the responsibility of the buyer, the liability token in the value transaction 4
should be modelled at the buyer and not at the seller.
3.3.6 Sub-ideal value interface
A value interface is sub-ideal if it contains at least one sub-ideal value port. In Figure 3.5 all
value interfaces, containing value ports with liability tokens are sub-ideal.
3.3.7 Sub-ideal dependency segments
A sub-ideal dependency segment is a segment connected to at least one sub-ideal value trans-
fer. Graphically, the segment is marked with a liability token at the specific port. In Figure
3.7 every segment that is connected to a value transfer marked with a dashed line is sub-ideal.
These are segments connected to value transactions 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8.
3.3.8 Sub-ideal dependency paths
We define an ideal dependency path as one that only contains ideal segments and has the same
structure of segments and AND- and OR-forks as in the ideal value model. An ideal path models
an ideal situation. Consequently, a sub-ideal dependency path is a path that contains at least
one sub-ideal segment. In other words, it goes through at least one sub-ideal value transfer.
Therefore, a sub-ideal path represents a sub-ideal situation.
We see several paths in Figure 3.7. Each one starts with a consumer need at the buyer and
follows with an OR-fork. The OR-fork splits the initial paths into five sub-paths. Then at the
seller we have a second OR-fork which leads to the three sub-paths. So, a total of fifteen paths
are modelled in Figure 3.7. Of these fifteen paths only the path that goes through transfers 1
and 6 is ideal. All other paths are sub-ideal since they go through at least one sub-ideal value
transfer. For example, the path that goes through value transfer 2 and 6 models a situation when
the seller does not get payment from the buyer, but that he does pay the taxes. The path that
goes through value transfers 2 and 7 models that the seller neither gets a payment nor pays the
taxes.
3.3.9 Sub-ideal actors
Actors that have liability tokens behave sub-ideally. They can be called sub-ideally behaving
actors, or just sub-ideal actors. In Figure 3.7 every actor has a liability token. Note that the
token is assigned to a value port which means that only one actor is responsible for the sub-
ideality of a transfer connected to a port with a liability token.
3.4 Modelling rights and evidence
In the remaining sections of this chapter we will address the issue of modelling rights and
evidence documents in e3valuemodels. Evidence documents play an important role in controls
and are often associated with economic value. Furthermore, evidence documents often represent
rights, for example, the stocks, which are essentially evidence documents, represent rights for
company’s profit paid in a form of dividend. In addition, stocks have a value, defined by the
market.
Taken that e3value differs greatly from process modelling [Gordijn, 2002], it is sometimes diffi-
cult to decide whether the transfer of an evidence document, the transfer of a right or a physical
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transfer of some object are really value transfers. For instance, is an airplane ticket a value
object, given that it cannot be sold or refunded?
In order to answer this question, we extend the e3valuemodel presented in Figure 3.2 in two
ways. Firstly, we suggest that there is a need to distinguish between possession and ownership
rights. Secondly, to relate value transfers to transfer of possession and rights, we we examine
the operational details of a value transaction, which is the concept of operational activity. As a
result, we bridge procedural aspects of controls of the internal control theory (see section 2.1.1)
with the value aspects of e3value . In addition, we also describe how the concept of evidence
document fits into this relation.
3.5 An extended value object ontology
In Figure 3.8 we propose a model, which relates the e3value concepts, such as ‘value object’
and ‘value transfer’, to process-level concepts, such as ‘operational activity’, ‘right’, ‘custody’
and ‘evidence documents’. This model is based on findings in [Kartseva et al., 2006a]. Other
authors suggest similar models [Andersson et al., 2006, Weigand et al., 2006]. In our model we
include the concepts that are relevant for our goal to link the concept of evidence documents
and rights with the concepts of value object and value transfer. New elements added to the
initial e3value ontology in Figure 3.2 are shown in gray. The new elements are Resource, Right,
Evidence Document, Custody, Activity, Transfer Activity and Conversion Activity.
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Figure 3.8: Extended value transfer ontology
We will now describe the concepts of the model in Figure 3.8 and then go on to discuss how
rights and evidence documents can be modelled in e3value .
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3.5.1 Resources
Figure 3.8 shows that every Value Object is associated with one or more Resources. The concept
of Resource is different than the concept of Value Object which refers to an abstraction of
something of value. A Resource, on the other hand, is not necessarily of value to anyone. For
instance, a Resource can play a role in a process model, but may not be of relevance to a value
model.
A value object can require several resources. For example, a value object Delivery Service
consists of the resources Car and Driver. A hair dresser service requires resources such as
Scissors, Hairdryer, Hairdresser, Electricity, Shampoo and Water, to name just a few. Unlike
a value object, a resource is not always of value to someone. For example, scissors alone are
of no value to someone who wants to have a haircut. This person values the whole bundle of
resources which are represented by a value object Hairdresser Service.
It is possible to identify some general categories of resources such as physical goods, infor-
mation, and money. [Baida, 2006] also identifies human resources, capability resources, and
experience resources2. Human resources refer to the human effort required for a value transfer
to take place. Capability resources refer to an ability to use some service, e.g. insurance, which
can be used or not. Experience resources represent an experience offered by a value transfer,
e.g. an experience of a good service.
A resource may have properties and associations with other objects, e.g. the colour of a shirt.
Such properties and associations are modelled by means of a property Feature of the Resource,
see Figure 3.8.
3.5.2 Rights
According to the property rights theory [Alchian and Demsetz, 1972], [Coase, 1960], resources
are associated with property rights. A property right is the exclusive authority to determine
how a resource is used, whether that resource is owned by a government or by individuals
[Alchian and Demsetz, 1972]. [Coase, 1960] suggests that each asset (or, as we call it - a re-
source) refers to a vector of rights. Conventionally, property rights include (1) exclusive rights
to the use of a resource, (2) exclusive rights to the services of a resource, and (3) rights to ex-
change the resource at mutually agreeable terms [Alchian and Demsetz, 1972]. Other types of
rights include copyrights.
So, in Figure 3.8 we model several Rights related to one Resource. For example, a resource
House is associated with a right to use and right to sell. The type of the right (e.g. use or sell
right) is modelled as a property RightType of a Right.
Rights to a resource need not be held by a single person or organization, and can be partitioned
among several actors [Alchian and Demsetz, 1972]. For example, the owner of the house usu-
ally has a right to use and sell the house, but has no right to demolish it. Permission from the
municipality is usually required to exercise this right.
2[Baida, 2006] also defines change of state resource, which represent a change of something, which can be an
actor himself (e.g. a haircut), a physical good (e.g. cooking in a restaurant, shipping of goods), or information (e.g.
book editing). In our ontology this is modelled with the Conversion activity.
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3.5.3 Transfer and Conversion activities
A value transfer is valuable not only because of the rights and resources it transfers, but also
because of the operational activities needed to transfer these rights and resources. Therefore, we
model that every value transfer requires the execution of operational activities. For example,
for a delivery service one should drive a car and upload the delivery. Operational activities are
normally described in process models, e.g. in UML activity diagrams [Fowler and Scott, 2000].
They are also an important unit of analysis in the internal control theory, as discussed previously
in section 2.1.1.
Note that the operational activities discussed here are not automatically value activities. A value
activity is defined by [Gordijn, 2002] as a collection of operational activities, and, by definition,
a value activity should be profitable for a performing stakeholder. This profitability requirement
holds only for value activities, and not for operational activities which denote something to be
done, in order to produce outputs as a result of inputs and resources, and is not required to be
profitable.
There are two types of operational activities: Transfer Activity and Conversion Activity. A
Transfer Activity is related to two kinds of transfers: giving a right for this resource and giving a
resource in a physical custody. By the transfer a resource to someone’s custody we mean to give
the resource in that person’s possession or to provide the person with access to the resource. In
Figure 3.8 we model this distinction with a Transfer Activity that can transfer either a Right to a
resource or a Custody of a resource. According to the property rights theory, having ownership
rights to a resource and having it in custody are two different things. Ownership means the
lawful possession of, or access to a resource, and may not come with actual physical custody.
For instance, a person who steals a car possesses it, but has no legal rights to it.
Finally, the Conversion Activitymodels value transfers that require the conversion of a resource,
e.g. a hairdresser services involves ‘conversion’ of a resource ‘hair’. The Conversion Activity
converts the Resource, not the Value Object.
3.5.4 Evidence documents
As we have already explained, one value transfer can be related to three types of operational
activities: a (Right) Transfer Activity to transfer rights for a resource, a (Custody) Transfer
Activity to transfer a resource in another actor’s custody, and a Conversion Activity to change
the state of a resource. Every activity can be complemented with an evidence document which
contains information about the activity and the resources and actors involved in the transfer or
conversion. For example, a receipt can serve as evidence of buying goods. So, in Figure 3.8,
one Activity can be complemented with zero or more Evidence Documents.
In addition, an evidence document can be a part of a bundle of resources that represents a value
object. For example, the value object Stock is of value to the owner, since it can be sold. The
stock certificate is an evidence document, which certifies the transfer of the rights associated
with the stock to the stock owner. The stock certificate is also often a required resource of the
value object Stock, since without the certificate the owner cannot execute his rights (e.g. receive
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a dividend). In Figure 3.8 we generalize this finding and model that the Evidence Document
represents a Resource of a Value Object.
3.6 Rights and evidence in e3value
Since e3value differs greatly from process modelling [Gordijn, 2002], it can be argued that a
value transfer specifies a transfer of a right to a resource rather than a transfer of custody of a
resource. In addition, representing transfers of evidence documents as value objects in value
models may seem to be irrelevant, since evidence documents are often associated with proce-
dures. On the other hand, as was already mentioned, there are examples, for which it makes
sense to introduce value objects that represent transfer of custody. One such example is consid-
ered here and raises the question: Are transfers of custody and transfers of evidence documents
value transfers?
We will now analyze an example which demonstrates that value transfers can be of value to
actors not only when they transfer certain rights for resources, but also when they transfer the
resources to the actor’s custody. However, to represent an operational transfer of custody is not
a sufficient condition for the transfer to be a value transfer. There should be a willingness to
exchange this resource for another value object.
3.6.1 Rights and custody in one value transfer
In Figure 3.9 we model that someone buys a visit to a movie. We represent it with one value
transfer between two actors - a cinema and a visitor. The visitor receives the value objectMovie
Viewing, and the cinema receives the value object Money.
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Figure 3.9: Example of visiting a cinema
Money is a value object that has a resource with the same nameMoney. Note that resources are
not modelled explicitly in e3value . We argue that the value transfer Money is associated with
the operational transfers of both rights and custody of the resourceMoney. By paying money to
a cinema, (1) the right to the money is transferred from the visitor to the cinema and (2) access
to the money is also granted, since only then is it of value to the cinema. So, the transfer of
custody is also required to gain value from a value transfer.
Movie Viewing is a value object that has many resources. For instance, a Place in a cinema, and
a Film. The resources Place and Film are not represented explicitly in the e3valuemodel. The
value transfer Movie Viewing is similar to the value transfer Money, in that both are associated
with the operational transfer of both value and custody of the resources Place and Film. When
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money is paid, the visitor is granted the right to enter the cinema as well as the access to his seat
Place and to a movie Film. Access to the film and seat is of value to the visitor, since without
them the visitor cannot view the movie and his ticket will expire.
So, we make two observations. Firstly, custody transfers can also be of value. For instance,
access to a seat in a cinema is of value, since without it the visitor cannot view the movie and
his ticket will expire. Secondly, a value transfer can be associated with both a transfer of rights
and a transfer of custody of a resource on the operational level.
3.6.2 Splitting transfer of rights and custody
In some cases it can be useful to represent operational transfers of custody and rights to the
same resource as separate value objects. In Figure 3.10 we show the same scenario as in Figure
3.9, but model the transfers of rights and custody to the resource Film and Place in separate
value transfers. To do this, we explicitly model the ticket to the cinema as a value object.
Firstly, the visitor buys a ticket. This is modelled with the value transfers of Ticket and Money
between the visitor and the cinema. The value object Ticket is associated with an operational
activity of transferring the rights to the resources Film and Place to the visitor. The ticket
certifies the transfer of rights and provides evidence that the visitor has a right to a certain seat
and has a right to see a movie. In the ontology in Figure 3.8, the ticket represents an evidence
document that certifies the Transfer Activity.
The value transfer Ticket models only the transfer of rights, but not the transfer of custody of
the resources Film and Place. If the visitor has the ticket, he either sells it to another visitor
or exchanges it for access to the cinema. Only in the latter case is the custody of the resources
Film and Place transferred to the visitor. This is represented with the value transfers Movie
Viewing c exchanged for Ticketc between the visitor and the cinema (here the index C stands
for ‘custody’). The value transferMovie Viewing c is associated with the custody transfer of the
resources Place and Film to the visitor. In other words, it models that to gain full value of the
exchange, the visitor must get access to the seat and see the movie. Similarly, the value transfer
Ticketc is associated with the custody transfer of the resource Ticket to the cinema. No rights
are transferred by these two value transfers.
To summarize, as in the previous model, access to the resources Place and Film are of value
because without the access the visitor cannot view the movie and his ticket will expire. How-
ever, in this case two different value transfers are being used to model the transfer of rights and
the transfer of custody for the resources Film and Place. Ticket value transfer corresponds to
the transfer of rights to the resources, whileMovie Viewing c value transfer corresponds to their
custody transfer.
3.6.3 Criteria for distinguishing a value transfer
The questions that bothers many researchers (e.g. [Weigand et al., 2006, Kartseva et al., 2006a])
is whether it is acceptable to represent a transfer of an evidence document, like the Ticket, or a
custody, like Movie Viewing c, as value transfers. Are they really value transfers?
86 The e3controlmethodology
ch3_ticket, 2008-04-12 17:47:19, http://www.e3value.com/
CINEMA
VISITOR
Money
Movie Viewing
CINEMAVISITOR Money
Ticket
OTHER
VISITORS
Ticket_c
Movie Viewing_c
Money Ticket
Ticket_c
Movie Viewing_c
Figure 3.10: Example of a ticket modelled separately
The main criterion that is worth following when modelling an evidence document or a custody
transfer as a value transfer is that the transferred object should be of value to some actor. In
other words, at least one actor should be willing to exchange another value object in return for
this object. An evidence document should only be modelled as a value object if it is of value to
at least one actor. The same rule is valid for objects that represent only physical transfers.
In the example of the cinema, the value transfer Movie Viewing c is associated with a custody
transfer for the film and the seat, but is not associated with transfer of any rights. However,
as was previously argued, this is still a value transfer because without access the visitor cannot
view the movie and his ticket will expire. Similarly, the value transfer Ticketc is associated with
a custody transfer of the ticket, but is not associated with transfer of any rights. One of the
reasons why possessing the ticket is of value to the cinema is that the cinema has to have an
evidence of payments in order to ensure that money is not stolen by a cashier, tickets are not
given away for free and seats are not given without tickets. Therefore, the ticket is of value due
to control-related reasons.
To summarize, value objects can be of value to actors not only when the actors receive certain
rights to the resources of these value objects, but also when they receive them in custody. How-
ever, representing an operational transfer of custody is not a sufficient condition for the transfer
to be a value transfer. There should be another reason why having a resource in custody is of
value to certain actors, e.g. because not having it in custody will lead to a value loss.
The choice of explicitly modelling transfers of custody and evidence documents as value trans-
fers depends on the context and goals of modelling. Sometimes, modelling the provision of
custody, evidence documents and rights is so trivial that it is not important to make them ex-
plicit in a model. In other cases, when the focus of the design is on rights, custody and evidence
documents, modelling them explicitly is necessary to provide useful insights.
For example, it is only worthwhile explicitly modelling the ticket in the example of the cinema
if we want to show that the visitor can resell the ticket. In Figure 3.9, where we do not consider
the ticket as a value object, we are not able to model that the ticket can be resold.
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3.7 Summary
In this section we have suggested the e3control design framework and the e3control ontology.
Within the e3control design framework we put forward a distinction between an ideal situation
and a sub-ideal situation in networks. Whereas the ideal situation contains no unintentional er-
rors or intentional irregularities, the sub-ideal situation does. Furthermore, the e3control design
framework suggests three steps in designing controls:
1. Designing the ideal situation;
2. Analysis of existing or possible sub-ideal situations;
3. Designing control mechanisms to reduce damage from the control problems.
The steps can be performed iteratively to handle multiple control problems. The framework is
based on the internal control theory, as described in [Romney and Steinbart, 2006].
The e3control ontology contains concepts that allow us to represent opportunistic behaviour in
value models. It is an extension of the e3value ontology of [Gordijn and Akkermans, 2003].
Among other things, the e3control ontology includes such concepts as sub-ideal value object
and sub-ideal value transfer in order to show that the result of sub-ideal behaviour is an incorrect
exchange of a value object or an exchange of an inappropriate value object. An example of a
sub-ideal value object is damaged goods. The transfers of sub-ideal value objects are marked in
graphical models with dashed lines. In addition, we introduce a liability token, a concept that
allows identification of a party who behaves sub-ideally.
Furthermore, we have also presented an extension of the e3value ontology by linking the con-
cepts of e3valuewith a process model ontology. A value object is described by Resources,
which are associated with Rights and Custody. A value port of a value transfer is associated
with the operational activities of the actor who has this port. These activities are of two types:
Transfer Activity and Conversion Activity. The Transfer Activity transfers a Right to a resource
or a Custody of a Resource. The Conversion Activity is an activity that changes a Resource.
Finally, we have argued that transfers can be of value to actors not only when they correspond
to transfers of certain rights to resources, but also when they transfer the resource’s custody
(e.g. granting access to a resource). However, to represent an operational transfer of custody is
not a sufficient condition for the transfer to be a value transfer. In addition, we have argued that
transfers of evidence documents can also be of value. For example, when an actor is accountable
for something and when the evidence document provides the accountability. In general, the
criterion for defining whether a transfer is a value transfer or not is that the transferred object
should be of value to at least one actor in the model.
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Chapter 4
Controls in the private sector
In this chapter we present a case study concerning the intellectual property rights clearance
procedure for webcasting. This study demonstrates and explains e3control in greater detail.
Webcasting generally refers to the streaming of audio over the Internet and it is sometimes
called “Internet radio”. In order to broadcast music commercially, a radio station has to obtain
several licenses and pay several copyright fees, including a fee for the right to broadcast music
to the public. In Europe, this right is defined in European legislation1. A similar law, known
as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA2) exists in the USA . Each music track has
several rights owners, who eventually receive the copyright fees. Songwriters and/or their music
publishers, record companies that produce, manufacture and distribute records, and performing
artists are examples of rights owners.
Radio stations have to pay copyright fees to many rights owners. Therefore, special organiza-
tions, called rights societies carry out the clearance procedure. These societies act as a ‘middle
man’ between radio stations and rights owners. In Europe, Intellectual Property Rights (IPR)
societies. Such societies operate on behalf of rights owners and provide radio stations with
the service of clearing rights for a large group of rights owners, e.g. all Dutch rights owners.
Although the rights clearance business is a government-regulated monopoly at the moment, a
trend towards market liberalization can be discerned.
We commence by considering the model shown in Figure 4.1. It depicts individuals who wish to
listen to music received from either an ethereal radio station or from an internet radio station.
The listener decides which radio station to choose. This decision has been modelled by the
OR-fork at the listener. For this case, we assume that only the value transfers related to Internet
radio stations need to be considered. Consequently, we have not modelled any further exchanges
between the ethereal station and other parties.
Two things must be done in order to listen to an Internet radio station. Firstly, the listener
needs to secure an infrastructure, namely Internet access, of which various forms exist, e.g.
broadband, fixed, or mobile. Secondly, the listener needs to hear at least one music track which
1EUDirective 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22May 2001 on the harmonization
of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society. See EU Directive 2001/29/EC at
www.europa.eu
2www.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.pdf
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Figure 4.1: A Free Internet Radio business model
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is broadcast by an Internet radio station. This is represented by a value object Stream, which is
a stream of music tracks and in return for the stream, the Internet radio station gains Audience
Size. The size of the audience is important to the radio station, because a large audience attracts
advertisers, who are the main source of revenue for a radio station. The advertisers pay an
Advertisement Fee for the audience size. In this model, we assume that listeners do not need to
pay for listening: this is a free-to-air radio.
As we have explained, radio stations have to pay for the right to broadcast each track. The
payment is made through rights societies, the most relevant of which in the Netherlands are:
BUMA3 and SENA4. Therefore, we have modelled value transfers of Fee and Right to Broadcast
between the Internet radio station and SENA with BUMA. The rights are paid per track, not per
stream. Therefore, there is an explosion element (see section 3.1) at the Internet radio station,
which shows that a stream consists of m tracks, and for each track a right to broadcast has to be
paid.
SENA and BUMA clear the same rights, but do so for different groups of rights owners. SENA
transfers the money collected from the stations to artists and producers. BUMA does the same
for music and text writers. Although there is only one producer per track, many artists, text
writers and music writers are involved. Therefore, there are AND-forks and explosion elements,
which show that one fee coming from the Internet radio station is distributed over n artists, text
writers or music writers.
Each track is identified with the International Standard Recording Code (ISRC), a unique and
permanent identification for a specific recording which in principle can be permanently encoded
into a product as its digital fingerprint using watermarking technology. An encoded ISRC pro-
vides means to automatically identify recordings for the purpose of repartitioning rights pay-
ments. Radio stations pay a fee for the right to broadcast a track according to its ISRC. The fee
is around E 0.0007 per track per listener.
At present, the information concerning tracks that are played is reported to rights societies by
the radio stations themselves. According to www.riaa.com, every radio station has to report
information about their broadcasting each calendar quarter. The problem with such a procedure
is that a violation of the segregation of duties principle occurs (see section 2.1.1) when radio
stations are allowed to report their own broadcasts. Radio station wish to pay lower rights-
related fees, so, obviously, they have an incentive to understate either the number of listeners
or the number of broadcasted tracks. Therefore, if a proper segregation of duties is to take
place, the information about broadcasts should be provided by an actor who is not interested in
reducing of the fees for the broadcast; this actor should be someone who is impartial.
There is no technology available for ethereal radio, which allows anybody other than a radio
station to precisely identify what track is played and how many people listen to it. Therefore,
market research is done on a regular basis to estimate the size of the audience. However, Internet
does provide technology that enables other independent parties to calculate the exact number of
listeners per broadcasted track as well as to identify the ISRC of the broadcasted track. In this
case study, we have designed such a clearance procedure for webcasting taken from the value
perspective using e3control .
3See www.buma.nl
4In Dutch: De Stichting ter Exploitatie van Naburige Rechten. See www.sena.nl
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4.1 Research Context
Our case study is based on information provided by SENA5, an Intellectual Property Rights
(IPR) society, responsible for collecting royalties for music broadcasting. J. Gordijn, a con-
sultant at the SENA had access to the primary information within the realm of his work at the
SENA. The author of this thesis acquired her knowledge of the case mostly from the information
provided by J. Gordijn. In addition, she had access to the deliverables of the OBELIX research
project (see http://obelix.e3value.com) and a series of articles, e.g. [Pedrinaci et al., 2005],
where the case is described by other researchers.
4.2 Step 1. Ideal value model
The first step in designing controls is to construct an ideal value model. In fact, the model in
Figure 4.1 is the ideal model of the rights clearance procedure. Note that, when specifying the
ideal model here, we do not claim that regulations laid down by the Dutch rights societies are
the best solution for Internet radio stations. The term ‘ideal value model’ simply indicates that
this model shows that economic exchanges between different organizations are completely in
accordance with the regulation of the Dutch rights societies.
For the remainder of this case study, we employ a more concise ideal value model, shown in
Figure 4.2. We do so for reasons of brevity only. The differences are twofold. Firstly, the
access providers and advertisers have been removed, because at this stage they play no role
with respect to controls. Secondly, we have created a model for one rights society (e.g. one per
country) and one rights owner (e.g. the main artist). This solution can be scaled up to a case
with many rights owners and many rights societies. In addition, in Figure 4.2, the exchanges
between the radio station and rights societies are on a per track per listener basis. Therefore,
we have modelled a value object Track instead of Stream and Listener instead of Audience. So,
in order to calculate how many people have listened to a specific track, we need to know the
number of listeners in a certain market segment. In order to determine how many tracks were
played, we then have to calculate the number of executions of the consumer need element in the
e3valuemodel.
4.3 Step 2. Sub-ideal value model
In the ideal model in Figure 4.2 we assume that the information about actual broadcasting is
delivered to the rights societies by the Internet radio station. This information is trustworthy
only if we assume that the Internet radio station reports the tracks they have played correctly.
However, in a sub-ideal situation both Internet radio stations as well as rights societies may
misrepresent information, which results in a loss of revenue for rights owners. In addition,
administrative errors can be made which also result in the loss of the revenues. Such situations
are considered here as sub-ideal.
5In Dutch: De Stichting ter Exploitatie van Naburige Rechten. See www.sena.nl
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Figure 4.2: An ideal value model for Internet radio business model
Figure 4.3 presents the various sub-ideal paths that reveal control problems in a situation where
one of the actors behaves sub-ideally. We assume that both the Internet radio station and rights
society will expose sub-ideal behaviour. The listener has no prime interest in doing so, because
listening to music is free anyway.
In Figure 4.3 each track is marked with the letters A, B or C, which correspond to the ISRC
code for a track. As was explained in the case description, the ISRC code is a unique identifier
of every track. Henceforth, Track A stands for a broadcasted track (also exchanged between the
listener and the Internet radio station), and other labels, B and C, refer to other tracks than the
broadcasted Track A. This distinction is required to show that someone could pay for the wrong
track. In addition, the rights owners of a track are also labelled with the same track ISRC (A, B
or C). This indicates that every track is associated with a specific rights owner.
As explained in section 3.3.3, a sub-ideal value object can be empty or incorrect. Based on this,
we identify two kinds of sub-ideality for the value object Right (short for Right to Broadcast)
and Fee: (1) the rights to play a track to a specific listener are not paid for at all or (2) the rights
to play a track are paid for the wrong track (e.g. Track B instead of the played Track A). In both
cases, the authentic rights owner of the played track is not paid. In addition, in the second case,
the wrong rights owner receives the money (e.g. a party owning the rights for Track B, not the
played Track A).
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Figure 4.3: A sub-ideal value model for Internet radio business model. In this model we refer
to ‘Right to Broadcast’ as ‘Right’
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Internet radio station. Figure 4.3 shows how an Internet radio station can behave either
ideally or sub-ideally. This choice is modelled with the OR-1 fork at the Internet radio station.
In the ideal situation, the ideal value transfers are the same as in the ideal model: Fee A and
Right A, where A is an ISRC of the broadcasted track. In the sub-ideal situation, the Internet
radio station can do two things: (1) it does not pay at all for the broadcasted track, and (2) it
pays for a wrong track. The first sub-ideal situation (not paying for the track at all) is modelled
with the “dashed” sub-ideal value transfer No Fee. As a result, no right is issued, because in
a situation with no controls the rights society does not know that the Internet radio station is
cheating, so it just assumes that no track was played. However, the absence of the rights does
not stop the radio station from broadcasting this track: the transfer of Track A between the
listener and the radio is always ideal, even though the transfer of the rights between the radio
and the rights society may not be. The second sub-ideal situation (buying the right for another
track, e.g. Track B) results in the sub-ideal exchange of Right B in return for a sub-ideal Fee B.
The two sub-ideal value transfers No Right and Right B between the Internet radio station and
the rights societies are the responsibility of the Internet radio station. To represent this, we use
two liability tokens L at the Internet radio station actor.
Rights society. Sub-ideal behaviour relates to a specific actor. So, even though an Internet
radio station behaves ideally, the rights society may not. This choice is modelled by a set of
OR-forks at the rights society.
If the Internet radio station behaves ideally and exchanges Fee A and Right A, the path leads to
an OR-2 fork. At the OR-2 fork the rights society has a choice to behave ideally or sub-ideally.
If the rights society behaves ideally, the OR-2 fork leads to the ideal value exchange of Right A
and Fee A between the rights society and the rights owner of the Track A. If the rights society
behaves sub-ideally, theOR-2 fork leads to anotherOR-4 fork, where it again has again a choice
of two sub-ideal paths, similar to those at the Internet radio station. If the rights society does
not pay, the path at the OR-4 fork leads to the exchange of No Right and No Fee. If the rights
society pays for a wrong track, the path leads to payment to a wrong track owner (see Right C
and Fee C) as well as to non payment to the authentic track owner (see the AND-fork leading
to exchange of No Right and No Fee).
If the Internet radio station does not pay, neither does the rights society, since it does not know
that the track was played. Therefore, the exchange of No Right/ No Fee between the radio and
the rights society leads to the exchange of No Right/ No Fee between the rights society and the
rights owner.
If the Internet radio station pays for the unplayed Track B, the rights society may also choose
to behave ideally or sub-ideally at the OR-3 fork. If the rights society behaves sub-ideally at
OR-3, it pays for Track C instead of Track B or does not pay at all. These choices are modelled
with the fork OR-4, previously explained.
If the rights society behaves ideally at OR-3, it will pay for Track B. This path leads to paying
Fee B to the wrong rights owner of Track B and (see the AND-fork) paying nothing (No Fee)
to the authentic rights owner of Track A. In this case, the ideal behaviour of the rights society
still results in sub-ideal value transfers (Fee B and No Fee). The rights society does not know
that Track B has been reported incorrectly, so they assume that paying for Track B is ideal.
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So, wrongdoing is committed by the Internet radio station and not by the rights society. This
difference can be seen from the liability tokens, which in this case are assigned to the Internet
radio station, and not to the rights society.
4.4 Step 3. Modelling controls
In the previous section we have identified several control problems. The first one arises when
either the Internet radio station or the rights societies, or indeed both parties do not pay at all
for a track broadcast. The second occurs when the parties pay for a wrong track broadcast.
The object of this section is to design controls to mitigate the consequences of such sub-ideal
behaviour.
4.4.1 Solution 1: Collecting evidence from listeners
A control mechanism may address a sub-ideal path in two ways: firstly, it may detect a sub-ideal
path execution, secondly, it may prevent a sub-ideal path execution. In this section we focus on
modelling a specific detective control mechanism that can be used to assess whether all tracks
are cleared or not.
Controls against problems caused by an Internet radio station
Firstly we assume that only an Internet radio station behaves sub-ideally. The described control
problems described are caused by the transfer of untrustworthy information about the broad-
casted tracks and the number of listeners. To prevent this, the rights society should find a
trustworthy source of information about the broadcasts. One solution which is possible on In-
ternet, is to collect this information from listeners. If every listener shares information about
each track listened to, the rights society would be able to count the number of rights required
per listener per track without consulting the Internet radio station.
However, it is most unlikely that many listeners would be willing to share information, due,
for instance, to concerns about privacy. From the e3control point of view, they have to get
something ’in return’ to be willing to share the information. One way is to pay the listeners for
sharing the information. Another way is to allow the listeners to listen to a music track only
if they agree to share this information. In value models, this can be modelled by introducing
the value object Right to Listen. A right to listen is granted to listeners in return for sharing
information about tracks they listen to. A right to listen should be obtained to ensure that every
listener really shares the information.
To model this in e3control , we have added two value objects to Figure 4.4, exchanged between
the rights society and the listener. The first value object is the ISRC code, which gives informa-
tion about the track, listened to by a particular listener. The ISRC code is a value object: it is
of value to the rights society, because without the knowing the exact code the rights societies
cannot execute their core business of charging the correct and complete fee for broadcasting.
Essentially, the rights society ‘buys’ this information from the listener.
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Figure 4.4: Control of the Internet radio station
The second value object is the Right to Listen transferred from rights societies to listeners. Only
after receiving the right to listen should the listener be allowed to listen to the music. A listener
has the value object Right to Listen in the same interface as the value object ISRC code. This
shows that the listener does not get the right to listen without sharing the information about the
tracks listened to. Furthermore, the value object Right to Listen is also in the same interface as
the value objects Track. This model shows that the listener cannot listen to the track without
having the right to listen. As a result, the listener is not able to listen to an Internet radio
station unless he shares the information about the ISRC code. This is different from the right
to broadcast, where an Internet radio station has the object Right to Broadcast in a different
interface than the object Track, which means that it is possible to broadcast the track without
having the right to broadcast it.
Modelling reconciliation in e3control . The e3controlmodel also represents a reconciliation
aspect of control. The notion of a value interface requires that the number of value objects,
exchanged through it, is the same. That is to say, at the value interface of the rights society, the
number of objects Right to Broadcast issued to the Internet radio station must be the same as
the number of objects Right to Listen and ISRC code requested by listeners, and the same as the
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number of object Fee delivered to the rights society.
Since the right to listen is only issued if track information is exchanged, the number of objects
of Right to Listen and ISRC code is always the same. The Right to Broadcast is issued as soon
as the Fee is paid, so their number is also always the same. However, if the Internet radio
station lies about the number of listeners, for instance, it reports 10 listeners instead of 100, and
does not pay a fee for all the listeners, then an inconsistency at the value interface will be the
immediate result. The e3value tool generates an error message if we assign 1000 exchanges of
the Right to Listen and only 100 exchanges of the Right to Broadcast.
If the internet radio reports Track B instead of Track A, an inconsistency at the value interface
will also be visible, because Right to Listen and Right to Broadcast have to have to refer to the
same ISRC. Thus, reconciliation should reveal that the right to listen is issued for a track with
the ISRC code A, while the right to broadcast is issued for a track with the ISRC code B. This
reconciliation has not yet been implemented in e3control .
Controls against problems caused by rights societies
Assuming that the exchange of the right to listen to a specific track is guaranteed, the sub-ideal
exchanges No Right/ No Fee and Right B/ Fee B between an Internet radio station and a rights
society are detectable, and therefore they have been removed from Figure 4.4. However, other
sub-ideal exchanges caused by the sub-ideal behaviour of a rights society still remain and are
not targeted by the controls that have been introduced.
To eliminate the remaining sub-ideal exchanges, reconciliation should be executed by a party
other than the rights society. Ideally, the remaining party that can provide the right to listen is
the rights owner. In Figure 4.5 the right to listen has been issued to the listener by the rights
owner. Reconciliation of this right to broadcast can now be performed at the four-port value
interface of the rights owner. So, the number of exchanged rights to listen to a specific track
should be equal to the number of rights to make it public.
Additionally, it is unrealistic that every rights owner, be it an artist, a musician or a text writer,
set up their own rights management. Therefore, we now introduce a new actor rights manager
who performs the technical rights management on behalf of the rights owner. Actually, the
rights manager has to guarantee the exchange of the right to listen. This is done at operational
level and is described in the next section.
4.4.2 Solution 1: Information systems viewpoint
In the previous section, we have proposed adding an additional right: the right to listen to a
music track. So, the listener should be able to obtain both this right and the requested stream of
tracks. This is expressed by the value interface of the listener actor. We can guarantee that the
ideal semantics of the interface (exchange all objects, or none at all) hold by using encryption
technology. One such technical solution is modelled here.
The conceptual model of the solution is shown in Figure 4.6. Note that this figure is not an
e3controlmodel, rather it is more similar to a UML collaboration diagram
Step 3. Modelling controls 99
control2, 2008-04-12 18:51:02, http://www.e3value.com/
LISTENER
INTERNET
RADIO
STATION
Listener
Track
RIGHTS
SOCIETY
Right to broadcast Fee
RIGHTS
MANAGER
RIGHTS
OWNER
Right to 
listen
Right to 
broadcast
Fee
Service Fee
Technical Rights
Managment
ISRC
code
Figure 4.5: Introducing a trusted third party to control both Internet radio station and rights
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Figure 4.6: Using encryption technology for track counting
[Rumbaugh et al., 1999]. Arrows indicate messages that are exchanged between actors (boxes).
Numbers next to the arrows indicate a time sequence. Boxes with an “E” denote an encryption
operation, whereas “D” stands for decryption. This solution ‘translates’ the rights to a crypto-
graphic key issued to the various parties. We distinguish three parties: the listener, the Internet
radio station (as in the value model) and the rights issuer. The rights issuer can be a rights
society, a rights owner, or an organization operating on behalf of these e.g. rights managers).
The rights issuer and the Internet radio station have agreed in advance on an encryption key,
KIRS (message -2). The same holds for the rights issuer and the listener, they agreed on
KListener (-1). How these keys are exchanged does not fall within the scope of this work, but
one possibility is that these keys are stored on a smartcard which is issued by the rights issuer
to the listener and the Internet radio station, respectively. The assumption that these keys are
distributed in advance is denoted by the ”-” sign in the figure.
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Both the Internet radio station and the listener have a so-called secure computing and storage
device at their premises. Such a device is tamper-proof and is trusted by the rights issuer. In
practice, a secure device may take the form of a smartcard, but it is also possible to implement
such a device in a software component (however, in general a hardware smartcard is more
tamper-proof than just software code). It is important that the listener and the Internet radio
station do not have access to this device (without damaging it). The Internet radio should not
be able to modify the information on played tracks. Although listeners are not interested in
modifying the information on listened to tracks, they need protection at their site, since the
Internet radio can easily play the role of the listener. In addition, the protection at the listener
site constitutes a situation of non-free radio. Therefore, the keys,KIRS andKListener are stored
on the secure devices of respectively the Internet radio station and the listener. So, although the
Internet radio station and the listener physically have the keys, they cannot read them because
they are stored inside a tamper-proof device, which they can not access.
If an Internet radio station broadcasts a track (1), its secure device first requests a key, Kmusic
(2) This key is used later on to encrypt a music track in such a way that to listen to it, a listener
must obtain a key to decrypt the track. This Kmusic is issued by the rights issuer and encrypted
with KIRS (3), a secret shared by the rights issuer and the Internet radio station. Consequently,
no one can read Kmusic, not even the Internet radio station, since the key is on a secure device,
not accessible by the radio station. The encrypted music key (denoted by EKIRS (Kmusic)) is
decrypted by the Internet radio station’s secure device (denoted by D), resulting in the plain key
Kmusic (4). This key is used by the secure device of the Internet radio station to encrypt the
track (EKmusic(Track)) (5). Finally, this encrypted track is broadcasted and received by each
listener.
Before the track can be listened to, the listener’s secure device has to decrypt the encrypted
track by obtaining Kmusic. So, the device requests this key from the rights issuer (6) who logs
the request for counting purposes. The rights issuer compares the number of requests with the
number of tracks reported by the Internet radio station. He then sends the music key, encrypted
with an earlier agreed upon listener’s key (EKListener(Kmusic)) (7). The listener’s secure device
decrypts this message and uses the obtained key to decrypt the track and finally plays it (8).
The information system solution implements some aspects of the control mechanism designed
at value level in Figure 4.5. More about this can be found in the discussion section.
4.4.3 Solution 2: Sharing information with advertisers
Besides the controls described in the previous two sections, there are other ways to ensure the
authenticity of the information reported by the Internet radio station. In this section we look at
one such a mechanism, which has a more preventative nature.
In this control, we suggest that the rights society should check if the number of listeners reported
by the Internet radio station is the same as the number of listeners reported to advertisers.
The fee paid by advertisers is also a function of the number of listeners: the bigger the radio
audience, the higher the fee they can charge the advertisers. It is therefore in the interest of an
Internet radio station to increase the fee paid by advertisers. If advertisers and rights societies
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Figure 4.7: A solution involving a control service provided by advertisers
share information about the number of listeners, the Internet radio station would not be willing
to understate their number, since it would mean a decrease in advertising fees.
A value model with controls. In Figure 4.7 we show a value model for this solution. The un-
derlying assumption is that the Internet radio station first reports the information to advertisers
who then report it to the rights societies. Another assumption is that the advertisement fee is
charged on a per listener basis.
In Figure 4.7 we show the advertisers who pay the Internet radio station an Advertisement Fee
and get the Audience Size in return. The Audience Size gives information about the size of the
radio station’s audience of course. In fact, this is a number of listeners who listened to the radio
in a certain period of time, e.g. daily. Because we assume the exchanges per listener per track
(unlike in Figure 4.1) we introduce an implosion element. This element indicates that per m
listeners one object Audience Size is exchanged to the advertiser.
As in the sub-ideal model in Figure 4.3, we assume at the OR-1 fork that the Internet radio
station either reports the track listened to by the listener and pays the rights, which corresponds
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to the value transfers of Right and Fee; or the radio does not report the listener and pays no
fee for the rights, which corresponds to the value transfers of No Right and No Fee. We do not
consider other sub-ideal exchanges from Figure 4.3 in this model, since this solution does not
mitigate them, as will be explained later in the discussion section.
We assume that the information about the audience size has been shared by the rights society
and the advertisers. Therefore, if the Internet radio station pays the rights fees for a lower
number of listeners, the advertisement fee will also be lower, since it is based on the lower
audience size which is taken as an estimation of the rights fees. The understated audience size
and the lower advertisement fee are modelled by the value objects Low Advertisement Fee and
Low Audience Size. To model the dependency between the fee for the rights and the fee for the
advertisements in e3value , the value transfers No Fee and Low Advertisement Fee are connected
by an AND-fork. Because they are sub-ideal, Low Advertisement Fee and Low Audience Size
are marked with a dash similar to No Fee and No Right.
In this model, the Internet radio station is not interested in playing down the number of listeners
to the rights society. Should it do so, then this information will be immediately shared with the
advertisers, and will result in a lower advertisement fee. Thus, what the station gains on the
lower rights fees, it will lose on lower advertisement fees. For this reason, the Internet radio
station should prefer the ideal path of reporting the correct number of listeners rather than a
lower one.
In this model we show that the Internet radio station sells Audience Size to rights societies. It
is realistic to assume that rights societies are interested in this information and are ready to pay
for it, since this information is trustworthy. Such trustworthy information about the number of
listeners is valued by rights societies, since it is crucial to their core business.
Size of Advertisement Fee and Rights Fee. For this system to work, the value the Internet
radio station gets when reporting a listener and paying for the rights must be higher than the
value it gets when not reporting a listener and not paying for the rights. In other words:
AdvertisementFee− (Rights)Fee > NoAdvertisementFee−No(Rights)Fee.
Since the right part of the inequality is always zero, this condition states that the amount the
radio pays for the rights should be less than the amount it gets from advertisers. Otherwise, if
the radio gets fewer advertisement fees than the fees it pays for the rights, it will be tempted to
play down the number of listeners. On the other hand, under such conditions the Internet radio
station has a negative cash flow, so it is better for it to stop executing the business model.
4.5 Discussion
Discussion of the first solution Market liberalization means that new rights societies and
rights managers may emerge, that radio stations will be no longer obliged to clear rights with a
specific rights society, like BUMA and SENA, and that rights societies will compete in repre-
senting artists and other rights owners. The new value model in Figure 4.5 is in line with the EU
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policy towards liberalization of the rights management market [Pedrinaci et al., 2005], since it
can be adjusted to include participation of several rights societies.
The information system solution does not yet implement all aspects of the control mechanism
designed at value level in Figure 4.5. That is because Kmusic is not bound to a specific track
(modelled with labels A, B etc.), so this solution cannot guarantee that the correct track is
cleared, it only checks that a track is cleared. So the Internet radio station can still follow the
sub-ideal path along which it buys the rights for a wrong track (see Right B and Right C in
Figure 4.3).
How can we prevent an Internet radio station from combining a series of tracks into one track
and offering this one combined track to its secure device for encryption? There are some
solutions to this problem. First of all, the secure device can intelligently detect change of
tracks. Such technology is successfully used, e.g. to remove commercials from a video stream
[Hanpachern, 1982]. Secondly, the rights issuer’s computer can listen to a stream of tracks
broadcasted by the Internet radio station and carry out intelligent track detection. The detected
tracks can then be compared to the reported tracks. By using time-stamps, detected tracks can
be bound to the logged tracks per listener.
Discussion of the second solution A disadvantage of the second solution is that it only pro-
vides trustworthy information about the number of listeners, but not about the track played. In
addition, it only takes the sub-ideal behaviour of the Internet radio station into consideration,
but not that of the rights societies. As a result only one sub-ideal path of the sub-ideal model in
Figure 4.3 is mitigated: the exchange of No Right and No Fee by the Internet radio station. The
risks described by the other paths are not mitigated.
Another disadvantage is that the Internet radio station might be willing to overstate the number
of listeners, if the fees collected from advertisers are much higher than the fees paid for the
rights. This can be done, for example, with a purpose of generating a higher turnover. To avoid
this, another control should be introduced to ensure that the radio station does not overstate the
number of listeners, e.g. by taking samples of the audience density from time to time. However,
this is not really a risk for the rights owner as he simply acquires more money.
Although this solution is not the most effective, we have included it here for the reasons of
illustration. Firstly, it shows that there can be many solutions to one problem. Secondly, it has
several interesting aspects. This solution introduces a kind of an incentive for the Internet radio
station not to cheat. The incentive is based on the fact that if the Internet radio cheats, it will
lose a revenue. The incentive not to cheat is the difference in the advertisement fee and rights
fee. This difference should stay positive to ensure that the radio station does not understate the
number of listeners.
This is an example of the incentive control, discussed in section 2.1.2. Furthermore, the solution
is interesting, because it is based on a complex conflict of interests between the three parties:
the Internet radio station, the rights societies and the advertisers. Such conflict of interest is
possible only if the advertisers are involved and if the advertisement fee is a function of the
same variable (number of listeners) as the rights fee.
Lessons learned 105
4.6 Lessons learned
In the summary of lessons learned we reflect on our expectations about value modelling for
controls and compare them to the results of this case study. We also discuss the expressive
power of the e3control ontology, as demonstrated in this case study.
Lesson 1. Controls as commercial services with added value. This case study demonstrates
that controls can be commercial services. One such service observed is provisioning of the
ISRC code by the radio listener to the right society. Another control service is the technical
rights management, provided by the rights issuer to the rights owner. As argued below, the
ISRC code is an evidence document, which is of value.
Taken that the controls are seen as services, modelling them from the economic value perspec-
tive reveals different aspects of controls, as compared to the process of information system
models. Take for example the first control service. The listeners provide the ISRC code in-
formation for free. At the first glance, this means that the listeners do not get anything in
return for providing the information. However, this is not the case. In terms of e3value , noth-
ing is exchanged for free and each economic exchange should have a corresponding reciprocal
exchange. This way of thinking forced us to think about what the listener gets in return for
providing the information, which, we have argued, is the right to listen. Indeed, the listeners
can only listen to a radio if they have access to the music. In paid radio stations, the listeners
buy this access, which can be interpreted as buying the right to listen. However, if the access is
not restricted, as in this case study, the right to listen is granted automatically for free. In this
model, we suggest that the listener should be granted the right to listen in return for providing
the information about the listened to tracks.
Realizing that the right to listen exists and modelling it explicitly with e3control is important,
because it allows us to interpret the underlying information system solution as a mechanism
that guards the exchange of the right to listen. To summarize, the e3value requires modelling
the reciprocal exchanges for control services, which leads to a a better understanding of the
control mechanism.
Lesson 2. Value aspects of control instruments. We have observed several control instru-
ments in this case study, both rights and evidence documents. The reason of modelling evidence
documents as value objects is because they carry information which is of value. In the case of
music, the ISRC code is an evidence document, which is modelled as a value object because
the information it represents is of value to rights societies. Without having reliable information
about broadcasted tracks and audience size, rights societies cannot execute their core business
accurately: charging radio stations a fee per listener per track. This way of thinking goes
along with our argument in Chapter 2 that information-related objects in value models are value
objects as long as they are of value to some actors.
Another control instrument with a value aspect is a right. Rights are generally considered to
have a regulatory purpose, and, ate therefore control instruments. Two rights are defined in this
case study: Right to Broadcast and Right to Listen. Both rights are modelled as value objects,
since they carry economic value. Right to Broadcast is of value to rights owners, since they
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receive a fee for this right. Right to Listen is of value to the rights society or rights issuer, since
they receive an information about the ISRC code in return, which is a value object, as have been
discussed above.
Lesson 3. The value viewpoint is an abstract rationale for procedural aspects of controls.
We have shown how to model controls from two viewpoints: (1) the value viewpoints and (2)
the information systems viewpoints, in this case in terms of a cryptographic implementation.
We consider it to be important to distinguish the two viewpoints, since both of them focus
on different issues: issues of a business model and issues of technical implementation. The
advantage of the e3controlmodels is that they allow us to quickly sketch the control problems
by using such concepts as sub-ideal value object, liability token and others. The analysis is
very quick, since we abstract from any procedural details. Another advantage of e3control
models is that they identify a number of control problems and define mechanisms to prevent or
detect them. Information system models are not particularly developed to analyze the control
problems; they are primarily being used to describe a solution.
We have seen in the case study that the high-level economic value analysis guides the design
of the information system solution. The information system solution can be seen as a solution
that ensures occurrence of all value transfers of the corresponding value model. From this
point of view, the preliminary value modelling is important, because different economic value
solutions require different operational models to implement it. For instance, an information
system required to implement a business model for a paid radio is different from the considered
in this case business model for the free radio.
Furthermore, the economic value model provides criteria to judge whether an information sys-
tems solution is sufficiently good to mitigate the identified control problems. As seen in this
case study, the information system solution requires some adjustments to mitigate all the control
problems; however, a less simple solution could be provided to mitigate some of the identified
problems. A further value-level analysis could be done to identify what are the costs of the
adjustments and if they are justified by the benefits. This analysis could not be done if we limit
our analysis to the information system perspective.
Lesson 4. The e3control ontology. First of all, this case study demonstrates that modelling
controls with value models is possible. Several control problems have been identified at the
start of the case study and, as a result of the analysis, all of them could be modelled using the
e3control concepts. In general, all e3control concepts have been useful in describing the control
problems we have encountered. Such concepts as sub-ideal value object and sub-ideal path
provide means to model control problems.
We have also managed to create models which comply with the e3value ontology is the sense
that they do not contain loops in the dependency paths. Neither do the ideal value models
contain one-way value transfers.
There are several aspects in the e3control ontology we would like to discuss within the realm of
this case study:
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Separate transfers of rights and custody. In Chapter 3 we have argued that it is important to
understand what corresponds to a value transfer on the operational level: a transfer of a
resource’s custody, its rights or both. We have also argued that the transfer of custody and
a transfer of its rights can correspond to different value transfers in the value models. This
case study confirms that in some cases it is necessary to model a transfer of a resource’s
rights and transfer of a resource’s custody as separate value transfers. The value object
Right to Broadcast and Right to Listen represent rights associated with a resource Track.
However, access to the resource Track and transfer of the right to broadcast the track
are modelled as separate value objects. The transfer of custody for the resource Track is
modelled in the value transfer of the value object Track between the listener and the radio.
The rights to broadcast the track and the right to listen to the track are modelled by two
other value object Right to Broadcast and Right to Listen.
Modelling of reconciliation with a value interface. The value interface concept of e3value
provides formalism to model reconciliation of two or more value objects. As such, we
were able to generate an error message with the e3value software tool (see
www.e3value.com) if a value interface contained different amounts of value objects. It is,
however, not possible to reason about reconciliation of properties of the value objects. In
sum, the value interface concepts allows us to model reconciliation controls.
Incentives as controls. An e3controlmodel allows us to represent economic incentives as was
demonstrated by the second solution. The incentive for the Internet radio station not to
cheat depends on the difference of the advertisement fee the radio receives and the rights
fee the radio pays. This difference should stay positive to ensure that the Internet radio
station does not understate the number of listeners to avoid the rights fees. Incentives are
contractual controls, as discussed in the section 2.1.2.
4.7 Summary
In this section we have described a case study concerning a music rights clearance procedure
for Internet broadcasting. We have used e3control to analyze control problems and suggested
solutions to (possible) understatements of actual broadcasting information by Internet radio
stations and rights societies. In addition, we have also put forward an information-system level
solution.
The goal of the case study has been to demonstrate that value modelling can be carried out
for a high-level analysis of controls in networks. Firstly, we are able to model reconciliation
mechanisms by employing the concept of value interface. In addition to that, we are able to
represent controls as services and see how controls change the business model of the network.
In addition, value modelling facilitates the understanding and design of controls based on finan-
cial incentives. The added value of the value modelling approach, as compared to traditional
process modelling, is that it focuses on aspects of value, even when considering exchanges of
information.
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Chapter 5
Controls in the public sector
Inter-organizational controls often occur in highly regulated sectors, such as the electricity,
telecommunication and health care sectors. In such regulated environments, production, distri-
bution, and pricing decisions are made by a regulatory authority rather than defined by market
forces. A reasonable question is then whether the e3control approach, which relies on e3value
and its notion of the reciprocal economic exchange, make sense in such situations. To investi-
gate this question we have carried out a case study in the health care sector, specifically on recent
changes in the governance and control of a public insurance system in the Netherlands. Another
interesting aspect of this case is investigation of how controls are used in a non-commercial net-
work setting.
In the Netherlands, the system for exceptional health care deals with long-term and chronic
diseases, such as protracted illness, invalidity, learning disability, mental disorders and geriatric
diseases. An example of such illness is dementia. Because this kind of care is too expensive to
be covered by every ill person individually, in the Netherlands the system is arranged as public
health care insurance. The AWBZ1, an Act on Extraordinary Medical Expenses, regulates the
provision of this area of care. A patient only pays a small part of the costs; the largest part
of the costs is reimbursed to the care provider from a government fund, collected from taxes.
Currently, the exceptional health care system is undergoing a major change in terms of services,
finances, actors, and controls.
Clearly, the AWBZ system qualifies as a highly regulated environment. Patients need to apply
for care through a cumbersome bureaucratic process. Various semi-independent governmental
agencies perform tasks in the system, in return for government funding. Although the gov-
ernment retains political control over the system, increasingly also private care providers are
allowed to enter.
The goal of this case study is to design existing controls and to analyze the underlying control
problems. In fact, we perform a sort of reverse engineering of the past and present procedures
in the healthcare system to see if e3control can describe it. We separate the analysis in two
e3control cycles. In the first cycle, we perform a reverse engineering of the AWBZ system and,
as a result, explain the design of the AWBZ system using the control theory in Chapter 2. In the
1In Dutch: Algemene Wet Bijzondere ziektekosten
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second cycle, we analyze the weaknesses in the AWBZ system and suggest a future situation,
which is not implemented in practice yet.
5.1 Research Context
The case study was conducted within the Freeband User eXperience (FRUX) Freeband project2.
The FRUX Healthcare pilot explores opportunities for ‘we-centric’, context-sensitive bundles
of service in the field of dementia care. One service on which the FRUX Healthcare pilot
focuses is an intelligent, interactive, regional social chart that is easily accessible anywhere,
anytime, and anyplace. Besides providing general information on care and welfare services to
persons with dementia and their formal and informal caregivers, this Dynamic Interactive Social
Chart for Dementia Care (DEM-DISC) also responds to individual needs by customizing care
and support information and advice and by providing such relevant services as a planning and
communication service. The social chart enables users to find relevant customized and context
sensitive packages of care to match their needs, to resolve fragmentation issues and to improve
accessibility of health care and welfare. For example, a carer of a person with dementia would
find necessary services for the dementia patient in their region, such as day care, housekeeping
assistance and meal delivery. Our role in the project was to model the governance mechanisms
in the business model of the health care system and to investigate how the DEM-DISC will fit
into the business model as a control service.
The data for the case study was collected by two researchers - the author of this thesis and J.
Hulstijn - from a series of semi-structured interviews with five experts from different health care
organizations. The interviewed were carried out with domain experts at the indication centre
(in Dutch: centrum Indicatie Zorg (CIZ)), the administrative office (in Dutch: zorgkantoor) and
the project partner Vrije Universiteit Medical Centre (VUMC). The resulting e3controlmodels
were verified by the domain experts working for the indication centre and the VUMC. In ad-
dition, data was collected from publicly available documents [Okma, 2001, Exter et al., 2004]
and web sites of the government3. The data were collected before 1 January 2006, when a
new health care regulation came into operation in the Netherlands. Thus, some of the descrip-
tions in this case study may deviate from the situation after 1 January 2006. The results of
the case study were reported in various papers and reports including [Kartseva and Tan, 2005],
[Kartseva et al., 2005c], [Kartseva et al., 2006c], [Kartseva et al., 2006d], and
[Kartseva et al., 2007a].
5.2 Extraordinary health care system
To understand why the AWBZ care system should change in the first place, we perform an
e3control cycle for the situation as existed before April 2003. We will show that we are able
to model several weaknesses of the system, about which we have learned from interviews with
2http://frux.freeband.nl
3www.zorgaanzet.nl, www.minvws.nl, www.pgb.nl, ww.cvz.nl, www.overheid.nl, all in Dutch.
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experts and from the literature. We also model how these weaknesses have been resolved as the
system has been changed in April 2003 and in January 2005. Although in reality the changes
were motivated not only by the identified control problems, they still resulted in partial mitiga-
tion of the problems.
5.2.1 Step 1. Ideal value model
In Figure 5.1 we model the most important actors who participate in the AWBZ system. Every
Dutch resident is entitled to receive AWBZ care. Therefore, we have a market segment of
residents. The OR-1 fork at the resident models that the residents either (1) pay taxes and do
not use the AWBZ care, or (2) pay taxes and use the AWBZ care. In the last case, the path goes
through the AND-1 fork. In the last case, the resident also plays the role of a patient.
To enable the AWBZ funding for some of the residents, all residents have to pay taxes. This
requires modelling of a value transfer Taxes from the residents to the government. The govern-
ment is represented in the model by the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport, further referred
as the ministry. In return, the residents get an insurance that the AWBZ services will be paid
by the government, which is modelled with the object AWBZ Insurance.
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Figure 5.1: Value network for AWBZ health care system
The right path of the AND-1 fork models receiving of AWBZ Product from the care provider
by the resident in return for a Personal Contribution. AWBZ Product models a kind of treatment
received by the resident. AWBZ law covers several types of treatments, e.g. help with cooking,
cleaning, washing, etc. Personal Contribution is a small part of total costs of the treatment paid
112 Controls in the public sector
to care provider by the resident. The major part of the costs is covered by the government, and
will be discussed later.
Not everyone should be able to use the AWBZ fund, but only those who have an illness covered
by the AWBZ regulation. To avoid the misuse, in order to get access to the AWBZ product,
a resident should prove that he or she has an illness that falls under AWBZ. The assessment
of whether a person has such illness is done by an organization called the regional indication
centre. The assessment is done based on evidence of the condition of the patient, like medical
reports. In Figure 5.1 this evidence is modelled by a value object Care Need Evidence.
If a person qualifies for AWBZ care, the regional indication centre sends the person a needs as-
sessment letter, which entitles this person to receive certain care covered by the AWBZ funding.
Before April 2003 the need assessment letters specified what AWBZ products match patient’s
need. In fact, this letter gave the residents a right for certain AWBZ products. Thus, in Fig-
ure 5.1 we model a value object AWBZ Product Right, given to the residents in return for the
Care Need Evidence. The AND-1 fork that connects the transfers AWBZ Product Right and
AWBZ Product / Personal Contribution models that the patient cannot get the AWBZ-related
treatments for paying only the personal contribution without having the right for it.
When the regional indication centre grants a resident with the right by issuing the need assess-
ment letter, a copy of this letter is send to an organization called administrative care office
(in Dutch: Zorgkantoor). We model that this action corresponds to the value transfer of AWBZ
Product Right Evidence to the administrative office. Note that the exchange of the evidence is
between the resident and the administrative office, and not between the indication centre and
the administrative office. This is because delivering of this evidence is a responsibility of the
resident, not of the indication centre. In addition, the AWBZ product is granted in return for
this evidence to the resident, not to the indication centre, as can be seen from the reciprocal
exchanges of AWBZ Product Right Evidence, and AWBZ Product.
Administrative care offices, which operate on a regional level, make contracts with care providers.
Only care providers contracted by an administrative care office can provide AWBZ services. In
the Netherlands, the tasks of the administrative office are carried out by private insurance com-
panies selected by the government. Normally, these are the biggest insurance companies in a
certain region. Administrative care offices also operate on a region basis.
Administrative care offices also handle payments to care providers (see value object Budget).
The care provider is paid on a budget basis. To provide accountability for the budget, the care
provider needs to provide evidence of the delivered AWBZ care to the administrative care office.
On the basis of such evidence, the accountability for the budget is established. This evidence is
represented by a value object Delivered Care Evidence, and is given to the administrative care
office by a care provider in return for Budget. Originally, the budget is given to the administra-
tive care offices by the ministry. Administrative care offices are accountable for spending the
budget. Therefore, they must provide to the ministry an evidence of the delivered care, to show
how the budget is spent.
The introduced governmental agencies - regional indication centres and administrative care
offices - are paid for their services by the ministry. Regional indication centres provide needs
assessment services. In addition, because the need assessment letter contains information about
specific products, the indication centres in fact do allocation of the patient’s need to a specific
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AWBZ product. Thus, we model that the indication centre gets from the ministry Funding and
delivers Need Assessment and AWBZ Product Allocation in return. The services done by the
administrative care office are modelled with a value object Administration Services, delivered
to the ministry. In return the offices get Funding, similarly to the indication centre.
Note that we model the services (need assessment, product allocation and administration ser-
vices) between the ministry and the agency, not between the agency and the resident. In fact,
what we model is that the ministry outsources execution of the services to the agencies.
5.2.2 Step 2. Sub-ideal value model
As came out of interviews and literature research, there were several control problems in this
system. To reduce complexity, we use two sub-ideal value models in Figures 5.2 and 5.3 to
represent two different control problems. The models show two types of sub-ideal behaviour,
which can both occur.
Control problem 1. Inadequate needs assessment
It is important to understand that regional indication centres are assigned to a specific region
in the country. So, a resident can only apply to an indication centre in the region where he
or she lives. In addition, the indication centre can only prescribe AWBZ products available in
its region. In principle the entitlement to care should be the same for the whole country. But
because different regions have a different care supply, there may be different ways of translating
care needs into rights for care.
This situation replicates the situation before 1 January 2005. According to our experts, needs
assessments turned out to be inadequate in some cases: patients from different regions were
given different products for the same diagnosis. The decision of a regional indication centre
was partly based on the supply of care in their region, and not on the health problems of the
patient. This situation was not completely satisfactory, e.g. people from wealthier regions could
get a better care than the people from less wealthy regions.
From a control perspective, the problem is a result of a lack of conflict of interest between the
employees performing needs assessment and the employees performing the product allocation.
The need assessment must be done objectively, whereas the AWBZ product allocation must be
based on knowledge about the available products in the region. If these tasks are performed by
one organization, the knowledge about products influences the decision about needs assessment.
To represent this problem, in the sub-ideal value model in Figure 5.2 we make the value transfer
Need Assessment sub-ideal by marking it with a dashed line and naming the value objectWrong
Need Assessment. In addition, because of the inadequate needs assessment a person can receive
an improper medical treatment, e.g. due to a lack of facilities in a certain region. Thus, the
transfer AWBZ Product Right is also sub-ideal as well as the AWBZ Product. In Figure 5.2 they
are renamed to Wrong AWBZ Product and Wrong AWBZ Product Right. A liability token L1 is
assigned to the regional indication centre to represent that this actor is responsible for causing
the sub-ideal exchanges.
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Figure 5.2: Control problem 1 in AWBZ: Inadequate needs assessment
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Control problem 2. Risk of low quality care
In Figure 5.1, we do not have an actor who controls the quality of care products. As a result,
provisioning of products of lower quality can remain undetected. To model this, in Figure 5.3
the transfer of AWBZ Product between the residents and care providers is marked as sub-ideal,
and a liability token L2 is assigned to the care provider.
cycle1step2b, 2008-04-12 19:06:55, http://www.e3value.com/
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Figure 5.3: Control problem 2 in AWBZ: Risk of low quality care
5.2.3 Step 3. Control of indication centres and care providers
Control mechanism for problem 1. Splitting the regional indication centres
The government changed the system. In the new situation, the conflicting functions of needs
assessment and product allocation are responsibility of two different agencies. As depicted
in Figure 5.4, the needs assessment is done by one indication centre, a national organization
created instead of the regional indication centres. Thus, instead of modelling a market segment
of regional indication centres, we model an indication centre as an actor. The product allocation
is now done by administrative care offices (see value object AWBZ Product Allocation). As a
result, now there are two assessment steps.
In the first step, the need assessment is done by the indication centre. The needs assessment
is formulated not in terms of products, as before, but in terms of functions. The AWBZ care
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is categorized in standardized functions, which include domestic care, personal care, nursing,
supportive assistance, activating assistance, treatment and institutional care. For each function,
the intensity of treatment is specified. Medical needs of a particular person are defined based
on functions and intensities specified in the Care Entitlement Regulation4. As a result, the
indication centre gives a resident a right to use certain functions (see AWBZ Functions Right),
not to products, as previously. In addition, the indication centre now delivers to the ministry
Functions Need Assessment, which stands for an assessment of a need for an function.
In the second step, the administrative care office ‘translates’ the right for AWBZ functions into
a right for a specific product. In return for the right for product, a person has to demonstrate
that he or she is entitled for AWBZ. This entitlement is nothing else than an evidence of the
right for a function received from the indication centre (see value object AWBZ Functions Right
Evidence). On the process level, this evidence is a copy of the needs assessment letter.
The changes were implemented incrementally. The functions were introduced on April 2003.
The centralized indication centre was introduced in January 2005 5.
Control mechanism for problem 2. Accreditation of Care Providers
To ensure that AWBZ care providers deliver quality services, an external controlling party is
introduced. A basic form of quality control already does exist in the previous model. The
administrative care office is in a position to select care providers who deliver AWBZ services.
However, the administrative offices are mostly concerned with price negotiations rather than
with quality controls. The ideal model does not contain a party who assesses the care provider.
Before being allowed to deliver care services, the ability of care providers to provide these
services must be assessed. The result of this process is a kind of accreditation. The accreditation
process is delegated to a specific semi-governmental agency: the Health Care Insurance Board
(College voor Zorgverzekeringen (CvZ) in Dutch). The main task of the CvZ agency is to
control health care insurance companies. Accreditation of care providers for AWBZ is one of
their other functions6. This is modelled with an object AWBZ Accreditation, coming out of the
CvZ actor.
In return, the CvZ requires the care provider to demonstrate their ability to deliver AWBZ
services. This is modelled with the value object Ability to Deliver AWBZ. Thus, if a care provider
does not have the ability to deliver the care, the accreditation is not granted.
In the present system in Figure 5.4, the administrative care office can only assign people to
care providers who have an accreditation from the CvZ. Although the CvZ cannot provide an
ex-post quality control, it can at least ensure that the institution has facilities to deliver adequate
services (ex-ante control). An ex-post health care quality control is explained in section 5.3.
4Dutch: Besluit Zorgaanspraken AWBZ
5Source:Ministerie van VWS
6The responsibilities of CvZ were changed in 2006
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Figure 5.4: Solutions for the problems in the AWBZ health care system
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5.3 Personal budget and Social Chart
The health care system described in the previous sections has still a number of problems. Deci-
sions about issuing rights for a particular treatment, through needs assessment, are disconnected
from the available treatments. Care providers cannot always deliver the prescribed AWBZ prod-
ucts, because their budget from the government has a limit. Because care providers do not have
an incentive to provide services above their budget, the model in Figure 5.4 resulted in a supply-
driven system, with queues of people waiting for a treatment. The task of the administrative care
office is to manage those queues.
Before introducing the controls in section 5.2.3, the problem of queues was partly solved by
regional indication centres, which had an overview of the available care in a region and were
not prescribing the products that were not available. However, as we explained before, such
solution was not really fair, since it the prescribed services differed from region to region.
In addition, older people, who represent the majority of AWBZ clients, are less willing to leave
their home for a retirement house. The AWBZ services, contracted by the administrative care
offices, mostly include services where people must live in a retirement houses or other house
with medical facilities.
Nowadays, the Dutch government is moving towards a more demand-driven system. One of
such changes is the introduction of a personal budget system. The new situation, the resulting
control problems, and a possible solution are analyzed with the three steps of e3control .
5.3.1 Step 1. Ideal value model
Firstly, in Figure 5.5 we present an ideal model of how the personal budget system works.
Unlike in the previous system, with the personal budget a resident can select between being
assigned to a care provider by the administrative care office (as previously) or selecting a care
provider himself. In the last case, the administrative care office pays money not to the care
provider directly, but to the resident. The resident selects the care provider and pays him. The
resident can spend the money on any care services, provided either by traditional care providers,
contracted by the administrative care offices, or by alternative care providers.
The alternative care provider may be any company. In some cases, where the AWBZ services do
not require medical education, e.g. for cleaning, bathing, cooking, the alternative care provider
can be even a family member or a friend.
Contracting alternative care providers is one of the objectives of the personal budget. It has a
purpose to create more choices and to help disabled people to organize their own lives. For
instance, older people do not have to wait for a place in a big care house, but can hire other
people who support them in their live style at home. In addition, increasing the quantity of
available care services should reduce the waiting lists.
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Figure 5.5: Control problems with the Personal Budget system
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5.3.2 Step 2. Sub-ideal value model
The new personal budget system has some control problems. These problems are modelled in
Figure 5.5.
Control problem 1: Information about alternative care providers.
As interviews revealed, currently people are not adequately informed about the available al-
ternative care. The information about alternative care providers is not easy to find. Informing
people about available care is a responsibility of the administrative care offices. An administra-
tive care office has four tasks: (1) contracting care providers, (2) executing AWBZ, (3) product
allocation and waiting lists management, and (4) informing people about available care and
possibilities of AWBZ 7. Information about care providers, available from the administrative
care office, only concerns accredited care providers, with whom the offices make contracts.
Administrative offices have no means to inform people about alternative care provider, since al-
ternative care providers are not obliged to register at the administrative care offices. As a result,
people tend to select traditional care providers, rather than alternative care providers, even if
people use the personal budget.
This trend may stifle the development of the market for alternative care providers. This ob-
servation corresponds to the general idea that information asymmetry, a situation in which the
customer has less information about a product than the provider, has a negative effect on the
emergence of new markets [Bakos, 1998].
The personal budget was introduced to reduce the queues. However, if people do not use the
personal budget as intended (namely to use alternative care providers), the queues will not be
reduced. Therefore, in Figure 5.5 instead of the ideal value object AWBZ Product Allocation
between the administrative care office and the ministry, this control problem is represented by
a sub-ideal object Untimely Product Allocation.
Control problem 2: Quality of alternative care providers.
Traditional care providers have to be accredited by CvZ. Because of the large number of al-
ternative care providers, the CvZ cannot accredit these similarly to traditional care providers.
So, alternative providers are not required to have an accreditation. This results in a risk of low
quality of services provided by alternative care providers. This is the same problem as control
problem 2 considered in the first cycle in section 5.2. This problem is modelled by marking the
value transfer of AWBZ Product between the resident and the alternative care provider with a
dashed line and renaming it to Low Quality AWBZ Product.
5.3.3 Step 3. Controls: Social Chart
To solve the control problems 1 and 2 we suggest a possible future scenario, presented in Figure
5.6: a Social Chart. The Social Chart is an interactive web site that provides an overview of
7http://www.vgz-zorgkantoren.nl/
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the care services in a region, and provides facilities for community-based quality control. The
concept of such a dynamic interactive social chart, focused on the care takers of patients with
dementia (DEM-DISC) is further developed in the Freeband User eXperience (FRUX) Freeband
project [Droes et al., 2005].
Considering control problem 1: Care Provider Advice
In an e-commerce setting, the problem of information asymmetry would typically be solved
by an information broker, who matches supply and demand. The Social Chart executes the
role of such an information broker. The purpose of the Social Chart is to provide information
about alternative care providers, and to help users to select a care provider that satisfies their
individual needs. On the one hand, it provides facilities to give information about alternative
care providers on-line. On the other hand, it provides facilities to search for a care provider
on-line. In Figure 5.6 the Social Chart provides a service to residents called Advice & Search.
An interesting question is who will fund the Social Chart. In a possible scenario, the Social
Chart would be funded by administrative care offices. An increased usage of alternative care
providers as a result of the Advice & Search service offered by the Social Chart would reduce
the waiting list problem and improve the information services, which are the administrative care
offices responsibilities. Thus, the value transfer AWBZ Product Allocation becomes ideal.
Considering control problem 2: Informal Quality Control.
Quality control is a general concern in Dutch health care. Since 1995, an independent health
inspectorate (in Dutch: Inspectie Gezondheidszorg; not in the model) supervises the quality of
care providers. Given the expected explosion of new care providers, this organization cannot
feasibly control the quality of all care providers. We, therefore, propose that the Social Chart
should enable a kind of informal quality control. The Social Chart could provide, for example,
a web-forum with testimonials, an online community peer review, a reputation mechanism, or
collaborative filtering techniques [Schubert and Ginsburg, 2000]. In this manner, knowledge
about the quality of care providers can be shared throughout the community of patients and
relatives. Such community-based quality control only works when users contribute to the com-
munity. That is why in one possible scenario, depicted in Figure 5.6, the Social Chart receives
a value object Fill in Advice from residents.
Since this informal assessment would reduce the administrative burden of assessing alternative
care providers, one could argue that the ministry is interested to subsidize the Social Chart to
stimulate the development of an effective virtual community. So, in Figure 5.6, a value object
Informal Quality Assessment is exchanged from the Social Chart to the ministry in return for
Funding.
Note that this is only one of the many possible scenarios. A social chart could be set up for
example by the patients association, by commercial parties like an insurance company or infor-
mation broker, or by local or central governmental bodies. Members of virtual communities in
health care are generally willing to contribute to the community [Dannecker and Lechner, 2006].
We do realize that setting up a reliable system for online feedback is a research topic by itself.
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Figure 5.6: Social Chart as a solution
Discussion 123
For example, testimonials tend to be biased. More quantitative comparisons also exist. For
example a Dutch information broker, independer.nl, is using a large number of general practi-
tioners to get statistically valid feedback on the health care services of various hospitals in the
Netherlands.
5.4 Discussion
In this case study we have analyzed governance and control issues in the Dutch exceptional
health care system (AWBZ), using the e3controlmethodology, which is meant for the design
and analysis of inter-organizational control mechanisms. The AWBZ case is interesting, be-
cause it shows the complexity of a highly regulated environment, which involves public-private
partnerships. Since e3control is based on an economic value perspective, it is reasonable to ques-
tion whether such an approach is applicable in a sector like health care. In general, we argue
based on this study that that e3control is applicable also to design controls in a highly-regulated
environment.
In addition, we have encountered some specific issues while developing this case study. In
particular, they concern the design of indirect reciprocities, budgeting and community-based
service. Below we discuss how we handle them in e3control .
Indirect reciprocities. In the private sector, where the relations are often regulated by con-
tracts, we mostly see direct reciprocities. A customer obtains a good or service and pays
for it accordingly. But in the health care case described in this chapter, some economic
reciprocal relations are indirect.
The provisioning of care is largely paid for by the tax payer. The system implements a
solidarity principle, meaning that a majority of healthy people pays for an ill minority. In
a way, residents pay for the guarantee that they will have access to health care of a certain
quality, in case they would need it. In the value model we use an OR-1 and AND-1 forks
to model that everyone pays taxes, while not everyone uses the care services.
Such solidarity system requires modelling indirect reciprocities. Without the solidarity
system a reciprocity exists between a care provider and a resident: the care provider
performs a medical treatment for the resident and gets paid by him in return. In the
solidarity system in Figure 5.4 the money (see value object Taxes) and the treatment (see
value object AWBZ Product) are modelled in different value interfaces and are exchanged
even between different actors. For people who never suffer from a disease, covered by
AWBZ, the reciprocity may never be realized. They pay taxes their whole life, but will
never get a treatment, unless they have a need for it.
Modelling budgeting. In the private sector, we mostly see a direct relation between money
coming to the actor and money leaving the actor. For example, if a wholesaler buys
goods for some price, he usually sells it to a retailer for the same price plus a certain
margin. In the health care case, we have many government agencies that are not paid
per unit of their output. For example, the indication centre receives Funding from the
ministry and issues an AWBZ Right to the residents. However, the indication centre does
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not receive proportionally more funding, when it issues more rights. In fact, it is paid for
providing accurate, unbiased needs assessment. We model this with the reciprocal value
transfers Funding and Needs Assessment. In addition, the value transfers of Funding
and AWBZ Function Right are not connected by a dependency path, which shows that
their valuation functions are not directly related. A similar situation is the case for other
governmental agencies. At the administrative care office, the value transfers Funding and
AWBZ Product Right are not connected with the dependency path; at the CvZ, the value
transfers Funding and AWBZ Accreditation are also not connected.
Another type of indirect relations between incoming and outgoing value objects can be
modelled with cardinality jumps. In the initial model in Figure 5.1 the care providers
are paid based on a budget and not on per-treatment basis. Unlike the funding of the
government agencies, the incoming value object Budget is still a function of the outgoing
value object AWBZ Product. Thus, these two exchanges are connected by the dependency
path. However, to be correct we model a cardinality jump: the care provider receives
one budget and spends in on n treatments. With such a budgeting system, care providers
cannot always deliver the AWBZ products to every patient who has the indication. Their
budget is limited. Thus, if the budget is exhausted, the care provider either has to ask for a
budget extension or stop delivering the AWBZ services. Getting budget extensions from
the government is difficult. Because care providers do not have an incentive to provide
services above their budget, the model in Figure 5.4 results in a supply-driven system
Community-based services. The Social Chart is a community-based control service. Such a
community-based service, like a feedback or recommender system of the Social Chart,
only works when sufficient members actually contribute to it. To represent such a
community-based service in e3value , requires reciprocity on the level of a market seg-
ment (stack of actors). This means that the users of the Social Chart benefits from the
contributions of other users.
For the Social Chart, we model that the residents fill in an advice about a care provider
(see Fill in Advice) and get in return a possibility to read this advice (see Advise & Search).
Although the value objects are reciprocal, their reciprocity occurs not for one actor, but
for one market segment: one resident fills in some advice, but it is read by another res-
ident. The reciprocity does not occur at the level of an individual actor. In fact, some
residents only read advices, but do not fill in anything in return. The reciprocity and,
thus, functioning of the Social Chart, is possible when the whole market segment of the
residents contributes to its functioning, and not one particular resident.
Such a reciprocity on the level of market segments is not explicitly defined in e3value .
Thus, to model the community-based services, some minor changes would be needed to
the e3value ontology, namely modelling the reciprocity on the level of market segments.
This is not a control-related issue, so we do not consider it in this research.
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5.5 Lessons learned
In the summary of lessons learned we reflect on our expectations about value modelling for
controls and compare them to the results of this case study.
Lesson 1. Controls as commercial services with added value. We have seen that a highly
regulated environment requires many control services. Examples in the case study include
needs assessment (indication centre), allocation of actual care services, and the allocation of
personal budgets (administrative care office), and providing information about care providers,
and care provider assessment (Social Chart). Control services can be seen as commercial ser-
vices, which can in principle be outsourced. This is clearly modelled in the e3controlmodels
of this study: all controlling parties, whether they are government agencies or not, need to be
funded or paid. Taken that the controls are seen as services, modelling them from the economic
value perspective is very reveals another aspects of controls, as compared to the process models.
Lesson 2. Value aspects of control instruments. This case study illustrates numerous ev-
idence documents. Examples of in Figure 5.4 include Care Need Evidence, AWBZ Function
Right Evidence, and Delivered Care Evidence. This case confirms our arguments in favour of
modelling evidence documents as value objects in certain contexts. Evidence documents are
required to obtain other objects (rights, AWBZ care) and are thus of economic value for the
actors. For example, a person cannot obtain AWBZ care without the needs assessment letter
(modelled as the AWBZ Product Right Evidence value object).
Another reason why some evidence documents are of value for some actors is because they
are needed for their accountability. Accountability is a core objective of many government
agencies, as those in the health care case. Therefore, for them evidence is of value. For example,
the indication centre needs the evidence for delivered care to be able to prove that the needs
assessment is done properly.
Another control instrument with a value aspect is a right. A public-private partnership is often
characterized by extensive regulations. Examples in the case study are AWBZ Function Right
and AWBZ Product Right. Regulation can take the form of a system of rights, to restrict access
to a service. Legal rights can be seen as value objects because they guarantee access to a product
or service, and consequently, such rights are of real economic value to actors. For example, a
right to an AWBZ product or a right to an AWBZ function is of value to residents, because it
allows them to get access to AWBZ care.
In addition, the case confirms the argument of Chapter 3 that it is sometimes necessary to
model the transfer of a right of a resource and transfer of a resource’s custody in separate value
transfers. In this case, the right to get a treatment AWBZ Right and the treatment itself AWBZ
Product are modelled as different value objects.
Lesson 3. The value viewpoint is an abstract rationale for procedural aspects of controls.
This case study demonstrates that modelling controls with value models is possible. Several
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control problems have been identified at the start of the case study. As a result of the analysis,
we have been able to model all control problems using the concepts of e3control .
The e3controlmethodology allows focusing on pure value-related aspects of controls, which
provides additional functionality as compared to the process perspective on controls. In partic-
ular, we found the economic value perspective important in design of a new controls service,
the Social Chart. For the health care domain experts of the FRUX project [Droes et al., 2005],
this was actually the most important result. Modelling the Social Chart from the economic
value perspective spawns off such issues as who will fund the Social Chart, what service does
it provide and who will operate the Social Chart. A further e3value analysis enables answering
these questions.
The issue on who will operate the Chart is important also from the control perspective. As the
internal control theory states, the operator of the Social Chart should be independent from the
care providers or insurance companies, who would like to advertise the service. The e3control
methodology offers tools to design networks by taking both the value and control aspects into
account.
Lesson 4. The e3control ontology. In general, all e3control concepts have been useful in de-
scribing the control problems we have encountered. Such concepts as sub-ideal value object
and sub-ideal path provide means to model control problems. As in the music case, in this
case we can also model reconciliation controls with the value interface construct. For example,
in Figure 5.4 the four-port value interface models that for every AWBZ product there should
be a proper right for an AWBZ product. If we have ten AWBZ products transferred, but only
nine rights, the e3value software tool will generate an error message. This models that a care
provider should not provide treatments to people who do not have the need assessment letters;
otherwise they have to be charged a full price.
5.6 Summary
In this chapter we have described a case study on control mechanisms in a Dutch health care
system. We have demonstrated two cycles of e3control . In the first cycle we model control
problems and solution implemented in past. Thus, we do not design the solution ourselves, but
describe already existing solutions. Two problems have been modelled: (1) conflict of interest
within the indication centres and (2) the lack of quality control of care providers. The related
solutions are (1) splitting the functions of the indication centres and (2) introducing quality
control by a government agency CvZ. In the second cycle we have described present problems
in the health care system. We have found these problems during interviews with experts. These
problems include (1) lack of information on available care and (2) lack of quality controls of
alternative care providers. A solution for these problems is a Social Chart, an interactive web-
portal for dementia patients and their informal carers.
In the case study we model all the control problems and mechanisms that were discovered
during the data collection stage. This demonstrates that the value-based approaches like e3value
and e3control are not only applicable in commercial settings, but also in the highly regulated
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sector. In particular, regulatory rights and evidence documents, two mechanisms that are often
used by public institutions to regulate private businesses, can be seen as value objects. We
have also demonstrated how indirect reciprocities can be modelled in e3value and how to model
principles such as community-based services, solidarity and budgeting in e3value . Finally, we
have seen that also in the public domain, many control services should actually be seen as
commercial services, which should be adequately funded. The Social Chart is one such control
service discussed here.
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Chapter 6
Elicitation of control patterns
In the Chapters 3, 4 and 5 have suggested and demonstrated the e3control approach to designing
controls in network organizations. However, e3control , as presented in previous chapters, does
not as yet provide us with any specific control solutions. Neither does it contain explicit the-
ory on various kinds of control problems and control mechanisms, which a designer requires.
The design of inter-organizational controls would be facilitated if e3control offered knowledge
on control problems and control mechanisms in network organizations. Such knowledge could
facilitate the selection of a control mechanism for a particular control problem. For instance,
it would help the designer to have a library of existing common control problems and descrip-
tions of proven solutions for these problems. To incorporate this knowledge into e3control , we
propose a library of control patterns.
An e3control pattern is a description of a generic and re-usable control mechanism for a recur-
ring and well-known control problem. Control patterns are inspired by the use of design patterns
in architecture [Alexander, 1979] and software engineering [Gamma et al., 1995]. The idea is
to capture the ‘best practices’ in the design of buildings, software, and later also organizational
design [Tapscott et al., 2000], [Weill and Vitale, 2001], [Rolland et al., 2000] for different ap-
plications. The e3control patterns specifically focus on the domain of controls and in particular
on control problems that occur in network organizations.
In Chapter 2 we have already introduced the concept of patterns and argued in favour of or-
ganizing design knowledge for inter-organizational controls as patterns. To summarize, the
advantage of a patterns approach is as follows. On the one hand, patterns allow us to describe
controls in the form of problem-solution pairs, which is also common in the control domain.
That is to say, the problem can be represented using a sub-ideal model, and the solution turns
the sub-ideal model into an ideal model. On the other hand, the patterns allow us to incorporate
design knowledge for both process and value aspects of controls and also to capture not only
a textual description of the problems and solutions, but also to represent the problem and so-
lution using graphical conceptual models. Finally, we can also describe relationships between
different patterns, which allows us to capture interactions between the patterns. Such iterations
describe which control mechanisms substitute or complement each other.
To use control patterns in the e3control design process, we have first to build a library of pat-
terns. In other words: we have to elicit them. In this chapter we will do so by considering
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the literature review in Chapter 2 and undertaking a commonality-variability analysis of the
groups of controls extracted from it. We regroup the extracted groups of controls into unique
problem-solution pairs, which, later in Chapters 8 and 9 are encoded into control patterns.
6.1 Patterns elicitation method
Pattern development usually includes the identification, collection and codification of existing
knowledge [Fowler, 1997, Coad, 1992]. Amore advanced method for patterns elicitation, called
PattCaR, has been developed to support elicitation of patterns for business processes (in cloth-
ing manufacturing companies) [Seruca and Loucopoulos, 2003] and focusses on organizational
design.
To elicit patterns for the control domain, we use an adapted version of PattCaR. The initial
set of PattCar core activities, from which our elicitation activities were derived, comprise the
following: (1) Define domain and analyze context; (2) Define domain core business processes
and vocabulary; (3) Describe sub-domains in terms of existing generic business processes; (4)
Develop sub-domain enterprise models for examples of businesses; (5) Define patterns for the
sub-domain; and (6) Organize and interrelate patterns.
As can be seen, the PattCaR method considers elicitation of patterns from large numbers of
examples. In our case, the control domain is a well-established field of practice, which offers
a wide range of documented examples that are synthesized in a theory, outlined in Chapter 2.
Therefore, instead of analyzing the examples, we extract patterns based on the analysis of the
control theory.
In practice, our elicitation process included the following three phases:
1. In the first phase, we became acquainted with the control domain and collected some
examples of controls from case studies. This has been presented in Chapters 4 and 5.
2. In the second phase, we undertook a review of control problems and mechanisms de-
scribed in the internal control theory, namely in [Romney and Steinbart, 2006], which
lists multiple control problems and mechanisms associated with every activity of each
transaction cycle. We reviewed the Expenditure Cycle and the Revenue Cycle, since they
contain external activities which are of interest to us (see section 2.1 for more details
on the cycles). Altogether, there are 12 control problems for the Revenue Cycle1, and
17 control problems for Expenditure Cycle2; each control problem corresponds to about
three or four control mechanisms. So, altogether we have about a hundred control mecha-
nisms from [Romney and Steinbart, 2006], which also include both procedural measures
and measures related to information systems. The latter were not considered.
The control problems and mechanisms which were obtained are formulated in the original
source [Romney and Steinbart, 2006] from the internal perspective, which is usual in the
internal control literature. The control problems are defined under an implicit assumption
1See p. 381 of [Romney and Steinbart, 2006]
2See p. 435 of [Romney and Steinbart, 2006]
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that a problem occurs either because an employee neglects a problem caused by an ex-
ternal party or because the employee himself causes the problem. Consequently, control
mechanisms do not involve the activities of an external party.
Therefore, to obtain inter-organizational controls, we ‘translated’ the obtained internal
controls to the network perspective, which implies that a control problem is caused by
an external party. For example, for an internal problem ‘Purchasing from unauthorized
suppliers’, the corresponding inter-organizational problem would be ‘Supplier is unautho-
rized’. For the control problem ‘Purchasing goods of inferior quality’ the
inter-organizational control problem would be ‘Supplier sells goods of inferior quality’.
The control mechanisms were interpreted in a similar way. After this ‘translation’ we
grouped the control problems and mechanisms following several principles. Firstly, the
controls have to form non-overlapping problem/solution pairs. Secondly, they have to
be domain-independent: abstract away from the consumer/supplier relationship and ex-
pressed in terms of principal/agent relationship. We also abstracted such details as naming
a specific document, e.g. a purchase order or a contract. Any document was considered to
fall into the category ‘statement’. As a result of this exercise, we have obtained domain-
independent descriptions of controls, which has produced a list of potential patterns.
These patterns have been reported in [Kartseva et al., 2006b].
3. In the third phase, we have discovered that the mechanisms described in the potential
patterns are described in other sources. In fact, some mechanisms were the screening,
signalling, monitoring and incentive mechanisms of the the agency theory (see section
2.1.2). Other mechanisms turned out to be the commitment evidence and execution evi-
dence mechanisms described by Bons (see section 2.1.3). The potential patterns did not
give a one-to-one match to the mechanisms described in literature. For example, we had
one pattern Partner Screening, whereas the agency theory describes two groups of con-
trols that could be described by our pattern - Screening and Signalling. Therefore, we
have analyzed the commonalities and variabilities of the potential patterns and the mech-
anisms from literature. As a result, we have arrived at the set of final control patterns
presented in this thesis and they are documented in Chapter 8 and Chapter 9.
In this section we only present the third phase of the elicitation, which is based on the agency
theory, as described in section 2.1.2, and the work of Bons, as described in section 2.1.3. We
will not present the second phase, since, as we have already explained, the patterns can be
elicited solely from the control theories considered in the third phase. In addition, the internal
control theory, which was used in the second phase, has already been described in detail in
Chapter 2.
The patterns elicitation process of the third phase contains the steps listed below. In the field
‘Source’ we state where in this thesis the step is described.
Step 1: Define domain and analyze context. In this step, we review the domain of controls
and define its scope and context. This analysis is based on the thorough literature review
undertaken in Chapter 2.
Source: Chapter 6, section 6.2
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Step 2: Describe sub-domains and perform commonality-variability analysis. As already
explained, the sub-domains are extracted from the control theories. We analyze each sub-
domain with respect to its uniqueness when compared to the other sub-domains. They are
compared and common and variable features are defined and then a list of control patterns
is elicited.
Source: Chapter 6, section 6.3
Step 3: Define domain vocabulary. The domain vocabulary is a compendium of precise def-
initions of all significant terminology used by experts when discussing problems and
solutions in the domain. The vocabulary is needed to make the patterns more precise
and more understandable and it provides a terminology commonly understood by pat-
terns users. Our vocabulary is based on the control theories, as reviewed in Chapter 2
as well as on a more in-depth review of the work on the formal modelling of controls of
[Chen and Lee, 1992] and [Bons, 1997] in section 7.4.
In addition, we suggest a pattern template, which is a structure to describe each pattern,
e.g. Context, Problem, Solution, Example, Variations.
Source: Chapter 7
Step 4: Define patterns. In this step, each candidate pattern is encoded according to the pat-
tern template. In addition, the context, problem and solution of each pattern are described
using value and process models, which are built using the concepts described in the pat-
terns vocabulary and developed in the previous step.
Source: Chapter 8 and 9
Step 5: Organize and interrelate patterns. The relationship between the control patterns is
stated in the ‘Related patterns’ part of each pattern. There we describe which other pat-
terns provide alternative solutions.
In the remaining sections of this chapter we extend the review of literature to extract those
control patterns, which correspond to Step 3 of our elicitation method.
6.2 Domain of inter-organizational controls
In Chapter 2 we have made an overview of the domain of controls in networks. The findings of
Chapter 2 boil down to the following:
• Inter-organizational controls can be described in terms of the principal-agent framework.
In such a framework, a distinction is made between a primary and a counter actor, where
the primary actor plays the role of principal, and the counter actor plays the role of agent
(see section 2.1.2). The counter actor behaves sub-ideally and the primary actor wants to
reduce the loss caused by such behaviour.
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• There are several types of control problems and mechanisms relevant for network or-
ganizations described in the agency theory (see Figure 2.1). These are Screening, Sig-
nalling, Monitoring, and Incentives. The Screening and Signalling mechanisms are used
to counter the hidden characteristics problem. This occurs when the primary actor does
not have enough knowledge about the counter actor’s abilities or characteristics, as a re-
sult of which there is a risk that the counter actor will perform his activities in a sub-ideal
way. The screening and signalling mechanisms recommend checking the counter actor’s
abilities and characteristics before signing a contract with him. The Monitoring control is
used to counter the hidden action problem, which means that the counter actor performs
his activities in a sub-ideal way. The monitoring mechanism recommends verifying the
counter actor’s performance before rewarding him. If monitoring is difficult or costly,
the counter actor can be stimulated to behave ideally by Incentives which can be positive
(reward) or negative (punishment).
• Two additional inter-organizational controls are described in [Bons, 1997]. The Com-
mitment Evidence control applies to a situation in which a counter actor inappropriately
denies his commitment to the primary actor. The Execution Evidence control applies to a
situation in which a counter actor inappropriately claims that the primary actor executed
his activities sub-ideally. Both commitment evidence and execution evidence controls
require the creation of evidence that can be used in (legal) disputes against the counter
actor. These two controls stem up from the audit trail principle of the internal control
theory.
• A distinction can be made between ex-ante controls, i.e. controls executed before the
contract between two actors is settled, and ex-post controls, i.e. controls executed after
the contract is settled. The screening, signalling and settlement of incentives are ex-ante
controls, while monitoring, commitment evidence, execution evidence and execution of
incentives (actual rewarding or punishment) are ex-post controls. A further distinction
can be made between contractual controls and procedural controls. Contractual controls
employ value-based mechanisms to stimulate the counter actor to behave ideally. Pro-
cedural controls employ process-level mechanisms to repressively prevent or detect the
counter actor’s sub-ideal behaviour. With the exception of incentives, all the groups of
controls considered here are procedural.
• It has already been argued that informal controls, which are important for network or-
ganizations, are more a condition rather than a mechanism that can be designed (see
section 2.1.4). As in [Bons, 1997], the notion of trust can be incorporated in condition of
inter-organizational controls, not as a mechanism. An inter-organizational control is only
needed if there is not enough trust between primary and counter actors.
6.3 Commonality - variability analysis
In our review of the domain we have identified Screening, Signalling, Monitoring, Commitment
Evidence, Execution Evidence and Incentives controls. We call these sub-domains of the control
domain, but it should be noted that this is by no means an exhaustive list of sub-domains.
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However, taken the focus and limitations of this work, we consider it to be a good starting point
to elicit patterns. In this section we compare the sub-domains with each other, and re-group
them to select the unique problem-solution pairs. These pairs will form the control patterns.
In order to extract the control patterns from the sub-domains, we perform the commonality-
variability analysis which is used to identify the common features of similar models and the
elements distinguishing them from other models. From this analysis, a set of control patterns
will be elicited.
6.3.1 Grouping criteria
Before proceeding with the commonality-variability analysis, we must ascertain several require-
ments which we want our patterns to comply with. These requirements define the criteria we
follow in identifying similar and variable features of the sub-domains. The following criteria
are used:
• Unique problem-solution pairs. Wewant the patterns to represent a unique combination
of problems and solutions. We establish the following criteria: (1) two different control
problems should fall in two different patterns, (2) two different control mechanisms for
one control problem should be represented in two different patterns, and (3) if one control
mechanism mitigates two fundamentally different control problems, the two problems
with the similar control mechanism should also be represented by two different patterns.
• Lightweightness. In line with the approach of e3value [Gordijn, 2002], we want the pat-
terns library to be lightweight. This means that the fewer patterns we have to describe
all the considered controls, the better it is. To achieve this, we abstract from domain-
specific details, which are present in the internal control theory. Firstly, we do not con-
sider any specific roles of actors, such as a supplier or a customer. We describe a trans-
action in terms of the principal-agent framework, or, more exactly, its interpretation by
[Bons, 1997], as described in section 2.1.3. In this way, we distinguish between a primary
and a counter actor. The counter actor behaves sub-ideally and the primary actor wants
to reduce the loss caused by this sub-ideal behaviour. The actors can delegate their ac-
tivities to trusted parties. Secondly, we do not differentiate controls because they involve
different types of documents, e.g. a purchase order or a contract. We only consider one
object of type ‘statement’.
• Differences. Although patterns are domain-independent, we do not want to make them
too general. Therefore, we have defined some boundaries to distinguish certain differ-
ences between controls. To be specific, a difference is made between ex-post and ex-ante
controls and contractual and procedural controls. For example, if two control problems
or mechanisms rely on a similar process or a value transaction, but one mechanism is
ex-ante and another is ex-post, we consider them to be two different mechanisms.
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6.3.2 Dealing with delegation
The agency theory and the work of Bons, from which our patterns are extracted, consider con-
trols in a relationship between two actors: a primary and a counter actor. In addition, Bons also
considers some network aspects. He sees networks as being derived from a two-actor network
as a result of the delegation of activities to other actors. But, should we include such situations
with delegations in our patterns?
From practical reasons, this is not a good idea, since a very large number of different networks
can be formed as a result of delegation. The corresponding activities of a primary and a counter
actor can be delegated to each other or to a third party. Third parties can also further delegate
these activities. If we also consider that actors not only execute primary and counter activities,
but also other activities associated with controls (e.g. reconciling, witnessing, verifying), even
more possibilities for delegation arise.
So, if we take delegation into account too, we will never be able to describe an exhaustive list of
patterns and we will only end up with an enormous number of them. Furthermore, these patterns
will describe similar control problems and mechanisms and only differ in the way activities are
delegated, which, strictly speaking, is not a control issue.
On the other hand, the principles of controls in a delegation network are the same as in the
two-actor transaction from which this network is derived. For example, a buyer always checks
if a delivery is correct, and is not concerned about whether the delivery is made by the seller
or if the seller delegates the delivery to a carrier. The only difference is that in the first case
the buyer controls activities of the seller, and in the second case - of the carrier. Consequently,
if we abstract from the specific actors difference and focus on the properties of the actors, the
controls in the two situations are the same.
An important issue that has to be considered in delegation segregation of duties principle. For
example, an actor should not have to control his own activities as a result of delegation. There-
fore, the actors to whom an activity is delegated should have the properties that obey the seg-
regation of duties. Such constraints can be defined also for the two-actor transaction between
a primary actor and a counter actor, e.g. stating that an activity that controls a counter actor
should not be delegated to this counter actor or his allies.
Taking this into account, we choose to describe each pattern only for a transaction between a
primary and a counter actor. In order to describe delegation situations, we introduce delegation
patterns, which provide guidelines on how the two-actor model of a control pattern should be
properly changed into the multi-actor model. They ensure that when an activity is delegated, the
controls prescribed by the control pattern, are still in place. Delegation patterns are described
in Chapter 10.
6.3.3 Deriving the patterns from control sub-domains
In this section we perform the commonality-variability analysis of the control sub-domains. The
following sub-domains have been identified: Screening, Signalling, Monitoring, Commitment
Evidence, Execution Evidence and Incentives. We compare the sub-domains with each other
136 Elicitation of control patterns
to identify whether they represent one pattern or not. Where appropriate, we also look inside a
sub-domain to consider whether it may be split up into several different patterns.
Screening and signalling
The controls of screening and signalling sub-domains mitigate the same control problem of hid-
den characteristics, see section 2.1.2. However, in the agency theory, screening and signalling
are considered to be different control mechanisms. In screening, the primary actor verifies the
activities of the counter actor. For example, when hiring a person, the employer puts him to a
test and checks how the test is performed by actually observing the test activities or their results.
In signalling, the primary actor verifies indirect signals and not the activities. Such signals have
a historical correlation with the expected performance of the actor in the future. For example,
an employer hires candidates who do well at school since it is known from the past that the
chance is higher that they do the job better than the candidates who study not so well.
The difference between screening and signalling is that screening is based on information col-
lected by direct observation of the counter actor’s activity, while signalling is based on infor-
mation collected from a third party. In the employment example, the indirect observation of
the candidate’s abilities is done by the university teachers that grade the candidate. However, if
we ignore delegation, the difference between the two mechanisms disappears. In other words,
signalling is the same as the screening, the only difference being that screening is performed by
a third actor.
So, the screening and signalling describe the same control problem and, in our view, the same
control mechanism. Therefore, they can be described by one pattern which we call Partner
Screening, meaning that the primary actor screens his partner.
Screening and monitoring
Screening and monitoring mitigate the same control problem: a sub-ideal execution of contrac-
tual agreements by a counter actor. On the other hand, the screening control also considers a
condition of hidden characteristics, and, therefore, employs an ex-ante control. As explained
before, screening verifies activities performed by a counter actor in the past with the assumption
that the past resembles the future. The monitoring mechanism does not carry the assumption
of hidden characteristics. As a result, it is an ex-post control performed in the context of an
existing contract and it suggests verification of activities under the contract.
Because of this difference, we describe screening and monitoring controls in different patterns.
The pattern for monitoring control is called Execution Monitoring, meaning that the execution
of the counter actor’s activities is monitored by the counter actor.
Positive incentives and negative incentives
Incentives may be positive or negative. Positive incentives stimulate the counter actor to behave
ideally by rewarding him while the negative incentives do the same by punishing the counter
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actor. As we have demonstrated in Chapter 9, these two mechanisms require different changes
in value models. Namely, positive incentives can be created by adding an incoming value object
to the counter actor in the case of ideal behaviour, while negative incentives can be created by
adding an outgoing value object to the counter actor in the case of sub-ideal behaviour. We
therefore put positive and negative incentives into two different patterns. Positive incentives are
described in the Incentive pattern and negative incentives are described in the Penalty pattern.
Monitoring and incentives
Both the monitoring and the incentive mechanisms mitigate the same control problem - that of
a sub-deal execution of contractual agreements by the counter actor. On the other hand, the two
controls are different, the former is a procedural control, while the latter is a contractual control.
Incentives also require monitoring mechanisms to check when the reward or punishment has to
be issued or not. For example, fraudulent activities have to be proved before someone can be
fined for tax fraud. Such proof can be modelled with the pattern Execution Monitoring, while
the actions related to the punishment are a part of the Penalty pattern. So, as we have demon-
strated in Chapter 9, the incentive mechanism is a variation of the monitoring mechanisms.
Execution evidence and commitment evidence
The execution and commitment evidence controls involve the same activity: the counter actor
should provide the primary actor with an evidence document, which can later be used in a legal
dispute. As a commitment evidence control, the evidence document contains a testimony of the
counter actor’s commitment to a future transaction with the primary actor. This evidence doc-
ument is normally represented by a contract. For the execution evidence control, the evidence
document contains the counter actor’s testimony that the primary actor executed his obligations
as stated in the contractual agreement. An example of such an evidence document is a receipt
given as proof of payment.
So, the processes behind these mechanisms are technically the same, only the role of the evi-
dence document is different. This is because the two controls address different control prob-
lems. In addition, the commitment evidence control is executed ex-ante, while the execution
evidence control is executed ex-post. For these reasons, we describe these two controls in dif-
ferent patterns.
The pattern for the commitment evidence control is described in the Proper Contracting pat-
tern. As the name implies, the control provides guidelines on a correct contracting process.
The pattern for the execution evidence control is called Execution Confirmation. The name
reflects the essence of the mechanism, which is to provide evidence about the execution of
primary activities.
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6.4 Control patterns
In the previous section we have identified several control patterns: Partner Screening, Proper
Contracting, Execution Monitoring, Execution Confirmation, Incentive and Penalty. The pat-
terns are summarized in Table 6.1, in which problems and their solutions are considered.
Table 6.1: Library of Control Patterns
Name Control Problem Solution
Partner
Screening
Counter Actor executes his
commitment sub-ideally.
Primary Actor verifies creden-
tials of Counter Actor before
making any commitments
Execution
Monitor-
ing
Counter Actor executes his
commitment sub-ideally.
Primary Actor verifies
Counter Actor’s execution
of the commitment, before
executing own commitments
Incentive Counter Actor executes his
commitment sub-ideally.
Primary Actor provides a re-
ward for the ideal execution
Penalty Counter Actor executes his
commitment sub-ideally.
Primary Actor provides a pun-
ishment for the sub-ideal exe-
cution
Proper
Contracting
Counter Actor denies to have
made a commitment to Pri-
mary Actor
Counter Actor provides an ev-
idence document, which con-
firms his commitment
Execution
Confirma-
tion
Counter Actor denies that Pri-
mary Actor executes commit-
ments ideally, and refuses to
execute his commitments in
return, or requires a compen-
sation for executing his com-
mitments
Counter Actor provides an ev-
idence document, which con-
firms that Primary Actor exe-
cutes his commitment ideally
Each pattern considers a transaction between two actors: a primary actor and a counter actor.
The two actors make a commitment by signing a contractual agreement. A pattern describes a
control problem and a control mechanism to mitigate this problem. In each pattern, the control
problem is a result of the opportunistic behaviour of the counter actor, while the primary actor is
the beneficiary of the control. The patterns are discussed in details in Chapter 8 and Chapter 9.
6.5 Classification of control patterns
As was explained earlier, the patterns Partner Screening, Execution Monitoring, Penalty and
Incentive deal with the same control problem. What differs in these patterns are the context
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and control mechanisms. Partner Screening considers verification executed ex-ante, Execu-
tion Monitoring considers verification executed ex-post, and Penalty and Incentives consider
contract-based punishments and rewards, agreed on ex-ante and executed ex-post. The knowl-
edge about the ex-post or ex-ante nature of the control is included into the context of the pattern.
In general, a pattern is ex-ante if it describes a solution, executed before the contract is signed.
A pattern is ex-post if it describes a solution, executed after the contract is signed. The Partner
Screening and Proper Contracting patterns are ex-ante, while Execution Monitoring and Execu-
tion Confirmation are ex-post. The patterns Penalty and Incentive are executed both ex-ante and
ex-post. Settlement of contracts where rewards or punishments are defined (e.g. agreements on
ownership structure) take place ex-ante. However, the agents are rewarded or punished ex-post.
This classification is shown in Figure 6.1.
As shown in Figure 6.1, the patterns can also be classified as contractual and procedural. In-
centive and Penalty patterns involve contractual arrangements that settle financial incentives to
align the interests of the parties. Therefore, these are contractual patterns. In fact, the contrac-
tual patterns provide value-based mechanisms to influence the behaviour of the counter actor
so that he does not behave sub-ideally. The other patterns are procedural because they rely on
procedures that prevent sub-ideal behaviour and do not involve financial incentives.
As with underlying controls, control patterns can be assigned to phases of a transaction cycle.
The process of concluding a transaction consists of four phases: the preparation phase and
the negotiation phase, which occur ex-ante, and the execution phase and the acceptance phase,
which occur ex-post [Weigand and de Moor, 2003], see also [Bons, 1997], p. 30. Therefore, the
Partner Screening pattern can be applied in the preparation phase and the Proper Contracting
pattern in the negotiation phase. The Execution Monitoring pattern can be applied during the
execution phase and the Execution Conformation pattern in the acceptance phase. The Incentive
and Penalty patterns describe controls that are applied in both negotiation and execution phases.
6.6 Summary
In this section we have performed a domain analysis and commonality- variability analysis to
extract six different control patterns. Our goal was to elicit a lightweight library of patterns,
which represent unique problem-solution pairs.
Each pattern considers a transaction between two actors: a primary actor and a counter actor.
A counter actor can behave sub-ideally, and a primary actor wishes to implement controls to
mitigate the loss from such sub-ideal behaviour. Any company or person can fill the role of
both primary and counter actor, depending on which control problem is considered.
Patterns are descriptions of control mechanisms for recurring control problems. Each pattern
is a unique combination of a problem and a solution. A problem describes certain sub-ideal
behaviour of the counter actor and the solution describes how the primary actor can mitigate the
loss from such behaviour.
Patterns can be classified as contractual or procedural. Contractual patterns are Penalty and
Incentive and procedural patterns are Partner Screening, Proper Contracting, Execution Moni-
toring and Execution Confirmation.
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Figure 6.1: Control Patterns Classification
Another classification of patterns is ex-ante and ex-post. Knowledge about the ex-post or ex-
ante nature of a control is included in the context of the pattern. Partner Screening and Proper
Contracting are executed ex-ante. Execution Monitoring and Execution Confirmation are ex-
ecuted ex-post. Penalty and Incentive are special cases because they consider contract-based
punishments and rewards, agreed on ex-ante, but executed ex-post.
In control patterns, activities which are needed to carry out a transaction, are executed by either
a primary or a counter actor. To model situations, when a actors delegate some of their activities
to third parties, we introduce delegation patterns. These patterns have rules on how a control
pattern solution should be modified to model a situation with delegation, while ensuring that no
control weaknesses occur because of delegation.
Chapter 7
Patterns vocabulary
In the previous chapter we put forward six e3control patterns. These patterns have been de-
scribed in an informal way using a textual description, see Table 6.1. Our goal is to represent
these patterns using conceptual modelling techniques, which means that we want to describe
the control problem and control mechanism of each pattern using conceptual models. We use
e3value and e3control to model value viewpoint and some process modelling techniques for the
process viewpoint. Conceptual modelling is necessary to come to a common graphical nota-
tion which will make the patterns more precise and achieve a common understanding between
patterns users.
In real cases, the mechanisms suggested by the patterns are applied in complex environments
and the pattern must be incorporated in other business processes and business models that are
already in place. In such cases, we need guidelines to ensure that the patterns are implemented
correctly. We need a mechanism to link the patterns with each other and with the external
environment. To achieve this, in this section we develop a vocabulary of concepts, which we
use to describe the control patterns. This vocabulary includes actors, value objects, operational
activities and objects and is based on the control theories reviewed in Chapter 2 as well as on a
more in-depth review of the work on formal modelling of controls of [Chen and Lee, 1992] and
[Bons, 1997], which we undertake in this chapter.
We wish to describe the patterns using a minimum number of concepts in a vocabulary. To
achieve this, we need to analyze each element which describes the patterns thoroughly, and
develop a vocabulary with a minimum set of terms.
The vocabulary consists of three parts. The first part contains concepts needed to describe an
ideal situation, in which no actor behaves opportunistically. The second part contains concepts
needed to describe a sub-ideal situation, in which the counter actor behaves opportunistically.
The third part contains concepts needed to describe control mechanisms and consists of two
vocabularies: (1) a Control Activities Vocabulary, which describes types of control activities,
used to models controls, and (2) a Control Principles Vocabulary, which describes how the
activities should be embedded in the context so that control mechanisms are executed properly.
Before proceeding with the vocabulary we will give a more precise definition of a control pattern
and describe a pattern template.
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7.1 A control pattern template
Traditionally, a pattern consists of name, context, problem, solutions [Gamma et al., 1995]. We
transfer the idea of using patterns to the control domain. We separate the description of the
context in which a solution is to be applied from the problem which motivates the selection of
a pattern [Coplien and Harrison, 2004].
In our interpretation, the context describes the value network with the actors, their relationships,
including trust, and the activities to be controlled. We assume that no sub-ideal behaviour
occurs. In other words, we describe an ideal situation in the context and we state at which
moment of the transaction – ex-post or ex-ante – we will consider implementing the control.
This knowledge is important to select a pattern. Some patterns consider the same problem and
the choice between the two patterns should be based on additional information, such as that
obtained at the moment of control execution.
The problem specifies sub-ideal behaviour by a counter actor which is to be mitigated by the
solution of the pattern. The solution describes the value network and the corresponding process
model, after implementing the control mechanism encoded in the pattern. We can therefore
define the pattern in the following way. A control pattern is a description of a generic and re-
usable control mechanism for a recurring control problem, selected on the basis of the context
and it consists of the following elements:
name: a descriptive name of the pattern, used to select patterns from a pattern library.
context: a description of the business network to be controlled, modelled from an ideal per-
spective and which means that no one behaves opportunistically. The context also de-
scribes the trust relationship between the actors and the moment of solution execution:
ex-ante or ex-post.
problem: a statement of opportunistic behaviour risks. A control problem exists if there is
some deviation in the prescribed transfers of economic value.
solution: description of a control mechanism, to detect, prevent or correct the control problem.
We suggest the patterns template, shown in Table 7.1. Besides the textual description of the
pattern, we also provide its graphical description which shows the context, problem and solution
using conceptual modelling techniques. We concentrate on value and process viewpoints (see
Chapter 2): To represent value aspects of the context, problem or solution, we use e3value ; To
represent process aspects, we use UML activity diagrams.
The context is interpreted in the control patterns as an ideal situation so it is represented by an
ideal value model and a corresponding process model, also called ideal process model. The
problem is interpreted as a sub-ideal situation and is therefore represented by a sub-ideal value
model and a corresponding sub-ideal process model. Finally, the solution is a model of control
mechanisms. It is represented by a value and process model with controls.
In the template we have also added a section Examples and optional sections Related Patterns
and Variations. These items are also common for the design patterns [Gamma et al., 1995],
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Table 7.1: Pattern Template
TEXTUAL DESCRIPTION
Name <name of the pattern>
Context <description of the ideal situation>
Problem <description of the sub-ideal situation>
Solution <description of the control mechanism>
Example <description of examples>
Variations <description of variations of the control
problem or mechanism>
Related
Patterns
<description of related patterns>
GRAPHICAL DESCRIPTION
Value View Process View
<ideal value model> <ideal process model>
<sub-ideal value model> <sub-ideal process model>
<value model with controls> <process model with
controls>
[Coplien and Harrison, 2004]. Within Related Patterns we describe the patterns which offer
alternative solutions. Within Variations we describe some of the most common variations of
the patterns, e.g. some minor changes in process models that do not change the essence of the
mechanism.
7.2 Ideal situation vocabulary
In this section we develop terminology to describe an ideal situation in the patterns used in the
Context and Solution of the pattern. The solution is described with the use of ideal models
because the controls, introduced by the solution, change a sub-ideal situation into an ideal one.
As was explained in Chapter 6, we describe a transaction between two actors in a pattern. We
call them a primary actor and a counter actor. This terminology was inspired by [Bons, 1997],
described earlier in section 2.1.3. In addition, we add the value perspective, absent in [Bons, 1997].
7.2.1 Value view
At the value level, the counter actor and the primary actor exchange value objects. The primary
actor transfers a primary value object PO to the counter actor, and the counter actor transfers a
counter value object CO in return. The graphical representation of this value transfer vocabulary
is shown in Figure 7.1.
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Figure 7.1: Control pattern vocabulary: ideal value view
7.2.2 Process view
An exchange of a single value object in a value model corresponds to the execution of one
or more operational activities in a process model (see section 3.4 for the relationship between
the value and process viewpoints). An operational activity, executed by the primary actor,
which results in the transfer of the value object PO is called a Primary activity. An operational
activity, executed by the counter actor, which results the transfer of the value object CO is called
a Counter activity. These acti ities can also be collections of multiple operational activities,
as defined in UML [Fowler and Scott, 2000]. In addition, one value transfer may require the
execution of multiple operational activities.
The UML activity diagram in Figure 7.2 shows the execution of Primary and Counter activities
by the primary and counter actors. This process model corresponds to the value model in Figure
7.1. The value model does not give us information about the order in which these activities are
executed: The primary activity can be executed first, or the other way around. Unless additional
information is provided by the context of the pattern, we assume that the order of activities is
not relevant. To model this graphically in UML, we use the transaction fork (see Appendix B
on the UML notation).
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Figure 7.2: Control pattern vocabulary: ideal process view
Penalty and Incentive. A special kind of primary value object is the object Incentive. It is
needed to model incentives given to the counter actor by the primary actor. At the process level,
the transfer of the value object Incentive corresponds to the activity Pay Incentive which is a
special case of primary activity.
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A special kind of counter value object is the object Penalty. It is needed to model a penalty paid
to the primary actor by the counter actor. At the process level, the transfer of the value object
Penalty corresponds to the activity Pay Penalty by the counter actor which is a special case of
counter activity.
7.3 Sub-ideal situation vocabulary
In the section Problem of a pattern we represent the sub-ideal behaviour of a counter actor. We
model control problems only from the point of view of the primary actor which is within the
framework of the agency theory (see section 2.1.2). The primary actor plays the role of principal
and the counter actor plays the role of agent. As a result, by definition the counter actor behaves
sub-ideally and the primary actor wishes to mitigate the risks caused by such behaviour.
This perspective does not mean that we only consider the counter actor to behave sub-ideally.
Neither do we mean that the primary actor does not behave sub-ideally. So, each actor can play
the role of both primary and counter actor. For instance, a pattern can be applied at least twice to
a transaction between a buyer and a seller: (1) assuming the buyer is the primary actor and the
seller is the counter actor, who behaves sub-ideally from the buyer’s point of view and (2) vice
versa, assuming the seller is the primary actor and the buyer is the counter actor, who behaves
sub-ideally from the seller’s point of view. Therefore, the intention is to handle the complexity
of control problems in multi-actor networks by splitting them into parts of problems considered
by every single actor.
In addition, we emphasize that we assume a subjective view on sub-ideal behaviour. As dis-
cussed in section 3.2.1, such behaviour may be perceived as sub-ideal by the actor, whereas
another actor may perceive the same behaviour as ideal. Sub-ideality is defined by the primary
actor in the patterns. For example, an untimely delivery of goods by a seller is sub-ideal from
the point of view of a primary actor who is a buyer. A rational seller, interested only in max-
imizing his own wealth, might not consider the untimely delivery to be sub-ideal, unless it is
settled in a legal contract. In some cases, a primary actor represents a group of actors, e.g. a
certain market segment or an agency acting in the interests of a group.
7.3.1 Value view
To represent sub-ideal behaviour from the value viewpoint we use e3control (see Chapter 3).
The result of the counter actor’s sub-ideal behaviour is a sub-ideal transfer of the value object
CO, modelled as Sub-ideal CO in Figure 7.3. The counter actor has also been given a liability
token L because he is responsible for this sub-ideal transfer.
7.3.2 Process view
In the process viewpoint, this sub-ideal value transfer CO corresponds to the execution of some
operational activities of which we distinguish two types. The first type are ideal counter activ-
ities executed sub-ideally, i.e. not as prescribed in the ideal situation. We call them Sub-ideal
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Counter activities. The second type, which we call Emerging Sub-ideal activities, are activities
that do not exist in the ideal situation and that emerge as a result of the sub-ideal behaviour. We
now consider the two types.
Sub-ideal Counter activities. A Sub-ideal Counter activity is an ideal counter activity not
executed as prescribed by an ideal situation. Graphically the activity is modelled in Figure 7.4.
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As described in Chapter 2, the following types of sub-ideal counter activities are possible:
• A counter activity takes place at the wrong time or in the wrong sequence (or does not
take place at all)
• A counter activity is carried out without the proper authorization
• A counter activity which involves the wrong internal agent
• A counter activity which involves the wrong external agent
• A counter activity which involves the wrong resource
• A counter activity which involves the wrong amount or number of resources
• A counter activity carried out at the wrong location
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In a situation when the value transfer of CO corresponds to more than one counter activity, at
least one counter activity can be executed sub-ideally to cause sub-ideality of the value trans-
fer CO. Furthermore, different combinations of sub-ideal counter activities can be related to
different control problems, and therefore require different controls.
Emerging Sub-ideal activities. Sub-ideal behaviour may involve not only the sub-ideal exe-
cution of counter activities, but also the execution of additional activities that are not executed in
a corresponding ideal situation. Such activities are called Emerging Sub-ideal activities. For ex-
ample, activities are not executed in an ideal situation when a document is forged, e.g. printing
the forged document.
Within this category of activities, we distinguish two special cases: Deny Commitment andDeny
Execution. These two activities are necessary in order to model the sub-ideal behaviour in the
controls described by [Bons, 1997], which are also a part of our pattern library, as described in
Chapter 6. By executing the Deny Commitment activity the counter actor explicitly claims that
he made no obligations to transfer theCO to the primary actor. By executing theDeny Execution
activity the counter actor explicitly claims that the primary actor executed the primary activity
sub-ideally.
7.4 Reviewing control terminology and principles
To derive a vocabulary for describing control mechanisms on the process level, we must return
to the internal control theory and in particular to the control principles identified in section 2.1.1.
The control principles - segregation of duties, authorization, access restriction, audit trail, and
independent verification - describe procedural details on how a control should be implemented
in a business process.
The plain text description of the control principles as given in section 2.1.1 is not very conve-
nient from which to derive the vocabulary of controls design. To do this, we use the work on for-
mal models of control principles by [Chen and Lee, 1992] and [Bons, 1997], [Bons et al., 1998],
[Bons et al., 2000], reviewed in part in section 2.1.3, henceforth CLB. CLB focuses on the de-
velopment of an expert system that automatically audits controls in business processes. As
a result, they describe the control principles with more granulations and in a more structured
way than the internal control theory does. In [Chen and Lee, 1992], the control principles are
referred to as ‘auditing principles’. In [Bons, 1997] they are refers to them as ‘contextual con-
ditions’. We provide a review of this work below.
Using the principles of CLB to develop the vocabulary is limited because that they do not cover
all the internal control theory principles identified in section 2.1.1. They consider primarily the
segregation of duties principle, independent verification principle and authorization principle.
The access restriction, audit trail and adequate documents and records principles are not cov-
ered. However, in the scope of the current work this is not a restriction, since this latter group
of principles is related mainly to the information system level of analysis.
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7.4.1 Models of internal controls
To model control mechanisms, Chen and Lee have developed a set of what they call auditing
principles, defined as “stereotypical descriptions of the relationships between activities, agents,
assets, and information repositories involved in an internal control system1” [Chen and Lee, 1992].
The principles find their roots in the internal control theory as discussed in section 2.1.1, e.g.
a segregation of duties principle. The original purpose of these principles was to use them as
heuristics in an expert system. In such a system, control weaknesses in business processes are
automatically detected by checking whether the business processes comply with the auditing
principles. In Table 7.2 we present a summary of these auditing principles.
Table 7.2: Auditing principles of Chen
Principles of precedence order of tasks
I Whenever an operating tasks exists, a corresponding control tasks should
also exist
II Whenever an operating task and its corresponding control task exist, the
control task should follow the operating task
Principles of relation between information and tasks
III When a control task exists, it must be furnished with supporting documents
IV The supporting documents should be generated by a trustworthy source, e.g.
by a previous control task
V The supporting documents should be generated by a source independent of
the source which generates the document to be verified
VI The supporting document should be transferred directly from the control
task that produced it
Principles of organizational structure
VII A control task and the operating task it intends to control should be segre-
gated into two different positions
VIII A control task and the operating task it intends to control should be dele-
gated to two different agents
IX The position responsible for a control task must not be lower in the formal
power hierarchy than the position of the operating task
X The agent responsible for a control task should be socially detached from
the agent responsible for the operating task
The principles use a specific terminology. Firstly, they make a distinction between operating
tasks and control tasks. A control task is a detective verification activity, which audits the results
of an operating task with respect to its legitimacy, quality, or quantity [Chen and Lee, 1992]. A
control task can therefore also be called ‘verification task’, and an operating task can also be
called ‘controlled task’ or ‘verified task’.
1Originally in [Chen and Lee, 1992] the principles are called ‘control patterns’. However, their definition of
the control patterns is defined from deontic logic perspective, and corresponds more to our definition of control
principles, rather than to our definition of control patterns. In later work of [Bons et al., 1998] the patterns of Chen
and Lee are referred as ‘auditing principles’.
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Furthermore, a control task compares a to-be-verified document and a supporting document.
The to-be-verified document represents claims about an operating task (e.g. made by observing
the task). The supporting documents represent trustworthy evidence about this operating task.
For example, to verify whether the right goods have been delivered, we use the observation
of the delivery and compare it with a purchase order or contract, which states what goods
were ordered. In this case, the purchase order or contract is a supporting document and the
observation of the delivery is a to-be-verified document.
The auditing principles in Table 7.2 are clustered in three groups. The first group considers the
order of tasks. Within this group, Principle I states that every operating task should be verified
by the control task. Principle II states that the control task has to occur after the operating task.
The second group considers the relationships between the tasks and the documents. Principle III
- V put additional requirements on the supporting documents, e.g. that they have to be present
and that they have to be generated by an independent source. Principle VI requires the direct
transfer of supporting documents from the source that generates them. The direct transfer re-
quirement is crucial to avoid any tampering with the document. In practice, a very high percent-
age of fraud cases involve the alteration of otherwise valid documents [Chen and Lee, 1992].
Finally, the third group considers the organizational structure, which is, in fact, segregation of
duties.
The operating tasks in Chen and Lee’s model correspond to both the primary and the counter
activity defined in our vocabulary. However, the patterns assume that the primary actor plays
the role of principal and the counter actor the role of agent, and, they therefore, only take the
sub-ideal behaviour of the counter actor into consideration. So, Chen and Lee’s operating task
is our counter activity and the Chen and Lee’s control task is an activity that verifies the counter
activity.
7.4.2 Models of inter-organizational controls
The auditing principles of Chen and Lee cover only internal controls of the expenditure cycle.
Bons and others in [Bons, 1997], [Bons et al., 1998], [Bons et al., 2000] model controls in a
similar way, but considers a broader set of them and specifically focuses on inter-organizational
controls. As described earlier in section 2.1.3, Bons describes the controls that correspond to
Execution Monitoring, Execution Confirmation and Proper Contracting patterns2.
To describe the controls, Bons uses a set of rules, which are similar in structure to the auditing
principles of Chen and Lee, but he calls them contextual conditions. They are listed in Table
7.33. The set of contextual conditions is an addition to the set of Chen and Lee’s auditing
principles.
In addition to the verification activity (the control task in Chen and Lee), Bons distinguishes
witnessing, promising and testifying activities. The witnessing activity is used in a strict sense:
a party should either be present during the execution of the controlled activity, or it should be
2These controls are called General Principles in [Bons, 1997]
3In I [Bons, 1997] means that the document has to have a certain power. For instance, a bill of lading in
international transport constitutes the right to take delivery of certain goods, whereas any other document does not
constitute this right, although both documents may contain the same information.
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Table 7.3: Contextual Conditions of Bons
Contextual Conditions for Testifying and Witnessing
I The right type of document should be issued by the proper role
II The role that testifies should be different from the role that performs the
primary activity
III The parties playing the roles should be different and socially detached
IV The role that testifies should witness the primary activity
V This witnessing has to occur before the document is issued
VI The document should be received by the role requesting the evidence
Contextual Conditions for Promise
VII The proper document should be issued by the appropriate role
VIII The issuing role should be responsible for the primary activity being
promised
IX The beneficiary of this activity should receive the document
able to personally inspect some items through which the result of the activity is unambiguously
determined. The latter is used in the definition of inspections, which do not usually take place
during the actual activity that is being inspected. For instance, the production of goods is
witnessed if a party actually sees the goods and is therefore able to infer that they have been
produced.
Promising and testifying activities refer to the exchange of so-called ‘performative’ documents.
Such a document is one of the instruments used as a part of a control mechanism and sev-
eral functions of such documents can be specified using the Speech Act theory [Austin, 1962].
Promising refers to a promise that a party will perform some future action. Testifying refers to
a statement made by a party that it has witnessed the completion of an activity.
7.4.3 Limitations of existing work
On the one hand, the work of CLB provides a good starting point to describe a vocabulary of
control activities. The disadvantage of the Bons’s contextual conditions for describing solutions
to control patterns is that they are, as their name implies, context-dependent. That is to say,
the conditions for testifying in Table 7.3 have been written for a situation in which a counter
actor witnesses and testifies about a primary activity. However, they are inapplicable to other
situations, e.g. where a primary actor witnesses and testifies about a counter activity. Similarly,
the conditions for promising assume that a promise is made by a trusted party of the primary
actor about the primary activity. The conditions for promising are not applicable to situations
in which a promise is made about a counter activity by a counter actor. This limitation is also
acknowledged by [Bons, 1997] at p. 60.
Chen and Lee’s auditing principles are context-independent: every activity can play the role of
an operational or control task. On the other hand, the disadvantage of this principles is that they
only describe the principles for verification, and not the principles for witnessing, promising
and testifying. In our case, we need all these principles to describe patterns.
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Therefore, in our vocabulary, we take a joint set of control activities and control principles from
both works. In addition, we express control principles as context-independent, which allows us
to use them for each different pattern and not only for one specific pattern.
In general, our contribution differs from the work of CLB because we are aiming for a method-
ology to design new control mechanisms, instead of checking the correctness or trustworthiness
of existing control procedures. In addition, unlike CLB, we do not intend to develop an expert
system which uses automated reasoning to select the optimal controls for a particular network.
Instead we have developed a methodology to assist human beings in the design process of
controls. Our methodology is computer-supported in the sense that it supports the building of
conceptual modelling diagrams for human designers.
7.4.4 The control activities and control principles vocabulary
In the next two sections, we suggest a vocabulary to describe control mechanisms in patterns.
Firstly, we describe a vocabulary of control activities in which we define them. We describe
their required inputs and outputs which are obligatory, meaning that it is impossible to execute
the activity without satisfying the input/output conditions defined in the activity vocabulary. For
example, it is impossible to execute verification of a document without first having seen it.
Secondly, in the Control Principles Vocabulary we specify controls principles, derived from
the auditing principles of [Chen and Lee, 1992] and contextual conditions of [Bons, 1997]. The
control principles are defined outside the context of a particular pattern. For example, in princi-
ple we describe a relationship between a testifying activity and a testified activity. In such a way,
the role of the testified activity can be executed by any activity in the pattern: a primary activity,
a counter activity or any other activity. We are therefore able to describe not only testification
of a primary activity, as in [Bons, 1997], but also of a counter activity.
Finally, not all the auditing principles of [Chen and Lee, 1992] in Table 7.2 are used in control
principles. The auditing principles were originally developed for internal controls. The inter-
organizational dimension of this research brings with it an extra complexity and to compensate
for it we simplify things by not taking some control principles any further into consideration.
In particular, Principles VII and VIII distinguish between positions and agents within organiza-
tions. Positions are the responsibility of one particular person, so in this work we only model
complete enterprises, and do not consider positions. Principle IX has also been omitted. At this
stage of our research we do not define hierarchical relationships between enterprises. These are
simplifications that can be added in further research.
7.5 Control activities vocabulary
In this and the following sections we describe concepts needed to model control mechanisms
from the process perspective only. As we will see later, it is sufficient to use the ideal situation
vocabulary from section 7.2 to model controls from the value perspective.
In this section we focus on operational activities needed to execute control mechanisms which
are called control activities. A set of control activities includes any activity needed for a control
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mechanism. Note that our definition of control activities is broader than that of verification as
in [Chen and Lee, 1992]. We describe the control activities verify, witness, testify and promise.
Graphical notation. Activities are represented graphically using the notation of UML activity
diagrams. Take Figure 7.5 as an example. It represents an actor by using swim-lines, the two
parallel lines at the sides of the figure. The actor executes an activity, which is represented by
the rounded square, see Verify Activity. The inputs and outputs of the activity are modelled as
objects, represented with by squares, see e.g. Positive Statement. Further details about the UML
notation can be found in the Appendix B.
7.5.1 Verify activity
The Verify activity is defined as the verification of correctness, legitimacy, or completeness of
some operating activity or its outcome4. The required inputs and outputs of the verify activity
are presented in Figure 7.5.
Verify
To Be Verified
Statement
Supporting
Statement
[negative 
outcome]
[positive 
outcome]
Verify
Activity
Negative
Statement
Positive
Statement
Figure 7.5: Activity ‘Verify’
Statements. As shown in Figure 7.5, the Verify activity has two required inputs: a To-be-
verified Statement and a Supporting Statement. We prefer to use the term ‘statement’ rather
than ‘document’. Nowadays, many paper documents have been replaced by electronic records.
The term ‘statement’ is more general and can be applied to both paper documents and elec-
tronic records. We define ‘statement’ as an object, denoting either an oral or written statement,
whereby the latter is an evidence document or an electronic record that has the status of such
a document. In a control setting, the statement must be written, so that it can further fulfil its
function as an evidence document.
To-be-verified and Supporting Statements. The Verify activity compares the information in
the to-be-verified statement and supporting statements. The to-be-verified statement represents
untrustworthy information that must be verified by the activity Verify. The supporting statement
4Our definition of the verification activity corresponds to the ‘control task’ in [Chen and Lee, 1992]
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represents information that helps to judge the trustworthiness of the information in the to-be-
verified statement. For example, if a seller claims that goods have been delivered, but the buyer
has not seen the actual delivery, then verification lies in the fact of delivery. In this case, the to-
be-verified statement is the seller’s claim and the supporting statement is the buyer’s observation
of the actual delivery or observed delivery.
The roles of to-be-verified and supporting statements should be assigned depending on the
subject of verification and thus one document can play both roles in different situations. In
the previous example, the buyer wants to verify the fact of the delivery. In another situation,
when a buyer has already observed a delivery and wants to check its correctness, the supporting
statement is a purchase order or a contract between the buyer and the seller, which states what
was ordered and what should therefore be delivered. Observed delivery is now the to-be-verified
statement, whereas in the previous situation it played the role of the supporting statement.
Negative and Positive Statements. The outcome of the Verify activity is a decision element
with two guard conditions: positive outcome and negative outcome. The guard condition ‘pos-
itive outcome’ is met if the Verify activity finds a correspondence between the to-be-verified
statement and the supporting statement. Otherwise, the guard condition ‘negative outcome’
is met. If the positive outcome is met, the control flow ends with a positive statement; if the
negative outcome is met, the control flow follows ends with a negative statement.
For example, if the verification of a delivery reveals that the goods were not ordered, the out-
come of the verification activity is a document stating that the delivery is illegitimate. This is a
negative statement. Otherwise, the outcome is a document stating that the delivery is legitimate.
This is a positive statement.
We often omit the positive and negative statements in our models: the outcome can already be
seen from the guard conditions [positive outcome] and [negative outcome] of a decision ele-
ment. However, it is important to remember that the outcome of the decision element produces
objects of type Statement. This allows us to connect the outcome of the verify activity to other
activities that require objects of type Statement as an input, e.g. a testify activity.
7.5.2 Witness activity
Witness
Witness
Activity Statement
Figure 7.6: Activity ‘Witness’
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TheWitness activity reports on an observation of reality5. In Figure 7.6 the output of the witness
activity is an object of type Statement which contains information about the observation of
reality. The statement produced by the witness activity can be further used for various purposes,
such as an incoming object for a verification activity.
7.5.3 Testify activity
Unlike witnessing, the Testify activity testifies information in another statement, not an ob-
servation6. The difference between witnessing and testifying is that in the case of witnessing
someone ‘sees something happening and ‘declares’ that he has really seen it. In the case of
testifying, someone ‘declares’ that information in a statement is true, an example of which is
signing a document.
In Figure 7.7, the Testify activity requires an input of an object of type Statement, and has
a Testifying Statement as an output. In addition, we consider a situation in which one actor
testifies something to another actor. Thus, a Testifying Statement is transferred between two
actors. This case is the most common in patterns.
Testify
Testify
Activity
Testifying
StatementStatement
Figure 7.7: Activity ‘Testify’
7.5.4 Promise activity
The Promise activity gives confirmation of some future actions. By giving a promise, an actor
obliges himself to execute an activity in future. The promise activity in Figure 7.8 does not have
any obligatory inputs: Anyone can promise anything without any previous requirements. The
output of the promise activity is an object of type Statement, called Confirmation Statement,
which is an evidence document about the promise made. An example of a confirmation state-
ment is a contract in which a seller promises to provide some product or service to a buyer. In
patterns we only consider promises made by a primary actor to a counter actor, or vice versa.
Therefore, in Figure 7.8 we model a situation in which a confirmation statement is transferred
between two actors.
5Note that our interpretation of witnessing is slightly different to that of [Bons, 1997]. Bons defines witnessing
as merely observing something and not reporting about it. In Bons, the reporting is done by the testifying activity
6Note that we interpret testifying slightly different than that of [Bons, 1997]. Bons considers is as testifying
about both observations and documents.
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Promise
Confirmation
Statement
Promise
Activity
Figure 7.8: Activity ‘Promise’
7.6 Control principles vocabulary
In this section we define the control principles for every control activity, described in section
7.5. The principles have their root in the internal control theory and, more specifically, are based
on the auditing principles of [Chen and Lee, 1992] and contextual conditions of Bons, described
in section 7.4. As such, we have control principles for verification, witnessing, promising, and
testification. In addition, we introduce a pre-execution principle based on work of Bons and
described in section 2.1.3. The difference between our control principles and the work of CBL
is discussed in detail in section 7.4.3.
Structure of the control principles. We describe all the principles in a unified manner within
three groups:
1. The Activities-Activities principles describe relationships between two activities, e.g. which
activity should be executed first.
2. The Activities-Objects principles describe the relationships between an object. e.g. a
statement and the activities that exchange this object. For example, these principles re-
quire a direct transfer of a statement between two activities.
3. The Activities-Actors principles describe which actors have to execute the activity and
involves the segregation of duties principles.
The control principles vocabulary is an extension of the control activities vocabulary and it
introduces more restriction on execution of a control activity. Unlike in the control activities
vocabulary, in control principles vocabulary the necessity of these restrictions is defined by the
control theory, not by the activity itself. For example, the control activities vocabulary states
that the Testify activity must have a statement as an input, however it does not state that the
statement should come from an activity executed earlier; the latter requirement is stated in the
control principles vocabulary which follows on.
It is therefore physically possible to execute a control activity without the inputs and outputs
specified in the control principles vocabulary. However, such an execution would be untrust-
worthy according to the internal control theory. For example, it will be untrustworthy to execute
Testify activity before an activity which is being testified is executed. Similarly, it will be un-
trustworthy to execute Verify activity before an activity which is being verified is executed. Such
restrictions are described in the control principles vocabulary. The control principles must hold
in any control pattern and violation of a control principle creates a control weakness.
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Graphical notation. Each principle is represented with a graphical notation in UML. Take
Figure 7.9 as an example. There we see two variations of one principle: A and B. In variation
A the principles require two activities to be executed parallel to each other. In variation B the
activities are executed in a sequential order. This is modelled using the corresponding concepts
of the UML activity diagrams notation: a control flow and a transaction fork.
The activities are assigned to different actors, represented by swim-lines (see the explanation of
the UML swim-lines in Appendix B). We do not give any specific names to the actors. However,
the principles are defined assuming the interest of the actor who executes the control activity. In
other words, the actor who executes the control activity is a primary actor or his trusted party.
Segregation of duties in graphical notation. The swim-lines have a special semantics here.
We use them to represent the segregation of duties requirement, written in Activity-Actor prin-
ciples. For example, in Figure 7.9 we assign two activities to different actors, separated by a
swim-line, to model that an activity Witness is executed by an actor who is not the one who
executes the activity Witnessed. If activities are not separated by a swim-line, the model shows
that it is not obligatory to separate them. This notation is used throughout the book to represent
the segregation of two activities.
Numbering the principles. The textual formulation of the control principles is listed along
with their graphical notation, see Figure 7.9. In this and other figures, the principles are given
an ID, which consists of a letter (seeW) and a number (I, II, III...). The letter refers to the name
of the principle, e.g. W stands for theWitnessing principle. The letters a and b indicate to what
variation of the principle we refer to. The Witnessing principle in Figure 7.9 has two variations:
A for witnessing of behaviour and A witnessing of outcome. If neither a nor b are indicated,
then the principle should hold for both situations.
7.6.1 Witnessing Principles
Every witness activity can be associated with an activity that is being witnessed and is referred
to as the witnessed activity. Any operating or control activity can play the role of a witnessed
activity, for example, that of witnessing a counter or primary activity, or even witnessing another
witness activity.
We distinguish two kinds of witnessing: witnessing of behaviour and witnessing of output. This
distinction corresponds to the behaviour and output control in the agency theory (see section
2.1.2) and in the management control [Ouchi, 1979]. Bons also makes this distinction implicitly
by stating that the witnessing activity implies that (1) the party should either be present during
the execution of the controlled activity, or (2) it should be able to personally inspect some items
through which the result of the activity is unambiguously determined. The first part of the
definition refers to the witnessing of behaviour, and the second part refers to the witnessing of
output.
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Witness
Activity
Witnessed
Activity
Witnessing Principles
(A) Witnessing of behavior
(B) Witnessing of an output
Witness
Activity
Witnessed
Activity Output
Activities-Activities principles
W- I Witness activity must exist
W-IIa Witnessed activity must occur at the same time as Witness
activity
W-IIb Witnessed activity must precede Witness activity
Activities-Objects principles
W-
IIIb
Witnessed Outcome must be directly transferred to Witness
activity from the Witnessed activity
Activities-Actors principles
W-IV An actor executingWitness activity must be independent and
socially detached from the actor executing Witnessed activ-
ity.
Figure 7.9: Witnessing Principles
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Witnessing of behaviour. For witnessing of behaviour, the observer wants to make a state-
ment about the execution of the Witnessed activity. Thus, the Witness activity must occur at
the same time as the Witnessed activity. In Figure 7.9 (A) we show this by modelling a parallel
execution of theWitnessed andWitness activities. We cannot model the simultaneous execution
in the UML language, and, therefore, we model the parallel execution only.
Witnessing of output. For the witnessing of output, the observer wants to make a statement
about an output of an activity. The output is modelled as an object Output and it is assumed
that the output is an object through which the result of theWitnessed activity is unambiguously
determined. In this case simultaneous execution is not required. As shown in Figure 7.9 (B),
the Witnessed activity happens before the Witness activity.
We often omit the object Output in our graphical models in order to simplify them. However, it
is important to remember that non-simultaneous execution can only be allowed if the output of
the activity Witnessed determines the witnessed activity unambiguously. For example, Output
must not be altered by unauthorized people so that it represents trustworthy information about
the Witnessed activity. If Output does not possess such characteristics, Witnessed and Witness
have to be executed simultaneously, as in the witnessing of behaviour in Figure 7.9 (A).
The control principles for relationships between the activities Witness and Witnessed are for-
mulated in text in Figure 7.9. The first principle requires the Witnessed activity to precede the
Witness activity, the motivation behind it being that we cannot witness something that has not
happened. The second principle requires theWitness activity to be executed by a party that is in-
dependent and socially detached from the actor who executes the Witnessed activity. This goes
back to the segregation of duties: making claims about your own activities is untrustworthy.
7.6.2 Verification Principles
Each verification activity corresponds to some activity which it verifies and will be further
referred to as a Verified activity. In fact, any activity can play the role of a Verified activity. For
example, we can speak about verifying a counter or a primary activity, verifying a witnessing
activity, or even verifying a verification activity.
The principles for relationships between a Verify and a Verified activity are formulated graph-
ically and in text in Figure 7.10. The Verify activity checks the correctness, completeness or
legitimacy of the Verified activity. For example, if the Verified activity corresponds to a delivery
of goods, then the Verify activity checks if the delivered goods were indeed ordered.
Verification of a behaviour. In section (A) of Figure 7.10 we considered the verification of
behaviour or, in other words, verification of the execution of a Verified activity which should be
observed by a Witness activity and only then verified.
The Witness activity is executed as required by the Witnessing control principle: by a party
independent of the party executing the observed Verified activity and after the Verified activ-
ity. The Witness activity produces a To-be-verified Statement. The Supporting Statement is
information that helps to judge correctness, completeness or legitimacy of the Verified activity,
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To be verified
Statement
Supporting
Statement
Witness
Activity
Verified
Activity
Verified
Activity
Verify
Activity
Verify
Activity
Verification Principles
To be verified
Document
Supporting
Statement
(B) verification of a document
(A) verification of an activity
Activities-Activities principles
V-Ia Witness activity must exist
V-II Verify activity must exist
V-IIIa Witness activity must follow Verified activity
V-IVa Verify activity must follow Witness activity
Activities-Objects principles
V-V Supporting Statement must be directly transferred to Verify activity
from a source that generates it
V-VIa To-be-verified Statement must be directly transferred to from the
Witness activity to the Verify activity
V-VIb To-be-verified Statement must be directly transferred to from the
Verified activity to the Verify activity
Activities-Actors principles
V-VIIa An actor executing Witness activity must be independent and so-
cially detached from the actor executing Verified activity
V-VIII An actor executing Verify activity must be independent and socially
detached from the actor executing Verified activity
V-VIX Supporting Statement must generated by an actor independent and
socially detached from the actor executing Verified activity
Figure 7.10: Verification Principles
160 Patterns vocabulary
as described in the To-be-verified Statement. For more details on the definition of the Verify
activity see section 7.5.1.
Verification of an output. In section (B) of Figure 7.10 we consider a Verified activity which
produces a statement, for example, when the Verified activity produces a contract and verifica-
tion is needed to check if the contract satisfies the necessary requirements. In such cases, the
Witness activity, which refers to the witnessing of this statement, is not modelled: The UML
activity diagrams assume that the receiving party possesses the statement, which is equivalent
to witnessing the document.
The control principles for the Verify activity in Figure 7.10 are based on Chen’s auditing prin-
ciples described in section 7.4. The Verified activity must occur before the Verify activity and
the Verify activity must be executed after the Witness activity. This is because it is not possi-
ble to verify something that has not been witnessed in the same way that it is not possible to
witness something that has not happened. Furthermore, the Verify and Witness activities must
be executed by an actor, who is independent and socially detached from the actor executing the
Verified. In addition, the Supporting Statement must be produced by a source, independent and
socially detached from the actor executing the Verified activity. This is related to the segregation
of duties: witnessing, verifying or making some claims about your own actions is not trustwor-
thy. In addition, in order to avoid forging, the Supporting Statement must be transferred directly
from the issuing actor to the receiving actor. The same goes for the To-be-verified Statement in
situation A.
Generally speaking, the principle about the direct transfer of a statement can be relaxed if the
statement cannot be forged, i.e. tamper-proof. Proving whether a document is tamper-proof or
not is an information-level decision and it is out of the scope of this research. Therefore, in all
patterns we assume that statements are not tamper-proof and we require direct transfer.
Henceforth, the source that generates the supporting statement is modelled as the UML Initial
State element. Semantically, the UML initial state is a sub-class of the operational activity.
Since we do not always know which activity generates the supporting statement, we model
it with the initial state. According to the control principle V-VIX in Figure 7.10, the initial
state should be assigned to an actor who is independent and socially detached from the actor
executing the Verified activity.
7.6.3 Promising Principles
A Promise activity creates an obligation to execute certain activities in the future. These future
activities are called Promised activities and a promise made by a primary actor creates his
obligations with respect to the Primary activity. So, the Promised activity is the Primary activity
for a primary actor and in a similar way the Promised activity is the Counter activity for a
counter actor.
The control theory states that an actor should only execute activities if he has promised to do so.
This is stated in the contextual condition VIII of [Bons, 1997] in Table 7.3. An actor should first
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sign a contract and only then should he execute activities under it. Therefore, in Figure 7.11 the
Promise activity should always precede the Promised activity of the same actor. In addition, the
direct transfer of a Confirmation Statement should be observed.
Promising  Principles
Confirmation
Statement
Promise
Activity
Promised
Activity
Activities-Activities principles
P-I Promise activity must exist
P-II Promise activity must precede Promised activity of the same
actor
Activities-Objects principles
P-III Confirmation statement must be directly transferred from the
Promise activity to the actor receiving the promise
Figure 7.11: Promising Principles
7.6.4 Testification Principles
As defined in section 7.5.3, Testify activity testifies information in another statement. This
statement is produced by a Testified activity, which we model in the principle here. The control
theory prohibits testifying about anything that has not been executed. It is similar to the principle
for the verification activity, which prohibits verification of any activities that have not been
executed. Thus, the Testified activity that produces the statement must be executed before the
Testify activity.
The principles for relationships between the Testify and Testified activities are formulated graph-
ically and in text in Figure 7.12. It states that the Testify activity must follow the Testified activ-
ity. In addition, the Statement issued by the Testified activity must be transferred directly to the
Testify activity. The same rule of direct transfer is applied to the Testifying Statement. The last
principle ensures that only the actor who possesses the Statement can testify it.
When the Testified activity is represented by a Witness activity, the Testification Principles
model the contextual conditions of Bons for witnessing and testifying activities as listed in
Table 7.3.
7.6.5 Pre-execution Principles
In addition to the control principles, which have been derived from the auditing principles
of [Chen and Lee, 1992] and contextual conditions of [Bons, 1997], some additional rules are
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Testified
Activity
Testify
Activity
Testification  Principles
Statement
Testifying
Statement
Activities-Activities principles
T-I Testify activity must exist
T-II Testify activity must follow Testified activity.
Activities-Objects principles
T-III Statement must be directly transferred from the Testified ac-
tivity to the Testify activity
T-IV Testifying Statement must be directly transferred from the
Testify activity to the actor receiving the testification
T-V Testify activity must be executed by the same actor who has
the Statement
Figure 7.12: Testification Principles
Verify
Primary
Activity
Pre-execution  Principles
[negative
outcome]
[positive
outcome]
Positive
Statement
Negative
Statement
Activities-Activities principles
PE-I Verify activity must exist (optional)
PE-II Verify activity must follow Primary activity
Activities-Objects principles
PE-
III
Positive Statement must be directly transferred from the Ver-
ify activity to the Primary activity
Figure 7.13: Pre-execution Principles
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needed to describe patterns. These rules are the pre-execution requirements, described earlier
in section 2.1.3. The pre-execution requirements are found in Bons, who implicitly states them
within the definitions of the controls, see [Bons, 1997], pp.60-62. For instance, in monitor-
ing controls, the pre-execution requirement is to execute the verification of the counter activity
before the primary activity is executed.
An important feature that makes the pre-execution requirements different from the other control
principles is that they can be relaxed if the trust relationship between the primary and the counter
actor changes. For example, in monitoring controls, the verification of a delivery may be done
after payment is made if the buyer trusts the seller. ‘Trust’ means here that the buyer expects
the seller to refund the goods or to exchange them if any damages is discovered. If the buyer
does not trust the seller, he will check the goods before paying, as required by the pre-execution
principle.
The pre-execution principles for the verification and primary activities are listed in Figure 7.13.
As indicated, the existence of a Verify activity is optional.
The pre-execution principle does not necessarily only apply to the Verify activity and the Pri-
mary activity and the patterns contain different variations of the pre-execution principle. They
include the requirement to execute verification before promising and to execute a promising
activity only after the counter actor’s promising activity. All the variations are not described
here and are only described within the patterns. The common feature of all these variations in
different patterns is that they can be relaxed depending on the level of trust between primary
and counter actors.
7.7 Summary
In this chapter we have introduced a pattern template. Each pattern consists of Context, Prob-
lem, Solution, Example, Variations and Related Patterns sections. In addition to textual descrip-
tions, the context, problem and solution given by the patterns are represented using conceptual
modelling techniques. We distinguish value and process viewpoints. We use e3value to repre-
sent the value viewpoint and UML activity diagrams to represent the process viewpoint.
Furthermore, we have introduced a vocabulary, which describes the terminology used in the
patterns. It includes two operating activities, Primary activity and Counter activity, and four
control activities, Witness, Verify, Promise, and Testify. Every control activity considered pro-
duces a kind of statement as an output. This statement plays the role of an evidence document
and can be used as an input to other control activities. In this way, activities can be linked with
each other by matching inputs and outputs. For example, a witness activity produces a state-
ment which can be used as a to-be-verified statement or a supporting statement of inputs for a
Verify activity. In addition, the Verify and Testify activities have statements as a required input.
For each activity we define control principles, which describe permitted relationships between
an activity and other activities, objects and actors, including relationships between a verify
activity and an activity it verifies, a witness activity and an activity being witnessed, a promise
activity and an activity it promises, and a testify activity and an activity it testifies. All the
principles can be classified in one of the three groups: Activities-Activities, Activities-Objects
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and Activities-Actors principles. The principles are normative rules that are required to ensure
that control weaknesses do not exist. Every pattern has to comply to these control principles.
Chapter 8
Procedural patterns
In this chapter we present a library of procedural control patterns. As has already been intro-
duced in Chapter 6, we consider four procedural patterns: Partner Screening, Proper Contract-
ing, Execution Monitoring, and Execution Confirmation.
We describe the patterns using the patterns template, as suggested in section 7.1. According
to this template, each pattern consists of a Context, Problem, Solution, Example, Variations
and Related Patterns section. In addition to textual descriptions, the patterns are represented
using graphical conceptual modelling techniques. We distinguish between a value viewpoint,
for which we use e3value , and a process viewpoint, for which we use UML activity diagrams.
In a pattern, we consider two actors: a primary actor and a counter actor. In the problem of a
pattern, we consider a counter actor who behaves sub-ideally and a primary actor who wishes
to mitigate the loss caused by such behaviour. For the solution, we model control mechanisms
introduced by the primary actor.
The value viewpoint of such a two-actor model does not change by introducing controls. The
solution affects only the process viewpoint, and only impacts the value viewpoint if a primary
or a counter actor delegates some activities to other actors. As was explained in Chapter 6 we
consider delegation separately in the delegation patterns in Chapter 10 and here we consider
only the two-actor exchange.
On the process level each solution should comply with the control principles described in the
control principles vocabulary of section 7.6. The relevant control principles are described in
short in the corresponding section within a pattern’s solution. In addition, the principles are
listed in detail in Appendix A.
8.1 Partner Screening
The Partner Screening pattern relates to verification of a counter actor’s past performances
before any commitment is made to him. So, a primary actor does not trust the counter actor to
perform a future counter activity in an ideal way. There is a hidden characteristics problem: the
counter actor may hide relevant information about his characteristics, such as skills, abilities,
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legitimacy (see section 2.1.2). One of the ways to obtain more certainty about a counter actor
is to examine activities he performed in the past or to check if he has acceptable characteristics
(e.g. size of the company, turnover, and reputation), see section 2.1.2. This pattern requires that
a primary actor verifies the past activities or characteristics of a counter actor with respect to
their compliance with stated requirements of ideality, which are assumed to be known by the
primary actor. The graphical representation of the pattern is shown in Figure 8.1.
8.1.1 Context
A primary actor and a counter actor execute a Primary and a Counter activity, as a result of
which they exchange value objects PO andCO. According to the Promising Principles in section
7.6, the primary actor confirms his commitment to execute the Primary activity before actually
executing it. This is done by performing a Promise activity, which results in a Confirmation
Statement being sent to the counter actor. The most common interpretation of the Confirmation
Statement is a contract.
The Promise activity is added to the context, since the pattern is ex-ante. An ex-ante situation
implies that a contract has not yet been signed by at least one of the parties. We, therefore,
include the Promise activity, which models contracting process, into the context in order to
show that the screening activities occur before the contract is signed.
8.1.2 Problem
A primary actor is not certain if a counter actor has the required abilities and the proper qualifi-
cations to execute the Counter activity. For example, a counter actor may not be able to deliver
a product or a service of the required quality, may be dishonest, or have a reputation of not
paying on time.
This sub-ideal situation is modelled with a sub-ideal value object CO in the value model and
a liability token is assigned to the counter actor. This sub-ideal situation is expressed with the
Sub-ideal Counter activity in the process model.
8.1.3 Solution
The primary actor must know what criteria the counter actor has to comply with. This can
be legal criteria (e.g. a counter actor must have the right to import into a certain country) or
commercial criteria (e.g. a counter actor should not have debts). Then the primary actor must
verify if the past activities of the counter actor demonstrate compliance with these criteria.
The compliance of past activities with the criteria will create reasonable certainty about the
performance of the future counter activity.
In the solution of the pattern in Figure 8.1 this mechanism is modelled in the following way.
Before making any commitments to the counter actor by executing a Promise activity, the pri-
mary actor must first verify known past activities of the counter actor or their results (see Past
Counter Activity). The Verify activity checks whether the past execution or results of the counter
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activities comply with the primary actor’s criteria, represented in the Supporting Statement. Fur-
thermore, the primary actor has to witness the past activities or their results before executing
the verification activity. The outcome of the Witness activity is the To-be-verified Statement.
The contracting activity Promise and the further execution of the Primary and Counter activities
only take place if verification shows that the Past Counter Activity satisfies the criteria in the
Supporting Statement.
If verification is negative, the Primary and Counter activities are not executed. Such an outcome
corresponds to a value transfer with two empty value objects and is normally not modelled.
Control Principles
The control principles, which are relevant to the pattern Partner Screening, are Verification,
Witnessing, Promising, and Pre-execution (see section 7.6). Among other things, they require
witnessing to be performed after the past counter activity and before verification. Further they
require the direct transfer of the supporting document. Finally, they require verification and
generation of supporting statements to be carried out by an actor who is independent and so-
cially detached from the counter actor. The segregation of activities is modelled by means of
swim lanes, as was explained in Chapter 7.
The Pre-execution principles of the pattern Partner Screening requires the Verify activity to be
performed before the Promise activity. This is because it makes more sense to screen a counter
actor before a contract is signed so that to prevent engaging in a relationship with a dubious
party. This requirement can be relaxed if the primary actor trusts the counter actor. For a more
precise description of the principles see the Appendix A.
8.1.4 Example
We apply the pattern Partner Screening to an exchange between a buyer and a seller, shown in
Figure 8.2. As considered here, the buyer’s control problem is that the seller may not deliver
goods on time. Similar problems are an unreliable seller, a seller who sells products or services
of bad quality, or even a seller who is not eligible to deliver in a particular region or who is not
eligible to sell particular services. For the particular problem of untrustworthy delivery times
the solution requires the buyer to check if previous deliveries made by the seller were on time.
The instantiation of the context is represented by an ideal process model in Figure 8.2. Here,
the buyer is a primary actor, the seller is a counter actor, Pay Goods is a primary activity,
Deliver Goods is a counter activity, Send Order is a promising activity, and Purchase Order is
the confirmation statement. The control problem is represented by a sub-ideal process model in
Figure 8.2, where the Deliver Late activity is the sub-ideal counter activity.
In the solution process model in Figure 8.2 the buyer should witness previous deliveries made
by the seller and compare information about the seller’s previous delivery times in Receiving
Report, with agreements about the delivery time inDelivery Terms. If such a comparison reveals
that most of the deliveries made by the seller were on time (see [positive outcome]), the buyer
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should proceed with sending the Purchase Order. Otherwise, the buyer is not recommended to
order from this seller.
If the buyer has not collected information on past deliveries made by the seller (e.g. because
the buyer had never traded with the seller), then he can obtain such information from a trusted
party. This can be modelled using the delegation patterns from Chapter 10.
8.1.5 Variations
No Witness activity. A common practice when selecting a counter party is not to judge his
past performance, but to assess his characteristics, such as size of the company, popularity of
brand, reputation, and turnover. For example, a primary actor may believe that large organiza-
tions deliver better service, in which case he may select the counter actor based on the counter
actor’s profits, number of employees, and other similar criteria. Such a control is known as
signalling (see section 2.1.2), which can be modelled as a variation of the solution of the pattern
Partner Screening, see Figure 8.1. In such a variation, the To-be-verified Statement, or selection
criteria, is no longer an outcome of the Past Counter activity, so this activity disappears. The
Witness activity then refers to the witnessing of information about these criteria. An obvious
additional requirement is that the To-be-verified Statement is generated by a trustworthy source.
Witnessing of behaviour. In the pattern in Figure 8.1 we consider witnessing of output of the
Past Counter activity. As stated in the Witnessing principle in section 7.6, the witnessing of
output requires the direct transfer of the output of the witnessed activity to the witness activity.
This is to say, the output of the activity must unambiguously determine the Past Counter activity.
If this is not possible, the witnessing activity must occur simultaneously with the Past Counter
activity. This should be modelled according to theWitnessing of Behaviour principle described
in section 7.6.
No Promise activity. In some cases, the Promise activity is absent, for example, it is not
performed at all or it is just not included into the model because it is not relevant to the study.
In such cases, it should be ensured that verification precedes the Primary activity.
8.1.6 Related patterns
The problem described in the pattern Partner Screening can also be treated by the patterns
Penalty, Incentive, and Execution Monitoring. The difference in Partner Screening is that it is
an ex-ante control which is performed before a contract is signed.
8.2 Proper Contracting pattern
The Proper Contracting pattern describes how the process of contracting must be performed
to avoid misunderstandings in the future. The associated control problem is that a counter actor
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refuses to recognize that he made a commitment to a primary actor and, as a result, refuses
to execute the counter activity. The control mechanism requires the counter actor to provide
documentary evidence of his commitment to the primary actor. This is normally accomplished
by getting the counter party to sign a contract.
8.2.1 Context
A primary actor and a counter actor execute a Primary and a Counter activity, as a result of
which they exchange value objects PO and CO. The primary actor confirms his obligation
to execute a Primary activity before actually executing it. He confirms his commitment by
performing a Promise activity, which results in a Confirmation Statement being sent to the
counter actor.
The Promise activity is added to the context, since the pattern is ex-ante. An ex-ante situation
implies that a contract has not yet been signed by at least one actor. We, therefore, include the
Promise activity, or contracting process, into the context in order to model that the screening
activities occur before the contract is signed.
8.2.2 Problem
A counter actor does not confirm his commitments to a primary actor, as a result of which, the
counter actor may deny any commitments made to the primary actor and refuse to execute the
counter activity in return for the primary activity or not execute the counter activity as agreed
(i.e. sub-ideally).
On the value level, this situation is modelled with the sub-ideal value transfer of CO. On the
process level, it is modelled with the sub-ideal activity Sub-ideal Counter activity. In addition,
the counter actor executes the Deny Commitment activity, which denotes a denial action.
8.2.3 Solution
The problem from the primary actor’s perspective is that he cannot prove that the counter actor
made the commitment to execute the counter activity. The solution is to create such a proof by
introducing an evidence document.
The solution in Figure 8.3 suggests that, before making any commitments, the primary actor
must obtain a conformation statement from counter actor, in which a promise to execute the
counter activity is made. Thus, the counter actor must execute an activity Promise (CA) and
send a Confirmation Statement (CA) to the primary actor 1. The Confirmation Statement is
evidence of the counter actor’s commitment to execute the Counter activity in return for the
Primary activity. If the counter actor later denies his commitment, this Confirmation Statement
can be used to disprove it.
1CA indicates that the activity is executed by the Counter Actor
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Furthermore, the primary actor uses a Supporting Statement to verify the confirmation statement
with respect to its completeness, correctness and legitimacy. Here, the Supporting Statement
represents the criteria laid down the primary actor with respect to what should be in the Con-
firmation Statement. The Confirmation Statement is a contract between counter and primary
actors, and the criteria to which it must comply are to be found in the Supporting Statement
which may represent regulations that a primary actor is bound to, e.g. a requirement of a con-
tract to be signed by the chairman of the counter actor’s company, and not just by a middle-level
manager.
If the outcome of the verification is positive, the primary actor may continue with making his
promises to the counter actor by sending the Confirmation Statement. Otherwise, the process
stops and the Promise, Primary and Counter activities are not executed. Such an outcome,
omitted in the value model, corresponds to a value transfer of two empty value objects.
Control Principles
The control principles relevant to this pattern are Verification, Promising, and Pre-execution.
They require the primary actor to execute the primary activity only after a promise to execute it
is made. They also require the primary actor to execute a Promise activity only after verification
of promises made by a counter actor. The segregation of activities is modelled by means of swim
lanes, as was explained in Chapter 7. In addition, the direct transfer of the supporting statement
is required.
The Pre-execution principles of the pattern Proper Contracting require the counter actor to make
the promise first. This requirement can be relaxed depending on the level of trust between the
two actors. Normally, the contracts are signed simultaneously. For a more precise description
of the principles see the Appendix A.
8.2.4 Example
We apply the pattern to an exchange between a buyer and a seller, shown in the ideal process
model in Figure 8.4. In this model, a seller sends a buyer a Quote of prices for certain goods.
In the ideal and sub-ideal models we assume that if the buyer does not respond to the quote, he
agrees to buy the goods. In fact, by sending the quote the seller makes a commitment to deliver
the goods. The control problem in such a case is that when the seller delivers the goods, the
buyer may refuse to pay the price quoted.
The solution suggests that the seller should not make the commitment to deliver the goods for a
certain price, unless the buyer confirms his agreement to pay it. In accordance with the pattern
Proper Contracting, we add an activity Order to the buyer which is an instance of the pattern’s
activity Promise (CA). By performing the activity Order, the buyer sends a confirmation state-
ment Purchase Order, in which he states the price he is ready to pay for the goods. The seller
then verifies if the price stated in the purchase order is the same as in the quote, and, if so, sends
an order acknowledgement and delivers the goods. Otherwise, the goods are not delivered.
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Note that in the solution model the primary actor makes a commitment to deliver the goods only
by sending the Order Acknowledgement, which is different from the sub-ideal model, in which
a commitment is already made by sending the Quote.
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Figure 8.4: Example of Proper Contracting pattern
8.2.5 Variations
Self-confirmation. A usual variation of this pattern is when a counter actor’s obligation is
created as a result of his non-response to the Confirmation Statement. The primary actor sends a
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Confirmation Statement (e.g. contract) to the counter actor and gives him some time to respond.
By responding, the counter actor can cancel the contract and thus prevent the binding. However,
if the counter actor does not respond, he finds himself bonded by the contract. So, the counter
actor’s non-responsiveness during the allotted period of time is equivalent to his execution of
the Promise activity.
8.3 Execution Monitoring pattern
The Execution Monitoring pattern describes the control problem in which a counter actor
does not execute his commitments or executes them in a sub-ideal way (e.g. not as agreed in
the contract). The control mechanism requires the primary actor to monitor counter activity.
This solution is very similar to the Partner Screening pattern, the only difference being that
verification concerns the counter activities under the contract and not an actor’s past counter
activities.
8.3.1 Context
A primary actor and a counter actor execute a Primary and a Counter activity, as a result of
which they exchange the value objects PO and CO. This pattern is ex-post, which means that
the commitments between the counter and the primary actor have already been established.
8.3.2 Problem
The primary actor is not certain if the counter activity complies with certain requirements, e.g.
the agreements made in the contract, some legislation or some generally-accepted norms. This
may lead to doubts both with regards to the proper execution of the activity or with regards to
its outcome.
This sub-ideal situation is modelled with a sub-ideal value object CO in the value model and
is expressed with the Sub-ideal Counter activity in the process model. The liability token is
assigned to the counter actor in the value model.
8.3.3 Solution
The primary actor must verify if the counter activity or its outcome comply with the require-
ments, as stated in a Supporting Statement. Only if compliance is established should the primary
actor execute the Primary activity.
This is modelled as follows in Figure 8.5. Before executing the Primary activity, the primary
actor performs verification of the outcome of the Witness activity, which observes the counter
activity.
The outcome of the Witness activity is a To-be-verified Statement, which contains information
about the counter activity. The Verify activity compares the information in the To-be-verified
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Statement and the Supporting Statement. The primary actor should only execute the Primary
activity if the outcome of verification shows that the Counter activity complies with the previous
agreements stated in the Supporting Statement.
Control Principles
This control involves the Verification, Witnessing and Pre-execution principles (see section 7.6).
Among other things, they require the Counter, Witness, and Verify activities to be executed one
after another. Furthermore, they require the Supporting Statement to be transferred directly
to the Verify activity from a trustworthy source. Finally, they require a proper segregation of
duties, e.g. execution of verification and witnessing by a party who is not acting in the interests
of the counter actor. The segregation of activities is modelled by means of swim lanes, as was
explained in Chapter 7.
The Pre-execution principles for the pattern Execution Monitoring require verification to be
performed before the primary activity. For example, a buyer should not to pay before he checks
the delivered goods. This requirement, however, can be relaxed if the primary actor trusts the
counter actor, e.g. if the buyer knows that the seller always delivers the goods (e.g. from
previous experience). For a more precise description of the principles see the Appendix A.
8.3.4 Example
We apply the pattern to an exchange between a buyer and a seller, shown in Figure 8.6. The
control problem is that the seller may deliver goods which were not ordered by the buyer. A
similar problem is that the seller does not deliver goods at all, delivers them too late, delivers
damaged goods, etc. The control mechanism, according to the pattern, requires the buyer to
pay only if reconciliation with the purchase orders proves that the delivered goods have been
ordered.
The instantiation of the context is represented by an ideal process model: Pay Goods is a primary
activity, and Deliver Goods is a counter activity. The control problem is represented by a sub-
ideal process model, where Deliver Wrong Goods is the sub-ideal counter activity.
The process model of the solution shows that the buyer should pay for the goods only after
delivery is reconciled with the corresponding purchase order. So, the buyer executes Pay Goods
after the activity Verify Delivery. This verification means checking the correctness of quantity,
quality and legitimacy of the delivery using a supporting statement, which is a Purchase Order
in this case. Verification also requires witnessing the delivery. The outcome of the Witness
Delivery activity is a Receiving Report, which is used as the to-be-verified statement.
8.3.5 Variations
No Witness activity. The outcome of the counter activity can be a statement, e.g. when the
counter activity is a reporting activity. Then, witnessing refers to witnessing of this statement.
In such cases, the Witness activity can be omitted, since the activity diagrams assume that the
receiving party possesses the document thereby witnessing it.
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Witnessing of behaviour. Here we consider witnessing of output of the Counter activity. As
stated in the Witnessing principle in section 7.6 output should unambiguously determine the
Counter activity, e.g. it should contain correct information which represents the reality. If
output has no such characteristics, the witnessing activity must occur simultaneously with the
Counter activity. This should be modelled according to the Witnessing of Behaviour principle
described in section 2.1.1.
Self-reporting statement. Another frequent situation in practice is when a counter actor re-
ports a counter activity himself. We call this self-reporting. For example, the counter actor
is a beer producer who sends an invoice stating how many bottles of beer he has delivered.
This self-reporting statement – the invoice – should not be used as the To-be-verified Statement,
because it is not generated by the primary actor or his trusted party and, thus, may contain incor-
rect information, e.g. an overstated or understated number of bottles. From the perspective of
the Execution Monitoring pattern, this self-reporting statement can be eliminated, since it is not
needed for the controls described here. However, a self-reporting statement is needed for the
controls described in the Execution Confirmation pattern, as shown in the ‘Variation’ section of
the Execution Confirmation pattern in section 8.4.
8.3.6 Related patterns
The problem described in the pattern Execution Monitoring can also be treated by the patterns
Penalty, Incentive, and Partner Screening. The specific characteristic of Execution Monitoring
is that it considers ex-post procedural control.
8.4 Execution Confirmation pattern
The Execution Confirmation pattern describes a control problem in which a counter actor
incorrectly claims that the primary actor executed a primary activity sub-ideally. The control
mechanism suggests introducing an evidence document, in which the counter actor testifies
about the execution of the primary activity. The primary actor can use such a testifying docu-
ment later in (legal) disputes as proof that the counter actor agreed to the ideality of the primary
activity.
8.4.1 Context
A primary actor and a counter actor execute a Primary and a Counter activity, as a result of
which they exchange the value objects PO and CO. This pattern is ex-post, which means that
the commitments between the counter and the primary actor have already been established.
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8.4.2 Problem
A primary activity is executed ideally. However, a counter actor claims that that is not the case
and either refuses to execute the counter activity or, if the counter activity has already been
executed, requires compensation. As a result, the primary actor does not get the counter value
object CO. The value transfer of CO is sub-ideal.
On the process level, the counter actor executes the Counter activity sub-ideally. In addition,
he executes an activity Deny Execution, which models his claim about the sub-ideality of the
Primary activity.
8.4.3 Solution
The primary actor must ensure that the counter actor testifies about the primary activity in a
document, which is unconditional evidence of the ideal execution of the Primary activity and
can be used later in a legal dispute, should the counter actor deny this.
The counter actor will always check if the Primary activity is ideal before testifying to it. We
consider that the counter actor witnesses the Primary activity and verifies its ideality, even
though such verification is not required by the primary actor. The witnessing is done at the
same time as the primary activity. Here we consider witnessing the execution of the primary
activity. The witnessing of its outcome is also possible and should be modelled according to the
Witnessing principles described in section 2.1.1.
The Supporting Statement, used in verification, represents previous agreements on the ideality
of the Primary activity. The To-be-verified Statement states the results of the counter actor’s
witnessing of the Primary activity. After the verification, the counter actor can do two things.
If verification reveals that the Primary activity is ideal, then the counter actor testifies about it
in a Testifying Statement. Otherwise in case of [negative outcome], the counter actor denies the
ideality of the primary activity by executing a Deny Execution activity.
Note that this pattern contains the elements of the pattern Execution Monitoring, applied from
the counter actor’s perspective. Unlike in other patterns, here we also take the counter actor’s
viewpoint into account by assuming that he does not trust the primary actor and will not testify
about the primary activity before verifying it. This verification is not needed from the primary
actor’s perspective. However, it is not realistic to assume that the counter actor will testify about
the primary activity without checking it. Therefore, the counter actor’s perspective is also taken
into account.
Control Principles
The solution should observe the Verification, Witnessing, Testification, and Pre-execution con-
trol principles (see section 7.6). Among other things, they require the Witness and Verify activ-
ities to be executed one after another. The Witness and Testify activities should be executed at
the same time as the Primary activity. Here, the Witnessing of Behaviour principles are applied
(see section 7.6). In fact, a primary actor would like to receive the testification statement be-
fore a primary activity is executed. However, this will always conflict with the counter actor’s
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perspective: according to the Testifying principles, the counter actor must not testify about the
primary activity before it is executed. An example of simultaneous execution is a carrier who
delivers goods to their destination, but does not trust the recipient. The receipt issued as evi-
dence of delivery is handed over in return for goods, which requires that both parties are present
during the exchange of goods and the receipt of them.
Furthermore, the principles require the Supporting Statement to be transferred directly to the
Verify activity from a source that is independent of the primary actor. A proper segregation
of duties is required, e.g. execution of verification and witnessing by a party not acting in
the interests of the primary actor. The segregation of activities is modelled by means of swim
lanes, as was explained in Chapter 7. Finally, the Testifying Statement also has to be transferred
directly to the primary actor.
The Pre-execution principles of the pattern Execution Confirmation require the execution of
the Verify activity before the Testify activity. The requirement, however, can be relaxed, if the
counter actor trusts the primary actor. For a more precise description of the principles see the
Appendix A.
8.4.4 Example
As an example, we apply the solution of the pattern to an exchange between a buyer and a seller
as shown in Figure 8.8. The control problem involved is the seller’s claims that the buyer has
not paid for goods. To solve the problem, the control mechanism requires the buyer to receive
a receipt from the seller. The receipt can always provide evidence of payment, if later on the
seller claims that the buyer has not paid.
In the ideal process model, the activity Pay Goods is a primary activity, and the activity Deliver
Goods is a counter activity. The control problem is represented by a sub-ideal process model.
Claim Less Payment is an instance of the Deny Execution activity.
In the solution process model, the seller testifies the buyer’s payment by issuing a receipt after
witnessing and verifying payment with actual delivery. Here the Delivery Report, used as the
supporting statement, states what the payment should be. The Payment Record plays the role of
the To-be-verified Statement and states what the payment actually is.
8.4.5 Variations
Self-confirmation. A frequent variation of this pattern is when the primary actor is empow-
ered to use his own invoice or a similar document as evidence of execution of the Primary
activity. This is different from requiring the counter actor to testify, as described in the pattern
in Figure 8.7. In this variation, the primary actor sends a statement to the counter actor, by
which he makes a claim about the execution of the primary activity. The counter actor then has
some time to react. If he does not deny what is claimed in the statement, it will have the same
power as the Testifying Statement otherwise issued by the counter actor.
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Figure 8.9: Example of the variation of the Execution Confirmation pattern
For example, in Figure 8.9 we have a buyer as a counter actor and a seller as a primary actor. The
seller sends the buyer an invoice on which he states that ten containers of beer have been deliv-
ered and the buyer has a term of three months to claim the opposite. According to the pattern in
Figure 8.7, before paying the invoice, the buyer first verifies that a delivery, which corresponds
to the purchase order, has been made and, second, he verifies if the invoice corresponds to the
delivery. In the example, the buyer pays if ten containers of beer have been delivered as stated
in invoice. If only eight containers of beer have been delivered, the buyer pays for them, and
sends a correction note Payment Statement to the seller which states that only eight containers
were delivered. However, if the buyer does not send the Payment Statement within the three
month term, the seller can claim that the buyer testified the delivery of the ten containers and is
obliged to pay for all ten of them.
So, if the invoice is correct and the buyer does not send the seller any corrections, the copy of
the invoice can be used by the seller to prove that the buyer is satisfied with the delivery. If the
invoice is incorrect and the buyer sends a correction note, the note then plays the role of the
testifying statement.
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8.5 Summary
In this section we have introduced four procedural patterns: Partner Screening, Proper Contract-
ing, Execution Monitoring and Execution Confirmation. The Partner Screening and Execution
Monitoring patterns describe the monitoring of a counter actor’s activities. The difference be-
tween these two patterns is that Partner Screening suggests an ex-ante control, and Execution
Monitoring suggests ex-post control. The pattern Proper Contracting describes how the con-
tracting process should be arranged to avoid misunderstandings about the commitments the
actors make to each other. Finally, the pattern Execution Confirmation suggests how the final
process of the transaction should be arranged to avoid misunderstandings about the activities
performed.
The control mechanisms suggested in the procedural patterns affect only the process viewpoint.
These controls are implemented by adding new operational control activities and objects, such
as evidence documents which are not necessarily of value. Therefore, the value perspective
does not change. A change in the value perspective can occur when some of the added control
activities are delegated to a third party as will be described in Chapter 10.
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Chapter 9
Contractual patterns
In this chapter we describe the Incentive and Penalty patterns of contractual controls. In an
Incentive pattern, a primary actor gives a counter actor a reward in order to refrain him from
potential sub-ideal behaviour. In the Penalty pattern, a primary actor introduces a penalty to
punish a counter actor for behaving sub-ideally.
Each pattern consists of a Context, Problem, Solution, Example, Variations and Related Patterns
sections which are similar to the procedural patterns described in Chapter 8. As in procedural
patterns, we distinguish between a value viewpoint, for which we use e3value , and a process
viewpoint, for which we use UML activity diagrams. Furthermore, in Chapter 7 we introduced
a vocabulary, which describes the terminology used in the patterns. Each pattern contains
elements described in the vocabulary.
The process models of the Incentive and Penalty patterns are variations of the Execution Moni-
toring pattern. The difference is that these patterns incorporate value-based control instruments
– a penalty and an incentive, which stimulate the counter actor’s ideal behaviour. Compared to
process models, value models provide us with a better model for the analysis of penalties and
incentives, because they allow us to reason about the size of the monetary incentive using the
e3value concepts of objective and subjective value.
9.1 Penalty pattern
In Figure 9.1 illustrates a Penalty pattern. Below we discuss its context, problem and solution.
9.1.1 Context
Value view. A primary actor and a counter actor execute a Primary and a Counter activity, as
a result of which they exchange the value objects PO and CO.
Process view. At the process level, the value transfers PO and CO correspond to the execution
of a primary activity and a counter activity correspondingly.
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9.1.2 Problem
Value view. The sub-ideal value model shows that a counter actor has a choice behaving
ideally or sub-ideally, which is modelled with two dependency paths: the ideal path and sub-
ideal path. The value transfers of the ideal path are the same as in the context model: PO and
CO. In the sub-ideal path, the counter actor transfers a sub-ideal counter value object Sub-ideal
CO, while the primary actor transfers the ideal value object PO. In addition, a liability token L
has been assigned to the counter actor to indicate that he is responsible for the sub-ideality.
Although we depict the ideal value transfer PO in the models, this pattern also covers a situation
in which PO is sub-ideal. For example, if a seller delivers damaged goods, a buyer can (1) pay
for them, which corresponds to the transfer of the ideal value object PO, or (2) refuse to pay for
them, which corresponds to the transfer of the sub-ideal value object Sub-Ideal PO. The solution
given by the pattern is applicable to both situations. Further we consider only the situation when
PO is ideal.
Process view. In the process view, the transfer of the Sub-ideal CO corresponds to a Sub-ideal
Counter activity. For brevity of representation, in the process model in Figure 9.1 we show a
process that only corresponds to the sub-ideal path.
9.1.3 Solution
Value view. The solution suggests that to prevent a counter actor from taking the sub-ideal
path, the value he accumulates in the sub-ideal path should be lower than the value he accumu-
lates in the ideal path. This is achieved by requiring the counter actor to transfer an outgoing
value object Penalty in the case of sub-ideal behaviour, as shown in the solution part of Figure
9.1.
The value object Penalty is included into the same value interface as the value object Sub-ideal
CO and is transferred from the counter actor to the primary actor. This models that as soon as
the counter actor transfers Sub-ideal CO, he has to transfer the value object Penalty.
There are also other ways of modelling a penalty in e3value , for example, as a value object
in another value interface of the sub-ideal path. The main requirements for the penalty value
object is that (1) it is added to the path that corresponds to the sub-ideal behaviour of the counter
actor, and (2) it reduces the value the counter actor accumulates in the sub-ideal path. This last
point will now be further discussed in more detail.
Penalty size. Actors accumulate value by exchanging value objects. A counter actor chooses
the sub-ideal path if the value he accumulates in this path is higher than the value he accumulates
in the ideal path. The goal of the penalty in Figure 9.1 is to make the value a counter actor
accumulates in the sub-ideal path lower than the value he accumulates in the ideal path. If we
assume that all the value objects in Figure 9.1 are monetary, the following condition should
hold:
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PO − CO > PO − SubIdeal CO − Penalty. (9.1)
This states that the value accumulated by a counter actor in the ideal path is higher than the
value he accumulates in the sub-ideal path.
However, the objects PO, CO and Sub-ideal CO are not always monetary. One of the two value
objects exchanged in a value transaction usually represents goods and services and the other one
represents money paid in return. According to e3value in Chapter 3, an important point that has
to be taken into account is that actors value non-monetary objects subjectively, e.g. depending
on their wealth, surroundings and needs. In economics this incorporated into concepts of utility
and budget constraints [Varian, 2006].
Such a subjective valuation influences the decision about the size of a penalty in the condition
9.1. A penalty of a fixed amount will be effective for some actors, but not for others. For
example, a person in a hurry will not consider a penalty of 100 Euro for parking illegally in the
centre of Amsterdam so high as compared to the time he spends for looking for a legal parking
space. A less busy person will consider this penalty high and will spend time looking for a
parking space to avoid the penalty.
The subjective values of the non-monetary value objects can also be expressed in monetary
units. For example, we can say that a busy person values the time spent on looking for a
parking space as a loss of 1000 Euro. The penalty of 100 Euro will not compensate the loss of
1000 Euro, so this person will choose to pay the penalty and park illegally, thereby saving time.
The less busy person, who values the time at 10 Euro does not wish to pay the penalty, because
he will then make a loss of 90 euro. To sum up, the penalty is not effective for a busy person,
but it does have an effect on a less busy person.
As a result, we rewrite the criterion for the effective penalty size as follows:
POCA − COCA > POCA − Sub− ideal COCA − Penalty. (9.2)
By using the lower index CA we indicate here that the objects PO, CO and Sub-ideal CO are
valued from the subjective perspective of the Counter Actor (CA). Note that we assume that
the value objects PO, CO and Sub-ideal CO are non-monetary and the Penalty is monetary.
Thus, the penalty amount depends on how the counter actor values the objects PO and CO and
Sub-ideal CO.
Besides the counter actor’s perspective, we should also take that of the primary actor into ac-
count. A primary actor wishes to get a refund or even extra compensation for a loss caused by
a counter actor. So, the primary actor wants the accumulated value in the sub-ideal path to be at
least the same as the accumulated value in the ideal path. This can be formulated as follows:
Sub− ideal COPA + Penalty − POPA ≥ COPA − POPA, (9.3)
in which the left-hand side of the inequality represents the value accumulated by the primary
actor in the sub-ideal path, and the right-hand side represents the value accumulated by the
primary actor in the ideal path. By using the lower index PA we indicate that the objects PO,
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CO and Sub-ideal CO are valued from the subjective perspective of the Primary Actor (PA). The
penalty is assumed to be monetary, while other PO, CO and Sub-ideal CO are non-monetary.
Penalty size in complex cases. The models can be more complicated in real-life cases. An
ideal and/or sub-ideal path could contain more than one value transfer providing there are AND-
or OR-forks, or a value transfer could contain more than one object PO, CO or Penalty. In such
cases, the calculation of the accumulated value should take into account these additional value
objects. A general criterion for an effective penalty is to make the subjective value, which the
primary (counter) actor accumulates in the ideal path, at least the same as (or higher than) the
subjective value he accumulates in the sub-ideal path.
Process view. At the process level, the solution requires verification of the ideality of a counter
activity before penalizing a counter actor, see Figure 9.1. This solution is a variation of the
solution of the Execution Monitoring pattern, which was discussed in detail in section 8.3. In
short, a primary actor has to witness and verify a counter activity. If verification confirms
that the counter activity is ideal (see ‘positive outcome’ in Figure 9.1), the Primary Activity is
executed. If verification confirms that the counter activity is sub-ideal (see ‘negative outcome’
in Figure 9.1), the counter actor executes Pay Penalty activity, which transfers an object Penalty,
indicating a monetary penalty.
The process level solution of the Penalty pattern is variation of the ExecutionMonitoring pattern
and can therefore be expressed by the same control principles. In addition, some pre-execution
principles have been added. This is because the Verify activity must be executed before the Pay
Penalty activity and the Primary activity must be executed after the Pay Penalty activity. These
requirements can be relaxed if the primary actor trusts the counter actor to pay the penalty even
if the Primary activity has been executed. The principles are listed in Appendix A.
9.1.4 Example
An example of this pattern is illustrated in Figure 9.2, in which we only focus on the value view
since the process view is very similar to the Execution Monitoring pattern and has already been
demonstrated in Chapter 8. In the ideal model, a primary actor Buyer and a counter actor Seller
exchange value objects Goods and Money. In the sub-ideal model, a seller delivers damaged
goods, which is modelled with the corresponding sub-ideal value object Damaged Goods. In
return, a buyer does not pay, which is modelled with the sub-ideal value object Money.
Although both value transfers are sub-ideal, the actor behaving sub-ideally is the seller. This
can be seen from the liability token L placed at the seller.
In the solution, the seller has to pay compensation for the damaged goods, which is modelled by
a value object Compensation and corresponds to the value object Penalty of the Penalty pattern
(see Figure 9.1).
If a penalty is to work, it should be sufficiently high for the counter actor. From the counter
actor’s Seller perspective, the value he accumulates as a result of delivering damaged goods and
paying the penalty should be less than the value he accumulates when delivering non-damaged
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goods. From the primary actor’s Buyer perspective, the compensation should compensate the
loss he made because of the damaged goods delivered.
9.1.5 Related patterns
The process view of the penalty pattern is a variation of the Execution Monitoring pattern (see
section 8.3).
9.2 Incentive pattern
A penalty is based on punishment and an incentive is based on rewards. To sum up, the incentive
pattern rewards the counter actor for ideal behaviour by introducing a value object that increases
the accumulated value of the counter actor in the ideal path.
9.2.1 Context
Value view. A primary actor and a counter actor execute a Primary and a Counter activity, as
a result of which they exchange the value objects PO and CO.
Process view. At the process level, the value transfers PO and CO correspond to the execution
of a primary activity and a counter activity correspondingly.
9.2.2 Problem
Value view. A counter actor may choose to behave ideally or sub-ideally, which corresponds
to two dependency paths in the sub-ideal value model: the ideal path and sub-ideal path. The
value transfers of the ideal path are the same as in the context model: PO and CO. In the sub-
ideal path, the counter actor transfers a sub-ideal counter value object Sub-ideal CO, while the
primary actor transfers the ideal value object PO. In addition, a liability token L is assigned to
the counter actor to indicate that he is responsible for the sub-ideality.
Process view. In the process view, the transfer of the Sub-ideal CO corresponds to a sub-ideal
counter activity. For brevity of representation, in the process model in Figure 9.1 we show the
process that only corresponds to the sub-ideal path.
9.2.3 Solution
Value view. The solution is to prevent the sub-ideal value transfer CO by making a counter
actor’s value, accumulated in the ideal path, higher than a value accumulated in the sub-ideal
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path. Such an incentive can be modelled in several ways. In Figure 9.3 the incentive is repre-
sented by a counter actor’s incoming object Incentive, modelled in the same value interface as
PO and CO. Other ways to model an incentive is as a subtraction from the CO (e.g. CO - Incen-
tive) or as an addition to the PO (e.g. PO + Incentive), or as a separate value object Incentive,
but in a different part of the ideal path. In general, the main requirements for the Incentive value
object are that (1) it is added to the path that corresponds to the ideal behaviour of the counter
actor, and (2) it increases the accumulated value of the counter actor. This last point will now
be discussed in more detail.
Incentive size. BAs in the Penalty pattern, an incentive should make the value accumulated
by the counter actor in the ideal path higher than the value accumulated in the sub-ideal path.
In other words, the following should hold:
POCA − COCA + IncentiveCA > POCA − Sub− ideal COCA. (9.4)
in which the left-hand side of the inequality represents the value accumulated by the counter
actor in ideal path, and the right-hand side represents the value accumulated by the counter
actor in the sub-ideal path. With the lower index CA we indicate here that the objects PO, CO
and Sub-ideal CO are valued from the subjective perspective of the Counter Actor. They are
non-monetary, whereas the Incentive is monetary.
Taken from his perspective, a primary actor should not create incentives which lead to losses in
value. An incentive should therefore not make the value accumulated by the primary actor in
the ideal path any less than the value accumulated in the sub-ideal path:
COPA − POPA − IncentivePA ≥ Sub− ideal COPA − POPA, (9.5)
in which the left-hand side of the inequality represents the value accumulated by the primary
actor in the ideal path, and the right-hand side represents the value accumulated by the primary
actor in the sub-ideal path. With the lower index PA we indicate that the objects PO, CO
and Sub-ideal CO are valued from the Primary Actor’s subjective perspective. They are non-
monetary, whereas the Incentive is monetary.
Process view. At the process level, the solution requires verification that a counter activity
has been performed ideally before an incentive is handed over (see Figure 9.3). This solution is
a variation of the solution given by the Execution Monitoring pattern, which was discussed in
detail in section 8.3. In short, the primary actor has to witness and verify the counter activity. If
verification confirms that the counter activity is ideal (see ‘positive outcome’ in Figure 9.3), the
Pay Incentive activity and the ideal Primary activity are executed. The Pay Incentive activity
denotes a collection of operational activities which are required to transfer the object Incentive.
If the verification finds the counter activity sub-ideal (see ‘negative outcome’), the incentive is
not paid.
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Control in an Incentive pattern is less strict than in a the Penalty pattern, in the sense that it does
not prohibit execution of a primary activity in a sub-ideal situation. Unlike the Penalty pattern,
a primary activity is always executed, even in return for a sub-ideal counter activity.
As in the Penalty pattern, the control mechanism at the process level can be expressed with the
same control principles as for the Execution Monitoring pattern. In addition, some conditions
have been added which relate to the transfer of an incentive. This is because the solution requires
the Pay Incentive activity to be executed before the Primary activity and after the Verify activity.
9.2.4 Example
Ideal value model
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Figure 9.4: An example of an Incentive pattern
An example of an Incentive pattern is illustrated in Figure 9.4. It represents a value transfer
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between a city council, say City, and people who live there, say People. Taken from the city
council’s perspective, the ideal behaviour of people is that they do not throw garbage on the
streets, i.e. do not litter. In the ideal situation we therefore model the counter actor People to
deliver a value object No Littering to the city. In return the city states that a person complies to
existing laws about not littering, which is modelled with the value objectCompliance exchanged
in return for No Littering. In fact, a person always has compliance except when caught littering.
In the sub-ideal model, the sub-ideal path represents the behaviour of those people who litter.
In most cases littering is not detected since the police and other government agencies cannot
catch every person who litters. Thus, the sub-ideal counter value object Littering is transferred
in return for the ideal primary value object Compliance.
The city council can introduce incentives against littering by rewarding good behaviour. For
example, in the Netherlands, there is a system called ‘Statiegeld’, which motivates people to
return empty bottles to a shop by giving them an amount of money in exchange for them.
In Figure 9.4 we model a shop that has a bottle recycling point; people bring the Bottles to the
shop and get a Fee back. As in the case of the Penalty pattern, such an incentive mechanism also
requires witnessing. However, it requires witnessing of the ideal behaviour (bottle recycling)
rather than of the sub-ideal behaviour (littering).
This example demonstrates an incentive Fee which is not part of the ideal value transfers No
Litter and Compliance, as in Figure 9.3, but a part of another value transfer in the ideal path of
the counter actor People.
From the perspective of the counter actor People, the value of returning the bottles should be
higher than the value of throwing them on the streets. This value is subjective for every person.
If we assume that people assign no value to empty bottles, then they will always prefer to return
them and will not litter. However, for people who collect bottles, who are lazy, or who live
far from the bottle recycling point, taking the bottles to a recycling point will create costs and
thus reduce the accumulated value. These people may not be motivated by the incentive and
will proceed with littering. From the perspective of the primary actor City running the bottle
recycling point should be less expensive than collecting bottles from the streets.
9.2.5 Related patterns
The process view of the Incentive pattern is a variation of the Execution Monitoring pattern (see
section 8.3).
9.3 Summary
In this section we have introduced two contractual patterns: Incentive and Penalty. The Penalty
pattern describes a mechanism of punishing sub-ideal behaviour and the Incentive pattern de-
scribes a mechanism of rewarding ideal behaviour. In these patterns the control mechanism
affects both the value and the process viewpoint. To model a penalty we use the value object
Penalty, which is added to the sub-ideal path. To model an incentive we use the value object
Incentive, which is added to the ideal path.
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In addition, we have discussed issues related to determining the size of a monetary penalty and
incentive. As was argued, we need to know the value of other objects in the ideal and sub-ideal
paths in order to define the size or amount of a penalty or incentive. In general, penalties and
incentives should make sure that the accumulated value of a counter actor who behaves sub-
ideally is less than the accumulated value for ideal behaviour. The primary actor should not
make losses by paying incentives, and he should be compensated by the penalty.
At the process level, the Incentive and Penalty patterns represent variations of the Execution
Monitoring pattern. In the Penalty pattern, a primary actor should verify a counter activity and
demand a penalty only if the activity is sub-ideal. In the Incentive pattern, a primary actor only
pays an incentive if the counter activity is ideal.
Chapter 10
Delegation patterns
So far now we have described six control patterns, in which we assume a value transfer takes
place between two actors: a primary actor and a counter actor. In reality, the two actors often
delegate activities to other actors. It can be necessary for both control and business reasons. A
control-related reason for delegation is segregation of duties: sometimes the procedural pattern
prescribes that an activity has to be delegated to avoid violation of the segregation of duties. This
was demonstrated in the health care case study in Chapter 5, in which the needs assessment and
product allocation functions were assigned to different actors to avoid a conflict of interests.
Segregation of duties may be required in the control patterns as stated in the Activities-Actors
principles, see Chapter 7. An example of a business-related motivation for delegation is when
it is more efficient to delegate an activity to another actor rather than to execute it yourself.
Delegation should not result in violation of the control principles described in the original con-
trol pattern. In delegation patterns we describe how delegation has to be performed to ensure
that all the control principles are observed and that the delegated activity is executed ideally.
Delegation patterns have a context-problem-solution structure. A problem in a delegation pat-
tern is related to a sub-ideal execution of a control activity which can emerge because of its
delegation. The solution given by a delegation pattern describes how a control pattern has to be
adjusted to prevent this control problem.
In this the chapter we present two delegation patterns: Simple Delegation pattern and Testifying
Chain pattern. In the Simple Delegation pattern we consider an initial situation (the context) in
which the output of a control activity Statement is received by the same actor who executes the
control activity. In the Testifying Chain pattern we consider an initial situation (the context) in
which the output of a control activity is received by an actor who is not the one who executes
the control activity. We consider delegation of the control activity in both patterns.
10.1 Delegation Box
To illustrate the delegation more precisely, we introduce a delegation box which is drawn in
Figure 10.1 with a dashed square. The box surrounds the unit of delegation, which is an activity
or a part of a process that is delegated. In Figure 10.1 a unit of delegation is an Activity A. The
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box is connected to inputs and outputs of the unit of delegation. An incoming point is depicted
with a white circle, and it indicates a point of connection of the incoming objects of the unit.
An outgoing point is depicted with a black circle, and it indicates the point of connection of
the outgoing objects of the unit.
In Figure 10.1, (a) the Activity A and the delegation box are placed between two swim-lines,
which indicate an assignment of Activity A to Actor A. The fact that the incoming and outgoing
points are placed within Actor A indicates that this actor receives inputs and outputs of Activity
A.
The inputs and outputs of Activity A are modelled with objects Incoming Object and Outgoing
Object correspondingly. The Incoming Object is always connected to the incoming point of
the delegation box and the Outgoing Object is always connected to the outgoing point of the
delegation box.
Outgoing
ObjectActivity A
Actor A
Incoming
Object
Outgoing
ObjectActivity A
Third Actor
Incoming
Object
Actor A
(a)
(b)
Figure 10.1: The Delegation Box
In Figure 10.1, (b) we model a situation in which Actor A delegates Activity A to a Third Actor.
Certain rules should be observed in such a situation. Firstly, the Incoming Object should be
received by the actor who executes the delegated activity. Secondly, theOutgoing Object should
be received by the actor who delegates Activity A.
The following rules can be defined to ensure that the objects move correctly, within the terms
of the delegation box:
• The incoming point of the delegation box moves to the actor who executes the delegated
activity.
• The outgoing point of the delegation box stays at the actor who delegates the activity.
• The Incoming Object and Outgoing Object should remain connected to the incoming and
outgoing points of the delegation box correspondingly;
Following these rules always ensures that the incoming and outgoing objects remain in the
correct position, that they are not missing and that they are received by the correct actor after
the activity is assigned to another actor.
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10.2 Simple Delegation pattern
The process-level solutions of procedural and contractual patterns require the addition of control
activities to either a primary or a counter actor. Control activities include witness, verify, testify,
and promise activities (see Chapter 7). However, in some cases, the primary and counter actors
are not able to execute these activities, as already explained, in which case these activities should
be executed by third parties on behalf of the primary or counter actor. Such a delegation may
cause sub-ideal execution of the control activity. The Simple Delegation pattern, as shown in
Figure 10.2, describes such a situation and suggests a solution to avoid it.
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Figure 10.2: Simple Delegation pattern
10.2.1 Context
In the context we consider that a primary actor delegates the Control Activity to a Trusted Actor.
Thus, the primary actor is a beneficiary of the control activity, while the execution is done by a
trusted actor. The outcome of the Control Activity is an object Statement and it is received by
the primary actor, as a beneficiary of the control activity.
The model of the context is created by moving the control activity to the third actor from another
‘no-delegation’ model where the control activity is executed by a primary actor. To ensure the
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situation with delegation has proper inputs and outputs, we followed the rules stated in Figure
10.1. We moved the incoming point of the delegation box to the third actor and left the outgoing
point at the primary actor.
10.2.2 Problem
Such a delegation can lead to several problems, as a result of which the Control Activity can be
executed sub-ideally. Other possible problems are that the Trusted Actor is not independent and
socially detached from the counter actor and that the Statement is transferred from the Control
Activity to the primary actor indirectly.
These problems are represented in Figure 10.2 by depicting a Sub-ideal Control Activity instead
of an (Ideal) Control Activity. In addition, the link between the control activity and the statement
received by the primary actor is broken. Finally, the indirect transfer is modelled by showing
that the statement is transferred to a primary actor via a third actor.
10.2.3 Solution
To ensure that the Control Activity is executed ideally, the primary actor has to observe the
following rules:
• The Trusted Actor, who executes Control Activity, should be independent and socially
detached from the counter actor.
• The Statement should be transferred directly from the Control Activity to the primary
actor.
10.2.4 Example: Certification
This Simple Delegation pattern can be combined with the process-level solution of any of the
six patterns described in Chapter 8 and Chapter 9. We illustrate the application of this pattern
in combination with the pattern Partner Screening. We call this particular combination Certifi-
cation and, though it is not the only possible combination, it was observed most frequently in
the case studies.
Figure 10.3 shows the solution of the Partner Screening pattern, which requires the primary
actor to execute Witness, Verify and Promise control activities. The delegation box indicates
which activities are to be delegated to a third actor. As we can see, the Witness and Verify
activities are to be delegated as well as the generation of the Supporting Document. In Figure
10.4 and 10.5 we show changes in the process and value models of the solution after the Simple
Delegation pattern is applied.
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Figure 10.3: Solution of the Partner Screening pattern
Process view. As in the Partner Screening pattern, the primary actor in Figure 10.4 must
witness the past activities of the counter actor and verify compliance with certain standards
the primary actor maintains. Suppose, the primary actor has to delegate the verification and
witnessing activities to a trusted actor, e.g. because it is more efficient. The trusted actor
verifies the past activities of the counter actor and, if the outcome of the verification activity
is positive, it generates a Positive Statement, which is transferred directly to the primary actor.
The primary actor must receive a Positive Statement from the trusted actor before executing the
Promise activity and sending Confirmation Statement to the counter actor. Should verification
produce a negative outcome, the primary actor does not receive a Positive Statement, but is
notified by the Trusted Actor about the negative outcome.
Value view. The effect of delegation also changes the value view, unlike in the Partner Screen-
ing pattern. The result is shown in Figure 10.5. Firstly, the trusted actor is added to the value
model. Secondly, the value transfers between the trusted actor and the primary actor are added.
At the process level, the trusted actor executes Witness and Verify activities on behalf of the
primary actor. At the value level this corresponds to a value transfer from the trusted actor to
the primary actor. We call this value transfer Partner Screening (Witness&Verfy). In return the
primary actor transfers Payment, because we assume that this service is provided for money.
In addition, the primary actor has an OR fork, which models a positive outcome of the partner
screening service, in which case, the primary actor exchanges values with the counter actor.
Otherwise, the exchange does not take place and the OR fork leads to the boundary element.
Note that in the process model we omit the processes that correspond to the transfer of the value
object Payment. The process model must be revised one more time to add these corresponding
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processes.
Example of Certification: health care case revisited
Let us reconsider the health care case study in Chapter 5. In this case study, the administrative
office can only make contracts with the care providers that are accredited by the government
agency CVZ. The accreditation by CVZ is an example of Certification. The process model of
the example is shown in Figure 10.6.
Ministry 
(Primary Actor)
Administrative Office 
(Primary Actor)
CVZ (Trusted Actor) Care Provider 
(Counter Actor)
Provide
CareWitness
Pay for
Care
Provide
Care
Care 
Report
Offer
Contract
AWBZ
Contract
Accreditation
Verify
[positive
outcome]
[negative
outcome]
AWBZ
norms
Figure 10.6: Certification, an example in healthcare
The ministry of Health contracts care providers to deliver AWBZ services. The ministry wishes
to ensure that only those care providers who are really able to deliver the services, get the
contract. In this case, the ministry is the primary actor and the care providers are counter ac-
tors. According to the Partner Screening pattern, the ministry has to screen every care provider
and only contract one if the check reveals the appropriate abilities to provide care. Obviously,
although the ministry is responsible for all these tasks, the actual execution is delegated to gov-
ernment agencies. To be specific, the contracting process is performed by the administrative
office and the screening of care providers is performed by CVZ. Within the scope of the Certifi-
cation model shown in Figure 10.4, the CVZ plays a role of the trusted party.
As the process model in Figure 10.6 shows, CVZ first verifies that a specific care provider is
capable of providing AWBZ care and, if this is the case, then informs the administrative office
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by providing an accreditation for the care provider. The Accreditation object is an instance of a
Positive Statement in the Certification model in Figure 10.4. Furthermore, the contract with the
care provider as well as the delivery of services by the care provider (see the counter activity
Provide Care) are only executed after accreditation has been issued.
This example is more complex than the Certification model described in Figures 10.4 and 10.5.
The role of the primary actor is played by two parties: the ministry and the administrative office.
The contracting process (the promise activityOffer Contract) is performed by the administrative
office and the primary activity Pay for Care is performed by the ministry.
10.3 Testifying Chain pattern
The Testifying Chain pattern considers a situation in which the beneficiary of the control activity
is some actor, called a third actor. Let us consider that he delegates execution of the control
activity to a primary actor. Furthermore, the primary actor delegates the execution to the trusted
actor. As a result, the responsibility of the execution lies on a primary actor, while the actual
execution is done by a trusted actor. The situation is more complicated with the fact that the
third actor only trusts the primary actor and not the trusted actor. Thus, the primary actor should
guarantee reliable execution of the control activity to the third actor.
10.3.1 Context
In the context in Figure 10.7 the primary actor delegates the Control Activity to his Trusted
Actor. Thus, the Control Activity is executed by a trusted actor. The outcome of the activity,
Statement, is transferred to a third actor. The primary actor has no role in the process.
10.3.2 Problem
The third actor trusts the primary actor, but not his trusted actor. Thus, from the third actor’s
perspective, the control activity may be executed sub-ideally, which is modelled in the problem
section in Figure 10.7. Because the primary actor has responsibility for the control activity, the
third actor will accuse the primary actor in case of a sub-ideal execution of the Control Activity.
Thus, some measures should be taken against the sub-ideal execution by the trusted actor.
10.3.3 Solution A: Low trust
To ensure that the control activity is executed in a proper way, the Statement should be testified
to by the primary actor before being sent to the third actor. This is needed because the third
actor will trust the control activity only if it is executed, or at least testified, by the primary
actor.
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Solution A in Figure 10.7 (C) shows that the trusted actor sends the Statement to the primary
actor, who testifies to it with a Testify activity and then sends it on to the third actor. The
statement received by the third actor is a Testifying Statement.
Delegation can be repeated several times to form a chain of testifying statements. The trusted
actor can delegate Control Activity to his (second) trusted actor, who, in turn can then delegate
it to a third trusted actor and so on. This chain of statements goes back to the audit trail concept
in the internal control theory (see section 2.1.1). With help of a chain of statements we can trace
the actor who executes the Control Activity and the one who testifies its execution.
Some control principles must be observed here. According to the Testified - Testify Principles
the Testify activity must be performed after the testified Control Activity. In addition, the Tes-
tifying Statement has to be transferred directly to the third actor and the Statement has to be
transferred directly to Testify activity.
10.3.4 Solution B: High trust
In Solution Awe state that the primary actor must testify to the outcome of the Statement, which,
on the other hand, creates an extra administrative burden. The Statement has to be processed by
the primary actor, and this can create delays, which is not the case in a situation in which the
statement is sent directly from the trusted actor to the third actor.
If the primary actor is really sure that the trusted actor executes the Control Activity ideally,
the primary actor can entitle the trusted actor to send the Statement directly to the third actor
without extra testification. In this case, a proper legal entitlement of the trusted actor by the
primary actor is needed, allowing that the trusted actor could act on behalf of the primary actor.
To remain in control, the primary actor has to have a copy of the Statement.
This kind of delegation is described Solution B in Figure10.7. The Control Activity is executed
by the trusted actor, the Testify activity is not added and the trusted actor sends the Statement to
the third actor and sends a Copy Statement to the primary actor.
10.3.5 Example
An example of this pattern will be demonstrated in the beer living lab case study in Chapter 13.
10.4 Summary
In the control patterns in Chapters 8 and 9 we assumed exchanges between two actors: a primary
actor and a counter actor. In reality, the two actors often delegate activities to other actors, which
may result in control problems and weaken the control mechanism as suggested by the control
pattern. In this chapter we introduce delegation patterns to describe how delegation has to be
executed to prevent the sub-ideal execution of the control activity.
The delegation patterns describe control problems caused by delegation and the solution to this
problem. From our examination of two kinds of delegation, we have determined two patterns:
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Simple Delegation pattern and Testifying Chain pattern. The first pattern considers the dele-
gation of a control activity by a primary actor when the outcome of the control activity is also
received by the primary actor. The second pattern considers the same situation, but when the
outcome of the control activity is received by an actor other than the primary actor. The control
problem in both cases is that, when a control activity is delegated, it is executed sub-ideally.
The patterns identify control problems for each situation and suggest a solution.
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Chapter 11
The e3controldesign framework for
patterns
In this section we describe the steps to be performed in designing controls with the e3control
patterns. The process consists of five steps, which are an extension of the three steps of e3control
in Chapter 3 adjusted to incorporate the control patterns in the design process.
The steps and their outcomes are schematically shown in Figure 11.1. As in e3control , the
design process starts with the design of an ideal situation in Step 1 and a sub-ideal situation in
Step 2. In Step 3 the user selects an appropriate pattern to mitigate the control problem identified
in the Step 2. In Step 4 the user designs a solution to a problem by applying the selected pattern.
Steps 1 to 4 can be repeated to deal with various control problems. For example, if several con-
trol problems have been identified, Steps 1 to 4 have to be applied for each of them separately.
The single execution of the four steps is referred to henceforth as an e3control cycle.
Each step results in design artifacts, e.g. e3controlmodels or process models, which we refer to
as outcomes of the step. The outcome of Step 1 is an ideal value and an ideal process model.
The outcome of Step 2 is a sub-ideal value and a sub-ideal process model. The outcome of Step
4 is a solution value and a solution process model.
In addition to the description of each step, we discuss an Example, Guidelines, and References.
In the Example we illustrate the step using an educational example. In Guidelines we describe
how to handle more complex situations that can occur in this step. In References we provide
a reference to the theory (described in this thesis) that should be familiar to the user when
performing the step.
11.1 Step 1: Design an ideal situation
The first step considers the design of an ideal situation. As defined in Chapter 3, an ideal
situation is a situation in which counter parties are supposed to behave without errors or irregu-
larities.
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Figure 11.1: Steps to design controls with control patterns in e3control
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An ideal value and an ideal process model are developed in this step. A value model is re-
quired to analyze and design value-related aspects of controls, and a process model is neces-
sary to analyze and design procedural aspects of controls. An ideal value model should be
developed using the e3value ontology (see section 3.1) and an ideal process model should be
developed using a process modelling technique. In our case, we use UML activity diagrams
[Fowler and Scott, 2000].
11.1.1 Guidelines
Guideline 1: Controls in an ideal model. Notice that an ideal model can still include some
controls and, in practice, some elements of controls are already present in an ideal model.
An ideal situation is defined as a situation with no errors or irregularities, and with ideally
behaving actors, which does not imply that there are no controls included in the ideal model. If
these controls are efficient, then risks will not materialize. Controls that are inefficient will not
mitigate the risks, so the old controls have to be improved or new controls have to be introduced.
11.1.2 Example
In the educational example we consider three actors: a buyer, a seller, and a carrier. The ideal
process and value models developed in Step 1 are shown in Figure 11.2.
A buyer buys some goods from a seller in return for a Goods Fee. In addition, the goods are
delivered to the buyer by a carrier, who receives the Delivery Fee. As can be seen from the
process model, the buyer makes the payment after the goods have been shipped and delivered.
These models are usually built based on data collected by a user and with the assumption that
all actors behave ideally. A definition of what is ideal or what not is also given by the user
according to the points of view taken by the stakeholders in a case study.
11.1.3 References
Ideal situations and ideal value models are discussed in Chapter 3, section 3.1. For more refer-
ences on the e3valuemethodology for building ideal value models see [Gordijn, 2002].
11.2 Step 2: Design a sub-ideal situation
The second step considers the design of a sub-ideal situation. As defined in Chapter 3, a sub-
ideal situation is a situation in which network participants behave with errors or irregularities,
and this leads to control problems.
In this step, sub-ideal value and sub-ideal process models should be developed to analyze value-
related and procedural aspects of a control problem. The sub-ideal value model should be
developed using the e3control ontology (see Chapter 3). The sub-ideal process model should be
developed using a process modelling technique such as a UML activities diagram.
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11.2.1 Guidelines
Guideline 2: Multiple control problems. Multiple control problems can occur when, for
example, multiple actors behave sub-ideally or when one actor causes several problems. It is
more convenient to consider one control problem in one e3control cycle at a time. If multiple
control problems are detected during this step, just one of them should be selected to proceed
and the rest should be tackled by repeating Steps 1 to 4 in the next e3control cycle.
Note that in the methodology we do not describe considerations behind implementing controls
in a particular order, even though this choice can influence the final result, which is known as
feature interaction in computer science. This is an important issue and is a subject of future
research.
Guideline 3: Using patterns to identify control problems. Patterns can be used not only
to design control mechanisms, but also to identify control problems. The user of the method-
ology may collect data while being familiar with certain patterns and being aware of the con-
trol problems described by them. Such a design process is accepted in the patterns literature
[Gamma et al., 1995]. However one should not forget that the e3control patterns do not describe
all possible controls problems. For example, control problems related to information system-
level of analysis are not covered by the e3control patterns.
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11.2.2 Example
There are multiple potential control problems in our educational example. Suppose, we identify
one important control problem during the investigation of our case and we consider it further.
The risk taken by the seller is that the buyer may claim that goods have not been received and,
based on this claim, he refuses to pay for the goods. A similar problem is when the buyer claims
that he has not received the goods that he ordered and demands compensation or change of the
goods.
The control problem is modelled with sub-ideal value and process models in Figure11.3. The
sub-ideal value model shows a sub-ideal value transfer of the object Goods Fee. The corre-
sponding sub-ideal value object is called No Goods Fee. The model also specifies that the
reason for the missing value object is the claim of non-delivery by the buyer. In the sub-ideal
process model the activity Pay of the buyer is not executed; instead, the buyer executes the
activity Claim Wrong/No Delivery, which results in the delivery of a Claim to the Seller.
Sub-deal value model
step2, 2008-04-12 22:43:31, http://www.e3value.com/
BUYER SELLER CARRIER
Goods
No Goods Fee
(claim no delivery)
Delivery
Delivery
Fee
Sub-ideal process model
BUYER CARRIERSELLER
Ship
Goods Goods
Deliver
GoodsGoods
Claim wrong/no
delivery
Pay Delivery Fee
Claim
Figure 11.3: An example of Step 2
11.2.3 References
The sub-ideal situation and the sub-ideal value model are discussed in Chapter 3.
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11.3 Step 3: Select a control pattern
In this step we need to select a control pattern which suggests an appropriate mechanism against
the control problem identified in the Step 2. We start by identifying the primary and counter
actor and the primary and counter activities and value objects. Then, we identify the pattern to
be applied to mitigate the selected sub-ideal counter activity according to type.
11.3.1 Step 3.1. Identify ideal and sub-ideal primary and counter actors,
value objects, and activities
In this step we identify which actors play the roles of the primary actor and the counter actor.
We also identify primary and counter value objects as well as primary and counter operational
activities for both the ideal and sub-ideal situation. We now go on to describe each element that
should be identified.
Primary Actor. A pattern always considers one primary actor. The sub-ideal value model from
Step 2 should be used to find a primary actor in a case. Use the following guidelines:
1. A primary actor does not trust the counter actor (see below) with respect to the
execution of some value transfer and expects him to behave sub-ideally;
2. The sub-ideal behaviour is defined subjectively by the primary actor;
3. A primary actor plays the role of a principal.
Counter Actor. A pattern always considers one counter actor. The sub-ideal value model de-
veloped in Step 2 should be used to find a counter actor in a case. Use the following
guidelines:
1. A counter actor behaves sub-ideally and causes sub-ideal value transfers;
2. In graphical models a counter actor has a liability token;
3. A counter actor plays the role of an agent.
Sub-ideal Counter Value Object. A sub-ideal counter value object is a result of errors or ir-
regularities made by the counter actor. The sub-ideal value model should be used to find
a value object that corresponds to the control problem described in Step 2. This is a sub-
ideal value object. The value transfer that transfers this value object is marked with a
dashed line.
Ideal Counter Value Object. The ideal value model should be used to find a value object that
corresponds to the sub-ideal counter value object. This is an ideal counter value object
Ideal Primary Value Object. A primary value object is exchanged in return for a counter
value object. The ideal value model should be used to find the primary value object.
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Sub-ideal Primary Value Object. In some cases the transfer of the sub-ideal counter objects
causes sub-ideality of the primary value object. The sub-ideal value model should be
used to find a sub-ideal value object that corresponds to the primary value object. This is
a sub-ideal primary value object.
Ideal Primary Activities. The ideal process model should be used to identify an activity or
a set of activities that correspond to the value transfer of the primary value object. The
primary activities are executed by the primary actor or delegated by the primary actor to
other actors.
Sub-ideal Primary Activities. If the sub-ideal primary value object exists, there will also be
sub-ideal primary activities. The sub-ideal process model should be used to identify an
activity or a set of activities that correspond to the value transfer of the sub-ideal primary
value object.
Ideal Counter Activities. The ideal process model should be to identify an activity or a set of
activities that correspond to the value transfer of the counter value object. The counter
activities are executed by the counter actor or delegated by the counter actor to other
actors.
Sub-ideal counter activities. The Sub-ideal Counter activities can be found in the sub-ideal
process model. They are sub-ideal versions of the ideal counter activities. As already
identified in section 7.3, the following sub-ideal counter activities are possible:
• A counter activity executed at a wrong time or in the wrong sequence
• A counter activity not executed at all
• A counter activity executed without proper authorization
• A counter activity executed by a wrong actor
• An activity involving a wrong resource
• An activity involving a wrong amount or number of resources
• An activity executed at the wrong location
In addition to sub-ideally executed counter activities, the sub-ideal process model may
contain activities known as Emerging Sub-ideal activities that do not exist in the ideal
value model. For example, forging a document necessitates the execution of sub-ideal
activities, e.g. printing the forged document. In particular, we distinguish two types of
such sub-ideal activities: Deny Commitment and Deny Execution.
To summarize, we distinguish four types of sub-ideal activities:
1. Sub-ideal Counter activity is an ideal counter activity executed sub-ideally;
2. Deny Commitment activity is an Emerging Sub-ideal activity by which the counter
actor claims that he made no obligations to transfer the CO to the primary actor;
3. Deny Execution activity is an Emerging Sub-ideal activity by which the counter
actor claims that the primary actor executed the primary activity sub-ideally.
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4. Other Emerging Sub-ideal activities are activities, which appear as a result of sub-
ideal behaviour;
11.3.2 Step 3.2. Match the sub-ideal activity to a pattern
A sub-ideal activity has now been selected which can be one of four types: Sub-ideal Counter,
Emerging Sub-ideal, Deny Commitment and Deny Execution. If the selected sub-ideal activity
matches one of these types, a control pattern can be selected in two steps.
Select the pattern according to the sub-ideality type. Activities of the Sub-ideal Counter
and/or Emerging Sub-ideal types signal control problems described in the Partner Screening
pattern, and Execution Monitoring and its contractual variations Penalty and Incentive patterns.
Therefore, if an activity of one of these two types is found, one or more of these patterns -
Partner Screening, Execution Monitoring and Penalty and Incentive - can be applied to the
control problem in question.
A combination of activities of the Sub-ideal Counter type with a Deny Commitment activity
indicates a control problem of the Proper Contracting pattern. Finally, a combination of Sub-
ideal Counter type with a Deny Execution activity signals a control problem of the Execution
Confirmation pattern.
The described matches between the types of sub-ideal counter activities and the relevant patterns
are summarized in the Matching Template in Table 11.1.
Table 11.1: Matching Template
Sub-ideal activity type Pattern Y/N
Sub-ideal Counter or/and
Emerging Sub-ideal
PARTNER SCREENING
EXECUTION MONITORING
PENALTY
INCENTIVE
Deny Commitment and Sub-
ideal Counter Activity
PROPER CONTRACTING
Deny Execution and Sub-ideal
Counter Activity
EXECUTION CONFIRMATION
Select between multiple patterns. Patterns are selected on the basis of the type of sub-ideal
activity which signals the control problem. As already explained, multiple patterns can be
implemented for control problems that have emerged through the activities of the type Sub-ideal
Counter or/and Emerging Sub-ideal. The Execution Monitoring, Partner Screening, Penalty
and Incentive patterns, as shown in Table 11.1, can therefore be applied. By using the following
rules a further selection can be made:
Step 3: Select a control pattern 219
• Partner Screening involves verification of the counter actor ex-ante. This pattern should
be applied for controls before a contract between a primary and counter actors is settled.
• Execution Monitoring suggests the ex-post verification of the counter actor (i.e. monitor-
ing). Tt considers verification of a sub-ideal counter activity and should be applied for
controls after a contract between the primary and counter actors is settled.
• The Penalty and Incentive patterns are variations of the Execution Monitoring pattern.
They should be applied to add contractual elements of controls, which are missing in the
Execution Monitoring pattern.
• The Penalty pattern can be chosen to design a mechanism that punishes a counter actor in
order to discourage him from performing sub-ideal behaviour.
• The Incentive pattern can be chosen to design a mechanism that rewards a counter actor
and encourages him to behave ideally.
The described choices between the different patterns are shown in Table 11.2.
Table 11.2: Pattern Selection Template
Pattern Ex-ante/Ex-
post
Contractual/Procedural Y/N
PARTNER
SCREENING
ex-ante procedural
EXECUTION
MONITORING
ex-post procedural
PENALTY ex-post contractual (punishment)
INCENTIVE ex-post contractual (reward)
11.3.3 Guidelines
Guideline 4: Treating multiple sub-ideal activities. The primary and counter activities can
also be collections of multiple operating activities, as defined in UML [Fowler and Scott, 2000].
In addition, these activities can be executed by an actor, other than the one who transfers the
value object. Therefore, there can be more than one sub-ideal activity.
If multiple sub-ideal activities are encountered, any of these activities can be used as an anchor
to apply the pattern: several patterns can be applied to control every sub-ideal activity. We
advise selecting one sub-ideal activity to proceed and the remaining steps should be repeated
for each sub-ideal activity in another e3control cycle.
The selection of a sub-ideal activity is case-dependent and should be made by the user of the
methodology since it can only be based on knowledge of the case study. An exemplary choice is
to select an activity, verification of which involves the lowest costs. In further steps we consider
that one sub-ideal activity is selected.
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Guideline 5: Delegation of operating activities. The identification of primary and counter
activities should take into consideration the fact that activities may have been delegated by the
primary and counter actors. In such cases, they are executed by an actor other than the one who
transfers the corresponding value objects. The primary (counter) activity is not executed by the
primary (counter) actor. In the case when primary or counter activities are delegated, Step 3
should be performed in the same way as in the situation without delegation.
Guideline 6: No match. Patterns are selected on the basis of the type of sub-ideal activity
which signals the control problem. Four types of sub-ideal activities have been identified: Sub-
ideal Counter, Emerging Sub-ideal, Deny Commitment and Deny Execution. If the selected
sub-ideal activity does not match any of these four types, two things can be done. Firstly, go
back to Step 2 and try redefining the control problem so that it matches one of the sub-ideal
activity types. Secondly, the type of control problem may not have been described by any of the
patterns in which case the library of control patterns should be extended. An obvious example
of such a case is when a control problem is related to information exchanges, e.g. security
problems, or a one-off problem. Patterns consider problems at value and process levels, and do
not include problems related to information exchanges.
11.3.4 Example
We identify the ideal and sub-ideal primary and counter actors, value objects, and activities for
our example.
Primary Actor. In our example, the role of the primary actor is played by the seller. The seller
does not trust the buyer and expects him to claim wrong or no delivery without good
reasons for doing this.
Counter Actor. The counter actor is the buyer, and is the one who the primary actor expects to
behave sub-ideally.
Sub-ideal Counter Value Object. As can be seen from the sub-ideal value model in Figure
11.3, a sub-ideal counter value object is the object No Goods Fee. It is modelled with a
dashed line and is exchanged by the buyer, the counter actor.
Ideal Counter Value Object. As can be seen from the ideal value model in Figure 11.2, the
No Goods Fee replaces the ideal value object Goods Fee. Goods Fee is therefore the ideal
primary value object.
Ideal Primary Value Object. In return for theGoods Fee the seller transfers the objectGoods.
This is the primary value object and is illustrated in the ideal value model in Figure 11.2.
Sub-ideal Primary Value Object. In the sub-ideal value model in Figure 11.3, the primary
object Goods remains ideal. Therefore, there is no sub-ideal primary value object.
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Primary Activities. The transfer of the value object Goods requires the execution of the activ-
ities Ship Goods by the seller and Deliver Goods by the carrier in the ideal process model
in Figure 11.2. Thus, Ship Goods and Deliver Goods are the primary activities.
Sub-ideal Primary Activities. Since there is no sub-ideal primary value object in our example,
we do not have any sub-ideal primary activities.
Counter Activities. The transfer of the value object Goods Fee requires the execution of the
Pay activity by the buyer in the sub-ideal process model in Figure 11.3 and so, Pay is the
counter activity.
Sub-ideal Counter Activities. Sub-ideal counter activities can be found in the sub-ideal pro-
cess model in Figure 11.3. The sub-ideal activity Claim Wrong/No Goods is an activity of
type Deny Execution. We also encounter the sub-ideal activity Pay, which is not executed
and is therefore not shown in the sub-ideal model.
In Figure 11.4 we annotate the elements of the ideal and sub-ideal process model. We indicate
which role each element plays in italics. In (a) we show the ideal model and in (b) we show the
sub-ideal model.
As discussed previously, two sub-ideal counter activities have been found: Claim Wrong/No
Goods of type Deny Execution and non-executed activity Pay of type Sub-ideal Counter. Ac-
cording to the Matching Template in Table 11.1, these sub-ideal activities indicate the problem
of the Execution Confirmation pattern, which we select for further implementation.
11.3.5 References
The execution of Step 3.1. requires knowledge of patterns vocabulary which can be found
in Chapter 7. Step 3.2. also requires some acquaintance with the control patterns library as
described in Chapter 8 and 9.
11.4 Step 4: Apply the control pattern
The solution to a selected pattern should be implemented by revising the ideal value model and
the ideal process model. This involves the following steps.
11.4.1 Step 4.1. Match context and problem
Match the context models of the pattern with the ideal value and process models. In the case of
value models, this means matching actors and value objects of the pattern’s context models to
the value objects in the ideal process and value models. At the process level it means matching
operational activities and objects of the pattern’s context models to operational activities and
objects in the ideal process model. The problem value and process models should be matched
in a similar way with the sub-ideal value and sub-ideal process models.
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Figure 11.4: An example of Step 3
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This match has been partially performed in Step 3, but it only identifies primary/counter activ-
ities and primary/counter value objects. The context and problem of the pattern may contain
other activities and objects, e.g. an activity Promise. All the actors, activities and (value) objects
of the context and problem should be identified in this step.
11.4.2 Step 4.2. Design a value model that solves a control problem
The ideal value model should be adjusted by using the suggestions of the value-level Solution
of the selected pattern:
• Add new actors to the ideal value model;
• Add new value objects to the ideal value model.
The new actors and value objects are suggested by the solution given by the selected pattern.
Note that for procedural patterns, described in Chapter 8, the ideal value model remains un-
changed unless there is some delegation of control activities.
11.4.3 Step 4.3. Design a process model that solves a control problem
The ideal process model should be adjusted by using the suggestions in the process-level Solu-
tion of the selected pattern:
• Add new activities and objects to the ideal process model by following the process view
of the pattern’s solution. In the graphical representations of the patterns in Chapter 8 and
in Chapter 9, these new elements are marked with grey.
• Connect the new objects and activities with each other and with other elements of the
process model so that it matches the solution given by the pattern.
The new activities and objects are suggested by the pattern’s solution. The order of activities
and their assignment to the actors are also described by the patterns.
11.4.4 Guidelines
Guideline 7: Starting with a value or a process viewpoint. For procedural patterns, it is
convenient to commence application of the pattern at the process level and then change the
value model accordingly. For contractual patterns Penalty and Incentive it makes sense to start
solution design with a value model. The core of contractual patterns is a change in a value
model. The process model might not even be of interest.
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Guideline 8: Control Principles. The process model of the solution must comply with the
control principles of the applied pattern. If any control principle has not been conformed to,
Step 4 must be repeated until all control principles have been observed.
The same goes for the value model of the solution, which must corresponds to the pattern. If
this is not the case, then a control weakness is obvious at the value level.
Compliance with the Actors-Activities, Activities-Activities and Activities-Object control prin-
ciples of the pattern for process models must be checked. For instance, correct segregation of
duties must be observed, the execution of witnessing of a counter activity before it occurs must
be avoided as should the indirect transfer of documents where it is required.
A Control Principles Checklist can be used to check compliance with the control principles, as
in Table 11.3 for the Execution Confirmation pattern. Y should be assigned for each principle
in the last column of Table 11.3 if the solution process model complies with the principle.
Otherwise, N should be assigned. A control weakness exists if at least one principle is assigned
with N. The control principles lists for other patterns can be found in Appendix A.
Table 11.3: Control principles of pattern ‘Execution Confir-
mation’
Principle ID Control principles Y/N
Activities-Activities principles
V-Ia Witness activity must exist
V-II Verify activity must exist
V-IIIa Witness activity must be executed at the same time as Pri-
mary activity
V-IVa Verify activity must follow Witness activity
T - I Testify activity must exist
T - II Testify activity must follow Primary Activity
PE - I Verify activity must precede the Testify activity
Activities-Objects principles
V-V Supporting statement must be directly transferred to Verify
activity from a source that generates it
V-VIa To-be-verified statement must be directly transferred from
Witness activity to Verify activity
T-III The outcome of the Verify activity (Positive statement or
Negative Statement, both not shown in the model) must be
directly transferred from Verify activity to Testify activity
T-IV Testifying Statement must be directly transferred from Tes-
tify to the primary actor
Activities-Actors principles
V-VIIa An actor executingWitness activity must be independent and
socially detached from the actor executing Counter activity
V-VIII An actor executing Verify activity must be independent and
socially detached from the actor executing Counter activity
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V-IX Supporting statement must generated by an actor indepen-
dent and socially detached from the actor executing Counter
activity
T-V Testify activity must be executed by the same actor who re-
ceives the Positive Statement from the Verify activity
Guideline 8: Delegation of control activities. The procedural patterns prescribe the execu-
tion of control activities to a primary and a counter actor, however, the primary actor or counter
actor may not be able to execute them. In such cases, control activities can be assigned to third
parties, which requires delegation of the control activities. In such cases, a pattern is applied in
a similar way except that the delegated activities are assigned to actors other than the counter or
primary actor. In addition, the delegation principles of the applicable delegation patterns must
be observed (see Chapter 10).
Guideline 9: Reusing parts of the existing process. In practice, the ideal models often con-
tain some elements of the applied pattern. For example, the ideal process model may contain a
Witness activity, but not contain a Verify activity. In such cases, a pattern is applied in a similar
way except that the elements of the pattern are assigned to the existing activities and objects.
The emphasis of the application of the pattern lies on verification of the control principles rather
than on the introduction of new elements suggested by the patterns.
11.4.5 Example
The context of the pattern is matched to the ideal value and process model, as described in Table
11.4. The left-hand column of the table names elements of the Execution Confirmation pattern.
The upper part lists the elements of the context and the lower part lists the elements of the
problem. The right-hand column indicates corresponding elements of the ideal and sub-ideal
value and process models in Figures 11.2 and 11.3. For example, the first row indicates that the
role of the primary actor in the context is played by the Seller in the ideal model in Figure 11.2.
The last row shows that the sub-ideal counter activity described in the problem of the pattern is
instantiated by the No Pay activity in the sub-ideal process model in Figure 11.3.
The Execution Confirmation pattern, selected in Step 3, suggests that the seller must receive a
Testifying Statement from the buyer. In addition, the pattern suggests that the buyer witnesses
and verifies delivery before testifying to it. Finally, Deny Execution activity must be executed in
the case of negative verification. Therefore, we should add activities Witness, Verify, Deny Ex-
ecution, and Testify and objects To-Be-Verified Statement, Supporting Statement, and Testifying
Statement to the ideal process model in Figure 11.2.
The result of the application of the solution to the process and value model is shown in Figure
11.5. The To-Be-Verified Statement is represented by aDelivery Report (DR) generated after the
buyer witnessed the goods. The Supporting Statement is a Purchase Order (PO), which states
which goods were delivered. If the PO and DR correspond to each other, the buyer pays and
testifies to the delivery by executing the activity Testify. The testifying statement is represented
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Table 11.4: Matching context and problem
Context Ideal models
Primary Actor Seller
Counter Actor Buyer
Primary Value Object Goods
Counter Value Object Goods Fee
Primary Activity Ship Goods (by Seller)
Deliver Goods (by Carrier)
Counter Activity Pay
Problem Sub-ideal models
Primary Actor Seller
Counter Actor Buyer
Primary Value Object Goods
Counter Value Object Goods Fee
Primary Activity Ship Goods (by Seller)
Deliver Goods (by Carrier)
Deny Execution Claim Wrong/No Delivery
Sub-ideal Counter Activity No Pay (by Buyer, not shown in the
model)
by Acceptance Note, by which the buyer testifies to delivery. After signing the acceptance note,
the buyer can no longer deny delivery.
The solution also involves the Testifying Chain pattern, because the Acceptance Note is not sent
directly to the seller, but to the carrier. This complies with the pattern, in which the carrier is
independent and socially detached from the buyer. The carrier then testifies to the delivery to
the seller by sending the Acceptance Note to him.
Note that the resulting model complies with the control principles of the Execution Confirma-
tion pattern. They are listed in Table 11.3.
Since the process-level solution involves delegation of the activity Testify by the seller to the
carrier, the ideal value model has to be changed correspondingly. In value terms, the carrier
delivers a service to the seller by requiring an acceptance note from the buyer and testifying to
the delivery to the seller. We call this service Acceptance Service. For example, such a service
may require the carrier not to give the buyer the goods unless the buyer signs the acceptance
note. In return for the acceptance service, the seller pays a separate Service Fee to the carrier as
shown in the value model in Figure 11.5. The processes that correspond to the payment of the
service fee are not yet in the process model in Figure 11.5 and have to be added.
11.4.6 References
Execution of this requires knowledge of the control patterns library, which is described in Chap-
ter 8 and 9.
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11.5 Summary
In this chapter we have proposed a structured step-wise approach to the design and redesign
of control mechanisms in complex business networks using patterns. The design process starts
with designing an ideal situation in step 1 and a sub-ideal situation in Step 2. Further in Step
3 the user selects an appropriate pattern to mitigate the control problem identified in Step 2. In
step 4 the user designs the solution to the problem by applying the selected pattern. In Step 4 the
user also checks compliance of the process model of the solution with the control principles.
If any control principle has not been conformed to, Step 4 must be repeated until no control
weaknesses are left. In this section, we have also discussed such issues as multiple control
problems, multiple sub-ideal activities, how to match a control problem to a pattern, and how
and at what step in the design process to handle delegation issues.
Chapter 12
Renewable electricity in UK
One of the industries with interesting complicated control problems is the renewable electricity
industry. In order to comply with international environmental agreements, such as the Kyoto
protocol, governments must ensure that a sufficient amount of electricity is produced with tech-
nologies that do not use fossil fuel. Examples of CO2-friendly technologies are wind turbines,
photovoltaic panels and hydro generators. Such technologies are called renewable or green tech-
nologies. At present these technologies require high initial investments, which means that the
price of green electricity is higher than the price of electricity produced in the conventional way
using fuel-based technologies [Laresgoiti et al., 2004]. Many government regulated schemes
have been implemented to make renewable technologies commercially more attractive, e.g. tax
cuts and subsidies on initial investments, premiums for generated electricity, etc. In this chapter
we examine more closely one such scheme which was implemented in the United Kingdom
(UK).
In the UK, the Renewable Obligation (RO) regulation law was introduced to stimulate the gen-
eration of renewable electricity. The first Renewable Obligation regulation in the UK came into
force in April 2002. The law places an obligation on electricity suppliers, licensed to sup-
ply electricity in the UK, to source a certain proportion of electricity from renewable sources
[OFGEM, 2004b]. When the regulation was introduced, this portion constituted 10% of the to-
tal supply of a UK supplier. In 2006/07 a UK supplier is obliged to generate 6.7% of its supply
from renewable sources.
Suppliers prove that they meet their obligations by presenting Renewable Obligation Certifi-
cates (ROCs) each one of which represents one Mega Watt/hour (MWh) of produced renewable
electricity output. ROCs can be acquired by suppliers from producers of green electricity.
The producers get ROCs from a government agency, the Office of Gas and Electricity Mar-
kets (Ofgem) for each MWh of renewable electricity output they produce. In addition, Ofgem
maintains a register of all ROCs it has issued.
The suppliers must therefore provide ROCs as evidence of how much MWh of green electricity
they have supplied. If a supplier does not have sufficient ROCs to cover his obligation, he must
make a deposit into a buy-out fund. The buy-out fee is a fixed price per MWh shortfall and is
adjusted in line with the Retail Prices Index each year. Premiums from the buy-out fund are
paid back to suppliers in proportion to how many ROCs they have presented.
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In this case study we apply the e3controlmethodology and patterns to describe the controls that
appear in this case. Actually, we reverse engineer the ultimate ROC-scheme with the goal of
explaining, by means of the patterns, why this scheme is needed from the control perspective.
For example, we illustrate how the patterns explain the necessity of introducing ROCs.
Our discussion starts in a situation of no ROCs introduced. We then go on to explain the control
problems that may occur in such a network. We explicitly take the government’s point of view
and only describe the problems as perceived by the government, which is represented by Ofgem.
Then, step by step, we design the ROC scheme by applying the patterns. As a result, we will
demonstrate that the ROC scheme can be explained by means of e3control patterns.
12.1 Research Context
The initial data collection for the case study was carried out within the EU-funded research
EC-EESD project BusMod1 before this research started. During the BusMod project, the data
was collected by several researchers, including the author of this thesis. It mostly took the form
of organized brainstorming sessions with domain experts from different organizations in the
network. Domain experts from six different European organizations participated in the BusMod
project. The advantage of such a setting is that it was possible for us to actively participate in the
project meetings with the domain experts. One of the primary goals of these meetings was to
share knowledge on how the electricity markets operate in different countries, including the UK.
During the BusMod project we also had a chance to verify some results of the value modelling
with the domain experts. For example, we gave a workshop during which the domain experts
learned how to build e3valuemodels. In fact, the models presented here are based on another
value model of the UK electricity market built by the domain experts themselves. This latest
model can be found in [Mutale and Strbac, 2004].
Knowledge about processes behind the ROC scheme was gained mostly from material found
on the Ofgem web site (www.ofgem.co.uk), including [OFGEM, 2004a], [OFGEM, 2004b] and
[OFGEM, 2006].
12.2 The first e3controlcycle: Non-tradable ROCs
12.2.1 Step 1: Ideal situation
Value view. Figure 12.1 presents an ideal value model for the renewable energy case. In this
model we show desirable behaviour of the suppliers from the perspective of Ofgem. As was
explained earlier, Ofgem wants the suppliers to provide at least 10% of their electricity from
renewable sources.
The dependency path in Figure 12.1 starts at the customer, the final electricity consumers in
the UK. The customer buys Electricity from the supplier and pays the supplier a Retail Fee in
1http://www.e3value.com/projects/ourprojects/busmod/
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return2. As denoted by the OR-fork at the supplier, the supplier can buy electricity from two
sources: from non-renewable producers or from renewable producers. For more specific
definition of what producer falls under renewable producers see regulation in [OFGEM, 2004b].
In the first case, the supplier buys Regular Electricity and pays Regular Fee in returns . In
the second case, the supplier buys Green Electricity and pays a Green Fee. Because green
electricity is produced by more expensive renewable technology, the renewable producer asks
a higher price for electricity than the non-renewable producer. Therefore, we assume that the
following inequality holds:
RegularFee < GreenFee
According to the RO regulation, a supplier has to obtain 10% of electricity from renewable
sources3. In e3value terms, this means that the electricity delivered by buying Green Electricity
in Figure 12.1 has to account for at least 10% of the Electricity supplied to the customers.
In this model, we assume that the suppliers behave ideally and always buy 10% of their supply
from renewable producers. Therefore, when a supplier buys Green Electricity, he simulta-
neously reports the supply of green electricity to Ofgem and receives a compliance with the
renewable obligation. This is modelled with objects Green Supply and RO Compliance accord-
ingly (see path a’).
Note that the value objects Green Electricity and Green Supply are two different value objects.
Green Electricity denotes an amount of electricity, whereas Green Supply denotes the fact of
generation of electricity with renewable sources.
Process view. In Figure 12.2 we represent an ideal process model that corresponds to the
described ideal value model. The process starts at the supplier who, as in the value model, has
the choice of buying electricity from a renewable or a non-renewable supplier. In the first case,
the supplier executes a Buy Regular Electricity activity, followed by a Sell Regular Electricity
activity of the non-renewable supplier. In the second case, the suppler executes a Buy Green
Electricity activity, followed by a Sell Green Electricity activity executed by the renewable
supplier. After that, in both cases a Supply Electricity activity is executed by the supplier, which
results in a transfer of an object Electricity from the supplier to the customer. Further, the
supplier reports information about his supply (in MWh) to Ofgem by transferring a statement
Supply Declaration to Ofgem. In the Supply Declaration, the supplier reports how much green
electricity was supplied and what part of this electricity was green.
Since this model represents an ideal situation, the supplier is always assumed to behave ideally.
In other words, the suppler always buys at least 10% of green electricity. Therefore, at the end
of the process the RO compliance is always granted.
2In this model, the customer buys both green and conventional electricity for the same price. However, other
business models are possible, in which the customer is charged a higher fee for green electricity than for conven-
tional supply.
3When the regulation was introduced in 2002, the limit was around 10%. Currently in 2006/07 it is 6.7% and
2.6% in Northern Ireland. In this model we assume a limit of 10%.
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12.2.2 Step 2: Sub-ideal situation
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Figure 12.3: Sub-ideal value model for the problem of not supplying green electricity
We can identify two types of sub-ideal behaviour of suppliers within the developed models.
Firstly, not every supplier complies with the renewable obligation, and those that do not comply
with the RO are considered by Ofgem as behaving sub-ideally. A sub-ideally behaving supplier
buys a lower percentage of green electricity than the 10% prescribed by the regulation. In this
case, the RO compliance is not (completely) granted.
Secondly, some suppliers can overstate the percentage of green supply in order to obtain the
RO compliance illegally. To do this, the suppliers report a higher percentage of green electricity
and get the Illegitimate RO compliance. Another way to mislead the Ofgem is to understate
the total supply so that the percentage of the green supply constitutes 10%. This also leads to
Illegitimate RO compliance.
Below we model these two sub-ideal situations. Firstly, we represent the problem in a value
model, and then we model the problem in a process model.
Value view. A sub-ideal value model in Figure 12.3 models both the ideal and sub-ideal be-
haviour of a supplier. The second OR-fork leads to the ideal paths a and sub-ideal path b. The
ideal path a shows the same as in the ideal value model: the supplier buys green electricity and
gets RO compliance.
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The sub-ideal path b corresponds to the two types of sub-ideal behaviour. In both cases, the sup-
plier buys Regular Electricity, instead of Green Electricity. This corresponds to the exchanges
in the sub-path b”. Further, the OR-fork at the sub-path b’ indicates two possibilities of sub-
ideal behaviour. The sub-path, marked with a liability token L1, corresponds to a situation in
which the supplier reports his low supply of green electricity and does not get the RO compli-
ance. At the sub-path, marked with a liability token L2, the supplier either overstates his low
supply of green electricity or understates the total supply. As a result, he gets the RO compli-
ance illegitimately. The value objects that correspond to this situation are marked as sub-ideal
with dashed value transfers.
Process view. In Figure 12.4 we represent only the sub-ideal behaviour of the supplier. As in
the ideal process model, the initial state of the sub-ideal process model is located at the supplier
who has a choice of buying electricity from the renewable or non-renewable producer. In the
represented sub-ideal behaviour, the supplier buys insufficient green electricity. We model it
with a sub-ideal activity Buy Less Green Electricity instead of the Buy Green Electricity, as in
the ideal process model.
After supplying the electricity the supplier has a choice of reporting the true supply of green
electricity or of overstating it. The choice is modelled with the UML decision element. In
the first case, the supplier transfers a Supply Declaration in which he informs Ofgem about
insufficient green supply and, as a result, he does not get the RO compliance. In the second
case, the supplier overstates the percentage of green supply and transfers an Incorrect Supply
Declaration. As a result, the supplier gets the RO compliance illegitimately.
12.2.3 Step 3: Select a control pattern
In order to solve the control problem, Ofgem should implement one or more control mecha-
nisms. In this step we select a pattern that is appropriate for the control problem described in
step 2.
Step 3.1. Identify ideal and sub-ideal primary and counter actors, value objects, and
activities
To find a pattern, we must first identify the primary and counter actors, as well as the primary
and counter activities and value objects. Then, we identify which pattern can be applied to
mitigate the selected sub-ideal counter activity.
Primary Actor. The primary actor in this case is Ofgem. This is the actor who considers an
insufficient green supply to be a problem.
Counter Actor. A counter actor is Supplier. He is considered to behave sub-ideally by not
supplying sufficient green electricity. In the sub-ideal value model in Figure 12.4 the
supplier has liability tokens L1 and L2.
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Sub-ideal Counter Value Object. The result of the sub-ideal behaviour of the supplier is the
sub-ideal value object Regular Supply in the sub-ideal path L1 and Overstate Green Sup-
ply in the sub-ideal path L2. These are sub-ideal counter value objects.
Sub-ideal Primary Value Object. The value object No RO Compliance and Illegitimate RO
Compliance are the sub-ideal primary value objects. They are transferred in return for the
sub-ideal counter value objects identified earlier.
Ideal Counter Value Object. The value object Green Supply, which in the ideal value model
corresponds to the sub-ideal counter value object, is the ideal counter value object.
Ideal Primary Value Object. The value object RO Compliance, transferred in return for the
ideal counter value object Green Supply is the ideal primary value object.
Primary Activities. To transfer the primary value object RO Compliance the Ofgem executes
the activity Grant RO Compliance. So, Grant RO Compliance is the primary activity.
Sub-ideal Primary Activities. The sub-ideal primary activities are No RO Compliance for the
sub-ideal path L1 and Illegitimate RO Compliance for the sub-ideal path L2.
Counter Activities. The Supplier must execute several activities to transfer the counter value
objectGreen Supply. Firstly, he buys green electricity (see activity Buy Green Electricity).
Secondly, he reports the supply to Ofgem (see activity Report Supply). The activities Buy
Green Electricity and Report Supply are therefore ideal counter activities.
Sub-ideal Counter Activities. For the sub-ideal path L1, the sub-ideality of the value object
Green Supply is caused by delivering less green electricity than required. So, the sub-
ideal counter activity is Buy Less Green Electricity. The sub-ideality of the value object
Green Supply in the sub-ideal path L2 is not only caused by delivering insufficient green
electricity, but also by overstating the green supply. So, the activity Incorrect Supply
Declaration is also sub-ideal.
As a result, we have selected two sub-ideal activities: Buy Less Green Electricity and Incorrect
Supply Declaration. To proceed, we must focus on one sub-ideal counter activity and deal
with the rest of the activities later on. From now on we focus on the activity Buy Less Green
Electricity. Later on we show that the pattern that is being used to prevent sub-ideality of the
activity Buy Less Green Electricity also helps to avoid the activity Incorrect Supply Declaration.
Step 3.3: Identify type of sub-ideal activity
To select a pattern, we must first identify the type of Buy Less Green Electricity, which is
the sub-ideal activity under consideration. In Chapter 7, we distinguish three types of sub-ideal
activities: Sub-ideal Counter, Emerging Sub-ideal, Deny Commitment and Deny Execution (see
Chapter 11 for more details). The sub-ideal activity Buy Less Green Electricity is of the first
type Sub-ideal Counter. In fact, this sub-ideal activity is a sub-ideal variant of the ideal counter
activity Buy Green Electricity, but executed in an incorrect way. We do not see activities of
types Deny Execution and Deny Commitment in the sub-ideal process model.
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Step 3.4: Match the sub-ideal activity to a pattern
Table 12.1: Pattern Selection Template for ROC case
Pattern Ex-ante/Ex-
post
Contractual/ProceduralY/N
PARTNER
SCREENING
ex-ante procedural N
EXECUTION
MONITORING
ex-post procedural N
PENALTY ex-post contractual (punish-
ment)
Y
INCENTIVE ex-post contractual (reward) Y
The type Sub-ideal Counter signals the presence of the control problems described in the
Partner Screening, Execution Monitoring, Penalty, and Incentive patterns. Further we use the
following steps to select the pattern:
• The Partner Screening pattern considers an ex-ante problem of hidden characteristics,
e.g. that a supplier would hide from Ofgem his ability to deliver green energy. This is not
the control problem we want to solve, so we do not select the Partner Screening pattern.
We limit our choice to the Penalty, Incentive and Execution Monitoring patterns, which
consider ex-post problems of hidden action.
• Execution Monitoring suggests the ex-post verification of a sub-ideal counter activity
Buy Less Green Electricity. The solution given by the Execution Monitoring pattern sug-
gests identifying parties that supply less green energy and not grant them RO compliance.
However, this will not harm the suppliers much, unless a refusal to grant RO compliance
is supported by a monetary loss for the suppliers. This monetary loss can be introduced
by Penalty and Incentive patterns, which we select as a solution to our problems.
• The Penalty and Incentive patterns are variations of the Execution Monitoring pattern.
The Penalty pattern can be used to punish suppliers for delivering less green electric-
ity than required. The Incentive pattern can be used to reward them for buying green
electricity.
In the ROC scheme, both Penalty and Incentive mechanisms are implemented. The final choice
is summarized in the Pattern Selection Template in Table 12.1.
12.2.4 Step 4: Apply the Penalty and Incentive patterns
In order to design a solution, we need to add elements of the solutions given by the selected
Penalty and Incentive patterns to the ideal value and process models shown in Figures 12.1 and
12.2. As a result, we obtain the solution value and process models shown in Figures 12.6 and
12.5 correspondingly.
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Process view. The process level solution of both Penalty and Incentive patterns requires the
primary actor Ofgem to check the outcome of the sub-ideal counter activity Buy Green Elec-
tricity and, depending on the outcome, to reward or punish the supplier. To model this, we first
add a Verify Compliance activity to Figure 12.5. This is an instance of a Verify activity in the
patterns (see Figures 9.1 and 9.3).
Furthermore, according to the pattern, Verify Compliance requires two inputs: Supporting State-
ment and To-be-verified Statement. The To-be-verified Statement gives information about a per-
centage of electricity supplied from renewable sources. In fact, this corresponds to the object
Supply Declaration, presented in the model.
According to the pattern, the to-be-verified statement Supply Declaration must be produced by
an activity that witnesses the activity Buy Green Electricity. In addition, the pattern requires this
witnessing activity to be executed either by the primary actor Ofgem or by a party independent
and socially detached from the counter actor Supplier. If this is not the case, the violation of
segregation of duties occurs, since the supplier who is responsible for buying green electricity
also executes reporting it.
In the ideal value mode, the to-be-verified statement Supply Declaration is produced by the
Supplier. This violates the requirements of the pattern. To correct the situation, the following
changes are made in the solution model. Firstly, we explicitly model the witnessing activity
Witness Green Supply, instead of only the reporting activity. Secondly, we assign this activity to
an actor, who is independent from the Supplier and is able to produce trustworthy information
about the supply. Ideally such an actor is the primary actor Ofgem. However, as it is just an
administrative body, Ofgem does not have the resources to control each supplier. So, Ofgem
delegates control of the suppliers to some trusted party.
The role of such a trusted party can be played by the renewable producer who supplies electricity
to suppliers. This party is therefore physically able to keep track of how much green electricity
is bought by each supplier. In Figure 12.5, the activity Witness Green Supply is assigned to the
renewable producer.
The third change me make is to rename the to-be-verified statement. This statement, previously
called Supply Declaration, in now called Renewable Obligation Certificate (ROC) in this model.
One ROC is issued for each Mega Watt/hour (MWh) of eligible renewable output. According
to the pattern, the ROC is fed into the activity Verify Compliance, which compares whether the
ROCs of one particular supplier represent 10% of his total supply.
The ROC only represents the amount of green electricity. However, the important criteria for
granting RO compliance is the share of the green electricity within the supplier’s total electricity
supply. Therefore, we add another to-be-verified statement Total Supply, which represents this
information. As with ROC, the Total Supply must be generated by an actor who is independent
and not acting in the interests of the supplier. For instance, the data about the total supply
could be retrieved from the final customer or from the supplier’s annual accounts, assuming
they are trustworthy. In the model we show that the Total Supply is generated by Ofgem. Data
concerning the total supply of each supplier is easily accessible to a governmental organization
like Ofgem.
The Verify Compliance activity requires a supporting statement, namely, information, which is
needed to decide whether the RO Compliance should be granted. Such a document is an RO
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legislation, stating e.g. the required percentage of green electricity (which we assume is 10%),
which producers are qualified to hold the status of ‘renewable’, to which customers should the
reported green electricity be supplied, etc.
In addition, according to the patterns, the activities are assigned in a proper order, as required
by the control principles. The activity Witness Green Supply is executed after the Buy Green
Electricity activity and before Verify Compliance activity. In addition, the Verify Compliance
activity is executed before the primary activity Grant RO Compliance.
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Figure 12.5: Solution process model with penalties and incentives
According to the penalty pattern, an object Penalty should be added. The penalty should be
transferred to Ofgem by a supplier who supplies less than 10% of green supply. According to
the RO regulation, a supplier who does not have sufficient green supply to cover his obligations
must make a deposit into the buy-out fund [OFGEM, 2004b]. Such a payment corresponds
to the object Penalty of the Penalty pattern. In Figure 12.5 the Buy-out Fee is paid by the
suppliers according to the RO regulation. According t the pattern, if the outcome of the Verify
Compliance states that the green supply is less than 10%, the RO compliance is granted only
after the buy-out fee is paid by the supplier. The Pay BuyOut Fee activity corresponds to the
Pay Penalty activity of the Penalty pattern.
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According to the solution given by the Incentive pattern, an object Incentive should be added.
This object should be transferred to the supplier who supplies at least 10% of green supply. In
reality, this kind of penalty exists. The buy-out fund is paid back to suppliers in proportion to
how much green electricity they have purchased [OFGEM, 2004b]. This payment, henceforth
called Buy-out Premium, represents the incentive. We add it to Figure 12.5.
In addition, according to the pattern, we model that if the outcome of the Verify Compliance
states that the green supply is more than 10%, then RO compliance is granted and the Buy-out
Premium is paid. The Pay BuyOut Premium activity corresponds to Pay Incentive activity of the
Incentive pattern.
Note that in the application of this pattern we have also used the Simple Delegation pattern,
see Chapter 10. This is needed to model that the Witness Green Supply activity is delegated by
Ofgem to the trusted actor Renewable Producer.
Value view. We now make appropriate changes in the ideal value model. The changes have
been caused by the introduction of penalties and incentives as well as by the delegation of the
witnessing activity.
Penalty. According to the value level solution given by the Penalty pattern, we make the
following changes in the ideal value model. We add a new value transfer, indicating a penalty,
as an outgoing value object of the counter actor Supplier in the sub-ideal path L1. We add it to
the transfer of No RO Compliance and Regular Supply, and change No RO Compliance to RO
Compliance.
In addition, because we have renamed the Supply Declaration to ROC in the process model, the
ROC also appears as a value object in the value model. We model ROC instead of the value
object Green Supply and No ROC instead of the value object No Green Supply.
The resulting value model is presented in Figure 12.6 and this corresponds to reality. The
penalty is represented by a value transfer Buy-out Fee. So, at the sub-ideal path b, where the
supplier does not supply enough green electricity, he is obliged to pay a buy-out fee in order to
cover the RO.
Incentive. According to the solution given by the Incentive pattern, an incoming value object
Incentive should be added to the Supplier in the ideal value transfer. As explained earlier,
the incentive is the buy-out premiums paid by Ofgem to compliant suppliers. As a result,
the incentive value object BuyOut Premium is added to the transfer of Green Supply and RO
Compliance in Figure 12.6.
Witnessing service. The changes at the process level require some additional clarification of
the value model. Because the renewable producer executes a witnessing activity on behalf of
Ofgem, a new value object, e.g. Witnessing Service, should modelled to represent this service.
However, in reality, Ofgem most probably does not pay the producer for the witnessing service.
Empowered by the status of a government agency, Ofgem obliges the producer to submit this
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Figure 12.6: Solution value model with penalties and incentives
information. We will not focus on this any further and therefore, we will not model this service
in the value model.
12.3 The second e3controlcycle: Tradable ROCs
The solution process model in Figure 12.5 represents only a part of the actual process of ROCs
scheme. The scenario of transferring ROCs from producers to Ofgem is not completely realistic.
Due to the nature of the electricity business, suppliers can buy and sell electricity several times
to other suppliers before it reaches the final customer. According to RO regulation, ROCs can
be claimed by the supplier who delivers the associated green electricity to final customers. If a
supplier sells green electricity to another supplier, the ROCs should also be transferred to this
other supplier.
In addition, in practice not only is transfer the ROCs with the associated electricity allowed, but
trading them separately from the associated electricity is also allowed. This creates a market of
ROCs. The ROC is in fact a security similar to stocks and bonds. As will be explained later, the
ROC market was created to stimulate green electricity production.
Because ROCs can also be traded amongst suppliers, additional controls are required. Wemodel
these controls below in a new e3control cycle. We present this cycle in a short format, paying
less attention to all the details of pattern selection and application.
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12.3.1 Step 1: Ideal value and process models
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Figure 12.7: An ideal process model with tradable ROCs
The ideal process model of the scenario with tradable ROCs is shown in Figure 12.7. Unlike
in the solution process model in Figure 12.5, here the ROCs are transferred to the supplier
before being transferred to Ofgem to comply with the required percentage of supplied renewable
energy. The supplier has the choice of selling the obtained ROCs or of reporting them to Ofgem.
This choice is denoted by the UML decision element at the supplier. If the supplier reports the
ROCs to Ofgem, the verification process of charging the buy-out fee or the paying buy-out
premium remains the same as before. However, if the supplier sells the ROCs, they are not
presented to Ofgem.
The corresponding value model is shown in Figure 12.8. The following changes have been made
compared to the situation without tradable ROCs in Figure 12.6. Firstly, suppliers obtain ROCs
from the renewable producers. Secondly, unlike in the solution value model in Figure 12.6, the
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ideal dependency path now offers a choice between (1) obtaining ROCs for free while buying
the (more expensive) green electricity in path c or (2) buying ROCs separately and purchasing
the (cheaper) regular electricity in the path d. Thus, because ROCs can be traded, they are
modelled as value objects, and not as process objects only.
12.3.2 Step 2: Sub-ideal value and process models
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Figure 12.9: A sub-ideal process model with tradable ROCs
The new ideal models in Figures 12.7 and 12.8 differ from the pattern-compliant models in
Figure 12.6 and 12.5. In fact, the new models do not comply with the prescriptions of the
Penalty and Incentive patterns, applied earlier. To be specific, to perform the Verify Compliance
activity, Ofgem has to rely on information received from the supplier. This implies that the
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supplier performs Witness Green Supply activity. As already explained, this contradicts the
pattern, since the supplier should not report his own activities. For example, the supplier can
forge ROCs and overstate the number of supplied green electricity.
In Figure 12.9 we show the sub-ideal process model of the scenario with tradable ROCs. The
supplier overstates the number of ROCs he has, which is modelled by an activity Overstate
Green Supply. This corresponds to the transfer ofNo ROCs by the supplier in the sub-ideal value
model in Figure 12.10. Because the overstatement remains undetected, the supplier receives the
RO Compliance and even gets the BuyOut Premium in return. This path is marked with the
liability token L3.
Note that the supplier has an illegitimate interest in overstating the number of ROCs which does
not depend on whether he can cover the RO obligation or not. If the supplier has enough ROCs
to cover the obligation, he can be motivated to overstate ROCs to receive the buy-out premium
(see path a). If the supplier has not enough ROCs to cover the obligation, he is motivated to
overstate ROCs to avoid the buy-out fee penalties (see path b).
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12.3.3 Step 3: Select a control pattern
In order to select a pattern for the design of an appropriate control mechanism, we first need
to identify the primary actor, the counter actor, primary activities, counter activities, and other
elements, as explained in section 11. As in the previous e3control cycle, the Supplier is a counter
actor and Ofgem is a primary actor. According to the sub-ideal value model in Figure 12.10, the
ideal primary object consists of two value transfers: RO Compliance and BuyOut Fee. The ideal
counter value object is ROC and the sub-ideal counter value object is No ROC. The sub-ideal
counter activity is Overstate Green Supply. Note that the counter activity Buy Green Electricity
can be either ideal or sub-ideal. As we have explained earlier, the supplier has an illegitimate
interest in overstating the number of ROCs which does not depend on whether he can cover the
RO obligation or not.
As in the previous cycle, the sub-ideal activity Overstate Green Supply is a Sub-ideal Counter
Activity. This type corresponds to the Penalty and Incentive contractual patterns, and the Exe-
cution Monitoring and Partner Screening procedural patterns. As in the previous cycle, we are
concerned with controlling the sub-ideal behaviour ex-post, and therefore, we limit ourselves to
Execution Monitoring, and its variations Penalty and Incentives. Although an additional penalty
might be introduced for the supplier who cheats, we concentrate on the process level of the so-
lution. Therefore, we select the pattern Execution Monitoring to be applied as the control for
the indicated problem.
12.3.4 Step 4: Apply the Execution Monitoring pattern
Process view. Following the solution given by the Execution Monitoring pattern, we add a
new verification activity Verify ROC to Ofgem. It verifies the Present ROCs activity of the
Supplier. That is to say, it checks if a ROC, submitted by a supplier, corresponds to a ROC
reported by the renewable producer.
In addition, unlike in the ideal model with ROCs in Figure 12.7, the renewable producer not
only issues an ROC to the supplier, but also reports the number of issued ROCs to Ofgem. This
is modelled with an object ROC Register. The ROC register is an electronic, web-based system,
supported by Ofgem, which allows generators and suppliers to view the ROCs they hold and to
transfer ROCs to other parties. In this way, Ofgem can verify the authenticity of each ROC.
Note that the activity Report ROCs is added not because of a pattern’s prescription. It is added
because the UML language restrains modelling exchange of the object (ROC Registry in this
case) directly from the AND-join (the black thick bar). We therefore add an activity in between.
In this solution, an ROC plays the role of the to-be-verified statement, while the ROC Register
plays the role of the supporting document. Thus, the renewable producer plays the role of the
provider of a supporting document.
After the verification of an ROC, the Verified ROC object is used. As in the previous e3control
cycle, the Verified ROC plays the role of the to-be-verified statement for the verification activity
Verify Compliance.
The value model does not change and is the same as the ideal value model in Figure 12.8.
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Figure 12.11: Controls in a process model with tradable ROCs
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12.4 The size of the buy-out fee and the buy-out premium
This section is devoted to the question of the size of penalties and incentives in the ROC scheme.
In the value model in Figure 12.8 the value objects BuyOut Fee and BuyOut Premium play the
roles of a penalty and an incentive correspondingly. To make the penalty and incentive effective,
the total value the supplier receives from taking the sub-ideal path must be less than the value
he receives from taking the ideal path. The supplier has two ideal paths and one sub-ideal path.
The sub-ideal path involves buying electricity from a regular supplier (path b). The first ideal
path involves getting ROCs by buying green electricity (see path c). The second ideal path
involves buying ROCs separately and buying regular electricity (path d).
12.4.1 Acquiring ROCs together with green electricity
Let us consider the ideal path c and the sub-ideal path b in Figure 12.8. As explained in Chapter
9, the penalty and incentive for the counter actor should be such that the value he accumulates
in the ideal path c is larger than the value he accumulates in the sub-ideal path b. Then the
following condition must hold:
−BuyOut Fee−Regular Fee+Retail Fee <
BuyOut Premium−Green Fee+Retail Fee
The left-hand side of the inequality contains the sum4 of the value objects exchanged by the
supplier in the sub-ideal path b. The right-hand side of the inequality contains the sum of the
value objects exchanged by the supplier of the ideal path c.
Note that here and further on we include only monetary value objects, in accordance with the
e3valuemethodology, as described in Chapter 3. Non-monetary objects, such as Electricity,
come in and out of the supplier and do not change the accumulated net value.
Retail Fee on the left and right sides of the inequality can be cancelled. This leaves us with
the following inequality:
Regular Fee+BuyOut Fee > Green Fee−BuyOut Premium (12.1)
This states that to make the incentive and the penalty effective, the payments for green electric-
ity minus the buy-out premiums must be lower for the supplier than the payments for regular
electricity and payments to the buy-out fund. Without considering the buy-out premiums, this
means that the buy-out fee per MWh should be more than the difference between the green
and the regular electricity prices per MWh. Because electricity prices are determined by mar-
ket mechanisms, the Regular Fee andGreen Fee components in the inequality are constantly
changing. To make sure this condition holds, Ofgem must constantly monitor the market and
adjust the values of the buy-out fee and buy-out premium if the price of electricity changes. If
Ofgem fails on this and allows the buy-out fee per MWh to be substantially lower than the price
4Here and further the outgoing value objects are taken with the ‘minus’ sign.
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difference, the whole scheme becomes ineffective. The suppliers will prefer to pay the buy-out
fee. The condition (12.1) mirrors the reality: As it is stated at Ofgem’s web site, the buy-out
price is a fixed price per MWh shortfall and is adjusted in line with the Retail Prices Index each
year [OFGEM, 2004b].
12.4.2 Buying ROCs separately
Now we consider the second part of the ideal path, where the supplier buys conventional elec-
tricity and buys ROCs separately (path d). This means that the supplier pays the ROC Fee plus
Regular Fee instead of paying Green Fee. The following condition should then hold:
BuyOut Fee−Regular Fee+Retail Fee <
BuyOut Premium−Regular Fee−ROC Fee+Retail Fee
As before, we include only monetary value objects. After cancellation of Retail Fee and
Regular Fee components, the condition for the effectiveness of the buy-out fee and buy-out
premium becomes the following:
ROC Fee < BuyOutPremium+BuyOutFee.
This condition states that the price of the ROC per MWh must always be lower than the sum of
buy-out fees charged and buy-out premiums paid per MWh. Only if this condition holds, will
suppliers prefer ROCs to the penalty. Since the price of ROCs is defined by the market, Ofgem
has to adjust the buy-out premium and the buy-out fee according to the price of ROCs.
12.4.3 ROC Fee as a penalty
The underlying idea of the ROCs scheme is to stimulate the production of green electricity to
comply with the Kyoto protocol. Only if sufficient green electricity is generated will the UK
government, represented by Ofgem, be willing to increase renewable electricity production. The
increase of renewable production can be achieved only if sufficient MWh of renewable gener-
ation can be supplied. The ROC scheme has mechanisms to motivate building of renewable
generation facilities. Let us examine this more closely.
If we assume that the ultimate goal of the UK government, represented by Ofgem, is to increase
renewable generation (at least until the level of green energy output prescribed by Kyoto is
achieved), then it is fair to state that Ofgem wants to stimulate the suppliers to buy green elec-
tricity, as in path c, and not to buy regular electricity (with ROCs), as in path d. In our terms,
Ofgem considers that the path c as ideal and the path d as sub-ideal. In this respect, ROC Fee
– the price of ROCs – plays the role of a penalty, which the supplier has to pay for not buying
green electricity. According to the penalty size condition in section 9.1, to stimulate the sup-
pliers to buy green electricity, the value accumulated when buying green electricity (the path c)
must be higher compared to the value accumulated when buying ROCs and regular electricity
(the path d). Thus, the following condition must hold for Figure 12.8:
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Green Fee < ROC Fee+Regular Fee.
If the ROC Fee increases, the suppliers will prefer to buy electricity from renewable producers
(the path c), and not to buy ROCs from other suppliers (the path d). Because of the scarcity
of renewable production facilities in the UK, only a certain number of suppliers will be able to
comply with their required 10% of green supply by buying electricity from renewable producers
in path c. As soon as path c is exhausted, the suppliers will need to either buy ROCs on the
ROC market (path d) or pay the buy-out fee (path b). If the condition of the previous section
ROC Fee < BuyOutPremium + BuyOutFee holds, suppliers will prefer to buy ROCs
rather than to pay the buy-out fee. As a result, the demand for ROCs will grow, thereby pushing
up their price ROC Fee. In such a situation, the only way to reduce the ROC Fee and to avoid
paying the buy-out fee is to build more renewable generation facilities and increase the supply
of green electricity in path c. This is what the UK government hopes the effect of the RO
regulation will be.
12.5 Discussion
We have demonstrated how the combination of the Penalty and Incentive contractual patterns
and the Execution Monitoring procedural pattern can explain controls in the ROC scheme. The
models in Figure 12.8 and Figure 12.7 represent a part of the actual scenarios of ROCs ex-
change. The correspondence with reality was ensured by comparing the results of the patterns
with our knowledge about the ROC scheme obtained from documentary sources and the Bus-
Mod project (see Research Context section).
The pattern also allows us to reason about the size of the penalties and incentives which have
been introduced. As was demonstrated, an ROC plays the role of the penalty in stimulating the
building of new renewable generation sources.
As reported in Ofgem’s in their Annual Report of 2004-20055, the ROC scheme has had an
effect. There has been a growth in the amount of electricity supplied from renewable sources.
The report shows that in 2004-2005 (the third year of the scheme) more than 10.8 million ROCs
were issued compared with 7.5 million in 2003-2004 and 5.5 million in 2002-2003. There were
also a total of 788 generating stations participating in the scheme at the end of 2005 up from
505 at the end of the first year.
12.6 Lessons Learned
In the lessons learned we reflect on our expectations about value modelling for controls and
compare them to the results of this case study.
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Lesson 1. Controls as commercial services with added value. This case study does not
contain such a variety of control services as the health care case study in Chapter 5. There is
only one control service: The renewable producer executes a witnessing of the supply on behalf
of Ofgem.
What is remarkable with regards to value models, is that the principle of reciprocity of e3value
forces us to think about what should be exchanged in return for such a service. In this case, we
assume that the service is not a commercial service: Ofgem does not pay the producer for it.
Empowered by the status of a government agency, Ofgem obliges the producer to submit this
information. In value models, this service could be modelled by a value transaction, where one
value object indicates the service delivered by the producer to Ofgem and the reciprocal value
object Compliance indicates that the producer complies with the regulation.
From the process perspective, the control service has been shaped as a result of delegation of
the witnessing control activity by a primary actor to a trusted actor. So, at a process level, the
controls service corresponds to a delegated activity.
Although the described service is not commercial, the existence of such a service as such
demonstrates that the control can be seen as commercial services. This justifies the use of
the value modelling in the design of controls, as suggested in this thesis.
Lesson 2. Value aspects of control instruments. In this case study, we have an extensive
variety of control instruments: penalties, incentives and evidence documents.
As far as penalties are concerned, we have encountered the buy-out fee that represents a penalty
paid by the supplier for not complying with the renewable obligation. As for incentives, the
buy-out premium payment has been described, which is a reward to the suppliers who complied
with the renewable obligation. Remarkable in this case is that the premiums were paid from the
collected buy-out penalties.
The core evidence document in the case study is the Renewable Obligation certificate or ROC,
which was introduced to keep track of renewable energy supplied by each supplier. The evi-
dence document ROC has been modelled as a value object for the following reasons: (1) the
ROC can be traded and (2) the ROC is of value to Ofgem, who needs trustworthy evidence of
green supply.
The ROC is even more interesting, because it is a value object that has a price and this price
plays the role of another penalty. The price of the ROC is a kind of a dynamic penalty that
has a goal to stimulate the suppliers either to buy green electricity or to build new renewable
generation facilities, if there is not sufficient green production to cover everyone’s need.
Lesson 3. The value viewpoint is an abstract rationale for procedural aspects of controls.
This case study demonstrates that modelling controls with value models is possible. The con-
cepts of e3control , such as sub-ideal value object, sub-ideal transfer and sub-ideal path, are
extensive enough to represent the discovered control problems. Namely, by using the OR- and
AND-forks, it is possible to model various kinds of ideal and sub-ideal choices the supplier
can make. Every control problem identified in this case could be represented by these choices
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and corresponding sub-ideal value objects. For each value object we could identify a set of
operational activities and objects in the process model.
The value perspective proves to be useful, since it is impossible to describe the ROC scheme
by taking the process perspective only. The scheme requires the implementation of both value-
related elements (the penalties Buy-Out Fee and ROC Fee, and the incentive Buy-Out Premium)
as well as process-related elements (Verification andWitnessing activities and the evidence doc-
ument ROC). Without analysing ROCs at value level it would be unclear, other than providing
evidence, what the rationale behind the ROCs is.
Lesson 4. Patterns. The controls of the study could be described using the Penalty, Incentive
and Execution Monitoring patterns. In addition, both delegation patterns have been used.
In general, we have not found anything of a serious nature that could not be expressed by the
patterns. Only at one point in section 12.3.4 did we have to add an activity Report ROCs, which
is not described by the applied pattern. This was necessary in order to obtain a correct UML
model and to avoid modelling a transfer of an object from an AND-joint and an activity directly.
We have also managed to create models which comply with the e3value ontology is the sense
that they do not contain loops in the dependency paths. Neither do the ideal value models
contain one-way value transfers.
12.7 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented patterns in the case of Renewable Obligation (RO) regula-
tions in the UK. We have demonstrated how the combination of the contractual patterns Penalty
and Incentive and the procedural pattern Execution Monitoring can explain the market of Re-
newable Obligation Certificates (ROCs) and processes behind it. ROCs are tradable securities
representing evidence of generation of renewable electricity in Mega-Watt/hours.
We have also demonstrated the process of selection and application of the patterns, as described
in Chapter 11. The models resulting from the application of the patterns closely match a real
situation with the RO regulation, which demonstrates that the patterns are usable for designing
solutions to real-life control problems.
Chapter 13
Beer export
In this chapter we proceed our evaluation of the relevance, consistency, and effectiveness of
our library of control patterns. We introduce a case study, which concerns the redesign of Pan-
European customs procedures for collecting excise duties. The focus will be on the export of
excised goods from the Netherlands to other countries within the EU, in particular, the UK and
Poland.
13.1 Research Context
This case study is part of an integrated project called ITAIDE (Nr.027829), which is funded by
the 6th Framework IST Programme of the European Commission (see www.itaide.org). The
ITAIDE project was motivated by a challenge that European governments are facing at the mo-
ment; that of solving the dilemma of increasing the security and control of international trade,
while at the same time reducing the administrative overhead carried by commercial and public
administration organizations. Part of the ITAIDE project is the Beer Living Lab (BeerLL) )
which was set up to redesign EU customs procedures. It focuses on procedures for shipments
of beer from the Netherlands to destinations outside the EU (export) and within the EU (intra-
community supplies). Collaboration between one of the worlds largest beer producers 1, the
Dutch Tax and Customs Administration, two very large technology providers and various uni-
versities aims to demonstrate that trade facilitation, reduced administrative burden for supply
chain partners and improved control and security are not necessarily contradictory efforts and
can actually coexist.
The scope of this case study differs from that of the BeerLL in the sense that we consider prob-
lems associated with untrustworthy beer producers. The BeerLL considers the beer producers
to be reliable and trusted parties. The contribution of this case study to the BeerLL is an analysis
of the case using control patterns.
The specificity of such a research context is that part of the data collection was accomplished
through participation in joint workshops with domain experts, such as customs officers and
managers of a beer producing company, who were BeerLL members. The goal of the joint
1The beer company is anonymous, but information is available upon request with the author.
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workshops was to come up with a redesign of current customs procedures. This means that
the whole research setting has elements of action research, since not only could the researchers
observe the decisions made by the domain experts, but they could also contribute to the dis-
cussions and decision making. Moreover, the ideas generated in the workshops as well as the
results presented in this case study were implemented in the real-life demonstrator, which con-
sisted of about ten containers shipping goods to various countries within and outside of the
EU.
In addition to the redesign workshops, data was collected by conducting multiple interviews
with the domain experts of the participating companies as well as with external domain experts.
Data collection was carried out by the university researchers of the ITAIDE project, including
B. Rukanova, Z. Baida, J. Liu, Y.-H. Tan [Baida et al., 2007]. In addition to data collected
by others for the ITAIDE project, the author also collected own data for the case study. The
author did this by participating in five project meetings and sessions of the ITAIDE project
and conducted one extensive interview with two representatives of Customs NL. The interview
specifically focused on control problems in export procedures.
The e3control and process models of the case study were many times presented in Power Point
slides during redesign workshops and discussed extensively by the domain experts. Further-
more, the models of the redesigned procedures were verified in a workshop with the domain
experts. The domain experts confirmed the correctness of the models.
13.2 Excise collection within the EU
We now go on to describe the current excise collection procedure. More details can be found in
[Baida et al., 2007] and [Rukanova et al., 2006].
When excise goods like beer and cigarettes are sold, the seller must pay a special tax called
excise. Within the EU, the general principle is that excise is only paid in the country in which
the excise good is consumed. Currently, excise tariffs differ among different EU countries.
Hence, if a beer producer in the Netherlands (BeerCo NL) exports beer to a retailer in the UK
and the beer is consequently sold to UK consumers, then the excise duty has to be paid in the
UK. In this case, the BeerCo NL does not pay excise in the Netherlands.
Since there are officially no borders between the EU member states, sellers are not obliged to
report exported goods to the customs of the country of export. So, BeerCO NL is not obliged to
report to Dutch Tax and Customs Administration (Customs NL). The customs agencies cannot
therefore physically follow the goods exported from the country of their jurisdiction for exports
within the EU.
Clearly, the excise free export is only acceptable for Customs NL, if there is trustworthy evi-
dence that BeerCo NL shipped the goods abroad. Since there are no border controls, the customs
have to rely on other evidence. Currently, the core evidence of export in the EU is the paper
Administrative Accompanying Document (AAD). The AAD contains information about goods
in the associated container or truck. According to the law, BeerCo NL should receive excise
exemption upon presenting the AAD stamped by Customs UK. By stamping the AAD, Cus-
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toms UK testify that the goods stated in the AAD have arrived to the UK. The second purpose
of the AAD is as a means to identify the cargo in case of a physical cargo inspection en route.
Verification of every imported container or truck is very labor-intensive for Customs UK. There-
fore, customs delegates the actual verification of the goods to a special retailer with the status
of Excise Warehouse (EW). To receive the status of EW, the internal controls of a retailer have
to be approved by audits carried out by Customs UK. If the auditing process by Customs UK
is satisfactory, the retailer is granted the EW license, and he is allowed him to operate with
excise-free exports. Excise-free export is only permitted if done through a EW retailer.
The procedure of stamping an AAD is as follows. The AAD accompanies the beer from the
Netherlands to the UK and is stamped by the Retailer UK (with EW status) as proof that the
goods have arrived in the UK. Further Customs UK also stamps the AAD. The UK customs
agency sends the stamped AAD back to the UK retailer who will forward it to BeerCo NL.
In the Netherlands, Customs NL periodically checks BeerCo NL’s excise declarations. The ex-
cise exemption is given by default for all the beer that BeerCo NL declares as being sold outside
the Netherlands. The fact of export is verified afterwards by comparing excise declarations with
AADs. As transferring paper-based AADs can take weeks or months, the actual verification is
done several months later. In practice, verification is often not done at all because it is labour
intensive. In fact, the BeerCo NL only submits AADs upon the request of the Customs NL.
The controls based on the paper AAD lead to an administrative burden and possible excise
errors or even fraud, as was indicated by the domain experts. For example, the AAD is a paper
document that can be lost, and this happens frequently according to the domain experts. In
addition, the AAD can be tampered with. According to the EU Commission [Brussels, 2006],
excise fraud for alcohol in the EU amounts to 1.5 billion yearly, approximately 8% of the
total excise duties receipts on alcoholic beverages. The EU, therefore, intends to introduce e-
Customs for excise goods, which means that paper-based control procedures, such as the AAD
procedure, will be replaced by electronic ones.
13.3 Case study structure
The goal of this case study is two-fold. Firstly, we analyze the control problems that underlie the
AAD procedure and what controls constitute the procedure. We are also interested in why the
AAD procedure does not provide sufficient controls. To answer the last question we compared
the AAD procedure with the solution suggested by the e3control patterns and identified the
control weaknesses of the AAD procedure compared to the patterns.
The second goal of the case study is to suggest a scenario on how the AAD procedure can be
improved using innovative information technology. In this case, the e3control patterns are used
to verify whether the new solution using the information technology will provide better controls
compared to the AAD procedure.
We have identified two common illegitimate manners of avoiding excise payments in the Nether-
lands2. The first is when the beer producer in the Netherlands BeerCo NL overstates the ex-
2Even more control problems exist in the customs procedures, but in the case study we focus only on these two
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ported goods and understates the goods sold in the Netherlands. To carry this out, the AAD
must be forged. According to domain experts, BeerCo NL is able to forge an AAD and over-
state the amount of exported beer using the existing paper-based procedure. We consider this
problem in the Tampered AAD scenario.
The second way of avoiding excise payments is referred to by domain experts as ‘virtual beer’.
The term ‘virtual’ refers to the export of beer that does not take place physically, but only ‘on
paper’. In this case, the administration of importers states that beer is shipped and sold outside
the Netherlands, while in reality it is sold in the Netherlands on the ‘black’ market. In this way,
excises are paid in the country of ‘virtual’ export, which has lower excise tariffs. This scenario
is even more attractive to fraudsters when they avoid excises in the country of ‘virtual’ export.
Avoiding these excises might be easier when the ‘virtual’ export is done to a country with high
corruption.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. In section 13.4 we describe the first e3control
cycle, in which we consider the Tampered AAD scenario, which describes the current AAD pro-
cedure. After analyzing the problem, we suggest a solution, resulting in the value and process
control models, which are the basis of the patterns. By comparing the current AAD procedure
with these models, the weaknesses in the AAD procedure are pin-pointed in more detail.
Furthermore, in section 13.5, we analyze to what extent the current initiatives to replace the
AAD procedure would really improve the situation. In section 13.6 we describe the second
e3control cycle, in which we consider the Virtual Beer scenario. In this section, we extend the
control solution models created in the first cycle to solve the ‘virtual’ beer problem. Amongst
other things, this solution explains why EW licensing is needed. Finally in section 13.7 we
suggest a new improved procedure that can be implemented using new TREC technology.
13.4 Tampered AAD scenario
In this section we consider the control problem when BeerCo NL avoids excise payments in
the Netherlands by faking the AAD so that it overstates the exported goods and understates
the goods sold in the Netherlands. We suggest improvements in the AAD procedure to combat
this risk. We start the analysis by modelling the AAD procedure using ideal value and process
models. We proceed with modelling the control problems in the AAD procedure with the sub-
ideal value and process models. Finally, we suggest a solution using patterns. As we shall see,
the AAD procedure already contains some elements of the Penalty pattern.
13.4.1 Step 1: Design ideal situation
Firstly, we model an ideal situation for the AAD procedure. We assume that no party commits
fraud by tampering with AADs and that there are no missing AADs.
To summarize, the following actors are involved in this study: (1) BeerCo NL, a large Dutch
beer producer; (2) BeerCo UK, the UK branch of BeerCo NL, functions as an intermediary
problems.
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between BeerCo NL and retailers in the UK; (3) Customs NL, the Dutch customs; (4) Cus-
toms UK: the British customs; (5) Retailer UK with EW, an EW retailer of beer in the UK;
(6) Consumer UK, an actor who combines two roles, representing supermarkets in the UK that
buy Dutch beer from Retailer UK and final consumers of the beer in the supermarkets; (7)
Retailer NL, a wholesale warehouse of beer in the Netherlands; (8) Consumer NL, an actor
representing end consumers and supermarkets in the Netherlands.
Value view. The ideal value model in Figure 13.1 shows the BeerCo NL who either sells beer
within the Netherlands or exports it to the UK. Since the beer is sold in the two countries -
the UK and the Netherlands- the dependency path has two consumer needs: one need of the
Consumer NL and the other need of the Consumer UK.
BLL_cyc1step1, 2008-04-12 23:35:18, http://www.e3value.com/
BEER CO NL BEER CO UK
RETAILER UK
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CUSTOMS UK
CUSTOMS NL
RETAILER NL
Beer Beer fee + Excise NL
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exemption AAD
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Beer Fee + 
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Figure 13.1: Ideal value model of the beer sales
Consumer NL buys beer from Retailer NL. In return, Consumer NL pays a fee, which includes
excises according to the Dutch excise tariff. This is modelled with the value object Beer, flowing
to Consumers NL from Retailer NL, and the value object Beer Fee + Excise NL, flowing in
return. BeerCo NL, who sells beer to Retailer NL, transfers Excise NL to Customs NL and in
return receives the value object Compliance, which indicates that by paying excises BeerCo NL
complies with the excise law.
Similarly, Consumer UK buys beer fromRetailer UK. In return, Consumer UK pays aBeer Fee
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and excises for the beer according to the UK excise tariff, Excise UK. Retailer UK buys beer
from BeerCo UK, who in its turn buys it from BeerCo NL.
Excise UK is paid to Customs UK by Retailer UK. BeerCo UK and BeerCo NL trade beer
without excises. Therefore, in the Netherlands, BeerCo NL gets Excise Exemption by presenting
the AAD.
Additional actors are Carrier NL who ships beer to the Netherlands and Carrier UK who ships
beer to the UK. We omit the carriers in the value models for the sake of simplicity of visualiza-
tion. We assume that the carriers work on behalf of BeerCo NL.
Process view. Figure 13.2 shows a process model that corresponds to the ideal value model.
In this model, we only focus on export to the UK.
This process was built based on a model in [Rukanova et al., 2006], p.17, built within the
ITAIDE project; the model was also approved by ITAIDE domain experts. In this case, not
all the process details are shown, but only those which reflect elements important in the excise
declaration process.
The process starts with Retailer UK ordering beer from BeerCo UK. BeerCo UK orders beer
from BeerCo NL. BeerCo NL ships beer to Retailer UK with EW status. According to the reg-
ulation, BeerCo NL is eligible for excise exemption in the Netherlands when the goods are ex-
ported out of the country. This happens when the carrier crosses the border of the Netherlands.
So, we model BeerCo NL who performs a Ship Beer activity and the Carrier who performs a
Cross Border activity on behalf of BeerCo NL. Retailer UK performs a Receive Beer activity.
After receiving the beer, Retailer UK stamps the AAD document and transfers it to Cus-
toms UK. Customs UK also stamps the AAD and transfers it back to Retailer UK. Retailer UK
forwards the AAD to the Carrier. Finally, the Carrier delivers the document to BeerCo NL.
Parallel to this, and after the beer is shipped, BeerCo NL claims excise exemption by provid-
ing an Excise Declaration to Customs NL. The Excise Declaration contains information about
exported goods and goods sold inside the Netherlands.
Although in practice excise exemption is granted to BeerCo NL based on the Excise Declara-
tion, the declaration has no legal power to be a reason for excise exemption. Only the AAD
has this legal power, which means that BeerCo NL has always has to back up the requested
excise exemptions with AADs. In reality the AAD is not checked 100% (e.g. because it is
labor-intensive). We therefore model that BeerCo NL presents the AAD to Customs NL only
if Customs NL asks for it (see the choice [check] and [do not check] at Customs NL). If ver-
ification of the AAD shows that the export is eligible for exemption, Customs NL grants the
excise exemption to BeerCo NL , see activity Grant Excise Exemption. If the AAD check is
not carried out, excise exemption is granted without the AAD, and is based solely on the Excise
Declaration.
If the check is done, the primary actor Customs NL executes the verification activity Verify
Export, by which the information in the AAD is reconciled against the Excise Law. The excise
law described what valid export evidence actually is. For example, an AAD that has not been
stamped by Customs UK is not valid export evidence.
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13.4.2 Step 2: Design sub-ideal situation
The control problem in the Tampered AAD scenario is that BeerCo NL can overstate the amount
of exported beer and claim excise exemption for beer that is actually sold within the Nether-
lands.
Value view. Figure 13.3 shows the sub-ideal value model. If the beer is exported to the UK,
BeerCo NL has a choice of submitting a correct AAD or of overstating the scale of export by
forging the AAD. This choice is modelled with the OR-1 fork. The forging activity results in
a sub-ideal value transfer Fake AAD. In both cases, Excise Exemption is granted. However,
if a Fake AAD is presented, then this excise exemption is sub-ideal, since it is granted for the
export that did not occur. The exchange of Fake AAD is marked with the liability token L1 at
BeerCo NL.
In this model we assume that BeerCo NL overstates the exported beer amount, but does not
overstate the total beer sales. This is realistic, since to overstate total sales, BeerCo NL would
have to make other administrative manipulations. In addition, the higher reported sales will
result in higher income taxes, which makes the attractiveness of the whole excise fraud ques-
tionable for BeerCo NL. Therefore, when overstating export, BeerCo NL will always understate
sales in the Netherlands3.
This is modelled with the OR-forks and AND-join. If the BeerCo NL overstates the amount of
exported beer at the OR-1 fork, then he understates the amount non-exported beer at the OR-2
fork. Both forks lead to the sub-ideal exchange through the AND-join.
Process view. Figure 13.4 represents the sub-ideal process model that corresponds to the sub-
ideal value model in Figure 13.3. In the process model, we show only the sales of beer to the
UK and assume that BeerCo NL overstates these sales. The beer that is declared for excise
exemption is illegally sold in the Netherlands to Retailer NL, not in the UK to the Retailer UK.
As a result, BeerCo NL’s carrier does not execute the Cross Border activity. Furthermore,
BeerCo NL overstates the excises by faking the AAD, see activity Present Fake AAD. Finally,
the excise declaration is also incorrect, since it has to correspond with the AAD. The activity
Grant Legal Compliance, executed upon the fake AAD is also sub-ideal.
13.4.3 Step 3: Select a control pattern
To solve the control problem, we should introduce an extra control mechanism. In this step we
select a pattern, which is appropriate to describe the control problem of the Tampered AAD
scenario.
3For example, if twenty-five thousand bottles of beer were exported to the UK, seventy-five thousand bottles
were sold in the Netherlands, but the fake AAD states that fifty thousand bottles were exported, then the excise
declaration would state that fifty thousand bottles were exported and fifty (not seventy-five!) thousand bottles were
sold in the Netherlands
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BLL_cyc1step2, 2008-04-12 23:37:20, http://www.e3value.com/
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Figure 13.3: Tampered AAD: a sub-ideal value model
Identify primary actor, counter actor, primary object and counter object, ideal and sub-
ideal primary and counter activities
To find a pattern for a problem, we first need to identify a primary actor, counter actor, primary
value object and counter value object. Then we identify primary and counter activities. For
ideal activities, we use the ideal process model in Figure 13.2. For ideal activities, we use the
sub-ideal process model in Figure 13.4.
Primary Actor. The primary actor in this case is Customs NL. This is the party that represents
the government interested in bona fide excise payments. The control of the excise pro-
cess is the primary responsibility of the customs agencies. Since the problem concerns
avoiding the payment of excises in the Netherlands, Customs NL, and not Customs UK,
is the party responsible for the control.
Counter Actor. The counter actor is BeerCo NL, who is considered to behave sub-ideally and
has the liability token L1 in the sub-ideal value model in Figure 13.3. BeerCo NL plays
the role of agent in the principal-agent relationship with Customs NL: he has more infor-
mation about his actual beer sales and can hide the information from Customs NL.
Sub-ideal Counter Value Object. The result of the sub-ideal behavior of BeerCo NL is the
sub-ideal value object Fake AAD in the sub-ideal path marked with L1. Fake AAD is a
sub-ideal counter value object.
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Ideal Counter Value Object. In this ideal path of the export to the UK, the value object Fake
AAD is replaced by the value object AAD. Thus, AAD is the ideal counter value object.
Sub-ideal Primary Value Object. In Figure 13.3, the sub-ideal value object Illegitimate Ex-
cise Exemption transferred by the primary actor Customs NL in return for Fake AAD is
the sub-ideal primary value object.
Ideal Primary Value Object. The ideal primary value object is Excise Exemption, exchanged
between BeerCo NL and Customs NL in return for the ideal counter value object AAD.
Primary Activities. Primary activities are (1) executed by the primary actor Customs NL or
his trusted party and (2) result in the value transfer of the primary value object Excise
Exemption. This makes the activity Grant Excise Exemption in Figure 13.2 to be the
primary activity.
Sub-ideal Primary Activities. The activityGrant Illegitimate Excise Exemption in Figure 13.4
is the sub-ideal primary activity.
Counter Activities. Counter activities are (1) executed by the counter actor BeerCo NL or his
trusted party and (2) result in the value transfer of the counter value object AAD. As can be
seen from the ideal process model, in order to transfer AAD, BeerCo NLmust first exports
the goods, and then, present the AAD. The activities Cross Border and Present AAD
are therefore counter activities. Cross Border is not the obvious match with the counter
value object AAD. However, this is also a counter activity, since in the ideal situation
presenting the AAD always occurs when crossing the border occurs. Although the Cross
Border activity is executed by the Carrier, not crossing the border is a responsibility of
BeerCo NL, since we assume that the Carrier is a sub-contractor of BeerCo NL.
Sub-ideal Counter Activities. There are several operational activities that correspond to the
transfer of the sub-ideal counter value object Fake AAD (see Figure13.4). Firstly, the
value transfer Fake AAD corresponds to the activity Present Fake AAD. Secondly, every
time the fake AAD is issued, the beer does not cross the border. That is why the Cross
Border activity does not take place. So, Present Fake AAD and Do Not Cross Border are
sub-ideal counter activities (see Figure13.4).
As a result, we identify two sub-ideal activities: Do Not Cross Border and Present Fake AAD.
In the sub-ideal process model they are marked with dashed lines.
To select a pattern, we identify the type of sub-ideal activities Do Not Cross Border and Present
Fake AAD. In Chapter 7, we distinguish the following types of sub-ideal activities: Sub-ideal
Counter, Emerging Sub-ideal, Deny Commitment and Deny Execution (see Chapter 11 for more
details). Both Do Not Cross Border and Present Fake AAD activities are of the type Sub-ideal
Counter. Do Not Cross Border corresponds to the ideal counter activity Cross Border. Present
Fake AAD corresponds to the ideal counter activity Present AAD.
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Step 3.2. Match the sub-ideal activity to a pattern
As was explained in Chapter 11, a Sub-ideal Counter corresponds to the Partner Screening,
Execution Monitoring, Penalty, and Incentive patterns. We can apply each of these patterns to
both counter activities Present AAD and Cross Border.
However, we stop the pattern selection process at this stage, since our goal is not to design a
new control but to see if the AAD procedure can be improved. Therefore, we examine whether
the AAD procedure corresponds to any of the suggested patterns. In fact, the AAD procedure
is nothing more than an ex-post verification of the Cross Border activity. As we can see from
Figure 13.2, the AAD procedure contains elements of the Execution Monitoring pattern. These
elements include:
Verify activity. The primary actor Customs NL executes the verification activity Verify Export
and grants excise exemption based on verification of the AAD with the excise legislation.
For example, if the legislation states that excise exemption is only granted for exports to
the EU countries, then an AAD coming from the US will not result in excise exemption.
To-be-verified and Supporting Statements. In the Verify Export activity, the AAD represents
the To-be-verified Statement and the Excise Law represents the Supporting Statement.
Witness activity. The activity Witness Export which is the witnessing of the Cross Border ac-
tivity is executed in the AAD procedure by Retailer UK with EW status. Retailer UK sees
the delivered beer and testifies to it by stamping the AAD.
Testifying Chain. According to the Execution Monitoring pattern, the Cross Border activity
should be witnessed by the primary actor Customs NL. However, the Dutch customs au-
thority is not able to witness when the beer containers or trucks leave the country. Since
there are officially no borders between the EU member states, exporters are not obliged
to report exports to customs. Therefore, the customs agencies cannot physically follow
goods exported from the country of their jurisdiction within the EU. Thus, Customs NL
does the verification of export based on the AAD, which was stamped by Customs UK.
In our terms, Customs NL delegates the Witness Export activity to Customs UK. Fur-
thermore, as explained earlier, the actual witnessing is not done by Customs UK, but by
Retailer UK with EW. Customs UK only stamps the AAD, already stamped previously by
Retailer UKwith EW. In our terms, we say that Customs UK also delegates the witnessing
activity to Retailer UK.
This AAD procedure can therefore be described as a combination of the Execution Mon-
itoring pattern with the Testifying Chain delegation pattern, described in section 10.3.
According to the Testifying Chain pattern, Customs UK plays the role of the Primary
Actor, to whom Customs NL delegates the control activity Witness Export. Retailer NL
plays the role of the Trusted Actor of Customs UK. The Stamp AAD activities are Testify
activities of the Testifying Chain pattern, and the AADs that come out of the Stamp AAD
activities, are the Testifying Statements of the Testifying Chain pattern. For more details
on the Testifying Chain pattern see section 10.3.
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The design of an improved AAD procedure can be seen as a task for ensuring that the existing
model complies with the Execution Monitoring pattern and the delegation pattern Testifying
Chain. Some elements of the patterns are already in place in the AAD procedure. However, we
must ensure that they are applied correctly, according to the patterns’ control principles.
In addition, we would like to punish BeerCo NL for faking the AAD. This can be done by
applying the Penalty pattern. The Penalty pattern, which is a variation of the pattern Execution
Monitoring, can therefore reuse the existing elements of the AAD procedure.
13.4.4 Step 4: Apply the Penalty pattern
In this section we check whether the current AAD procedure complies with the selected Penalty
control pattern and, if not, we correct the discrepancies. As a result, we suggest an improved
procedure for excise exemption. In Table 13.1 we list all the control principles of the Penalty
pattern. The principles have already been adjusted for delegation. In the last column of the
table, we note whether the principle has been observed or not in the AAD procedure in Figure
13.2. In square brackets we indicate how the elements of the principles are instantiated in the
case. The original control principles can be found in Appendix A.
Table 13.1: Verification of compliance of the AAD proce-
dure in Figure 13.2 with the Penalty pattern
ID. Control principles Y/N
Activities-Activities principles
V-Ia Witness [Witness Export] activity must exist Y/N
V-II Verify [Verify Export] activity must exist Y/N
V-IIIa Witness [Witness Export] activity must be executed at the
same time as Counter [Cross Border] activity
N
V-IVa Verify [Verify Export] activity must follow Witness activity Y
PE-I Verify [Verify Export] activity must precede Primary activity
[Grant Legal Compliance] and [Pay Penalty] activity
N
Activities-Objects principles
V-V Supporting statement [Excise Law] must be directly trans-
ferred to Verify [Verify Export] activity from a source that
generates it
Y
V-VIa To-be-verified statement [AAD] must be directly transferred
from Witness [Witness Export] activity to Verify [Verify Ex-
port] activity
N
Activities-Actors principles
V-VIIa An actor executing Witness activity [Retailer UK] must be
independent and socially detached from the actor executing
Counter activity [Carrier]
Y
V-VIII An actor executing Verify activity [Customs NL] must be
independent and socially detached from the actor executing
Counter activity [Carrier]
Y
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V-IX Supporting statement [Excise Law] must generated by an ac-
tor independent and socially detached from the actor execut-
ing Counter activity [Carrier]
Y
As Table 13.1 shows, not all the control principles of the Penalty pattern are obeyed. Firstly,
the activity Pay Penalty of the pattern is instantiated in the AAD procedure, as described in the
ideal value model4. This is indicated by the principle PE-I of Table 13.1.
Secondly, the AAD is not transferred directly to the primary actor Customs NL from Re-
tailer UK, the actor who does the witnessing. The AAD is transferred first to the Carrier, then to
BeerCo NL, and then to Customs NL. This violates the pattern, which requires the to-be-verified
document AAD to be transferred directly to Customs NL, as indicated by the principle V-VIa
of Table 13.1. Only if the AAD cannot be forged (which is not the case here), is an indirect
transfer acceptable. According to the domain experts, this diversion from the pattern indicates
a real and existing control problem.
Thirdly, because of a lack of resources, Customs NL does not perform a 100% check of the
AADs. As we have already explained, verification of each AAD is very labor intensive. Some
companies are not checked for this reason. This violates the pattern, which requires 100%
execution of the witness and verification activities. Therefore, we place Y/N in items VIa and
V-II to indicate that these principles are not always observed.
Finally, the witnessing of export is not done simultaneously with the Cross Border activity, as
prescribed by the pattern, but when the beer arrives at the premises of Retailer UK. As Figure
13.2 shows, the Witness Export activity occurs after the Cross Border and Receive Beer activi-
ties. The execution of theWitness Export activity after the Cross Border activity is only allowed
if the outcome of the latter activity remains unchanged (see description of the Witnessing prin-
ciple in section 2.1.1 for more details). This means that the contents of the container or beer
truck should not be changed by unauthorized persons, e.g. by the carrier. This is not the case
in this situation. In practice, the container can be unsealed and its contents can be changed. For
example, some part of the cargo can be removed and remain undeclared at the customs.
Another well-known problem is that other goods e.g. drugs, can be smuggled in beer containers.
In addition to the described control weakness, such a process creates a slowdown. Generally,
customs waits about three month for AAD and if it has not been received after that time they
can begin an investigation into fraud.
For all these reasons, the simultaneous execution of the Cross Border and Witness Export ac-
tivities is required by the pattern. This is not the case, as the principle V-IIIa in Table 13.1
indicates.
Control models of the Tampered AAD scenario
In this step we redesign the ideal value and process models so that they comply with the Penalty
pattern. The resulting models prescribe a control mechanism to combat the control problems
4The penalties exist in reality, but for illustrative purposes we do not model them explicitly in the ideal value
model in Figure 13.2
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of the Tampered AAD scenario exactly as suggested by the Penalty pattern. In addition, we
require simultaneous execution of Witness Export and Cross Border activities.
Process view
Figure 13.5 shows the result of correcting the process model in Figure 13.2 so that it satisfies the
Penalty pattern. Firstly, to remove verification slowdown, we require theWitness Export activity
to be executed at the same time as the Cross Border activity. In Figure 13.2, we only model the
parallel execution Cross Border andWitness Export with the transition UML element, since we
cannot represent the simultaneous execution with UML.
As was explained earlier, Customs NL cannot witness exports, since the borders in the EU are
open. Therefore, we should assign the Witness Export activity to an actor, who complies with
the requirements of the pattern. For the moment, we introduce a hypothetical actor trusted third
party (TTP). This actor should be independent and socially detached from BeerCo NL, and,
therefore, trusted by the Customs NL. In addition, this actor must also be trusted by BeerCo NL,
e.g. because BeerCo NL shares sensitive information with this party. Therefore, we call it
‘trusted third party’, and not just ‘trusted party’.
After witnessing export, the TTP sends Export Evidence to Customs NL. The Export Evidence
is a To-be-verified Statement which contains information about the beer exported by BeerCo NL
as witnessed by TTP. Finally, since the witnessing activity has been delegated to the TTP, the
Testify Export activity is also added after the Witness Export activity, according to the Simple
Delegation pattern.
Value view
The control value model is shown in Figure 13.6. We add the new actor TTP whose role is
to perform the witnessing of the Cross Border activity and testifying to it to Customs NL. At
the value level, we model this with a value object Testify Export, transferred from the TTP to
Customs NL. In return, Customs NL provides Service Value to the TTP. The object Service
Value can be a payment, if the service is provided by a commercial party.
In addition, in Figure 13.6 we model a value object Export Evidence and Sub-ideal Export Evi-
dence instead of AAD and Fake AAD. This creates a more general model, in which evidence can
be represented not only by AAD, but by any other statement that satisfies the pattern. Otherwise,
the value model is the same as in Figure 13.1.
In the presented control models, the TTP, Service Value, and Export Evidence should be treated
as variables. They can be substituted by real actors and documents. For example, in the AAD
scenario, the role of TTP is played by Customs UK and the role of Export Evidence is per-
formed by the AAD. Stamping the AAD corresponds to the Testify Export activity. In return,
Customs NL provides Customs UK with similar data needed to verify exports from the UK to
the Netherlands. This data provided in return represents the Service Value value object.
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Figure 13.6: A control value model for the Tampered AAD scenario
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13.5 EMCS scenario
In this section, we demonstrate another procedure that is currently being developed to replace
the AAD. We derive this procedure by instantiating the generalized elements in the presented
control models.
Currently, European governments and businesses are developing ICT-enabled solutions to cope
with the described deficiencies in international trade procedures. One such solution is the Ex-
cise Movement Control System (EMCS). This is a system in which every EU customs authority
records their data on excise goods entering the country. Using the EMCS system any EU cus-
toms department will be able to verify excise-free exports by consulting the EMCS system of
the other EU customs departments. Thus, instead of using the AAD, Customs NL receives an
electronic message from the EMCS system of Customs UK.
Process models
Figure 13.7 shows the models of export with the EMCS in place. Unlike in the process with the
AAD the parties work with electronic messages. After goods are received by Retailer UK, he
sends a message to Customs UK, thus testifying to receipt of the goods. After that Customs NL
can consult the EMCS system, and receive a record from it with, e.g. all the imports of beer to
the UK from the Netherlands during a certain period. So, the object Export Evidence from the
control model in Figure 13.5 is instantiated with an EMCS record.
As we can see, the EMCS system improves the process. Firstly, it eliminates the indirect transfer
of the export evidence, which is typical for AAD. The EMCS record is directly transferred from
the trusted third party Customs UK to the primary actor Customs NL. Secondly, because the
EMCS Records are transferred electronically, Customs NL are able to issue excise exemptions
based on the electronic records. The verification of the electronic EMCS record is less labor
intensive than the reconciliation of the paper AAD documents. As a result, all the principles
from Table 13.1 are obeyed.
Value models
The value model of the EMCS scenario is shown in Figures 13.8. As in the process model, the
role of the TTP is performed by Customs UK who deliver the EMCS service, which correspond
to the value object Testify Export. Since the witnessing of the beer export is first done by
Retailer UK, the Testify Export value object is transferred to Customs UK from Retailer UK.
This value transfer corresponds to the process activity Report Export of Retailer UK in Figure
13.7. In return, Customs UK obliges the retailer to provide the information about the exports
and to provide compliance with the obligation, see the value object (see Compliance). In this
way, Customs UK delegate execution of the Testify Export service to Retailer UK.
Although the EMCS system complies with the Penalty pattern, it is still not perfect. Consider
the following points:
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• The activity Witness Export by Retailer UK is performed after the Cross Border activity.
This is not reliable since the contents of the container can be changed before it arrives at
Retailer UK. In addition, it creates a slowdown in the process.
• The AAD cannot be eliminated even if the EMCS system is in place. The AAD is still
required for controls en route.
• The control relies on the EW licensing of retailers.
13.6 Virtual Beer scenario
In this section we demonstrate why EW licensing is needed and whether the patterns are able
to suggest the Excise Warehouse (EW) licensing mechanism. The role of this licensing will be
explained in the following section by means of the Partner Screening pattern. Therefore, we
further assume that Retailer UK has no EW license5.
One of the risks that occur, if the EW licensing is not in place, is the so-called ‘virtual beer’
fraud. The term ‘virtual’ refers to the fact that beer export does not take place physically,
but only ‘on paper’. In our case, we consider that the beer is ‘virtually’ shipped to Poland,
when actually it is sold in the Netherlands. The difference with the Tampered AAD scenario
considered in the first e3control cycle is that BeerCo NL is not the fraudster. The fraudsters are
the buyers in Poland and a retailer in the Netherlands.
The goal of the scheme is to avoid excise payments in a country with high excises, and pay
them in the country with low excises. In our example, the excises are paid in Poland, instead
of the Netherlands. In some cases, excise payments in both countries can be avoided, e.g. by
bribing the customs officers in Poland.
In some cases, a Retailer PL is formed by BeerCo PL and Retailer NL only for the sake of
avoiding the excise payments. Retailer PL is created only for one-two transactions and dis-
appears (goes bankrupt) as soon as the money has been laundered. Obviously, such a retailer
cannot be trusted to testify to exports, which demonstrates the weakness of the EMCS and AAD
procedures should the EW licensing of retailers not be required.
The ‘virtual beer’ scenario is possible in a situation in which BeerCo PL pays BeerCo NL at ex-
works delivery permissions, meaning that as soon as the goods leave the premises of BeerCo NL
on Dutch territory, possession is already in the Polish company. Unlike in the previous scenario,
the carrier now works on behalf of BeerCo PL.
There are multiple controls that can help to detect or prevent ‘virtual’ beer exports. We analyze
the problem and discover such controls, by using the patterns. As already stated, we deliberately
assume that the Retailer in Poland has no status of Excise Warehouse.
5According to the legislation, if the retailer in the country of import has no EW license, the whole excise-free
procedure is prohibited. However, we make this assumption here for illustrative reasons to be able to demonstrate
why EW licensing is needed and how the patterns describe the EW licensing mechanism
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13.6.1 Step 1: Design ideal situation
As a starting point in our analysis we assume that the controls of the EMCS procedure are in
place. As in the EMCS procedure, the witnessing of the export is delegated to Customs NL,
who in its turn delegates it to Retailer UK. The ideal value model is shown in Figure 13.8. The
ideal process model is shown in Figure 13.7.
13.6.2 Step 2: Design sub-ideal situation
Value view
As in the ideal value model, the sub-ideal value model, shown in Figure 13.9 has two consumer
needs: one for sales in Poland and one for sales in the NL. The Virtual Beer scenario considers
sales of the beer in the Netherlands. Therefore, the sub-ideal path starts at Customer NL.
Retailer NL has two choices of selling the beer in the Netherlands, as indicated by the OR fork.
Firstly, he can sell it legally by paying the excises in the Netherlands. This corresponds to the
left path of the OR fork. In this case, Retailer NL buys beer from BeerCo NL.
Secondly, Retailer NL can buy beer illegally and sell it illegally. In such a way, Retailer NL
gets excise payments from the customers but does not transfer them to BeerCo NL. As a result,
Customs NL does not receive excise payments. This choice of Retailer NL corresponds to the
right path of the OR fork. In this case, Retailer NL buys beer from BeerCo PL. This transaction
corresponds to value transfers Smuggled Beer and Smuggled Beer Fee between BeerCo PL and
Retailer NL. The beer is shipped physically from BeerCo NL to the Carrier, who acts on behalf
of the BeerCo PL. BeerCo PL buys beer from BeerCo NL, as in the ideal scenario.
The transaction with the Smuggled Beer takes place physically, but it is no reported in the
administration of BeerCo PL or Retailer NL. In fact, BeerCo PL registers a transaction with a
retailer in Poland Retailer PL. To model this, we introduce the value objects Virtual Beer and
Virtual Beer Fee between BeerCo PL and Retailer PL. We call these objects ‘virtual’ since they
do not correspond to any physical shipments and sales of the beer in Poland.
The value transfers Virtual Beer, Virtual Beer Fee, Smuggled Beer and Smuggled Beer Fee are
sub-ideal and are marked with dashed lines. The parties Retailer PL, Retailer NL and BeerCo PL
are also given liability tokens.
BeerCo NL does not know that the beer they sell to the Polish company is sold in the Nether-
lands. Obviously, BeerCo NL expects to have the Export Evidence (e.g. EMCS record or AAD)
stamped by Polish customs. To ensure this, Retailer PL testifies to Customs PL about the de-
livery of the ‘virtual’ beer from the Netherlands. As a result, Customs PL issues the Export
Evidence for ‘virtual’ beer, called Virtual Export Evidence. As in the ideal model, BeerCo NL
delivers the Virtual Export Evidence to Customs NL and receives Excise Exemption in return.
Although the value object Virtual Export Evidence, exchanged by BeerCo NL, is sub-ideal,
BeerCo NL does not get the liability token. This is because BeerCo NL does not behave sub-
ideally. The liability tokens are only assigned to the colluding parties BeerCo PL, Retailer NL
and Retailer PL, since they are responsible for the whole scheme.
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The gain for the colluding parties in the sub-ideal scenario is the avoided excises. The excises in
the Netherlands are always avoided, since these transactions are not recorded and are unknown
to the authorities. Polish excises for the ‘virtual’ beer are either paid or not. This choice is
modelled with the OR fork at Retailer PL. If excise in Poland is paid, Retailer PL and Cus-
toms PL exchange objects Excise PL and Compliance. Otherwise, they exchange No Excise PL
and Compliance. These value objects are also sub-ideal (even if the excise is paid), since they
do not correspond to actual sales within Poland.
The gain is shared by BeerCo PL, Retailer NL and Retailer PL and is modelled in Figure 13.9
with a value object %Unpaid Excise. The % sign represents that each actor receives some part
of the unpaid excises. If the parties choose to pay excises in Poland, the profit is the difference
between the excises in the Netherlands and Poland: %Unpaid Excise = %(ExciseNL −
ExcisePL). This scenario is only profitable if the excise tariff in Poland is lower than the tariff
in the Netherlands. If the parties choose to avoid paying excises in Poland, the revenue of the
parties is the unpaid excise in the Netherlands: %Unpaid Excise = %ExciseNL.
Process view
Figure 13.10 represents a sub-ideal process model of the Virtual Beer scenario. For simplicity
of visualization we assume that payment of excises in Poland is avoided.
In this process, the beer is ordered from BeerCo NL by Retailer PL via BeerCo PL. Physically
the beer is delivered by the Carrier PL to Retailer NL who then sells the beer and receives
money from the Dutch consumer. Then Retailer NL shares the profits with the BeerCo PL and
Retailer PL, from which BeerCo PL repays to Beer Co NL. Retailer PL also testifies about the
export to the Customs PL, as a result of which, BeerCo NL receives the export evidence and
gets the excise exemption.
The process differs from the ideal process model in Figure 13.7 in several aspects. Firstly, the
carrier does not cross the border (see activityDo Not Cross Border). Secondly, the physical beer
is not received by Retailer PL, but by Retailer NL (see activity Receive Beer at Retailer NL).
Consequently, Retailer NL sells the beer to Consumers NL, not to Consumers PL (see activ-
ity Sell Beer at Retailer NL). Retailer PL does not make a payment to BeerCo PL, as in the
ideal model. Instead, it fakes a record of payment in its administration (see activity Record Vir-
tual Transaction at Retailer PL). Furthermore, the payments are repaid between the colluding
parties. Retailer NL, who executes the ‘black’ sales and thus receives all the money from the
consumers, repays Beer Fee and shares the ‘black’ profit%Unpaid Excise with BeerCo PL (see
activities Pay Beer and Share Illegal Profit at Retailer NL). BeerCo PL also shares the illegal
profit with Retailer PL (see activity Share Illegal Profit at BeerCo PL). All these activities are
sub-ideal.
13.6.3 Step 3: Select a control pattern
To solve the control problem, we add a control mechanism. In this step we select patterns that
are appropriate to address the control problem of the ‘virtual beer’ scenario.
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Identify primary actor, counter actor, primary object and counter object, ideal and sub-
ideal primary and counter activities
To find a pattern for the problem at hand, we first need to identify a primary actor, counter actor,
primary value object and counter value object. The next step is to identify primary and counter
activities. For ideal activities, we use the ideal process model. For sub-ideal activities, we use
the sub-ideal process model.
Primary Actor. As in the Tampered AAD scenario, Customs NL is the primary actor.
Counter Actor. The Virtual Beer scenario has several counter actors: Retailer NL, Retailer PL
and BeerCo PL. They all behave sub-ideally and have the liability token L2.
Sub-ideal Counter Value Object. There are numerous counter value objects, including Vir-
tual Export Evidence, Virtual Beer, Virtual Beer Fee, Smuggled Beer, Smuggled Beer
Fee, %Unpaid Excise, and No Excises PL . All the sub-ideal counter value objects are
marked with the dashed lines in Figure 13.9. They are also listed in Table 13.2.
Ideal Counter Value Object. The ideal counter value object for the sub-ideal Virtual Export
Evidence is the object Export Evidence, the ideal value objects, which correspond to
the sub-ideal objects Virtual Beer, Virtual Beer Fee and others do not exist, since the
transaction does not happen in the ideal situation.
Sub-ideal Primary Value Object. The sub-ideal primary value object is the value object Ex-
cise Exemption, exchanged in return for the sub-ideal counter value object Virtual Export
Evidence.
In this case, there are multiple counter value objects, including Virtual Export Evidence,
Virtual Beer, Virtual Beer Fee, %Unpaid Excise, etc. However, since only one counter
value object Virtual Export Evidence is exchanged in a direct value transfer with the
primary actor Customs NL, we only consider this object in order to find the corresponding
sub-ideal primary object. This is an unusual situation, which occurs because none of the
counter actors has a direct value transaction with the primary actor Customs NL.
Ideal Primary Value Object. As in the Tampered AAD scenario, the ideal primary value ob-
ject is Excise Exemption, exchanged in return for the ideal counter value object Export
Evidence.
Primary Activities. As in the previous scenario, the Grant Excise Exemption is the primary
activity.
Sub-ideal Primary Activities. If Virtual Export Evidence is presented, the activities corre-
sponding to the granting of the excise exemption are sub-ideal. So, the activity Grant
Illegitimate Excise Exemption in Figure 13.4 is sub-ideal.
Sub-ideal Counter Activities. Because there are multiple sub-ideal value objects, there are
also multiple ideal and sub-ideal counter activities. The sub-ideal counter activities are
marked with the dashed lines in the sub-ideal process model in Figure 13.10. Table 13.2
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Table 13.2: Sub-ideal counter value objects and related sub-ideal counter activities in the ‘Vir-
tual Beer’ scenario
Sub-ideal
Counter
Value object
Coming
from
Activity Executed
by
Virtual Export
Evidence
BeerCo NL Do Not Cross Border Carrier
Testify Export Retailer PL
Smuggled
Beer Fee
Retailer NL Pay Retailer NL
Smuggled
Beer
Retailer PL Receive Beer Retailer NL
Virtual Beer
Fee
Retailer PL Record Virtual Transaction Retailer PL
Virtual Beer BeerCo PL Record Virtual Transaction Retailer PL
Do Not Cross Border Carrier
%Unpaid Ex-
cise
Retailer NL Share Illegal Revenues Retailer NL
%Unpaid Ex-
cise
BeerCo PL Share Illegal Revenues BeerCo PL
No Excise PL Retailer PL – –
shows more precisely which sub-ideal counter activities are related to the transfers of
sub-ideal counter value objects. The sub-ideal counter activities include Do Not Cross
Border, Share Illegal Revenues, Record Virtual Transaction, etc.
Identify type of the sub-ideal activity and patterns
To select a pattern, we must first identify the type of sub-ideal activities. In Chapter 7, we have
distinguished three types of sub-ideal activities: Sub-ideal Counter, Emerging Sub-ideal, Deny
Commitment and Deny Execution (see Chapter 11 for more details).
There are multiple sub-ideal activities. They are all of type Sub-ideal Counter or Emerging Sub-
ideal activity. For example, the sub-ideal Do Not Cross Border is the not executed ideal Cross
Border activity; so, this activity is of type Sub-ideal Counter. The sub-ideal Receive Beer is the
ideal Receive Beer activity executed by a wrong actor; thus, this activity is of type Sub-ideal
Counter. Record Virtual Transaction corresponds to the recording of a real transaction; this
activity does not correspond to any activity in the ideal value model and is thus an Emerging
Sub-ideal activity. Share Illegal Revenues is also an Emerging Sub-ideal activity.
The types Sub-ideal Counter and Emerging Sub-ideal signal the presence of the control prob-
lems described in the Partner Screening, Execution Monitoring, Penalty, and Incentive patterns
(see Chapter 11 for more details). Before selecting a pattern, we will first discuss the application
of each possible option.
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13.6.4 Step 4: Applying patterns
Penalty pattern
The Penalty pattern suggests decreasing the value the counter actors BeerCo PL, Retailer PL
and Retailer NL get from the sub-ideal path. To do this an additional outgoing value object
Fine could be introduced to decrease the value accumulated by them from getting the%Unpaid
Excise. However, ex-post fines are only effective if the fraud can be easily detected. This is
not the case with the virtual beer scenario. As we have explained earlier, when the authorities
discover the fraud and decide to collect the excise, the fraudulent parties have already left.
Another possibility is presented by the Incentive pattern, which suggests adding an incoming
value object to the counter actors, e.g. by rewarding them for paying correct excises.
Another opportunity, which can be modelled as the Penalty and Incentive patterns, is to make
the excise tariff in Poland and the Netherlands the same. If the tariffs are the same, there is
no point to such a fraud unless the excise in the country of ‘virtual’ export (here: Poland) is
avoided completely. It is current EU policy to make excise tariffs equal through-out the EU.
However, this solution does not eliminate the financial gain from fraud if excises are avoided in
both countries.
Execution Monitoring pattern
An Execution Monitoring pattern suggests detecting at least one of the multiple sub-ideal
counter activities. For example, detection of the activity Record Virtual Transaction of Re-
tailer PL means that Customs NL must check whether all transactions at Retailer PL have cor-
responding transactions with their customers. In this way they can discover records of the
virtual transactions. However, this procedure is time consuming and even unrealistic since the
retailer might have many customers.
Detection of the activity Receive Beer of Retailer NL considers catching the Retailer NLmoving
beer from a truck to his premises. However, in this case the parties can present a forged AAD,
which states that Retailer NL bought the beer.
Customs may try to catch the parties exchanging the ‘black’ money through controlling activ-
ities Share Illegal Revenues. For example, if they identify illegal money, they can the parties
owing the money.
The most efficient way is to apply the Execution Monitoring pattern to detect the Cross Border
activity, as in the Tampered AAD scenario. However, it remains difficult to find a party that
could provide trustworthy export evidence; unless the EW licensing is implemented.
Partner Screening pattern
The Excise Warehouse licensing of retailers can be described by means of the Partner Screen-
ing pattern which suggests ‘screening’ the sub-ideal actors (Retailer NL, BeerCo PL and Re-
tailer PL) before allowing them to operate with the excise-free procedure. Because the involve-
ment of Retailer NL in the virtual beer procedure is not recorded anywhere, it is only feasible
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to screen BeerCo PL or Retailer PL, with whom BeerCo NL has official transactions. The
screening of Retailer PL results in the EW licensing process. This model is shown in Figure
13.11.
The model shows that before issuing an EW license, Customs PL audits the internal processes
of Retailer PL. In accordance with the Partner Screening pattern, we have added a Witness
activity to Customs PL. The witnessing refers to the observation of certain Internal Controls of
the retailer. The witnessing produces the to-be-verified statement Internal Control Description,
which describes the processes as observed by Custom PL. After that, Customs PL performs the
verification activity Audit Internal Controls, by which the internal processes are compared with
the supporting statement of required quality standards for excise warehouses, modelled with the
object EW Controls Standards. If verification is positive and reveals that the internal processes
comply with the EW Controls Standards, Customs PL grants Retailer PL the status of Excise
Warehouse by executing the Certify EW activity and providing the EW License.
The audit is carried out by Customs PL, not Customs NL, which means that Customs NL del-
egates the verification activity Audit Internal Controls to their colleagues in Poland. Although
Customs NL are primarily interested in controlling Retailer PL, Customs NL have no legal
rights to oblige Retailer PL to comply with all rules. According to the pattern, Customs NL
should only execute the primary activity Grant Excise Exemption if the Certify EW activity is
executed.
In fact, excise-free export should not even start if Retailer PL is not EW-licensed. To model this,
we show that the whole process of excise-free export as one activity called Excise-Free Export.
In this model EW licensing is performed one time, while the export activities, including the
primary activity Grant Excise Exemption, are executed multiple times. This situation is specific
for this model and makes it different from the original Partner Screening pattern.
The corresponding value model of EW licensing is shown in Figure 13.12. At the value level,
the transfers EW License and EW Standards Compliance between Customs PL and Retailer PL
have been added. The object EW Standards Compliance refers to the compliance of internal
controls of Retailer PL with EW control standards. EW License shows that Retailer PL has the
Excise Warehouse license.
13.7 Future scenario with TREC
A combination of the AAD procedure with EW licensing still contains control weaknesses,
since the AAD is vulnerable to tampering. One option to improve the state of affairs is to
replace paper-based procedures by electronic ones. This is what the EU is currently doing by
introducing EMCS instead of the paper-based AAD. The combination of the EMCS systems
with the EW licensing procedures is not yet perfect. Firstly, the witnessing activity Witness
Export is performed by Retailer UK after the Cross Border activity. This is not reliable since
the contents of the container can be changed before it arrives at Retailer UK. Secondly, the
AAD cannot be eliminated and is still needed for controls en route.
Much greater benefits can be achieved if a radical rethinking takes place and the assumptions
underlying the procedures are questioned. The ITAIDE project has opted for this approach. Two
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technologies are used as corner stones in the BeerLL export procedure: the TREC smart seal for
container security and Electronic Product Code Information Services (EPCIS) databases. The
problems with the EMCS and the AAD can be solved by means of the BeerLL export procedure.
We will now describe how the BeerLL export procedure works based on the description in
[Baida et al., 2007]. After that we analyze this innovative trade procedure using the patterns.
13.7.1 Innovative Trade Procedure
The Tamper-Resistant Embedded Controller (TREC)6 is a container-mounted device which has
a mobile receiver tracking the containers precise location; sensors monitoring environmental
parameters in the container (e.g., temperature, humidity), sensors monitoring the physical state
of the container (e.g., door opening, tampering attempts) and communication modules for ex-
changing data (e.g., via handheld devices, via satellite, GSM/GPRS or short range wireless).
By monitoring a container’s position coordinates, an automatic message can be triggered by
a TREC device to supply chain partners including Customs NL, when the container actually
leaves the Netherlands, deviates from its predefined route, is being opened by an unauthorized
party, or when other predefined events occur. By monitoring a containers location, TREC de-
vices could replace the AAD and EMCS functionality to provide export evidence.
Container Information Services are leveraging the EPCglobal network and EPCIS non-proprietary
standards currently under definition by EPCglobal7. Those standards define interfaces, discov-
ery services, security mechanisms and other infrastructure for capturing and querying supply
chain data (and other EPC related data). The EPCglobal network, also called the ‘Internet of
things, is a suitable backbone for tracking goods moving along a supply chain. It leverages the
infrastructure from the Internet to create an open standard, Service Oriented Architecture-based
data sharing mechanism between trading partners.
When BeerCo NL prepares a shipment of beer in the new procedure, it publishes the goods
commercial data (originating from its ERP system) in its own EPCIS database that is accessible
through the Internet for authorized supply chain partners, including Customs NL. As soon as
a beer container is closed at the premises of BeerCo NL, the TREC device on that container
sends a message to the carrier and notification is sent to Customs NL. This message contains
a Unique Consignment Reference number (UCR), which the carrier and customs can use to
retrieve commercial data from BeerCo’s EPCIS and use it for all their procedures, including
excise, VAT, statistics and more. Hence, data is kept at BeerCo’s EPCIS and is accessible for all
relevant supply chain partners and government systems, also for periodic audits. As soon as a
container physically leaves Dutch territory (or: arrives at the country of destination), the TREC
device sends a message to Customs NL, providing digital export evidence. If the shipment is
physically inspected en route, customs officers can use handheld devices to obtain access via
the Internet and by using a UCR that the TREC device provides to commercial information
which identifies this shipment in BeerCo’s EPCIS. The digital export evidence (produced by a
TREC device) is also stored in the carrier’s EPCIS database, and can be accessed by authorized
supply chain partners.
6Further information on TREC is available at http : //www.zurich.ibm.com/news/05/trec.html and http :
//www.research.ibm.com/jam/securetradelane.pdf , last accessed on April 27, 2007.
7For further details see http://www.epcglobalinc.org
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13.7.2 Analyzing the TREC scenario with patterns
In Figure 13.13 we adjust the control model developed in Figure 13.5 so that it fits the new
solution. Note that we do not model the complete solution, but only a part of it. For example,
we do not model the use of AAD for checks en route.
The TREC service provider is a party which operates the TREC device. In the terms of our
model in Figure 13.5, the TREC service provider performs the role of the TTP. Furthermore,
as soon as a container physically leaves Dutch territory or arrives at the country of destination,
the TREC device sends a message to Customs NL, providing digital export evidence. In our
terms, this means that TREC can execute the Witness Export activity simultaneously with the
Cross Border activity, as prescribed by the patterns. In addition, according to the pattern, TREC
service provider sends the TREC Message directly to Customs NL. The TREC Message plays
the role of the Export Evidence.
This model has no control weaknesses and is implemented exactly according to the Penalty
pattern. With this model we show that TREC devices could replace the functionalities of AADs
or even EMCSs to provide more reliable evidence of export. In addition, TREC can also be
used for controls en route.
A pre-requisite for this scenario, according to the patterns, is that the TREC service provider
is independent and socially detached from BeerCo NL both at the company as well as at the
employee level. This is to avoid the risk that an employee can send a message about crossing
a border when no such event has taken place. A TREC device must therefore be able to send
a message without human intervention. To ensure this, a licensing process for TREC service
providers, similar to EW licensing is required. Licensing must ensure that only providers with
reliable processes can operate as TREC service providers. Such licensing can be provided by
customs or even commercial parties operating on behalf of customs.
The licensing of TREC services is modelled in Figure 13.13. It shows that Customs NL verifies
compliance of the TREC Processes with a particular TREC service provider with established
TREC control standards. If verification shows that the TREC service provider complies with
control standards, he will receive the TREC Licence and may operate with excise-free exports.
At the value level (see Figure 13.14), the model is an instantiation of the model in Figure
13.6 with additional exchanges for the TREC service licensing. We show that a TREC service
provider sends a message to Customs NL, while payment for the TREC service is done by
BeerCo NL (see TREC Service Fee). Which actor will pay for the TREC service is still under
discussion, but most probably it will be done by the commercial parties.
13.8 Discussion
In this chapter we have demonstrated how to put our patterns into practice in a case study about
the redesign of customs procedures for excise duties. Our focus was on the way the parties that
buy or sell excise goods can avoid excise payments in illegitimate way. As an example, we used
the export of beer from the Netherlands to the UK and to Poland.
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Based on interviews with domain experts, such as customs officers and managers of a beer
producing company, we have discovered two common illegitimate ways of avoiding excise
payments in the Netherlands. The first is when the beer producer in the Netherlands BeerCo NL
overstates exported goods and understates goods sold in the Netherlands. This was referred to as
the Tampered AAD scenario, since it involves tampering with the evidence document AAD. The
second way to avoid excise payments is referred to by the domain experts as ‘virtual beer’. In
this case, excises are avoided in the Netherlands; however the beer producer in the Netherlands
is not involved in the fraud at all. Other parties, namely the buyers in the country of the importer
(we use Poland as an example) and the local retailer in the Netherlands, collude to create exports
on paper but in reality they sell the beer in the Netherlands on the ‘black’ market. In this way,
the parties avoid excise payments either in the Netherlands, or even in both countries.
The case study revealed that the current EU AAD-based procedure is vulnerable to fraud with
excise declarations. The AAD, which should prove that goods have indeed left the country, is
transferred along all the parties of the supply chain, which makes it vulnerable to tampering.
This control problem can be mitigated in several ways. One of these would involve a technical
device, the TREC, and a new actor, the TREC provider. The TREC device sends an electronic
message when the goods have crossed the border. The message is delivered directly to the Dutch
customs office. With our analysis we have demonstrated that the export procedure that involves
TREC is an instantiation of the control model generated by the e3control patterns.
The challenge of TREC is in developing a reliable mechanism, to determine which parties
are authorized to access a container, at which point in time. This authorization mechanism
would require some form of information sharing between the customs’ information systems,
and the information systems of participants in a trading process. That means that parties must
be carefully scrutinized, before they can join. Such a control by the TREC service providers
can be described by the Partner Screening pattern.
The model of controls presented here is used in the ITAIDE project in which businesses and
governments, enabled by advanced technology, participate to redesign export procedures. Do-
main experts from the participating organizations confirmed that the control model does identify
real control problems, and suggests a viable solution.
The Proper Contracting and Execution Confirmation patterns have not been described in de-
tail in the Beer Export case study and their examples can only be found within the patterns
descriptions. This does not mean that the patterns do not exist in the described network. The
reason why we have not modelled them is that the problems that we have been focusing on and
which were important to the domain experts do not correspond to these two patterns. Within
the beer export network, the problem described by the Proper Contracting pattern could be that
the beer producer in the Netherlands does not trust the buyer in the UK and requires him to sign
a contract first. This was not considered to be a real-life problem by domain experts. However,
theoretically such a situation could exist. For the Execution Confirmation pattern the beer pro-
ducer in the Netherlands would not trust the buyer in the UK and would require him to send
confirmation of delivery. Such confirmation could also be represented by the AAD. However,
the problem underlying AAD is not the same that described by the Execution Confirmation
pattern.
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13.9 Lessons Learned
In the lessons learned we reflect on our expectations about value modelling for controls and
compare them to the results of this case study.
Lesson 1. Controls as commercial services with added value. This case study demonstrates
that controls are commercial services. This justifies the use of value modelling in the design of
controls, as suggested in this thesis.
The first control service that we observe is witnessing and testifying to export. In the AAD and
EMCS procedures, Customs NL cannot witness the export of beer outside the Netherlands due
to the open EU borders. Therefore, export evidence is provided by Customs UK who acquires
it from Retailer UK. The provision of export evidence can be seen as a service, provided by
Retailer UK to Customs UK and provided by Customs UK to Customs NL. Because the case
study is in the government domain, the service is not provided in return for a monetary reward.
Retailer UK and Customs UK are simply obliged to provide export evidence by legislation.
Another service is found in the suggested TREC model. The witnessing of export, provided by
the TREC service provider, is the control service. This is a commercial service and someone
has to pay for it. In our model we suggest that the service is paid for by the exporter BeerCo NL.
However, multiple business models are possible.
One more control service we observe is the Excise Warehouse licensing. Retailers in the UK are
licensed to to operate with excise-free shipments. Licensing is a service, provided by customs
in the EU, and the retailer pays for it.
Finally, the last control service we observe is certification of TREC service providers. The
TREC service providers must be certified to ensure that their technology provides adequate
information about export evidence.
Lesson 2. Value aspects of control instruments. The core control instrument in this case
study is an evidence document Export Evidence. The export evidence is instantiated with the
AAD document in the AAD procedure, by the EMCS Record in the EMCS procedure and by
the TREC Message in the TREC procedure.
This case study demonstrates that the evidence document Export Evidence is of value and,
therefore, it is not wrong to model it as a value object. In all the procedures, Export Evidence
has the role of providing trustworthy information about how much beer was exported to the UK
by a Dutch exporter. Having this information is of value to the Customs NL, since only with it
can Customs NL make a decision about excise exemptions of the exporter. Therefore, Export
Evidence and its instances is modelled as a value object.
Other evidence documents presented in this case study are EW license and TREC license. These
are evidence of third party certification. These licenses allow Retailer UK and TREC service
providers to be operators of excise-free exports, and therefore, they are of value to them.
We also encounter several penalties and incentives. Firstly, there is a penalty for not paying
excises which is modelled as a value object, as suggested by the Penalty pattern. One more
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penalty discussed in short is the difference in excise tariffs in different EU countries. Such a
difference creates a motive for the ‘virtual beer’ fraud. Making the tariffs equal can be seen as
a penalty which removes such an incentive.
Lesson 3. The value viewpoint is an abstract rationale for procedural aspects of controls.
This case study demonstrates that modelling controls with value models is possible. Two control
problems were identified at the start of the case study: Tampered AAD and Virtual Beer. As a
result of the analysis, we have been able to model both problems using the concepts of e3control
.
The e3controlmethodology allows us to focus on pure value-related aspects of controls, which
provides additional functionality compared to the process perspective on controls. The added
value of this functionality has been most strongly demonstrated in the analysis of the TREC
service. The advantage of the value modelling when designing the TREC model was that
it highlighted the business decisions that had to be made to introduce the TREC solution in
practice. The process models only describe how the TREC controls have to be implemented.
The value model, on the other hand, pushes the designer into thinking about economic objects,
which should be delivered in return for the TREC service. In other words, it raises the important
question of who will pay for the TREC service.
The analysis of procedural controls along with their value aspects is also important because
the choices made in value models should not contradict the control principles. For example,
it should be ensured that parties delivering the TREC service do not help exporters to hide
excises. Control principles, such as the segregation of duties, should be taken into account
when assigning value objects to actors. The case study demonstrates that the e3control provides
tools to design choices, which take into account requirements of both the value and control
perspectives.
We therefore conclude that in this case study the combination of process and value perspec-
tives provides a valuable tool to analyze both control and economic value issues related to
the introduction of these controls. The analysis performed by e3control is more powerful than
that provided by a value of process perspective separately. The domain experts of the ITAIDE
project have also acknowledged that the value perspective provides a simple and relevant view
on controls and is particularly useful for the redesign task. As they put it, because the value
perspective allows abstracting from procedural detail of old controls, it allows more extreme
redesigns compared to those based on the process perspective only.
Lesson 4. Patterns. The controls of the study could be described using the Penalty, Execution
Monitoring and Partner Screening patterns. In addition, both delegation patterns have been
used.
In general, the patterns produce interesting results. Firstly, they are able to explain the current
AAD procedure. Secondly, they provide useful insights into the redesign of this procedure
using the TREC technology. Before we carried out this case study it was difficult to make any
reasonable arguments with respect how the TREC device would impact the AAD procedure.
Some participants on the ITAIDE project had doubts about the ability of the TREC technology
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to provide sufficient control over the process. By using the patterns, we have analyzed how the
introduction of the TREC device will affect the AAD procedure and whether it will improve it.
In particular, the controls principles of the patterns were used to demonstrate exactly in which
aspects the TREC device can improve the AAD procedure.
In the first e3control cycle we performed an analysis of the AAD procedure. The procedure
already includes some elements of the Execution Monitoring pattern. Since our goal was to
improve the AAD procedure, the design of the control mechanism was narrowed down to iden-
tifying whether the AAD procedure corresponds to the Execution Monitoring pattern, or, more
precisely, to its contractual variation Penalty. As a result, by analyzing the compliance of the
AAD procedure with the control principles, we are able to identify the weaknesses of the AAD
procedure as well as suggest how the weaknesses can be removed. This demonstrates that
the patterns can be applied not only to design new controls from scratch, but also to improve
existing controls.
In the second e3control cycle we have analyzed the virtual beer fraud. As a result, we used the
Partner Screening pattern to explain the necessity of Excise Warehouse licensing. The same
pattern explained the necessity of certifying TREC service providers.
The case demonstrates that the application of patterns may not be considered trivial, as was
proved in the Virtual Beer scenario, in which we encountered multiple sub-ideal activities and
multiple sub-ideally behaving actors. This resulted in the increased possibilities of the controls
suggested by the patterns. Sorting out these situations is a topic for future research.
In addition, by applying the Partner Screening pattern to describe EW licensing we encounter
different time frames for different activities. Namely, the control activities are executed once
per time frame, while the primary activities are executed multiple times. Such a situation is a
variation of the original pattern.
We have also managed to create models which comply with the e3value ontology in a sense that
they do not contain loops in the dependency paths. Neither do the ideal value models contain
one-way value transfers.
13.10 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented the patterns in the case of the excise exemption procedure
within the EU. Within the EU, the general principle is that excise is only paid in the country in
which excise goods are consumed. Currently, the core evidence of export in the EU is the paper
based Administrative Accompanying Document (AAD). In order to export from the Netherlands
to the UK, the exporting party sends the document with the cargo to the UK, the document is
then stamped in the UK by the local customs authorities and sent back to the Netherlands. Upon
presenting the document, the exporter in the Netherlands gets the excise exemption, while the
importer pays taxes in the UK.
The AAD procedure does not provide sufficient controls to ensure that excise exemption is
granted only for exported goods. There are several ways of avoiding excise payments, e.g. by
tampering the AAD document.
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In the case study, we have undertaken a re-engineering of the existing AAD procedure and
suggested how it could be improved. To find the answer, we have investigated which control
problems the AAD procedure tries to cover and how they are addressed by the current AAD
procedure. Further, using the e3control patterns, we have explained how the problems can be
removed. As a result, we suggest value and process control models, which describe a ‘perfect’
solution against the control problems in the export scenario.
Furthermore, we suggest a scenario to improve the AAD procedure using new technology. We
suggest a scenario to replace the paper-based AAD solution with an electronic one with effective
control. This solution is enabled by innovative technologies, such as TREC and EPCIS.
Three patterns were used in this case study: Penalty, Execution Monitoring and Partner Screen-
ing. The patterns have proved to be useful. Firstly, Execution Monitoring allows us to identify
the problems in the AAD procedure and the Penalty pattern suggests a way of improving it.
Both patterns explain why Excise Warehouse licensing is needed and the Partner Screening
pattern describes the Excise Warehouse licensing mechanisms.
Finally, the patterns provide guidelines on how to design control procedures using the TREC
device. Before we carried out this case study it was not clear if the TREC device would improve
the AAD procedure. On the contrary, it could even have been said that the TREC device would
provide even fewer controls. By using the patterns, we have analyzed how the introduction of
the TREC device will affect the procedure. Based on the theory behind patterns, we conclude
that the TREC device, if correctly implemented, will improve controls.
Chapter 14
Conclusions and future research
This chapter presents conclusions and directions for further research on the design of controls
in network organizations. We start this chapter with the key outputs of this thesis in section
14.1. In section 14.2 we reflect on our experiences of using e3controlwith domain experts from
the business world. In section 14.3 we discuss managerial implications and, finally, in section
14.4 we outline limitations and directions for future research.
14.1 Key research outputs
The research objective of this thesis was to develop a methodology that would support human
analysts in designing controls against opportunistic behaviour in networks of organizations. To
achieve this, we have introduced the e3control approach that provides guidelines and conceptual
modelling tools to design controls in networks.
The e3control approach consists of three components: e3control ontology, e3control patterns and
e3control design framework. The e3control ontology provides constructs which are required
to describe control problems and control mechanisms from the value perspective. Although
the e3control ontology is a necessary part of the whole methodology, our contribution to the
ontology development is minor, since an extensive part of it has already been introduced in the
e3value ontology. Nevertheless, an important contribution of this research is the approach of
modelling controls from the value perspective as a whole, of which the e3control ontology is a
part.
Another part of the e3control approach to modelling controls is the use of e3control patterns,
which capture accepted design knowledge on specific inter-organizational control problems
and mechanisms. In this thesis the emphasis has been on the design of controls from the eco-
nomic value perspective. However, the process perspective is also considered to some extent in
e3control patterns.
At the beginning of the thesis we introduced the concept of inter-organizational controls and
defined our requirements for the design approach for inter-organizational controls, which, we
have argued should incorporate the following features:
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• To address the design of controls from the network perspective;
• To address the design of controls from the economic value perspective;
• To provide conceptual modelling techniques which support a human business analyst in
the design process. The identified conceptual modelling techniques include ontologies
and patterns.
In order to include these aspects, we have based our design methodology on requirements en-
gineering and internal control theories. We will now go on to discuss how each aspect can be
found in the e3control approach.
14.1.1 The network perspective
The controls in this thesis have been designed from the network perspective, which contrasts
with the traditional practice of the internal control theory in three ways: (1) explicit focus on
risks caused by external parties, (2) controls take into account the activities of external parties,
and (3) collaborative decision making.
Explicit focus on risks caused by external parties. The internal control theory states that
when the controls are introduced, no explicit distinction is made with regard to who causes
the risk: an internal employee or an external party. In the network perspective we consider
primarily controls against opportunistic behaviour of counter parties only. We do not invent
new controls: all the control problems and mechanisms, which we consider, have already been
described in the internal control literature, agency theory and other sources. Our contribution is
to describe these controls explicitly from the network perspective.
The network perspective is most clearly presented in the e3control patterns. These patterns de-
scribe pairs of control problems and control mechanisms. Each pattern describes two actors - a
primary actor and a counter actor. The counter actor is the one who behaves opportunistically
and causes a control problem for the primary actor. The primary actor is the one who wishes
to mitigate opportunistic behaviour and is a beneficiary of the control mechanism. This struc-
ture corresponds to the network perspective, in which actors are explicitly concerned with the
opportunistic behaviour of network partners.
Controls take into account the activities of external parties. Another feature of the network
perspective is that the primary actor, who introduces controls, takes into account the activities
of other parties in the network. For example, the order of activities between a primary and
counter actor is important from the network perspective. This aspect is also incorporated in
the patterns which state that a primary actor who has little trust in a counter actor should not
execute his commitments before the counter actor does so. Another example of the network
perspective in patterns is that when a primary actor delegates activities to a trusted party, it is
important to ensure that the party will not act in the interests of the counter actor. In the internal
control theory such principles mainly have a purpose to restrict actions of internal employees
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and are less concerned with opportunistic behaviour of external parties, see in Chapter 2. Our
control principles in Chapter 7 represent the ‘translation’ of the internal control principles for
relationships between organizations.
The initial effort to design inter-organizational control was made by [Bons, 1997]. Unlike Bons,
we did not develop an expert system which uses automated reasoning to select optimal controls
for a particular network. Instead the e3controlmethodology was developed to assist human
business analysts in the design of inter-organizational controls. In addition, by integrating the
agency theory and the internal control theory, the e3control patterns describe a broader set of
controls, than that of Bons. Finally, as will be discussed later, we incorporate the value perspec-
tive on controls.
Collaborative decision making. Collaborative decision making is another factor that makes
the network perspective different from the traditional internal control theory. For a network to
be sustainable, every party has to be content with a business model and, consequently, with the
controls incorporated within it. Self-interest seeking partners participate in networks voluntar-
ily, and therefore any agreements in networks, including controls, are typically not decided by
one individual manager [Man, 2004]. To achieve sustainability, networks employ collaborative
decision making where parties jointly achieve agreements on introduced controls.
To support collaborative decision making, we emphasize the importance of using graphical
conceptual modelling techniques when designing controls for networks. Our conceptual models
describe processes and value transfers between the network parties, and do not just focus on
processes within one individual company, as in the internal control theory.
14.1.2 The economic value viewpoint on controls
Modelling controls from the economic value viewpoint focuses on the way economic value is
created, exchanged and consumed in a multi-actor network. At the beginning of the thesis it was
argued that the development of the economic value viewpoint of controls has several motives:
(1) controls are commercial services with added value, (2) many control instruments have a
value aspect (e.g. incentives, tradable evidence documents), and (3) the value viewpoint is an
abstract rationale for procedural aspects of controls. We will now go on to discuss whether
these arguments have been confirmed in our case studies.
Controls as commercial services with added value. One argument for developing the value
viewpoint on controls is the fact that controls often result in commercial services. In all the
reported case studies, we were able to observe the controls as being services and we saw how
controls changed the business model of the network. In the music case, the control service
was the delivery of information on ISRC codes by the listeners to the rights societies. Multiple
control services were discernible in the health care case. Examples include needs assessment
provided by the indication centre to the ministry, the allocation of actual care services, the
allocation of personal budgets provided by the administrative care office to the ministry, the
provision of information about care providers, and care provider assessment carried out by the
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Social Chart. In the ROC case, we observed the witnessing of green supply, a service that the
renewable producer provides to Ofgem. However, this is not a commercial service, since a
government organization, Ofgem, simply obliges the producer to provide this information. The
Beer Export case also reveals many control services, e.g. providing TREC services, providing
the Excise Warehouse service, Excise Warehouse licensing, and signing of the AAD.
This variety of control services discovered in the case studies shows that it is also reasonable
to model controls from the economic value viewpoint. When it comes to control services,
the value viewpoint has more advantages than the process viewpoint. Firstly, it allows us to
demonstrate value-related features of controls without focusing on the procedural details. This
is especially useful when designing new control services. For example, we were able to capture
the business model of the Social Chart in the health care case without even knowing the details
of the businesses processes behind the service. This is very advantageous at the early stage
of development of such a service, when it is more important to understand business aspects of
the service rather than its procedural aspects. A question such as, ‘who is going to pay for the
service?’ is important. Such decisions should be made at the economic value level and not, in
our opinion, be further complicated by involving procedural details.
Value aspects of control instruments. Many control instruments have a value aspect. Exam-
ples include incentives/penalties, rights and evidence documents.
Evidence documents as value objects. Evidence documents are often associated with eco-
nomic value; sometimes they can be traded and they have been found in every case study. In the
music case, evidence in the form of an ISRC code of a track, is provided by its listener to the
rights society. In the health care case study came across many documents including Delivered
Care Evidence, an evidence document provided by a care provider to the administrative office
to confirm how many services were provided. In the ROC case, an evidence document called
an ROC certificate is provided by a supplier to Ofgem to show how much green energy has
been bought. In the Beer Export case, the AAD document, EMCS record and TREC message
are evidence documents which confirm beer export.
We can distinguish two reasons why evidence documents are value objects. The first reason is
that they are of value to the controlling actors, such as the rights society, an administrative of-
fice, Ofgem and customs. These controlling parties cannot perform their core business without
having the correct evidence. For example, in the music case a reliable ISRC code is a value
object, since without having reliable information about the broadcasted tracks and the number
of listeners, right societies cannot accurately charge radio stations per listener per track. Sim-
ilarly, in the Beer Export case, without trustworthy evidence about exported beer, the customs
authorities cannot make a correct decision about granting excise exemption.
The second reason why evidence documents can be of value is because they can represent
rights to some monetary value and, thus, are tradable. One such document is the cinema ticket
demonstrated in Chapter 3. In the ROC case, the ROC certificate represents rights to obtain RO
compliance. Therefore, it can be traded.
Modelling evidence documents in the value models allows us to represent the value aspects of
the documents. For example, the fact that an ROC certificate represents some value can only be
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conceptualized in the value models and not in the process models, since the latter do not have a
notion of value. Value models also allow us to model the impact of the ROC on a value model,
e.g. with e3valuewe can make a sensitivity analysis of the price and number of the ROCs and,
in this way, assess the impact of these parameters on the business model.
Rights as value objects. Another control instrument with a value aspect is a right. Rights
have been extensively represented by the music and the health care case study. Legal rights can
be seen as value objects because they guarantee access to a product or service, and consequently,
such rights are of real economic value to actors. For example, a right to AWBZ care in the health
care case is of value to people who want access to the AWBZ care services. In the music case,
the right to broadcast music is of value to rights owners, since they receive a fee for this right.
The existence of rights implies the existence of objects to which these rights are related. For
example, in the music case, we see a value object Track as well as a right to broadcast or listen
to the track. Modelling of the transfers of rights and transfers of the related value objects in
e3control have been extensively studied in Chapter 3 and have been illustrated in the music and
the health care case study.
Incentives and penalties as value objects. The case studies contain several incentives and
penalties. In the ROC case, there are two penalties and one incentive: the buy-out fees paid
by the suppliers for not complying with the renewable obligation, the price of the ROC, which
provides an incentive in favour of buying green electricity rather than paying for ROCs, and the
buy-out premium for buying green electricity.
In the Beer Export case, we discussed the difference in excise tariffs throughout the Europe.
The fact that tariffs are lower in some countries provides an incentive for ‘virtual beer’ fraud:
selling goods in a country with higher excise, but reporting the sale and paying excises in a
country with a lower excise. Making excise tariffs equal in all European countries can be seen
as a penalty for ‘virtual beer’ fraud1.
In the music case, we have suggested a scheme in which information about the number of
listeners to a radio station is shared between rights societies and advertisers. Therefore, if a radio
station understates the number of listeners, it will pay less rights fees, but it will also receive
fewer advertisement fees; this creates an incentive not to understate the number of listeners.
We argue that the properties of incentives and penalties can be better captured by value models
rather than by process models. In our view, these presented cases demonstrate that a decision to
introduce an incentive with particular properties should be taken at the value level. One of the
reasons for this is that the size of the incentive depends on other value transfers. For example,
in the ROC case, the size of the buy-out fee depends on the price of regular and renewable
electricity (namely, if the buy-out fee is too low, suppliers will prefer to pay the penalty rather
than to buy green electricity). The price is a value-level concept and, for purposes of comparison
the two, the incentive should also be modelled at the value level.
The value perspective also enables us to capture how an incentive or penalty impacts the prof-
itability of actors. Namely, an incentive increases the value received by a counter actor, while
1Making the excise tariffs equal is not the solution offered by the ITAIDE project.
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a penalty decreases it. Incentives and penalties could be added to net value sheets in order to
assess how the profitability of actors changes with different incentives. This is not possible to
model explicitly in process models or information systems models, since they do not have a
notion of value.
The value viewpoint is an abstract rationale for procedural aspects of controls. Many
controls, encountered in the case study, are procedural. This means that in order to implement
them, changes in business processes are required. The value viewpoint has two purposes for
procedural controls: (1) to represent a high-level economic motivation of controls and (2) to
provide abstraction of procedural details of controls.
A high-level economic motivation of controls. From the value perspective, opportunistic
behaviour, such as fraud, embezzlement or just loss of something of value, results in a sub-ideal
value transfer and this represents a missing value. If one actor exchanges an ideal value transfer
and his counter party exchanges a sub-ideal value transfer, then the first actor provides a value
object, but does not get equal value in return. The Principle of Reciprocity is not observed in
such cases. A control is needed when the value is missing, i.e. when the principle of reciprocity
does not hold. Such an economic motivation of controls is represented with sub-ideal value
models, using the e3control ontology.
The sub-ideal value model is a tool used to analyze control problems at the value level without
knowledge of procedural details. The value perspective is essential in understanding control
problems that underlie controls, since the controls are designed primarily to safeguard eco-
nomic value. An advantage of value modelling for the analysis of controls is that it does not
require knowledge of processes. As in the health care case, we were able to describe the control
problems without having knowledge of the procedural details.
With respect to other viewpoints, such as a process or information system viewpoint, the sub-
ideal value model provides criteria to judge whether the process or information system solution
is sufficient to mitigate the identified control problems. As in the music case study, the infor-
mation system solution does not mitigate all the control problems identified during the value
level analysis. A further value-level analysis could be conducted to identify the costs of im-
proving the information system solution and if these costs would be justified by the benefits.
This analysis could not be done if it was only limited to the information system perspective.
Abstraction of procedural details of controls. The second purpose of the value viewpoint
for procedural controls goes back to the complexity of networks. The design of inter-organizational
controls can be very complex, because, for instance, different perspectives of the multiple stake-
holders are involved. A way to deal with this multi-perspective problem is to use a multi-
viewpoint approach and in this thesis we have focussed on two viewpoints: the economic value
viewpoint and the process viewpoint. By introducing a value viewpoint, we provide a high-level
model of controls, without focusing on procedural details.
As can be concluded from the case studies, an economic value analysis of control guides the
design of the underlying process or information system solution. The latter can be seen as a so-
lution that ensures the occurrence of all value transfers of the corresponding value model. From
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this point of view, the preliminary value modelling is important, because different economic
value solutions require different operational models to implement it. For instance, in the music
case study, a business model for paid radio would require a different information system than
the business model for free radio considered in our case.
The e3controlmethodology allows us to focus on pure value-related aspects of control mecha-
nisms, and provides additional functionality compared to the process perspective on controls.
In the health care case, we found the economic value perspective important in the design of a
new controls service, the Social Chart, which was the most important result for the health care
domain experts of the FRUX project [Droes et al., 2005]. Modelling the Social Chart from the
economic value perspective yields such issues as who will fund the Social Chart, what service
does it provide and who will operate the Social Chart. A further e3value analysis enables us to
answer these questions, which is not provided by procedural modelling.
The analysis of procedural controls along with their value aspects is also important because
the choices made in value models should not contradict the control principles. The issue of
who will operate the Chart is important not only from the value perspective, but also from
the control perspective. The operator of the Social Chart should be independent from the care
providers or insurance companies, who would like to advertise the service. Similar issues were
encountered in the Beer Export case. In the Beer Export case, where the parties who deliver the
TREC service should be impartial and not not be prejudiced in favour of a reduction in excise
payments.
To summarize these arguments, we conclude that the combination of process and value perspec-
tives provides a valuable tool to analyze both control and economic value issues related to the
introduction of these controls. The analysis performed by e3control is more powerful than that
provided from a process perspective alone.
14.1.3 The e3control ontology
To design opportunistic behaviour, we have suggested the e3control ontology, which is based
on the existing e3value ontology, introduced by [Gordijn and Akkermans, 2003]. The e3value
ontology represents concepts to describe a network organization as a set of actors that exchange
objects of economic value with each other, however it does not incorporate control-related as-
pects, such as opportunistic behaviour. Therefore, we have extended the e3value ontology to
specifically include the concepts required to model the effects of opportunistic behaviour on
value transfers.
The concepts we have introduced in the e3control ontology include, among other things, sub-
ideal value object and sub-ideal value transfer to show that the result of sub-ideal behaviour
is an incorrect exchange of a value object or an exchange of an inappropriate value object.
The transfers of sub-ideal value objects are marked in graphical models with dashed lines. In
addition, we have introduced a liability token, a concept that allows us to identify the party who
behaves sub-ideally.
As was discovered in the case studies, all the control problems, which we have elicited from
domain experts or from literature reviews, could be modelled with the concepts of the e3control
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ontology. In all cases, the economic motivation behind the control problems could be identified
and modelled with the concepts of e3control .
However, e3control concepts were not sufficient when we wished to design more process- or in-
formation systems-related aspects of controls. For example, e3control cannot be used to express
the sequential order of activities. This means that when procedural or other non-value details
become important, an analysis should use the appropriate tools. In our work, some procedural
aspects of control are described in the control patterns using UML activity diagrams.
14.1.4 The e3controlpatterns
In addition to the e3control ontology, the designer also needs to have knowledge about possible
control problems and mechanisms that are possible and how they should be implemented in
a proper way. This knowledge was structured in e3control patterns, which are defined as de-
scriptions of generic and re-usable control mechanisms for a recurring control problem. In this
thesis, we have described four procedural control patterns and two contractual control patterns.
The procedural patterns include: Partner Screening, Proper Contracting, Execution Monitoring
and Execution Confirmation. The Partner Screening and Execution Monitoring patterns de-
scribe monitoring-based mechanisms to combat a counter actor who executes his contracting
obligations sub-ideally. The difference between the two patterns is that Partner Screening sug-
gests an ex-ante monitoring control, and Execution Monitoring suggests an ex-post monitoring
control. Further, the Proper Contracting pattern describes how the contracting process should
be arranged to avoid misunderstandings about the contracting commitments the actors make
with each other. Finally, the Execution Confirmation pattern suggests how the final process of a
transaction should be arranged to avoid misunderstandings about the performed activities. The
control mechanisms described in the procedural patterns affect only the process viewpoint, un-
less a control requires some activity to be delegated. Delegation creates a service, modelled at
the value level as a value transaction. In such a case, the control changes the initial value model.
Delegation is modelled by combining procedural patterns with special delegation patterns.
Furthermore, there are two contractual patterns: Penalty and Incentive. Both patterns describe
an actor’s choice of behaving ideally or sub-ideally. The Penalty pattern describes a mechanism
of punishing sub-ideal behaviour. The Incentive pattern describes a mechanism of rewarding
ideal behaviour. In these patterns the control mechanism affects both the value and the process
viewpoint.
The patterns have been demonstrated in detail in two case studies: the ROC case and the Beer
Export case. In the ROC case we describe the Execution Monitoring, the Incentive and the
Penalty patterns. The Beer Export case includes the Execution Monitoring and Partner Screen-
ing patterns. Other patterns, although not demonstrated, could also be found in the case studies.
The patterns can also be observed in the other two case studies. For instance, in the music case,
the rights societies monitor the number of listeners and tracks played by the radio station. This
ex-post monitoring process can be described by the Execution Monitoring pattern. The witness-
ing of the number of listeners and tracks is done by the listeners, who report this information
to the rights societies. The information is then sent by the listener to the rights societies in a
seamless model so that the listener does not interact with the process.
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In the health care case, several patterns can be found as well. For example, the government
agency CVZ monitors the performance of care providers to ensure that patients get good qual-
ity care. This corresponds to the controls described in the Execution Monitoring pattern. An-
other scenario is when a care provider may claim to have no commitment to provide care for
a given budget, and hence refuses to continue to provide care. In accordance with the Proper
Contracting pattern, the government only commits a specific budget, if a care provider promises
to provide the agreed care for that budget. The patterns in the health care case are analyzed in
more detail in [Kartseva et al., 2007b].
We have not invented the controls described in the patterns. We have structured existing knowl-
edge of controls by employing the patterns approach. The structuring of the knowledge of
patterns is a contribution in itself, since, in our view, the controls in the internal control the-
ory are not structured in an efficient way. Typical descriptions of internal controls are very
domain-specific. Firstly, separate risks and controls are described for every specific activity
of each transaction cycle. Secondly, they assume the presence of some specific documents or
parts of IS (e.g. picking tickets, packing slips, bar codes, and credit card processing systems).
As a result, a control designer must be acquainted with a huge number of control descriptions.
For example, in the controls described in [Romney and Steinbart, 2006], a control expert, who
wants to design controls for the sales and procurement processes inside an organization should
have thorough knowledge of about one hundred controls.
In the patterns, we describe the controls at a higher level of abstraction, without a specific focus
on a business process or an industry. This is possible, since we start by modelling the control
problems with domain-independent value models and initially describe a control problem as a
sub-ideal value transfer. Thus, the controls described in the patterns do not depend on a specific
business process, but only on a structure of the value transfers. As a result, we are able to
describe controls using a rather small number of patterns. In the case studies, we are able to
describe all the encountered control problems and mechanisms with the six patterns and their
delegation variations. We consider a limited number of patterns covering a large number of
cases as a contribution.
Another contribution of the patterns, as was already argued, is that they describe the control
problems and control mechanisms in a rigorous way using graphical conceptual models. Fur-
thermore, the patterns describe not only the business process viewpoint, but also the economic
value viewpoint of each control problem and control mechanism. Finally, the patterns specifi-
cally describe controls from the network perspective.
14.2 Reflection on experience with the e3controlapproach
The e3control approach has been applied in four case studies. In every case study the e3control
modelling has been done by the author of this thesis. A case study was usually performed as
follows; firstly, we elicited the knowledge about existing control problems and existing con-
trol mechanisms. This was done by interviewing domain experts, participating in meetings
with them, or studying documents, including the materials of earlier case studies. Secondly,
we carried out the e3controlmodelling of the control problems and mechanisms ourselves. As
much as possible, the e3controlmodels were presented to, corrected by and discussed with the
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domain experts. If this was not possible, the models were verified with the available docu-
mented sources. For more information about this process see the Research Context section of
the chapter of each specific case study.
Our general impression is that conceptual thinking and understanding of simple diagrams in
general was not new to the domain experts who, generally speaking, had had no e3control
training. It is worth mentioning that the domain experts who worked with the e3value and
e3controlmodels had differing and non-IT backgrounds, ranging from medical experts in the
health care case to customs officers in the Beer Export case. In our experience, many domain
experts tended to use some kind of graphical conceptual diagram to explain their ideas. For
example, in the health care case one interviewee at the indication centre CIZ drew her own
“conceptual” diagram (not an e3value one), to explain how the Dutch health care system works.
In the ITAIDE project, the graphical conceptual models of e3value in particular were used dur-
ing the redesign workshops with domain experts. The goal of the joint workshops was to come
up with a redesign of current customs procedures. The whole communication and decision
making process concerning redesign was based on the e3control and process models, in part
presented here in the Beer Export case study. The models were extensively used and discussed
with the domain experts. They were presented in a Power Point presentation and discussed
within the group. The domain experts would give their comments on the model, ask why this
or that value transfer was needed and what it represented, and then suggested their own ideas
on redesign. With the use of e3controlmodels, the ideas generated in the workshops were im-
plemented in the real-life demonstrator, which consisted of ten TREC devices fitted on pilot
containers shipping beer to various countries within and outside of the EU.
However, in our opinion, in some cases the e3controlmodels contained too many details for the
domain experts. The most intuitively understood concepts are the actor, the value object, and
the value transfer. This being the case, we presented simplified e3controlmodels to the domain
experts in some cases. We did not usually present the dependency path and we omitted some
value objects which were not relevant to the topic of discussion.
The fact that we did not show some concept like the dependency path does not mean that these
concepts are useless. Every concept in e3control is needed to perform a rigorous analysis of
the e3controlmodels by the e3control expert. However, our claim is that simplified models may
serve a better purpose when discussed with domain experts who are not familiar with e3control
.
In the ROC case, we also experimented with teaching the domain experts to perform the e3value
(not e3control ) modelling by themselves. This was done within the EU-funded project BusMod.
For this, we organized a two day workshop, during which all the concepts of e3valuewere
explained in detail to a group of around ten domain experts. After that the experts were asked
to build their own e3valuemodels with the use of a workbook, in which each modelling step
was explained in detail and examples were provided. The experts were also given assistance by
e3value experts. In the months following the workshop, the experts would perform the analysis
of a more complex case on their own. Our experience has been that most of the domain experts
were able to build and analyze the models. However, they still needed some assistance from
e3value experts even after the workshop. This assistance was given by e-mail or phone, and in
two out of the four cases the e3value expert would visit the domain expert’s site for a couple
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of days to assists with the modelling. A typical occurrence that was discovered during the
BusMod project is that the experts tended to model process-related details in the e3valuemodels
[Kartseva et al., 2004b].
The conclusion we come to from this experience, additional e3value training does not guarantee
that domain experts who have no experience with conceptual modelling in general will be able
to do the modelling on their own, and certainly not on at expert level. Therefore, in the interests
of efficiency, it is better to let domain experts carry out the analysis and design of controls
together with business analysts trained in e3value . The optimal way of using e3control is to
allow a domain expert, who has knowledge of conceptual modelling, to do the analysis, with
the proviso that he or she should be trained in the e3controlmethodology.
To sum up, we recommend the following to domain experts who wish to use the e3control but
have not had the appropriate training in it:
• The e3control analysis should be performed jointly by a domain expert(s) without an
e3control training and a business analyst trained in e3control (i.e. the e3control expert).
All e3controlmodelling should be done by the e3control expert.
• The e3control expert should elicit knowledge from the domain expert and perform several
iterations of the e3control cycle (ideal model – sub-ideal model – solution) by improving
the models through feedback from the domain expert.
• A more simplified version of the e3controlmodels can be presented to domain experts
unfamiliar with the e3control ontology. The level of simplification should depend on the
purpose of the presentation. For instance, if in focus, value transfers should be modelled
in detail, whereas the dependency path can be omitted, if not in focus.
14.3 Managerial implications
In addition to the theoretical contributions described, this study has provided new insights for
practical business management. This study has illustrated the importance of adopting a network
perspective in the context of control. It has been argued that an understanding of the business
model of the network as a whole enables us to take the sustainability of the network into account
when implementing controls. This kind of network view is specifically needed in relation to the
kind of managerial challenges faced by a company operating as a part of a network organization.
As this study has illustrated, it is not enough for a company to concentrate on developing and
sharpening internal controls, but it also needs to understand and try to take into account or even
influence the design of controls in the entire network. The broadening of the scope of control
of a company’s internal processes towards external issues is therefore an important managerial
challenge for a company operating in a network environment.
The study has also emphasized the importance of assessing the value impact of controls. It
has been argued that understanding the value aspects of control mechanisms is crucial, since it
allows us to make more rational decisions about implementing controls. The e3control tools can
be used for a cost-benefit analysis of controls.
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14.4 Research limitations and future research
As with all research, there are limitations to the interpretation of the results and other issues that
need to be considered when trying to generalize this analysis to broader issues of interest. Some
limitations as well as the related directions for future research are discussed in this section.
A limited view on the notion on control. In the start of the study, we assumed the definition
of control to be that of the internal control theory, which implies a somewhat limited view on
control problems and mechanisms. For example, in this study inter-organizational controls are
seen here as measures to mitigate opportunistic behaviour. However, in the control literature,
a second objective of controls, which is frequently put forward, is that controls also should be
designed in such a way as to motivate partners to reach the alliance’s objectives efficiently and
effectively [Geringer and Hebert, 1989], [Groot and Merchant, 2000]. This objective has not
been considered in this work.
Un addition, there are other theories, in which the controls are studied from a different per-
spective and with different purposes. Attention is paid to various factors that influence the
selection of one or another control mechanism. For example, Transaction Costs Economics
[Williamson, 1979] studies how control mechanisms are influenced by such factors as uncer-
tainty and asset specificity. They state that the degree of coordination in an inter-organizational
relation increases with the degree of interdependence and uncertainty of tasks performed by
parties in this relationship. Thus, this theory provides rules for selecting a level of control
depending on other properties of the network.
We have not incorporated rules for the selection of a certain level of control in the e3control
methodology because we assume that users of the methodology will make such a selection for
themselves, e.g. based on a case-specific knowledge. The only distinction we provide is a
difference between high trust and low trust between the network partners. In the case of high
trust, the controls can be relaxed. The introduction of a more sophisticated model to select the
levels of control would be a good extension of the methodology and could be a topic of future
research.
Furthermore, e3control is not an extensive risk management assessment methodology, as is for
example the COSO methodology in auditing. In general, we have described control problems
based on a case and we do not go into an analysis of what the probability is that a risk material-
izes. Extending the methodology with functionality, which provides guidelines on the selection
of certain controls or on assessment of severity levels of risks, can be a good extension to the
methodology.
Generalizability and Completeness . External validity deals with knowing whether the re-
sults are generalizable beyond the immediate case. As was explained earlier in Chapter 1,
generalizability cannot be guaranteed in the four case studies.
Nevertheless, we claim that the e3control is generalizable for the set of problems and mecha-
nisms similar to those described by the case studies. For instance, we are quite sure that tax
payment fraud can be described by using the e3control patterns, since a similar problem with
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excise payment fraud has already been described. In general, all four case studies have a strong
regulatory flavour. Many of the control problems which have come to light are the result of a
violation of some global governmental regulation or a contractual agreement. In our opinion,
e3control is capable of designing problems and mechanisms similar to those described in the
case studies.
It is questionable whether the list of e3control patterns is complete in the sense that it covers
all the possible control problems and mechanisms in network organizations. In this research,
the patterns were primarily elicited based on certain literature sources, as described in Chapter
6. Certainly, we cannot claim that these patterns describe all possible control problems and
mechanisms. However, in the case studies we have performed, all the control problems we
discovered could be described by the patterns. We have a tentative personal impression that
most of the relevant control mechanisms have been identified, but there is no empirical proof of
this.
Therefore, there is no guarantee that a complete and generalisable set of the patterns has been
described. The patterns library can be enriched by carrying out new case studies, finding other
literature streams, or focusing on a specific business domain.
Focus on value and process views. The e3control patterns describe the control problems and
mechanisms only from the value and process viewpoints. Other viewpoints, such as the infor-
mation system viewpoint or the communication viewpoint, described by [Bons, 1997] have not
been taken into account. Such problems and control mechanisms are described, for example, by
security patterns, which are concerned with solutions for recurring information security prob-
lems [Schumacher, 2003]. Other problems can be related to accuracy and completeness of data
and information exchanged in messages between organizations. We do not consider these view-
points and related problems within e3control . An important extension of the e3control patterns
in particular would be to describe the correspondence of the information system-level problems
and solutions to their value-level descriptions.
Cost-benefit analysis of controls. The e3valuemethodology enables the financial valuation
of profitability of each actor, a functionality which has not been used in this thesis. By making
such a financial analysis on the sub-ideal value models and comparing the results with the
results of the ideal value models, it is possible to calculate how much value is lost due to sub-
ideal behaviour or how much value is gained in an illegal way, as in the Beer Export case. We
have not performed such financial valuations of the cases, since our focus was on the conceptual
development of the methodology. However, such valuation is essential in order to completely
grasp the suggested solutions and extend the understanding of control problems.
Aggregation of multiple controls. Multiple control problems in networks are possible. Firstly,
every actor in a network has different perspectives on what he thinks a control problem is. Even
in a two-actor relationship, each of two actors can play the role of the primary actor, and con-
sider the other actor to behave sub-ideally. In a three-actor network, there are even more control
problems, since each of the three actors can be seen as a primary actor, who considers the other
two actors to behave sub-ideally.
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The assumption of the e3control patterns, which deal with this issue, is that controls in a network
can be represented as an aggregation of controls between the pairs of actors in this network.
In this respect, in the e3control patterns we only consider the control problems caused by a
counter actor to a primary actor. Even in a two-actor network, the control mechanisms Actor
A introduces to control Actor B should be aggregated with the mechanisms Actor B introduces
against Actor A. In a three-actor network, the control can be described as an aggregation of
controls of Actor A , Actor B, and Actor C. The idea behind this is to handle the complexity
of control problems in multi-actor networks by splitting them into parts of problems considered
by every single actor. There are several problems with such an approach.
The controls for Actor A and controls for Actor B may contradict. Such a case was reported
in [Kartseva et al., 2006e], where the controls of the seller require the delivery to be executed
before the payment, while the controls of the buyer require the opposite. The solution to this
conflict reported in [Kartseva et al., 2006e] is the use of the escrow service. Other similar mech-
anisms, which solve such conflicts have not been investigated in this study. The resolution of
such conflicts is a topic of future research.
Feature interaction. Another problem related to the aggregation of multiple controls is that,
after aggregation, the outcome of the final solution is defined by the order of introducing the
controls. The solution when we first introduce controls for Actor A and then for Actor B will
most probably differ from the solution when we introduce the controls in the reverse order,
first those for Actor B and then those for Actor A. In conceptual modelling this phenomenon is
known as feature interaction.
This phenomena is also relevant for the e3control patterns. In an exchange between a buyer and
a seller different controls will be introduced depending on whether we start with the buyer or
the seller. As an example, in the Execution Monitoring pattern, if we start from the point of
view of the buyer, we will require the seller to deliver goods before payment. However, if we
start as the seller, we impose the prepayment requirement for the buyer. So, we impose different
controls depending on what actor’s perspective we take first.
A more structured approach is needed to resolve the problems of feature interaction. Exami-
nation of the effects of feature interaction in the e3control patterns and development of corre-
sponding design rules is the topic of future research.
14.5 Future of the design of controls in networks
During the recent years many books have been published on network organizations
[Tapscott et al., 2000], [Weill and Vitale, 2001], [Man, 2004], [Seuring et al., 2003]. Many
books on control mechanisms have seen the light either [Hollander et al., 1999],
[Romney and Steinbart, 2006], [Starreveld et al., 1994]. In general, the design of networks and
controls are seen as two distinct tasks, where the design of networks is more focused on ef-
ficiency issues rather than on controls. What is lacking is a truly multi-disciplinary approach
to the design of controls in networks. The e3control approach takes a step towards such an
approach.
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The design of controls in networks is a relevant issue nowadays and many developments in
current society and businesses require new, effective solutions for inter-organizational controls.
A good example is developments in international supply chains. On the one hand, growing
threats, such as those to security and health require increased control of goods going through
international supply chains. On the other hand, growing volumes of trade make it impossible
to exert extensive control inspections at borders, and the administrative burden of businesses
should be lowered in order to create and maintain a viable economic zone. However, efficiency
and a reduced administrative burden can easily contradict increased security, safety and control.
For example, the threat of terrorism has resulted in new control regulations.
Similar challenges are also faced by other industries such as the food industry. On the one hand,
it is essential to be able to trace the origin of food in order to stop contaminations or the spread
of deceases in case such dangers arise. On the other hand, the market requires quicker and more
flexible delivery and distribution systems.
New control procedures are required in order to cope with these challenges. Designing and
implementing changes in controls in network organizations is a highly complex issue, where
technological, financial and political stakes have to be aligned. It obviously requires decisions
on value aspects, since new business models will emerge. In spite of the challenges, new tech-
nologies such as Internet and sensor-based tracking technologies create new opportunities for
the design of lean and effective controls. For example, RFID technologies are being introduced
to improve tracking systems in the food industry.
In addition, the field of control in networks is experiencing a major paradigm shift. A good
example is the idea of implementing of Authorized Economic Operators (AEO) in EU custom
procedures, which implies that each EU Member State Customs administration establishes a
partnership with the private sector in its country in order to involve the private sector in en-
suring the safety and security of international trade supply chains. Certified AEOs will enjoy
tangible benefits such as fast customs clearance and simplified procedures. Such partnerships
between government and private sectors is a fundamental shift in paradigm of control. While
in the past customs control was considered to be an issue for only customs authorities, nowa-
days businesses are seen as partners, and a win-win situation is required, such that businesses
are responsible for the control of their own supply chains, and customs can rely on this con-
trol. Because this relieves customs administrations from control tasks, these businesses can be
rewarded with simplifications of procedures [Rukanova et al., 2006].
To summarize, there are several important developments in the field. Firstly, societal changes
such as globalisation, an increase in the volume of international trade, and terrorism require
more controls, but fewer administrative burdens. Secondly, technology provides new ways to
achieve these objectives. Finally, there is a paradigm shift, at least within the EU, of outsourcing
of control by the government to the private sphere. This dynamic setting makes a future research
in the design of inter-organizational controls to be a relevant, exciting and promising field of
research.
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Appendices

Appendix A
Controls principles
Table A.1: Control principles of pattern ‘Partner Screening’
Principle ID Control principles
Activities-Activities principles
V-Ia Witness activity must exist
V-II Verify activity must exist
P-I Promise activity must exist
V-IIIa Witness activity must follow Past Counter activity
V-IVa Verify activity must follow Witness activity
PE-I Verify activity must precede Primary activity
P-II Promise activity must precede Primary activity
Activities-Objects principles
V-V Supporting statement must be directly transferred to Verify
activity from a source that generates it
V-VIa To-be-verified statement must be directly transferred from
Witness activity to Verify activity
P-II Confirmation statement must be directly transferred from the
primary actor’s Promise activity to the counter actor
Activities-Actors principles
V-VIIa An actor executingWitness activity must be independent and
socially detached from the actor executing Counter activity.
V-VIII An actor executing Verify activity must be independent and
socially detached from the actor executing Counter activity
V-IX Supporting statement must generated by an actor indepen-
dent and socially detached from the actor executing Counter
activity
V-VIIa An actor executingWitness activity must be independent and
socially detached from the actor executing Past Counter ac-
tivity.
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V-VIII An actor executing Verify activity must be independent and
socially detached from the actor executing Past Counter ac-
tivity
V-IX Supporting must generated by an actor independent and so-
cially detached from the actor executing Past Counter activ-
ity
Table A.2: Control principles of pattern ’Proper Contracting’
Principle ID Control principles
Activities-Activities principles
V-II Verify activity must exist
V-IIIb Promise(CA) must precede Verify activity
P-I The Verify activity must precede the primary actor’s
Promise(PA) activity
PE-I Promise(CA) activity must exist
PE-II The counter actor’s Promise(CA) activity must always pre-
cede the primary actor’s Promise(PA) activity
Activities-Objects principles
V-V Supporting must be directly transferred to Verify activity
from a source that generates it
V-VIb Confirmation(CA) must be directly transferred to Verify ac-
tivity
P-III Confirmation(PA) statement of the primary actor must be di-
rectly transferred from the Promise(PA) activity to the actor
execution Verify.
PE-I Promise(PA) activity of the primary actor must precede Pri-
mary activity.
Activities-Actors principles
V-VIII An actor executing Verify activity must be independent and
socially detached from the actor executing Promise(CA) ac-
tivity.
V-IX Supporting must generated by an actor independent and so-
cially detached from the actor executing Promise(CA) activ-
ity.
Table A.3: Control principles of pattern ‘Execution Monitor-
ing’
Principle ID Control principles
Activities-Activities principles
V-Ia Witness activity must exist
V-II Verify activity must exist
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V-IIIa Witness activity must follow Counter activity
V-IVa Verify activity must follow Witness activity
PE-I Verify activity must precede Primary activity
Activities-Objects principles
V-V Supporting statement must be directly transferred to Verify
activity from a source that generates it
V-VIa To-be-verified statement must be directly transferred from
Witness activity to Verify activity
Activities-Actors principles
V-VIIa An actor executingWitness activity must be independent and
socially detached from the actor executing Counter activity.
V-VIII An actor executing Verify activity must be independent and
socially detached from the actor executing Counter activity
V-IX Supporting statement must generated by an actor indepen-
dent and socially detached from the actor executing Counter
activity
Table A.4: Control principles of pattern ‘Execution Confir-
mation’
Principle ID Control principles
Activities-Activities principles
V-Ia Witness activity must exist
V-II Verify activity must exist
V-IIIa Witness activity must be executed at the same time as Pri-
mary activity
V-IVa Verify activity must follow Witness activity
T - I Testify activity must exist
T - II Testify activity must follow Primary Activity
PE - I Verify activity must precede the Testify activity
Activities-Objects principles
V-V Supporting statement must be directly transferred to Verify
activity from a source that generates it
V-VIa To-be-verified statement must be directly transferred from
Witness activity to Verify activity
T-III The outcome of the Verify activity (Positive statement or
Negative Statement, both not shown in the model) must be
directly transferred from Verify activity to Testify activity
T-IV Testifying Statement must be directly transferred from Tes-
tify to the primary actor
Activities-Actors principles
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V-VIIa An actor executingWitness activity must be independent and
socially detached from the actor executing Counter activity.
V-VIII An actor executing Verify activity must be independent and
socially detached from the actor executing Counter activity
V-IX Supporting statement must generated by an actor indepen-
dent and socially detached from the actor executing Counter
activity
T-V Testify activity must be executed by the same actor who re-
ceives the Positive Statement from the Verify activity
Appendix B
UML Activity Diagrams
In UML, an activity diagram is used to display the sequence of activities
[Fowler and Scott, 2000]. Activity diagrams show the workflow from a start point to the fin-
ish point detailing the many decision paths that exist in the progression of events contained in
the activity. They may be used to detail situations where parallel processing may occur in the
execution of some activities. Activity diagrams are useful for business modelling where they
are used for detailing the processes involved in business activities. In Table B.1 we describe
elements of UML activity diagrams.
Table B.1: Elements of an UML activity diagram
Element and its description
Activity: An activity is the specification of a parameterized sequence of
behaviour. An activity is shown as a round-cornered rectangle enclosing all
the actions, control flows and other elements that make up the activity.
Perform
Action
Control Flow: A control flow shows the flow of control from one action to
the next. Its notation is a line with an arrowhead.
Make
Payment
Accept
Payment
Initial Activity: Initial activity, also called initial node, shows the starting
point or first activity of the flow. It is depicted by a large black spot.
Send
Order
Final Activity: The end of the Activity diagram is shown by a bull’s eye
symbol, also called as a final activity or final node.
Close
Order
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Objects and Object Flows: An object flow is a path along which objects or
data can pass. An object is shown as a rectangle. An object flow is shown
as a connector with an arrowhead denoting the direction the object is being
passed.
Send
Invoice
Make
PaymentInvoice
Decision and Merge Nodes: Decision nodes and merge nodes have the
same notation: a diamond shape. The control flows coming away from a
decision node will have guard conditions which will allow control to flow
if the guard condition is met. A merge passes any control flows straight
through it. If two or more inflows are received by a merge symbol, the
action pointed to by its outflow is executed two or more times.
Action on 
True
Action on
False
[condition 
is true]
[condition 
is false]
Desicion
Merge
Guard condition
Fork and Join Nodes: Forks and joins have the same notation: either a
horizontal or vertical synchronization bar (the orientation is dependent on
whether the control flow is running left to right or top to bottom). They in-
dicate the start and end of parallel threads of control. The join synchronizes
two inflows and produces a single outflow. The outflow from a join cannot
execute until all inflows have been received.
Concurrent
Action 1
Concurrent
Action 2
Fork
Join
Swim lanes: An activity partition is shown as either a horizontal or vertical
swim lane. In the following diagram, the partitions are used to separate ac-
tions within an activity into those performed by a seller and those performed
by a buyer.
BuyerSeller
Send
Invoice
Make 
PaymentInvoice
Figure B.1 shows an example of a UML activity diagram for an ordering process. The model
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starts with the seller who executes the activity Receive Order, and follows with the decision
fork, where the seller makes a decision to accept the order or not. In the first case, the seller
ships the order and, in parallel, sends an invoice. The buyer pays the invoice. After the order is
shipped and the payment is accepted, the seller closes the order. If the order was not accepted
at all, it is also closed, which is modelled by the merge node before the activity Close Order.
Seller Buyer
Receive
Order
Fill
Order
Ship
Order
Close
Order
Send
Invoice
Make
Payment
Accept
Payment
Invoice
[order
accepted]
Figure B.1: Example of the UML activity diagram
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Samenvatting
Het ontwerpen van controlemechanismen in netwerkorganisaties
vanuit een waardeperspectief
Tegenwoordig worden diensten steeds vaker door een netwerk van partijen aangeboden. Als een
consument bijvoorbeeld een andere ringtone voor zijn mobiele telefoon wil hebben, heeft de
consument met al snel meerdere partijen te maken. Fabrikanten van mobiele telefoons moeten
allereerst hun telefoon op zodanig manier ontwerpen dat de ringtone gemakkelijk kan wor-
den aangepast. Tenslotte zijn er aanbieders van de ringtones zelf nodig, en die aanbieders
moeten rekening houden met de (on)mogelijkheden van mobiele telefoons. Verder moeten die
aanbieders betaald worden voor iedere verkochte ringtone; de betaling verloopt vaak via de
mobieletelefonie operator.
Al deze partijen samen vormen een netwerk. Steeds meer organisaties kiezen bewust voor
deze vorm van samenwerking: de netwerkstrategie. Door in een netwerk te participeren kun-
nen netwerkorganisaties aan een complexe klantbehoefte voldoen, waaraan deze organisaties
zelfstandig nooit zouden kunnen voldoen.
De netwerkstrategie zien we veel in e-commerce en e-business toepassingen, waar informati-
etechnologie zoals het Internet en Web technologie een intrinsiek en belangrijk onderdeel vor-
men van de propositie naar de consument. Een netwerkstrategie vereist dat organisaties ken-
nis en informatie met elkaar delen en activiteiten met elkaar coordineren. Organisaties zullen
dit echter alleen doen als er voldoende onderling vertrouwen is. Dit vertrouwen is niet altijd
aanwezig. Daarom worden er vaak controlemechanismen in het netwerk ingebouwd die het
mogelijk maken opportunistisch gedrag (zoals fraude of het niet nakomen van afspraken) in
het netwerk tijdig te detecteren of zelfs dergelijk gedrag te voorkomen. In het geval van een
netwerkorganisatie spelen interorganisationele controlemechanismen een belangrijke rol. On-
der interorganisationele controlemechanismen verstaan wij de door een partij opgestelde lijst
van maatregelen met als doel het opportunistische gedrag van een tegenpartij te voorkomen, te
detecteren en/of te corrigeren.
Waarden en controle. De focus van dit proefschrift is gericht op de analyse en het ontwerp
van controlemechanismen in netwerkorganisaties, beschouwd vanuit het economisch waarde
perspectief. In netwerkorganisaties zullen partijen objecten van economische waarde met elkaar
gaan uitwisselen, zoals diensten, goederen, en geld. Deze waarde-uitwisselingen vormen een
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belangrijk aandachtspunt wanneer we opportunistisch gedrag van partijen beschouwen; im-
mers opportunistisch gedrag van organisaties zal zich juist veelal richten op deze waarde-
uitwisselingen.
In dit proefschrift ontwikkelen we een ontwerpmethodologie, de zogenaamde e3controlmethod-
ologie, die ondersteuning biedt bij het ontwerpproces van controlemechanismen. In deze method-
ologie staat het begrip economische waarde centraal. Met economische waarde bedoelen wij
de waarde (bijvoorbeeld, in geld uitgedrukt), die toegekend kan worden aan producten of dien-
sten door een partij die ze wil kopen. Controlemechanismen kunnen zelf ook als commercie¨le
diensten beschouwd worden, als deze diensten een bepaalde waarde hebben voor de partijen
in een netwerk. Men kan bijvoorbeeld een waarde toekennen aan een controlemechanisme dat
administratieve fraude kan detecteren of voorkomen. Met het toekennen van waarden kan een
oordeel worden gegeven over het effect van controlemechanismen op het businessmodel van
het netwerk.
In de e3controlmethodologie worden controlemechanismen vanuit drie perspectieven geanal-
yseerd: het economische waarde-uitwisseling perspectief, het bedrijfsprocessen perspectief
waarmee waarde-uitwisselingen gerealiseerd worden en het informatiesysteem perspectief waarmee
de waardenuitwisselingen en bedrijfsprocessen worden uitgevoerd.
Dit onderzoek is gebaseerd op twee theoretische pijlers: enerzijds de bedrijfswetenschappelijke
accounting- en controletheorie, en anderzijds de informatiekundetheorie. Controlemechanis-
men zijn uitvoerig onderzocht in de accounting- en controletheorie. Dergelijk onderzoek is
echter hoofdzakelijk beperkt tot interne bedrijfsprocessen binnen een organisatie en wordt niet
specifiek op netwerkorganisaties toegepast. De focus in de beroepspraktijk van accounting en
controle is voornamelijk gericht op het onderzoeken van bedrijfsprocessen en informatietech-
nologie binnen een organisatie. De e3controlmethodologie voegt hieraan de waardenanalyse
van interorganisationele controlemechanismen tussen bedrijven in netwerkorganisaties toe.
In de informatiekunde zijn allerlei methodes ontwikkeld voor het preciezer, formeler
beschrijven en analyseren van processen en organisaties. Zulke methodes zijn gebaseerd op
het idee van conceptueel modelleren. De informatiekunde heeft de conceptuele modellen voor
bedrijfsprocessen en informatiesystemen uitvoerig bestudeerd. Het opstellen van dergelijke
modellen om software requirements te ontwikkelen in samenspraak met betrokken partijen
wordt ook wel requirements engineering genoemd. In de accountancy worden dergelijke con-
ceptuele modellen ook wel voor het analyseren en ontwerpen van controlemechanismen ge-
bruikt.
Een specifieke methode om waarde-uitwisselingen te modelleren is e3value . Deze methode
is echter nog niet toegepast op het ontwikkelen van controlemechanismen in netwerkorgan-
isaties. In dit onderzoek ontwikkelen we een methode die juist ondersteuning biedt bij het
ontwerpen van controlemechanismen met gebruikmaking van een economische waardemodel.
De e3controlmethodologie is gebaseerd op de e3valuemethodologie met daaraan toegevoegd
speciale modelleringsconcepten voor het modelleren van controlemechanismen.
De e3controlmethodologie. De e3controlmethodologie bestaat uit drie onderdelen. In dit
proefschrift worden de drie onderdelen beschreven, namelijk:
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1. Een raamwerk dat aangeeft hoe een netwerkorganisatie geanalyseerd kan worden met
betrekking tot het ontwerpen van interorganisationele controlemechanismen;
2. Een ontologie die een kader aanreikt voor het ontwerp en analyse;
3. Een verzameling patronen van controleproblemen en -oplossingen, die als bouwstenen
gebruikt kunnen worden in het ontwerpproces van controlemechanismen.
1. Het raamwerk. Het e3control raamwerk beschrijft het ontwerpproces om tot controle-
mechanismen te komen in drie stappen. De eerste stap behelst de beschrijving van een ideale
situatie waarin wordt verondersteld dat alle partijen in het netwerk de regels van het netwerk
volgen. De tweede stap identificeert mogelijke controleproblemen, dat wil zeggen situaties
die kunnen ontstaan als sommige partijen in het netwerk misbruik maken van andere partijen
en handelen zoals beschreven in de ideale organisatie, en representeert deze sub-ideale toe-
stand in een sub-ideaal waardemodel. De derde stap ontwerpt controlemechanismen die de
controleproblemen zoals gevonden in stap 2 kunnen verminderen of zelfs wegnemen.
2. Het waardemodel: de ontologie. Het ideale waardemodel wordt middels een e3value
model beschreven. De e3control benadering voegt concepten toe om ook een sub-ideaal waarde-
model te kunnen beschrijven. Deze uitbreiding noemen we de e3control ontologie. De e3control
ontologie is afgeleid van de e3value ontologie en bevat voor een deel dezelfde concepten zoals
actor, waardeobject, waardenuitwisseling en dependencypad.
Een actor vertegenwoordigt een organisatie (of bedrijf) in het netwerk. Waardeobjecten om-
vatten goederen en diensten die de bedrijven met elkaar uitwisselen. Waardeobjecten zijn ook
de financie¨le vergoedingen die de bedrijven betalen voor de uit te wisselen goederen en/of di-
ensten. Met dependencypaden worden de verschillende afhankelijkheden tussen de waardeob-
jecten gemodelleerd.
De belangrijkste toevoeging van de e3control ontologie ten opzichte van e3value is het onder-
scheid tussen ideale en sub-ideale situaties. In ideale situaties is er sprake van actoren, die zich
volgens de regel van het netwerk gedragen, die de ideale objecten van waarden uitwisselen en
bovendien een ideaal dependencypad volgen. In sub-ideale situaties gedragen de actoren zich
niet zoals is voorgeschreven. Er is dan sprake van sub-ideale waardenuitwisselingen en sub-
ideale dependencypaden. Een andere toevoeging is het boete concept, waarmee het sub-ideale
gedrag wordt toegerekend aan een specifieke actor in het netwerk.
3. Controle patronen. Het derde deel van de e3controlmethode bestaat uit e3control patro-
nen. Patronen zijn beschrijvingen van controlemechanismen die nuttig kunnen zijn in netwerken.
De beschrijving is voor het grootste deel afkomstig uit de accounting en controle literatuur, maar
is aangepast voor netwerkorganisaties. Sommige patronen zijn afkomstig uit case studies die
tijdens dit onderzoek zijn uitgevoerd. Enkele voorbeeldpatronen zijn het vooraf controleren
van de betrouwbaarheid en geschiktheid van een tegenpartij, en het geven van een beloning die
voorkomt dat een tegenpartij zich onbetrouwbaar gedraagt.
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Hoewel de primaire focus van dit proefschrift gericht is op het modelleren van controles met
waardenmodellen, was het voor de patronen ook noodzakelijk de gerelateerde bedrijfsprocessen
te beschrijven. Dat was vooral nodig omdat waardemodellen niet de volgordelijkheid van
waardeuitwisselingen beschrijven, en deze volgordelijkheid soms wel van belang is voor het
begrip van de controlemechanismen.
Hoewel het modelleren van de processen noodzakelijk is, is veel informatie over controlemech-
anismen al wel af te leiden uit de waardenmodellering. Denk daarbij aan controlemechanismen
zoals de uitwisseling van eigendomsrechten, de uitwisseling van bewijsdocumenten en vooral
het toekennen van effectieve boetes en beloningen bij het analyseren van de waardendistributie
in het netwerk. Toch is de relatie tussen bedrijfsprocessen en waardemodellen een onderwerp
dat nog nader onderzocht moet worden.
Case studies. De bruikbaarheid van de e3controlmethodologie is onderzocht in vier case
studies op het gebied van regelgeving in de digitale muziek, gezondheidszorg, elektriciteit en
internationale handel. In alle case studies hebben wij concrete controle problemen geanaly-
seerd en controlemechanismen daarvoor ontwikkeld. Hierbij beschrijven we de case studies in
het kort.
Internet radio De Internet radio case is gericht op het correct verdelen van geinde vergoedin-
gen voor het uitzenden van muziek via het Internet. Voor het uitzenden van muziek is
een radio-omroep verplicht de makers van muziek een vergoeding te betalen. Er zijn op
het moment van schrijven geen betrouwbare procedures om precies te bepalen hoeveel
mensen naar een muziekstuk hebben geluisterd en hoeveel keer het nummer is uitgezon-
den. Hierdoor is het niet mogelijk om de makers van de muziek exact te betalen waar ze
recht op hebben. In deze case studie hebben wij controleprocedures ontwikkeld die, door
middel van moderne technologie (zoals digitale versleuteling), het mogelijk maken om
op een betrouwbare manier de muziekrechten in kaart te brengen en hiermee uiteindelijk
de juiste vergoedingen te bepalen.
De Nederlandse gezondheidszorg In deze case hebben wij het complexe proces van publieke
gezondheidszorgverzekering in Nederland bestudeerd. In het bijzonder hebben we de
‘Algemene Wet Bijzondere Ziektekosten’ (AWBZ) onderzocht. Het huidige gezondhei-
dsverzekeringsysteem bevat vele processen die niet optimaal functioneren. Bijvoorbeeld:
ouderen en chronisch zieke mensen krijgen weinig informatie over mogelijkheden om
alternatieve zorg (zoals verzorging door een familielid) in te schakelen en daarvoor een
vergoeding te ontvangen. We hebben onderzocht in hoeverre de e3controlmethodologie
in staat was deze inefficie¨nties (in een sector die niet op winst is georie¨nteerd) in kaart
te brengen en te beschrijven. In de casestudie hebben wij een voorstel gemaakt om de
bestaande problemen op te lossen.
Duurzame energie In deze case studie hebben we onderzoek gedaan naar de ontwikkeling
van een beloning- en boetesysteem voor het stimuleren van de productie in duurzame
energie, zoals windenergie en zonne-energie voor de energiesector. In deze casestudie
is specifiek gekeken naar de wet ‘Duurzame Verplichting’ die in Engeland van kracht
is. Deze wet verplicht elektriciteitsleveranciers om een bepaald percentage (bijv. 10%)
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van de te leveren elektriciteit te laten bestaan uit duurzame elektriciteit. Leveranciers
van duurzame energie (bijvoorbeeld beheerders van een windmolenpark) kunnen zoge-
naamde ‘Duurzame Verplichting Certificaten’ geven aan elektriciteitsleveranciers. De
elektriciteitsleveranciers gebruiken deze certificaten om hun verplichte duurzame bij-
drage te kunnen verantwoorden aan de overheid. Door een gebrek aan duurzame en-
ergiebronnen stijgt de prijs van een certificaat, met als gevolg dat de energiemarkt wordt
gestimuleerd om nieuwe duurzame productie-installaties te bouwen. In deze case hebben
wij controlepatronen gebruikt om bestaande en nieuwe controlemechanismen voor het
uitwisselen van certificaten te ontwikkelen, te controleren en te optimaliseren.
Export van bier In deze case is onderzoek gedaan naar de accijnsprocedure binnen de Eu-
ropese Unie. Als een accijnsgoed, zoals bier, verkocht wordt in het land waar het gepro-
duceerd is, dan moet de producent daarover accijns betalen aan de belastingdienst. Als
het bier echter in een ander land wordt verkocht dan waar het geproduceerd is, dan hoeft
de producent geen accijns te betalen. In dit geval betaalt de koper in het land van invoer
de accijnskosten. Het innen van de accijns is een complex systeem en heeft veel zwakke
plekken, waardoor fraude mogelijk is. Door middel van het toepassen van de e3control
methodologie op de bestaande situatie, hebben wij onderzocht hoe dit systeem kon wor-
den verbeterd. Tevens hebben wij gekeken naar de vraag hoe de papieren documenten, die
nu worden gebruikt voor fraude preventie, konden worden vervangen door elektronische
gegevensuitwisseling om de fraudegevoeligheid te beperken.
Conclusie. Dit onderzoek heeft aangetoond dat het mogelijk is om controleproblemen en con-
trolemechanismen te analyseren door middel van waardenmodellen. Hoewel het niet met zek-
erheid te stellen is dat de beschreven controlemechanismen (zoals ze in de controlepatronen
staan) voor de in dit proefschrift onderzochte industriee¨n volledig zijn, hebben de case studies
wel aangetoond dat de controlepatronen gebruikt kunnen worden om een uitgebreide verzamel-
ing van controle aspecten te beschrijven. Op basis van de uitkomsten van de case studies zijn
we tot de conclusie gekomen dat de e3controlmethodologie, en in het bijzonder de controlepa-
tronen daarin, bruikbaar is voor het analyseren en ontwerpen van controlemechanismen voor
netwerkorganisaties.
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